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Preface  
There was a long path traversed from the various conceptions, being naive and 
illusory, regarding the compulsory judicial settlement of interstate disputes to the creation of 
the first permanent international judicial forum of a universal character, i.e. the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. Its Statute, by the provisions of the optional clause, finally 
introduced a system, up till then unknown, of partial obligatory international adjudication 
based on the full observance of the voluntary acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction.  
That system consists of a network of unilateral declarations in which states assume an 
obligation, in addition to those specified by the Court’s Statute, to the effect that they oblige 
themselves to submit their disputes with other states—also having made such declarations—
to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and since 1946 to the 
International Court of Justice. 
This system, since its establishment, has been the subject of controversies especially 
because it could not fulfill the expectations regarding a worldwide system of obligatory 
international adjudication. Nevertheless, it has great merits and it has contributed to the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes. 
The book offers a wide–ranging survey of the development of the optional clause 
system, the theoretical and procedural aspects of unilateral declarations of acceptance, the 
different reservations added to these declarations, and it seeks to find solutions to the 
improvement of the system. 
The author wishes to express its gratitude to Professor András Bragyova, who was 
kind enough to read the first draft of the book; special thanks must also go to Frank Orton, 
former Swedish judge and ombudsman for his encourangement and support. Sincere thanks 
are due to Judit Elek, head of the Library of the Centre for Social Sciences (Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences) who helped in collecting the respecting literature, and to Anthony 
 9 
Vago for checking the manuscript’s English. Finally, immense gratitute goes to Edward Elgar 
Publishing Lt. for publishing the book and Mr Ms   ……. for their very helpful and 
constructive approach. 
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1. Chapter A short history of the arbitral settlement of 
interstate disputes until the establishment of the PCIJ 
<a>I<em>OVERVIEW OF THE ARBITRAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERSTATE 
DISPUTES BEFORE THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 
Time and again in the centuries-old history of interstate relations there have emerged ideas 
arguing that states have to submit their disputes for third party settlement, especially to 
adjudication as an alternative to war. Such conceptions can be traced to old legends, 
according to which disputes between states or sovereigns were settled by arbitration. The 
records that have come down to us suggest that in more than one case bitter disputes were 
submitted to arbitration and the majority of arbitral awards were executed by the parties. In 
other words, it seems that recourse to arbitration was for centuries a rare but successful means 
of settling interstate disputes. 
Arbitration between ancient Greeks was rather widespread. Relying on cases treated by 
various authors, Taube estimates that over five hundred years, from the seventh to the middle 
of the second century B.C., the number of cases settled by arbitration between the city-states 
(polis) ran to about 110.
1
 Some sort of arbitration was practised in theory by the Senate 
between allies (socii) in the Roman Empire, but one cannot speak of genuine arbitration at the 
time of the Roman Empire as Rome sought to have even the institution of arbitration serve its 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Michel de Taube, ‘Les origines de l’arbitrage international antiquité et moyen 
age’ in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 1932 (Recueil Sirey 
1933) tome 42, IV, 14.  
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own expansionist aspirations.
2
 As Nicolas Politis rightly points out ‘Rome considered itself as 
the arbitrator of the world, accepted to be judge, but not to be justiciable’.3 
In the Middle Ages, the arbitral settlement of disputes between souvereigns was 
relatively frequently used and serving as sole arbitrators were, besides the Pope, sovereigns, 
kings, emperors and, not infrequently, certain institutions, law professors and lawyers acting 
on their behalf.  
By the 18th century, arbitration had practically disappeared from interstate relations, a 
fact which seems to be strange and incomprehensible, especially because the retreat of 
arbitration was witnessed precisely in the decades subsequent to the Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia, even though the foundation of contemporary international law was, in point of 
fact, laid by that Treaty. 
The idea of international arbitration was throughout centuries closely linked to different 
– rather illusory – projects of federation between states of the ‘civilized’ world, often with 
plans for ‘perpetual peace’ related thereto.4 Among the various projects for ‘perpetual peace’ 
                                                 
2
 On arbitration in the Graeco-Roman word see id., 24–56. 
3
 ‘… se considérant comme arbitre du monde, elle acceptait d’être juge, non justiciable’. Nicolas Politis, La 
Justice Internationale (2nd edn, Librairie Hachette, 1924), 27.  
4
 Such a conception was formulated in Pierre Dubois’s work, ‘De recuperatione Terrae 
Sanctae’, probably of 1306, in the proposal of King George of Pogebrady of Bohemia and his 
advisor (the humanist, Antonio Marini from Geneva) concerning the alliance of Christian 
States in the second part of the 15th century, and in the perceptions of King Henry IV of 
France and presumably his Minister Sully about a federation of European States. For more 
detail, see, Ernst Reibstein, Völkerrecht, eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis 
(Karl Alber, 1958); and Jacob Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen
 
Organisation in 
seiner Entwicklung (Martinus Nijhoff 1917) Vol. I, 99–339. One could also mention Émeric 
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and the related plans for a federation of European states, the greatest influence was 
undoubtedly exerted by Abbe Saint-Pierre’s work, ‘Projet pour rendre paix perpétuelle’ 
(1713).
5
 The influence of Saint-Pierre’s plan was enormous both in his own time and 
afterwards.
6
 One should also mention the famous perpetual peace project of the great 
philosopher Immanuel Kant.
7
  
                                                                                                                                                        
Crucé from the 17th century whose work remained practically unknown to later centuries. 
Émeric Crucé proposed the establishment of a permanent congress composed of 
representatives from all sovereigns, regulating the differences between them. However, the 
gravest questions touching sovereignty and independence should be settled by arbitration. 
According to Crucé, once arbitration was admitted to these disputes, it could not be rejected 
for disputes of lesser importance. See Émeric Crusé, Le nouveau Cynée (Réimpression du 
texte original de 1623 avec introduction et traduction anglaise par Thomas Willing Balch, 
Lane and Scott 1909).  
5
 Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre paix perpétuelle (Publisher Chez Antoine Schouten, 
Marchand Libraire MDCCXIII) (Open Librarie). 
6
 Cf. Ter Meulen (1932), 180–221. Thus, for example, both Rousseau and Leibnitz dealt 
extensively with Saint-Pierre’s work. See also Jean-Jaques Rousseau, A project for perpetual 
peace (Thomas Nugent (tr.) M. Cooper 1761). Rousseau’s abridgement of Sant-Pierre’s work; 
and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, Observations sur le Projet de paix perpétuelle de l'abbé de 
Saint-Pierre, précédées de la lettre de Leibniz à l’abbé de Saint-Pierre du 7 février 1715. 
(Presses universitaires de Caen 1993). 
7
 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), (translated with introduction and notes by 
Marie Campbell Smith, M.A.; Preface by Professor Latta. (1st edn), George Allen  Unwin Ltd., The 
MacMillan Company, 1903) 218. Kant’s essay on Perpetual peace takes the form of an international treaty, with 
the author’s comments and an Appendix two Annexes.  
 18 
In connection with the peace plans of the 17th and 18th centuries, the French author 
Michel Revon is right in noting that all these plans share the imperfection of being vague, 
utopian and having no practical meaning.
8
  
A much more realistic view than those of the aforementioned authors is struck by such 
classics of international law as Grotius and Vattel. By citing historical examples, according to 
Grotius, wars could be evaded by arbitral decision as well.
9
  
Vattel writes that, ‘When sovereigns cannot agree about their pretensions and are 
nevertheless desirous of preserving or restoring peace, they sometimes submit the decision of 
their disputes to arbitrators chosen by common agreement.’10 He emphasises that, ‘Arbitration 
                                                 
8
 Michel Revon, L’arbitrage international: Son passé. – Son présent. – Son avenir (Librairie nouvelle de droit et 
de jurisprudence 1892) 144.  
9
 Grotius writes:  
<quotation>The office of deciding wars and putting an end to the contentions of armies was assigned, according 
to Starbo, to the Druids of the Gauls, and upon the testimony of the same writer, it formed a part of the priestly 
functions among the Iberians. 
Surely then it is a mode of terminating their disputes, balancing their powers, and settling their presentations 
worthy to be adopted by Christian Kings and States. For if, in order to avoid trials before judges who were 
strangers to the true religion, the Jews and Christians appointed arbitrators of their own, and it was a practice 
recommended and enjoined by St. Paul, who much more sought such a practice to be recommended and enforced, 
to gain the still nobler end of preventing the calamities of war. 
These and many other reasons of no less importance might be advanced for recommending to Christian powers 
general congresses for the adjustment of their various interests, and for compelling the refractory to submit to 
equitable terms of peace.</quotation>  
Hugo Grotius (Hugo de Groot), On the Law of War and Peace (Tr. from the original latin De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
and slightly abridged by A.C. Cambell, A.M., Batoche Books 2011) 235. 
10
 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (Tr. from the French by Joseph 
Chitty, Esq. Based on the 1797 edition, republished by T.&J.W. Johnson 1853) Book II, § 329. 
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is a very reasonable mode, and one that is perfectly comfortable to the law of nature, for the 
decision of every dispute which does not directly interest the safety of the nation.’11  
The great English author, jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham in his essay, ‘A Plan 
for an Universal and Perpetual Peace’, points very rightly to the advantages of third party 
settlement by saying that ‘Establish a common tribunal, the necessity for war no longer 
follows from difference of opinion. Just or unjust, the decision of the arbiters will save the 
credit, the honour of the contending party.’12  
The idea to settle interstate disputes by adjudication was markedly present in the works 
of writers of the second half of the 19th century, owing not least to the fact that arbitral 
settlement of disputes between states had become rather frequent during that century and in 
the last two decades of the century more arbitral awards were rendered than those put together 
in the first part of the century.
13
 The modern area of arbitration dates back to the Jay’s Treaty 
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 Jeremy Bentham. ‘The Principles of International Law’ Essay 4, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham (published 
under the superintendence of his executor, John Bowring, vol. II. William Tait, Simpkin, Marshall  Co., 
MDCCCXLIII), 552. 
13
 The following figures can be mentioned in support of this statement. The number of 
arbitral awards was 
  <list>1 between 1801 and 1810 
about 17 between 1811 and 1820 
about  5 between 1821 and 1830 
about  7 between 1831 and 1840 
about  7 between 1841 and 1850 
about 23 between 1851 and 1860 
about 25 between 1861 and 1870 
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of 1794,
14
 and later on to the Alabama Arbitration in 1871–72, a successful settlement of a 
harsh dispute between the United States of America and the United Kingdom arising from the 
American Civil War.
15
 
During the 19th century, there were numerous plans for establishing international 
tribunals and some authors were arguing not only for such forums but for the introduction of a 
general obligation of states to recourse to arbitration for the settlement of certain disputes. The 
most notable among them were plans of Dudley Field (American lawyer and member of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
about 28 between 1871 and 1880 
about 46 between 1881 and 1890 
about 61 between 1891 and 1900</list> 
Cf. A.M. Stuyt, Survey of International Arbitrations 1794–1970. (Sijthoff, Oceana 1972) 6–237. 
14
 After the Treaty of Paris (1783), which ended the American War of Independence, the relations between the 
United States and Great Britain deteriorated. On 19 November 1794, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and 
Navigation (Jay’s Treaty) was signed, which among other things, provided for the establishment of three mixed 
claims commissions for dispute settlement. The first arbitral commission dealt with the delimitation of which 
river was under the name of St. Croix mentioned in the Treaty of Paris. The second commission’s task was to 
deal with claims with respect to debts owed by American citizens (or residents) to British creditors contracted 
before the peace. The third commission had to settle the claims of American citizens against Great Britain 
regarding the illegal seisure of ships and cargos. The mixed commissions consisted of an equal number of 
members (two or four) appointed by each of the two states, plus an unpair choosed by them or drawn by lot. The 
mixed commissions decided many claims to the satisfaction of the parties.  
15
 The Alabama Claims were a series of claims for damages by the United States against Great Britain for the 
assistance given to the Confederation during the American Civil War and especially for the violation of 
neutrality by allowing the construction in Britain of the warship Alabama which caused significant damage to 
the US Navy and merchant marine. The arbitration tribunal, composed of five arbitrators, decided the case on 14 
September 1972.  
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US Congress),
16
 the Moscow professor Kamarowsky,
17
 and Mérignhac from France, who 
developed similar principles which were adopted later at the First Hague Peace Conference.
18
 
Also concerned with projects of a permanent international court of arbitration were the 
Universal Peace Congresses, the Interparliamentary Union, the Institut de Droit International 
and the International Law Association.
19
 
A rather clear and – one might safely say – still valid statement about international 
arbitration during the 1880s was made by the Russian Professor Friedrich Fromhold 
Martens
20
 to the effect that, regarding the future of international arbitration, it was necessary 
to distinguish hopes and realities and international arbitration was not the way to go in all 
international disputes in which the political element was paramount.
21
 In the author's view, 
international arbitration is a viable path in the case of less significant disputes, particularly 
concerning questions of a legal nature and in cases where the rights of the parties can be 
clearly identified.
22
 
<a>II<em>THE RESULTS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 
The establishment of an arbitral tribunal were discussed in detail at the First Hague Peace 
Conference in 1899, convened at the initiative of the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, with the 
                                                 
16
 Cf. David Dudley Field, Project d’un Code International: Proposé aux diplomates, aux hommes d’État, et aux 
jurisconsultes du droit international (Albéric Rolin tr., Pédone-Lauriel, Adolphe Hoste 1881) 880.  
17
 Cf. Leonide Kamarowsky, Le tribunal international (Serge de Westman (tr.), G. Pedone-Lauriel 1887). 
18
 According to Mérignhac, one day there will be a permanent international forum whose decisions will 
sanctioned by international forces. 
Cf. Alexandre Mérignhac, Traité théorique et pratique de l’arbitrage international (L. Larose Éditeur 1895) 516.  
19
 Cf. Dr Hans Wehberg, The Problem of an International Court of Justice (The Clarendon Press 1918) 132–40. 
20
 Later on F.F. Martens was one of the leading figures of the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907. 
21
 Cf. F. de Martens, Traité de droit international (Alfred Léo (tr.), Librairie Marescq Ainé 1887) vol. 3, 154–5. 
22
 Id. 155. 
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purpose of elaborating on proposals for the reduction of armaments and discussing peace with 
the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations. 
At the First Hague Peace Conference, several proposals regarding arbitration and 
methods of pacific settlement of interstate disputes were presented,
23
 and the majority of 
delegates agreed that the settlement of disputes by international arbitration was important and 
desirable, but the debate was rather sharp about the arbitral tribunal to be established and 
mainly about whether states were under obligation to submit their disputes to that forum. 
During the negotiations, concrete proposals on obligatory arbitration were formulated in 
certain cases,
24
 provided that neither the vital interests nor the national honour of states were 
affected. Recourse to arbitration in other matters was to be subject exclusively to the 
discretion of states, and the parties’ consent to such recourse was to be required in each 
case.
25
 
                                                 
23
 Draft proposals were submitted by Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the United States. Those 
drafts drew heavily upon the customary law on arbitration that was available at the end of the 
19th century, as well as upon the drafts prepared by the Institut de droit international (see 
Resolution of the Institut de droit international adopted at the Session of 1875 at The Hague 
termed, ‘Projet de réglement pour la procédure arbitrale international’) and the 
Interparliamentary Union. The starting point for the negotiations was furnished by the Russian 
and British drafts, which were debated in a so-called special Committee of Examination.  
The documents produced by the Russian, British, American and Italian delegations, see The Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration. Reports and Documents. (Compiled and edited by 
Shabtai Rosenne, T.M.C. Asser Press 2001) 89–113. 
24
 It was the Russian proposal that went furthest towards the introduction of obligatory arbitration.  
25
 According to the Russian draft, subject to obligatory arbitration would be all legal matters which, arising in 
disputes between states, did not affect the vital interests and the national honour of states. The Russian draft 
specified two classes of international disputes subject to obligatory arbitration, notably pecuniary claims to 
 23 
The negotiations produced a draft proposing the introduction of compulsory 
international arbitration in a number of cases.
26
 
                                                                                                                                                        
recover for unlawful injuries on the one hand and, on the other, the interpretation or application of certain non-
political conventions, chiefly treaties known as ‘universal unions’ like the one exemplified by the Treaty of 1874 
on the Universal Postal Union, which in Art. 16 provides obligatory arbitration for the solution of all differences 
concerning the interpretation or application of that treaty. Cf. Rosenne (2001) 47. 
26
 Under the terms of the draft,  
<quotation>Arbitration is obligatory between the high contracting Powers in the following 
cases, so far as they do not concern the vital interest or national honour of the States in 
controversy: 
 <list>I. In case of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
conventions enumerated herein: 
 <nl>(1) Postal, telephone, and telegraphic conventions. 
 (2) Conventions concerning the protection of submarine cables. 
 (3) Conventions concerning railroads. 
 (4) Conventions and regulations concerning means of preventing collisions of vessels 
at sea. 
 (5) Conventions concerning the protection of literary and artistic works. 
 (6) Conventions concerning the protection of industrial property (patents, trade-marks, 
and trade-names). 
 (7) Conventions concerning the system of weights and measures. 
 (8) Conventions concerning reciprocal free assistance to the indigent sick. 
 (9) Sanitary conventions, conventions concerning epizooty, phylloxera and other 
similar scourges. 
 (10) Conventions concerning civil procedure. 
 (11) Extradition conventions. 
 24 
The draft appeared to be acceptable to the majority of delegates, but upon the second 
reading the German delegate came out against the adoption of the text, as in the German 
Government’s view the experience to-day was not sufficient to support the introduction of 
compulsory arbitration in connection with the conventions enumerated in the draft. According 
to the German delegation, ‘a too rapid introduction of obligatory arbitration into international 
law might present more dangers than advantages from the point of view of peace among 
nations.’27 Thereupon the Russian delegate submitted another draft proposing the introduction 
of compulsory adjudication in a still smaller number of questions. However, the delegates 
were still unable to reach an agreement and in place of enumerating various conventions, they 
adopted an article containing a twofold provision. The first refers to treaties which already 
provide a resort to arbitration, the second one is a declaration reserving the right to conclude 
new agreements extending obligatory arbitration to cases which they deem possible of 
submission thereto.
28
 
The result of the negotiations was a text which later on appeared as Articles 15–19 in 
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. That was a compromised 
text, reflecting the principle of voluntary arbitration, postulating that each State decides in its 
sovereign capacity whether a dispute should be submitted to arbitration or not. However, in 
Article 19 there was a reference to treaties stipulating obligatory arbitration, providing that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 (12) Conventions for delimiting boundaries so far as they touch upon purely technical 
and non-political questions.</nl> 
II. In case of disputes concerning pecuniary claims arising for damages when the principle of indemnity is 
recognized by the Parties.</list></quotation>  
27
 Report to the Conference from the Third Commission on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. See 
Rosenne (2001) 48. 
28
 Id. 48. 
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contracting parties may conclude new agreements with a view to extending arbitration to 
other cases they consider suitable for arbitration. 
At the First Hague Peace Conference, regarding the establishment of an arbitral 
tribunal, the outcome was also a compromised solution, although a permanent machinery was 
adopted and an agreement was reached on the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.
29
 What was not a real court but a list of jurists, designated up to four judges by 
each contracting party to the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, from among whom, in concrete disputes, the members of each arbitral tribunal 
might be chosen. Nevertheless, one can say that with the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, international tribunals have become a constant institution of 
international law, and the judicial settlement of international disputes is no longer a sporadic 
phenomenon in interstate relations. Thus, one can agree with Hershey that ‘its importance lay 
rather in what it held out by way of promise for the future than of actual achievement’.30  
At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, the question of obligatory arbitration 
and the conclusion of a convention on that subject were lengthily discussed. Several proposals 
were submitted by delegates with respect to the class of disputes to be subject to obligatory 
arbitration and regarding the revision of the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes in this respect.
31
 The Conference nevertheless reached no agreement on 
matters that were to be subject to obligatory arbitration without reserve nor the creation of a 
permanent tribunal, finally very few amendments were adopted to the provisions on 
                                                 
29
 On the Permanent Court of Arbitration and on cases decided by it see, James Brown Scott (ed.) The Hague 
Court Reports (OUP 1916) cxi, 664. 
30
 Amos S. Hershey, ‘Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences’ (1908), 2, AJIL, 29, 
30.  
31
 See Report to the Conference from the First Commission on the Revision of the Convention of 1899 for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. See Rosenne (2001) 223–399. 
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international arbitration of the 1899 Convention.
32
 Among others, as a result of the Second 
Peace Conference, one can refer to a declaration concerning obligatory arbitration in which, it 
was stated that: 
<quotation>while reserving to each of the Powers represented full liberty of action as 
regards voting, enables them to affirm the principles which they regard as 
unanimously admitted: It is unanimous: 
1. In admitting the principle of obligatory arbitration. 
2. In declaring that certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of international agreements, may be submitted to 
compulsory arbitration without any restriction.</quotation>  
Rather interesting is that the document goes on by saying that the Conference was ‘… 
unanimous in proclaiming that, although it has not yet been found feasible to conclude a 
Convention in this sense, nevertheless the divergences of opinion which have come to light 
have not exceeded the bounds of judicial controversy…’33 
The negotiations at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 about obligatory 
arbitration and about various categories of disputes to be subject thereto showed that the states 
agreed only in principle with obligatory arbitration in so far as it involved no concrete 
commitment and they were reluctant to assume any further concrete obligation already 
accepted at the First Peace Conference in 1899. 
                                                 
32
 The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes prepared in 1899 was 
amended and enlarged, especially with regards to the Commissions of Inquiry, and a new 
chapter was added for facilitating appeal to arbitration by summary procedure.  
On the amendments regarding arbitration see  Table 1.1 below. 
33
 Final Act of the Second International Peace Conference, 1907. See Rosenne (2001), 411. 
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Notwithstanding, one could say that the Second Hague Peace Conference was a 
success and in the final analysis, an important step towards the introduction of general 
international arbitration had been made. Most experts were of the opinion that it was possible 
for the general introduction of obligatory arbitration to be achieved only gradually and that 
the peace conferences had made a considerable step to reaching that goal.
34
 
 
Table 1.1 Relevant provisions of the two Hague conventions for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes 
 
Convention of 29 July 1899 
 
Title IV. International Arbitration 
 
Chapter I. The System of Arbitration 
 
Art. 15 
 ‘ International Arbitration has for its object 
the settlement of differences between 
States by judges of their own choice, 
and on the basis of respect for law.’ 
 
Art. 16 
 ‘In questions of a legal nature, and 
especially in the interpretation or 
application of International 
Conventions, arbitration is recognized 
by the Signatory Powers as the most 
effective, and at the same time, the 
Convention of 18 October 1907 
 
Part IV. International Arbitration 
 
Chapter I. The System of Arbitration 
 
Art. 37 
 ‘International arbitration has for its object 
the settlement of disputes between 
States by Judges of their own choice 
and on the basis of respect for law. 
 Recourse to arbitration implies an 
engagement to submit in good faith to 
the Award.’ 
 
Art. 38 
 ‘In questions of a legal nature, and 
especially in the interpretation or 
application of International 
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 While discussing the development of international arbitration and the judicial settlement of international 
disputes one should mention also the Central American Court of Justice, established by five Central American 
states (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
 
) which functioned between 1907 and 1917. 
The Court had jurisdiction not only for interstate disputes, but over certain cases of international character 
between a government and an individual who was a national of another state. During its existence of ten years, 
ten cases came before the Court, of which five cases were brought by individuals. According to many authors it 
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Manley O. Hudson, ’The Central American Court of Justice’ (1932) 26, AJIL, 759, 785. 
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most equitable, means of settling 
disputes which diplomacy has failed to 
settle.’ 
 
Art. 17 
 ‘The Arbitration Convention is concluded 
for questions already existing or for 
questions which may arise eventually. 
 It may embrace any dispute or only disputes 
of a certain category.’ 
 
Art. 18  
 ‘The Arbitration Convention implies the 
engagement to submit loyally to the 
Award.’ 
 
Art. 19 
 ‘Independently of general or private Treaties 
expressly stipulating recourse to 
arbitration as obligatory on the 
Signatory Powers, these Powers 
reserve to themselves the right of 
concluding, either before the 
ratification of the present Act or later, 
new Agreements, general or private, 
with a view to extending obligatory 
arbitration to all cases which they may 
consider it possible to submit to it.’ 
Conventions, arbitration is recognized 
by the Contracting Powers as the most 
effective, and, at the same time, the 
most equitable means of settling 
disputes which diplomacy has failed to 
settle. 
 Consequently, it would be desirable that, in 
disputes about the above-mentioned 
questions, the Contracting Powers 
should, if the case arose, have recourse 
to arbitration, in so far as 
circumstances permit.’ 
 
Art. 39 
 ‘The Arbitration Convention is concluded 
for questions already existing or for 
questions which may arise eventually. 
 It may embrace any dispute or only disputes 
of a certain category.’ 
 
Art. 40 
 ‘Independently of general or private Treaties 
expressly stipulating recourse to 
arbitration as obligatory on the 
Contracting Powers, the said Powers 
reserve to themselves the right of 
concluding new Agreements, general 
or particular, with a view to extending 
obligatory arbitration to all cases which 
they may consider possible to submit to 
it.’ 
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Chapter 2 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE AND ITS 
CONCEPTION 
 
I  Drafting the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
 
Even before the end of World War I, negotiations between states started on the post 
war political landscape, and it was already decided in those days to set up an international 
organization. The different conceptions included the idea that there should be an international 
court of justice created to decide interstate disputes within the framework of the international 
organization that was to be established. The related plans of more detail had not yet been 
drawn up, and the first proposals submitted to the Paris Peace Conference touched marginally 
on the question of an international court, generally in connection with the pacific settlement of 
disputes.  
So far as we know, the establishment of a permanent “judicial body” was first brought 
up in the British draft of 20 January 1919, but no concrete proposal concerning the court to be 
set up was contained in that document either.
35
 The resolution adopted at the 25 January 1919 
plenary session of the Preliminary Peace Conference, approving the principle of the League of 
Nations made no reference to a court, but decided to establish, for the study of the constitution 
of the League of Nations, a Commission to be composed of fifteen members, with the five 
great powers (British Empire,  France, Italy, Japan and United States of America) respectively 
                                                 
35
 Cf. Chapter II. of the British Draft Convention. For this document, see David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of 
the Covenant ( G. P. Putman’s Sons  1928) vol. II 106-116 
 30 
represented by two members each and five members elected to represent all the powers with 
special interest.
36
  
The Commission on the League of Nations started to work on 3 February 1919, and 
had before it three drafts – an American, a French and an Italian – relative to the future 
organization.
37
 The Commission decided to take the so-called Hurst-Miller Draft, presented 
by President Wilson of the United States, as the basis for its deliberations. Art. 12, of that 
document provided that the Executive Council of the future organization was to formulate 
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. Under the Hurst-
Miller Draft, the Court “will be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties 
recognise as suitable for submission to it for arbitration…”. In accordance with the 
aforementioned proposal, a drafting committee worded the articles of the League of Nations 
Covenant relating to the future international court and submitted it to the Preliminary Peace 
Conference.
38
 During the consultations on the Commission’s draft, several amendments were 
proposed until finally on 28 April 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference adopted the text 
which was to form Arts. 13 and 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
39
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 For the resolution, see Minutes (English) of the Commission on the League of Nations. Id. 229.  The elected 
members were from Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal and Serbia.   
37
 For the drafts, see Miller (1928) 231-255 
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 On the elaboration of the Covenant’s provisions relating to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, see Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 
1920-1942 (Arno Press 1972) 93-112.  and Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante y Sirvén, La 
Cour Permanente de Justice International (Paul Goulé tr, Librairie Recueil Sirey 1925) 80-95 
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 It may be of interest to note that on 9 May 1919 the German delegation put forward a 
counter-proposal dealing with, inter alia, the international court to be established. That 
delegation, which on previous occasions, including the Hague Peace Conferences, had come 
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These Arts. read as follows: 
Art. 13 
“1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall arise between them 
which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and 
which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter 
to arbitration or judicial settlement. 
 
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international 
obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are 
declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration or 
judicial settlement. 
 
3. For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case is referred shall be 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, established in accordance with Article XIV, or 
any tribunal agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing 
between them.   
                                                                                                                                                        
out against the introduction of obligatory international adjudication, but now suggested that 
the court should be invested with compulsory jurisdiction over disputes of legal nature and 
should also have jurisdiction over complaints of private persons in certain cases. That motion 
was not discussed in more detail, and Germany was told that its proposal would be submitted 
to the Council of the League of Nations for fuller consideration when preparing the draft 
relating to the establishment of the court. The case also happened with the Austrian counter-
proposals of 23 June 1919 relating to, inter alia, Arts. 12, 13 and 14 of the Covenant.   
For the German Draft see Miller (1928) 744-761  
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4. The Members of that League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or 
decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the 
League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or 
decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.”  
 
Art. 14 
“1. The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption, plans 
for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be 
competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties 
thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or 
question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.” 
 
A closer scrutiny of the quoted provisions basically admits two conclusions. On the 
one hand, after World War I the majority of states agreed on the need to set up an 
international court of justice—that was the Permanent Court of International Justice—and to 
take effective measures in pursuance of that goal.
40
 On the other hand, states, have never 
really held such clearly enunciated views on the Court’s jurisdiction and—although the 
Covenant lent itself to various interpretations with respect to the jurisdiction of the future 
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 As is known, the Covenant formed part of the post-First World War Peace Treaties (of 
Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon, Neully), and thus, by signing and ratifying them, some 27 
states gave consent to the establishment of the court. The United States was not among them 
as it did not ratify the instrument. Cf. Alexander Pandelli Fachiri, The Permanent Court of 
International Justice: Its Constitution, Procedure and Work (Reprint of the 2nd edition, 1932, 
Scientia Verlag 1980) 1  
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court—one thing remains certain, namely that the said instrument did not provide for the 
compulsory jurisdiction i.e. for the possibility of bringing a case against another state without 
the latter consenting to the proceedings.  That is why one could look upon the Covenant 
article on the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice as representing some 
sort of a retreat from the results of the Second Hague Peace Conference, since in 1907, the 
Powers expressed approval of compulsory  arbitration, in a declaration,
41
 which had not been 
opposed, at least openly, even by those Sates that had essentially disagreed with a wide 
introduction of international adjudication.  
By the terms of the Covenant, the Council of the League appointed a ten-member 
Advisory Committee of Jurists, representing different civilizations and legal systems,  to 
elaborate on a draft concerning a court referred to in the Covenant.
42
 The Advisory 
Committee of Jurists met at The Hague from 16 June to 24 July 1920.
 43
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 Cf. Final Act of Second Hague Peace Conference in Rosenne (2001)  412   
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 Among the members of the Committee of Jurists were numerous famous experts of 
international law of the time, such as Baron Descamps (Belgium), Albert de Lapradelle 
(France), Lord Phillimore (Great Britain), Elihu Root (United States). The other members of 
the Committee included Minéichirŏ Adatci (Japan), Rafael Altamira (Spain), Clovis 
Bevilaqua (Brazil)—who was later replaced by Raoul Fernandes—, Francis Hagerup 
(Norway), Bernard C. J. Loder (Netherlands) and Arturo Ricci-Busatti (Italy). 
43
 For the negotiations of the Advisory Committee of Jurists and those regarding the Optional 
Clause, see Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale (hereafter: C.P.J.I.), Comité 
Consultatif de Juristes. Procès Verbaux des Séances du Comité. La Haye, 1920.; Fachiri 
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During the Committee’s deliberations, one of the liveliest debates was provoked by 
the court's jurisdiction, notably regarding the question of whether or not to confer compulsory 
jurisdiction on the court.
44
 The controversy was due—in no small measure—to the members 
of the Advisory Committee of Jurists giving different interpretations of Art. 14 of the 
Covenant. The majority held that the Covenant conferred a priori compulsory jurisdiction on 
the court to be established, while Adatci of Japan, who opposed compulsory jurisdiction, was 
of the opinion that the Covenant deliberately intended to limit the competence of the Court to 
cases submitted to it by the parties.
45
   
The Advisory Committee of Jurists finally arrived at a solution and in Art. 34 it agreed 
that the Court may hear and determine without any special convention disputes between states 
                                                                                                                                                        
Well”: The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice’ (2002) 73 BYIL 187 187-259   
According to the speech delivered by Léon Bourgeois at the opening of the Committee’s 
meetings, the Committee  had to find answers essentially to following six questions, i.e. 
- “How should the Permanent Court be organized? 
- How should its members be appointed?  
- What will be their number and status? 
- In what country and in what town will the seat of the Court be fixed?  
- What will be its rules of procedure, both in the matter of preliminary pleadings and 
of judgment? 
- What will be, finally, the limits of its competence?” 
Cf.  C.P.J.I., Comité Consultatif de Juristes ... op. cit. 7  
44
 Compulsory jurisdiction was favoured chiefly by Loder of the Netherlands and was 
opposed most strongly by Adatci of Japan. Cf. Spiermann (2002) 210 
45
 Cf. C.P.I.J. Comité Consultatif de Juristes ... op. cit.  541-542 
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which are Members of the League of Nations, if such disputes are of a legal nature.
46
 The 
Committee unanimously adopted that position and was quite quick—in the space of six 
weeks—in preparing by 24 July 1920, the Draft Scheme for the establishment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. That document was sent to the Council of the 
League of Nations in the form of a report drawn up by de Lapradelle, a member of the 
Committee, and essentially served as a commentary on the various draft articles.
47
 At the time, 
the Committee was of the view that by the elaboration of the Draft Scheme or, as was put by 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists itself, by the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, states made a significant step in the direction indicated by the 
declaration adopted at the Second Peace Conference, according to which “certain disputes, in 
particular those relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions of international 
agreements, may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without any restriction.”48 Although 
the Draft Scheme was subsequently amended by the Council and the Assembly of the League, 
it remained the basis, and contains, broadly speaking, the system of the Court as was set up. 
Draft Art. 34, worded by the Advisory Committee of Jurists undoubtedly envisaged 
the introduction of compulsory jurisdiction by providing that disputes of a legal nature 
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 Draft Art. 34 reads as follows: 
“Between States which are Members of the League of Nations, the Court shall have jurisdiction (and this without 
any special convention giving it jurisdiction) to hear and determine cases of a legal nature, concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law; 
c. the existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; 
d. the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation; 
e. the interpretation of a sentence passed by the Court.ˇ”  
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 For the report, see C.P.I.J. Comité Consultatif de Juristes ... op. cit.. 693-746  
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arising between Members of the League of Nations could be submitted to the court with-out 
any special agreement. According to the reasoning of the Committee, this did not mean that 
such disputes were to be brought before an international court without the consent of states, 
since the jurisdiction of international tribunals had always been based on a treaty and, 
according to the interpretation of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, the Statute of the 
Permanent Court should be such a treaty. Under the Draft-Scheme, any dispute, in addition to 
those of a legal nature (in respect of which compulsory jurisdiction was intended to be 
introduced), could be submitted to the court on the basis of a general or special agreement 
between the parties.
49
   
The report of the Advisory Committee of Jurists evoked a lively debate at the Council 
of the League of Nations. The Council transmitted the Draft Scheme first to the member states 
of the League, which returned rather reluctant dismissive replies concerning the introduction 
of compulsory jurisdiction. 
The Council of the League of Nations entrusted the French jurist, Léon Bourgeois, 
with preparing the report on the future court. The report presented by Léon Bourgeois was 
approved by the Council on 27 October 1920.
50
 The document stated that the adoption of the 
draft articles elaborated by the Advisory Committee of Jurists on compulsory jurisdiction 
would in reality be a modification  of Arts. 12 and 13 of the Covenant. In order to avoid 
modifying the Covenant, the Council proposed amending the articles submitted by Committee 
of Jurists and omitting the proposal for the introduction of compulsory jurisdiction. As an 
explanation of that Council’s action, one can read the following: “ …(t)he Council will, no 
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and The adoption by the Assembly of the Statute of the Permanent Court.  45-50 
 
 37 
doubt, consider that it is not its duty, at the moment when the General Assembly of the 
League of Nations is about to meet for the first time, to take the initiative with regard to 
proposed alterations in the Covenant, whose observance and safe keeping have been entrusted 
to it.”51 In view of this, the Council suggested substituting in the draft scheme—in place of 
Arts. 33 and 34—, the following Arts.:  
 
Art 33.  
“The jurisdiction of the Court’s is defined by Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Covenant.” 
 
 Art. 34. 
“Without prejudice to the right of the parties according to Art. 12 of the Covenant to submit 
disputes between them either to judicial settlement or arbitration or to enquiry by the Council, 
the Court shall have jurisdiction (and this without any special agreement giving it jurisdiction) 
to hear and determine disputes, the settlement of which is by Treaties in force entrusted to it 
or to the tribunal instituted by the League of Nations.” 
 
In November 1920, the Council, with that amendment and some minor alterations, 
submitted the Draft Scheme to the Assembly, which  referred the document to the Third 
Committee of the Assembly for consideration.
52
 The Third Committee set up a Sub-
Committee of ten members to examine the Draft-Scheme in detail and report to the 
Committee.
53
  
                                                 
51 Id. 47  
52
  Cf. Id. 54-60 
53
 Five members of the subcommittee, Adaci, Fernandes, Hagerup, Loder, Ricci-Busatti  took 
part in the work of the Committee of Jurists as well; the other members were: Joseph Doherty 
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The Third Committee and the Sub-Committee continued the debate on jurisdiction, 
and several amendments were submitted to the Draft-Scheme. Some states, e.g. Italy, 
proposed an amendment to the draft which was tantamount to virtually ruling out compulsory 
jurisdiction in toto.
54
 On the other hand, Argentina presented a version of the text which 
would clearly have led to the introduction of compulsory jurisdiction between the member 
states of the League.
55
  
The opponents of compulsory jurisdiction were mainly delegates of the great powers, 
while the proponents thereof were mostly representatives of the smaller states. The great 
powers hinted at their intention to conclude, after signing the Statute, bilateral treaties 
specifying the class of disputes and the range of states for which they would recognize as 
compulsory the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, as is pointed at by Waldock, they 
wanted on no account to commit themselves in advance under the Statute to either a class of 
legal disputes or certain states with which they would bind themselves in accepting the 
Court’s jurisdiction.56 Incidentally, some authors assert that the debates made it quite clear 
that inclusion of compulsory jurisdiction in the Statute would have resulted in a number of 
states refraining from accession to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
57
   
In the Sub-Committee, the debate over compulsory jurisdiction had reached a rather 
critical point when the Brazilian delegate Fernandes came forward with the idea of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Canada), Henri Fromageot (France), Max Huber (Switzerland), Sir Cecil Hurst (Great 
Britain), and Nicolas Politis (Greece).  
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incorporating an optional clause in the Statute of the future court. Originally, Fernandes had 
proposed the inclusion of two versions of the articles on the jurisdiction of the court, one on 
compulsory jurisdiction and the other on voluntary jurisdiction, with states entitled to make a 
declaration, on accession to the Statute, as to the version of the court's jurisdiction which they 
chose to accept.
58
  
With an eye to the proposal of the Brazilian jurist, the much-disputed Arts. 33-34 of 
the draft statute were combined into Art. 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, containing the widely known formula called the “optional clause”. This 
formula, which will be discussed in detail at a later point,
59
 enables states—when adhering to 
the statute of the future court—to exercise the option of accepting its jurisdiction as 
compulsory, ipso facto, without special agreement in certain classes of legal disputes. 
As has been mentioned, the optional clause was inspired by Fernandes of Brazil, with 
most of the sources referring to him as the “father” of the clause. Nevertheless, the Fernandes 
formula was not completely new, for it had first appeared in a Swiss proposal at the Second 
Peace Conference at The Hague.
60
 The author of that document was the young professor Max 
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 Thus there will be a so-called “Temporary Provision” providing that “In ratifying the 
Assembly’s decision adopting the Statute, the Members of the League of Nations are free to 
adhere to either of the two texts of Article 33.  They may adhere uncondionally or condionally 
to the Article providing for compulsory jurisdiction, a possible condition being reciprocity on 
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Huber from the University of Zürich,61 who had participated as a member of the Swiss 
delegation at the Second Hague Peace Conference.
62
 
In the light of the above considerations, the provisions on the Court's jurisdiction read 
as follows: 
 
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters 
specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force. 
 
The Members of the League of Nations and the states mentioned in the Annex to the 
Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is 
adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes 
concerning: 
 (a) the interpretation of a Treaty; 
 (b) any question of International Law; 
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(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
 
The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity 
on the part of several or certain Members or States, or for a certain time.” 
 
Under the quoted provisions, the Court's jurisdiction is not compulsory, but states may 
by unilateral declaration undertake to recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in 
relation to states having made a similar declaration. Thus the jurisdiction of the Court rests 
clearly on the will of the parties and, by the terms of the article, the states may express their 
consent to the Court's jurisdiction in a compromise made after the dispute had arisen, in a 
jurisdictional clause of a treaty, or in a declaration of acceptance (of compulsory jurisdiction, 
also termed as “optional clause declaration”). 
The Third Committee’s document and the report were brought before the Assembly of 
the League of Nations which after debate, by a resolution of 13 December 1920, unanimously 
approved the draft Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and decided on a 
separate legal instrument with respect to the signature and ratification of the Statute i.e. the 
Protocol of Signature.
63
  Thus the Members of the League of Nations were to adopt the 
Statute in the form of a Protocol duly ratified and declaring their recognition of the Statute.
64
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  The resolution, see PCIJ Series D. No.1. 4 
64
 The resolution provided  also that  the Protocol shall be open for signature by non-member states enumerated 
in the Annex to the Covenant. The purpose of that provision was to permit the United States of America and 
some other non-member states to “adhere to the Statute.” Cf. Hudson (1972) 124 
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That Protocol was done at Geneva on 16 December 1920.
65
 and was ratified by the majority 
of the Members of the League of Nations before 5 September 1921, so the Statute entered into 
force on that day. Many believed that with the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the 1907 Hague Peace Conference had come to bear fruit, albeit 
compulsory jurisdiction had not been introduced.
66
 At any rate, the regime of Peace Treaties 
can be said to have been instrumental in, among other things, establishing the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, which came to be “a true court of international justice which 
means that it ought to decide questions according to international law rather than on grounds 
of compromise or expediency as may properly be done by a tribunal of arbitration.”67  No 
question, it was still impossible to achieve the introduction of a system of general compulsory 
jurisdiction, but some progress had certainly been made in this domain as well. The 
proponents of the judicial settlement of international disputes believed “that the future will 
bring compulsory jurisdiction between States.”68  
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 The Protocol of Signature, see  PCIJ Series D. No.1. 5. 
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 Cf. Manley O. Hudson, ‘The First Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice’ 
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On the activities of the Permanent Court, see Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in 
the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise of the International Judiciary. 
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II The San Francisco Conference: new Court but no break in the chain of 
continuity with the past 
 
During World War II, when politicians and experts began dealing with the plan to set 
up a new international organization, which was later to be the United Nations, there emerged 
again various conceptions about the need to establish an international judicial forum with 
compulsory jurisdiction. On this score, it is worthwhile to cite a study of 1943 by Hans 
Kelsen, who advocated the compulsory adjudication of international disputes, writing that 
“the next step on which our efforts must be concentrated is to bring about an international 
treaty concluded by as many states as possible – victors as well as vanquished – establishing 
an international court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction”.69 The eminent Austrian expert 
held that all parties to the treaty “shall be obliged to renounce war and reprisals as means of 
settling conflicts and to submit all their disputes without any exception to the decision of the 
court and to carry out its decisions in good faith.”70  
The first of the official documents with respect to the creation of the United Nations, 
addressing the question of a judicial forum of the world organization, was that of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization which in Chapter VII 
referred to the need for an international court within the new international organization to be 
established.
 71
 It was also stated that the court should be the principal judicial organ of the new 
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 See Hans Kelsen, ‘Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes’ (1943) 37 AJIL 397 
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 It is to be noted that unofficial documents had already addressed questions relating to 
international adjudication. Thus, among others, a committee of experts in London had studied 
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organization, with its statute which could be either the same as that of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice—with some modifications—or a new one based on that of the Permanent 
Court, and annexed, being a part of the Charter of the new Organization, the members of the 
Organization becoming ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court.
72
 A few rather important 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1943, and had indicated the 
provisions to be amended, as well as the nature of amendments. The members of that 
committee were purely in their personal capacity and not in the name of their government, it 
included R. M. Campbell (New Zealand), R. Cassin (France), E. Colban (Norway), G. 
Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom), A. Gros (France), F. Havlicek (Czechoslovakia), G. 
Kaeckenbeeck (Belgium), G. Schommer (Luxembourg), E. Star-Busmann (Netherlands), C. 
Stavropoulos (Greece) and B. Winiarski (Poland). For the committee's report, see Report of 
the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 10
th
 February, 1944. See  AJIL vol. 39 No.1.Supplement Official Documents (Jan. 
1945) 1-56 
72
 The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization in Chapter VII. 
under the title An International Court of Justice provided that   
“1. There should be an international court of justice which should constitute the principal 
judicial organ of the Organization. 
2. The court should be constituted and should function in acordance with a statute which 
should be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the Organization. 
3. The statute of the court of international justice should be either (a) the Statute of the 
Permanant Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as 
may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis. 
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questions on which the delegates views were sharply divided were left to further discussion, 
namely those points concerning the issues of whether to establish a new court or whether to 
adapt the Permanent Court to the new situation, the number of judges, the method of their 
nomination and to what extent compulsory jurisdiction should be incorporated into the new 
statute of the court.
73
  
A further elaboration of the draft statute of the new court was put into the hands of a 
Committee of Jurists consisting representatives from forty-four states. From 9 to 18 April 
1945 the Committee of Jurists met in Washington, with the American, Hackworth, as 
Chairman and the French, Basdevant, as Rapporteur thereof.
74
  
On the table of the Committee of Jurists lay a great variety of proposals for the 
amendment of both Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the Statute of the 
Permanent Court, and during the deliberations several suggestions were made concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                        
4. All members of the Organization should ipso facto be parties to the statute of the 
international court of jsutice. 
5. Conditions under which states not members of the Organization may become parties to 
the statute of the international court of justice should be determined in each case by the 
General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.” 
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization. San Francisco, 
1945. United Nations Information Organization, London, New York 1945 (hereafter UNCIO 
Documents)  vol. III 11-12 
73
 For a more detailed discussion of these topics, see Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice 
of the International Court 1920-2005 (fourth edition with the assitance of Yaël Ronen, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) vol. I. 52-55 
74
 For the deliberations of the Committee of Jurists, see Ruth B. Russel - Janette E. Muther, A 
History of the United Nations Charter (The Brooklings Institution 1958) 865-875  
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introduction of compulsory jurisdiction. However, the Committee members felt that the 
introduction of compulsory jurisdiction was a political matter, a reason why no decision was 
taken on that and many other important issues, leaving the final decision to be made by the 
San Francisco Conference with respect to elaborating the Charter of the new World 
Organization. Incidentally, as was pointed out by Hambro, the Committee of Jurists whose 
task “was technical and not a political one, decided not to take a definite position on this 
matter of principle, but proposed two alternatives for Art. 36.”75 This notwithstanding, the 
problem of compulsory jurisdiction was one of the most controversial issues during the said 
negotiations, and the introduction of compulsory jurisdiction was opposed chiefly by the 
United States and the Soviet Union.
76
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 Edward Hambro, ‘Some Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice’(1948) 25 BYIL 133 138  
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 In the case of the United States it was recalled that the accession by the United States to the 
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As for the Soviet Union, Moscow was known to have traditionally shown a negative attitude 
to international adjudication, as is well illustrated by the statement of Maxim Litvinov, later 
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had uttered at The Hague on 12 July 1922 and which 
have often been quoted ever since. He said that “It was necessary to face the fact that there 
was -Soviet world. Because there was no 
third world to arbitrate, … Only an angel could be unbiased in judging Russian affairs…” 
(Conference at The Hague. June 26-July 20, 1922. Minutes and Documents, p.126.) Quoted in  
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During deliberations of the Committee of Jurists, it was proposed (by Egypt) that the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction should be made as a general rule and that, in addition, every 
state should be entitled to withdraw from it. The Committee itself was not in full agreement 
with that nor other proposals, thus in its Report on Draft of Statute of an International Court 
of Justice Referred to in Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals there were presented 
two alternative texts relating to the court’s jurisdiction.77 One contained the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice with a few minor changes of a technical nature in the 
wording and no change with respect to jurisdiction. The other version provided for the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in Art. 36 of the Statute, without giving the option by 
which each of the states would be free to take or not take.
78
 As is stated in the Report which 
the Committee of Jurists presented to the San Francisco Conference,  
“…it did not seem certain, nor even possible, that all the nations whose participation in the 
proposed International Organization appears to be necessary, were now in a position to accept 
the rule of compulsory jurisdiction, and that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals did not seem to 
affirm it; some, while retaining their preference in this respect, though that the counsel of 
prudence was not to go beyond the procedure of the optional clause inserted in Article 36, 
which has opened the way to the progressive adoption, in less than 10 years, of compulsory 
jurisdiction by many States which in 1920 refused to subscribe to it.”79  
The subject-matters of the judicial forum were addressed by Commission IV. of the  
San Francisco Conference, and the question of jurisdiction was on the agenda of 
                                                                                                                                                        
T.A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (The MacMillan Company 1935, 
Kraus Reprint Co. 1972)   296  
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 See UNCIO Documents, vol. XIV  821-853  
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 For the part of the Committee's report dealing with the optional clause, see Id. 839-842   
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 Id. 840  
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Subcommittee D of Committee IV/1. During the deliberations of the Subcommittee, renewed 
attempts were made, chiefly by New-Zealand with support from Australia and Mexico, to 
adopt a version of Art. 36 of the Statute which would have been tantamount to the 
introduction in principle of compulsory adjudication, applicable to all disputes which the 
parties refer to the Court, with only two uniform reservations, unless the parties to any 
particular dispute otherwise agree.
80
  
Subcommittee D rejected the New-Zealand proposal and, as was stated in its report, 
came to the conclusion by majority “… that everything being taken into account, the system 
of optional jurisdiction at the present time would more likely to secure general agreement.”81 
Thus Subcommittee D finally left the provisions on the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court’s 
Statute unchanged, and the Committee IV/1 of the Conference decided by a vote of 31 to 14 
to incorporate  in the new Statute Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.
82
 Thus although the Committee after lengthy debates voted for retaining 
optional jurisdiction, it unanimously adopted a resolution on the motion of the delegate of Iran 
“that the Conference be requested to recommend to all members of the United Nations that 
they should make declarations adhering to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as soon as 
possible”.83 This text was adopted by the plenary session of the San Francisco Conference as 
well.
84
 
In light of the pronouncements made at the San Francisco Conference it can be stated 
that the representatives of the smaller and middle powers stood firm with respect to the 
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 The said desire was restated in the UN General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947. 
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introduction of compulsory jurisdiction, since they felt that it would be a great protection to 
them if they could bring any other state, large or small, into the Court.
85
 So it was not entirely 
without good reason that 15 years later Sørensen, a well-known jurist of Denmark, wrote that 
the sentiments in favour of compulsory jurisdiction ran higher in 1945 than they had at the 
time of the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
86
 In spite of the fact 
that at the San Francisco Conference a considerable proportion of  states advocated the 
introduction of compulsory jurisdiction, the Soviet Union and United States resolutely 
rejected the related proposals
87
, stressing that should compulsory jurisdiction be introduced 
they would “not be able to ratify” or would “be obliged to withhold their acceptance of the 
Statute.”88  
As can be seen, during the negotiations about an international judicial forum in the 
wake of World War II, just as different views were expressed concerning the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the future court as there had been at the time of the elaboration of the 
Permanent Court’s Statute and, regarding the substance, the same solution was adopted as in 
1920. 
The text of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as adopted at the San 
Francisco Conference showed no great difference from that of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court, and there was no fundamental change with respect to the optional clause either (see the 
Table below). Nevertheless, regarding Art. 36 of the Statute, the Conference inserted certain 
amendments, which may be summed up as follows: 
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 (a) Para. 2 of Art. 36 was amended. Its former wording, said that states might 
recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court “in all or any of the classes of legal 
disputes”, while the new text omitted the word “any”, thus states were no longer entitled to 
recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court concerning only the disputes under 
subparas. a), or b), or c) or d) of para. 2 of Art. 36 which is to say that states are to accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the new Court “in all legal disputes” under subparas. a), b), c), and 
d). 
(b) The second change was that a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court may only be made by a state party to the Statute, notably one which has signed and 
ratified the Statute. While at the time of the Permanent Court a declaring state could not only 
be a Member of the League of Nations, but a state not being a party to the Statute, provided 
that the state was mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant. 
(c) The declarations should be deposited with the UN Secretary General.  
(d) Para. 5 of Art. 36, was incorporated in the Statute as a new provision thereof, 
which passed to the International Court of Justice, the declarations relating to the Permanent 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction still being in force, thereby expressing the continuity between 
the two Courts.
89
 One cannot downplay this article at all, because at the time it did affect the 
in-force declarations of some 17 states.
90
  
 
  
     The two Statutes on jurisdiction 
The S                         The Statute of the PCIJ  
 
Art.   Art. 36 
 
          “The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all            
cases which the parties refer to it and all 
The S                         The Statute of the ICJ 
 
Art. 3 Art. 36 
 
1.         1. The jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all  cas cases which the parties refer to 
                                                 
89
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90
 Cf. I.C.J. Yearbook 1946-47 221-228  
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matters specially provided for in treaties and 
conventions in force. 
 
        The Members of the League of Nations and 
the States mentioned in the Annex to the 
Covenant may, either when signing or 
ratifying the protocol to which the present 
Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, 
declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, in 
relation to any other Member or State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction 
of the Court in all or any of the classes of 
legal disputes concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a Treaty; 
(b) any question of International Law; 
 (c) the existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be 
made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
 
The declaration referred to above may be 
made unconditionally or on condition of 
reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
Members or States, or for a certain time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the event of a dispute as to whether the 
Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be 
settled by the decision of the Court. 
 
 
 
 
it and all matters specially pro provided for in the 
Charter of the United Nations or in tre   treaties 
and conventions in force. 
1. 2. The States parties to the present 
Statute may at any time declare that they 
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any 
other State accepting the same obligation, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning: 
 
 
 
 
 (a)        (a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
 (b)        (b) any question of international law; 
 (c)      (c) the existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
 (d)       (d) the nature or extent of the reparation 
to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
 
 
2. 3. The declarations referred to above 
may be made unconditionally or on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
States, or for a certain time.  
3. 4. Such declarations shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to 
the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar 
of the Court. 
4. 5. Declarations made under Article 36 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and which are still in 
force shall be deemed, as between the parties 
to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice for the period which they still 
have to run and in accordance with their 
terms. 
5. 6. In the event of a dispute as to 
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter 
shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
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The negotiations on the establishment of the International Court of Justice are 
evidence that the decline and inefficacy of the League of Nations did not affect the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and did not shake the confidence of states in international 
adjudication. This was likewise stated in the report of the Washington Committee of Jurists, 
saying that  
“… the Permanent Court of International Justice had functioned for twenty years to the 
satisfaction of the litigants and that, if violence had suspended its activity, at least this 
institution had not failed in its task.”91  
 
 The activity carried out by the Permanent Court of International Justice to the 
satisfaction of the states is evidenced more clearly by nothing other than the fact that among 
the institutions created at the time of the League of Nations the Permanent Court was after all 
one such institutionthat came to be incorporated and unaltered, as it were, within the system 
of the new world organization, the United Nations.
92
  And as Nasrat Al-Farsy, the rapporteur 
of Committee IV/1 of the San Francisco Conference rightly pointed out “The creation of the 
new Court will not break the chain of continuity with the past”.93  To that, one could add that 
the international system established by the San Francisco Conference strengthens the position 
of the Court insofar as the International Court of Justice became a principal organ of the 
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United Nations and the provisions of the Charter served to increase the role thereof in the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.
94
  
 
 
III  The concept of the optional clause 
 
Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statutes of the two International Courts relating to compulsory 
jurisdiction is referred to as the “optional clause” in the literature of international law, which 
is rather misleading for two reasons. Firstly, because the term “optional clause” originally  
appeared as the title of a second section of the 1920 Protocol of Signature.
95
 That subsidiary 
document was not an independent instrument but a document attached to the 1920 Protocol of 
Signature and was designated to serve as a model text for the declarations relating to the 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court being compulsory.
96
 Secondly, the term 
“optional clause”, which is to be found nowhere in the Statute either of the Permanent Court 
or of the International Court of Justice in the last more than nine decades, was generally used 
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to designate the provisions of the two instruments by which states may recognize as 
compulsory the jurisdiction of the Courts.
97
 
It should be admitted that the optional clause was a fortunate solution in enabling 
states to recognize, if they so wish, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on a rather wide range 
of disputes. Accordingly it came to serve as a formula which, in the last analysis, introduced 
compulsory jurisdiction in a form fully respecting the sovereignty of states. 
By the terms of Art. 36 of the Statutes of the two Courts, the states may, by unilateral 
declaration of acceptance, recognize as compulsory, in relation to any other state having made 
a similar declaration, the jurisdiction of the Court in specified categories of disputes. As 
President McNair points out in his individual opinion submitted in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
Case, the optional clause is that of “contracting-in”, not of “contracting out”.98 The optional 
clause does not by itself impose on states any obligation whatsoever, but provides a basis for 
states undertaking, by unilateral declaration, obligations additional to those stated in the 
Statutes with regard to the Court's jurisdiction. It was with this consideration that Kelsen 
wrote that jurisdiction under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute could not be regarded as 
“compulsory” in the true sense of the word, for one could only speak of compulsory 
jurisdiction if the Statute provided that “…any member of the judicial community, party to 
any case whatever, is obliged to recognise the jurisdiction of the Court if the other party refers 
the dispute to the Court.”99  
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Along with para. 2 of Art. 36 paras. 3 to 5, are also often consigned to the “optional 
clause” insofar as they contain further elements concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court. Consequently, the optional clause as laid down in the Statute has in fact a wider notion 
of the term embracing, apart from Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute, all the provisions relating to 
the procedure for making declarations of acceptance, the validity thereof, etc. 
 The totality of  the declarations of acceptance made under the optional clause, 
constitute a special regime called the system of compulsory jurisdiction or optional clause 
system. The specific features of the system constituted by the optional clause—in the wider 
sense—and the unilateral declarations made by states, can be summarized as follows: 
 (a) The declarations made under the optional clause constitute a compulsory 
jurisdictional system between declarant states. The declarant states accordingly recognize the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in relation, not to the states party to the Statute, but only to 
those which have also made such a declaration. Any state party to the system and having 
made such a declaration, may, by unilateral application, institute proceedings against another 
declarant state, in all disputes covered by both states’ declarations.  
 (b) States making declarations of acceptance, accept the Court's jurisdiction not 
necessarily with regard to the same range of matters, and they may – by reservations –  
exclude one or several classes of international disputes from the scope of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction.
100
 
 (c) The principle of reciprocity applies in the fullest extent to declarations accepting 
compulsory jurisdiction, meaning that concerning two declarant states the Court has no 
jurisdiction except in the category of matters covered by the declarations of both states.
101
 In 
other words, a state may not sue another state for a dispute which was excluded by its own 
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101
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declaration of acceptance, even though the other state recognized the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction over that dispute. 
 (d) Under Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the legal 
effects of the in-force declarations of acceptance made between the two World Wars with 
respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court are to pass to the International 
Court of Justice. 
 (e) Declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice are to be deposited with the Secretary-General, of the United Nations, who is to 
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.
102
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Chapter 3 
DECLARATIONS ACCEPTING THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT  
 
 I  Who is entitled to make an optional clause declaration?  
  The Statutes of the two World Courts contain very few provisions concerning the 
declarations made under Art. 36, para. 2 and the texts thereof. 
 Art. 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice is confined to 
stating that  
 
“The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the Annex to the 
Covenant may, either when signing or of ratifying the Protocol to which the present 
Statute is adjoined, or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as c ompulsory 
ipso facto and without separate agreement, in relation to any other Member State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes 
of legal disputes concerning:...”   
 
Under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,  
“The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court...” 
 
 The cited paragraphs of the two Statutes seem rather similar at first sight, suggesting 
that the provisions set forth in the Statute of the Permanent Court were practically 
reproduced in the Statute of the new Court. However, as was already mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, some changes were effected at the San Francisco Conference to the 
Statute regarding optional clause declarations and thus there are differences which relate 
among others to the declaring states.  
 In effect, under the Statute of the Permanent Court, declarations accepting the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction could only be made by states, which had at least signed the Statute, 
meaning that a state could make a declaration of acceptance even before the Statute had 
entered into force in respect of that state. By contrast, the Statute of the new Court refers to 
states that are parties to the present Statute, which allows the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the new Court to be accepted only by states that are already parties to the Statute, namely 
those that have signed and ratified the Charter of the United Nations, of which the Statute  
forms an integral part, or by states that are not members of the world organisation but have 
acceded to the Statute,
103
 as Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Nauru did becoming parties to 
the Statute as non-members of the United Nations, who also concurrently—with the 
acceptance of the Statute—made their optional clause declarations. 
 At the time of the Permanent Court, it was in the Gerliczy Case that the question arose 
of whether a declaration of acceptance, made by a state which was not listed in the Annex to 
the Covenant of the League of Nations or which was not a member of the League of Nations, 
could be deemed to be valid. That dispute was submitted by Liechtenstein against Hungary in 
1939, on the basis of declarations of acceptance made by the two states.
104
 In that legal 
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dispute, the Hungarian Government questioned the validity of Lichtenstein’s declaration of 
acceptance, for Liechtenstein was not among the states listed in the Annex to the Covenant, 
nor a member of the League of Nations, having made declaration of acceptance upon the 
Council’s resolution of May 17, 1922.105 Since the Gerliczy Case remained pending because 
of the war, no answer was given to the question relating to a declaration of acceptance made 
by a non-member state of the League and not listed in the Annex to the Covenant.
106
  
 More than half a century later, the International Court of Justice was faced with a 
problem, somewhat similar to that of the Gerliczy Case, with regard to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: FRY) in the context of whether it was possible for a declaration 
of acceptance to have been made by a state whose membership in the United Nations was 
uncertain, and regarding that membership the opinion of the international community was 
rather divided.
107
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(supreme court) saying that these were contrary to international law and in particular to the Convention 
concluded between Hungary and Romania on 16 April 1924.  
105
 A letter of 21 February 1922, by the Court’s President led to Council’s Resolution of 17 May  1922, 
which concerned itself with the conditions under which states not Members of the League of Nations nor 
mentioned in Annex to the Covenant were entitled to resort to the Court. On this point, see Hudson (1972) 
386–387 and 755-756 
106
 The Gerliczy Case see  Manley O. Hudson (ed), World Court Reports (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 1943) vol. IV 495-499   
107
 After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the membership of the FRY in the United Nations was 
uncertain from 27 April 1992, i.e., from the date of its establishment. The problem of Yugoslavia’s 
membership in the United Nations was on the agenda of the General Assembly from 1992. Long debates 
and a quasi political compromise led to the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly as a result of 
a recommendation from the Security Council on 22 September 1992, which stated that the General 
Assembly “1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United 
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Appearing before the Court in the Cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, some 
respondent states
108
 argued that according to General Assembly resolution 47/1 of 22 
September 1992—which was adopted on the motion of the Security Council—FRY was not a 
UN member state, and not a successor to the former Yugoslavia, thus not a party to the Statute, 
and consequently it couldn’t make a valid declaration of acceptance.109 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nations; and therefore, decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should 
apply for membership in the United Nations and that it should not participate in the work of the General 
Assembly.” Thereafter, the FRY took part in the activities of only some UN organs. After the downfall of 
the Milosević regime, the FRY was admitted to the UN on 1 November 2000. During the days of the 
Milosević regime, the Belgrade Government made a declaration under the optional clause on 25 April 1999, 
and a few days later, on 29 April 1999, during the NATO air strikes, it instituted ten separate proceedings 
against ten NATO member states arguing that some of the alleged violations of international law by NATO 
air strikes against Yugoslavia were deemed to be genocide and violations of the prohibition of the use of force 
(Cases concerning Legality of Use of Force). In each case, the Belgrade Government based the Court’s 
jurisdiction on Art. IX of the Genocide Convention providing for the Court’s jurisdiction, and in the case of 
six states (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom) it invoked Art. 36, para. 2 of 
the Statute along with Art. IX, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
and in two cases (Belgium, Netherlands) it referred to other in-force treaties between the parties.  
In May 1999, the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia objected to the declaration of acceptance of Yugoslavia. According to these states, the 
declaration had no legal effect whatsoever, because the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) was not a member state of 
the United Nations, nor was it a state party to the Statute of the Court, that could make a valid declaration under 
Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the Court.  
108
 Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
109
  The membership in the UN of the FRY was also lengthily discussed in the Case concerning the Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), however, in that case the question of the declarations of acceptance were not touched 
upon because the Court’s jurisdiction was based on Art. IX of the Genocide Convention. 
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  For its part, in the first phase of the Cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, the 
Court gave no answer on the issue of the FRY’s membership in the United Nations110 and 
in connection with the Yugoslav declaration of acceptance, it found sufficient grounds to 
point out that, in view of the reservation ratione temporis (concerning future disputes) 
included in that declaration,
111
 the Court was without jurisdiction even prima facie, for, 
given this limitation, it had jurisdiction only in disputes relating to situations and facts 
subsequent to the signature of the declaration, whereas the dispute between the parties arose 
before 25 April 1999—which was the date of making the declaration of acceptance—for the 
air strikes by NATO states had already begun earlier on 24 March 1999.
112
 
 Thus, in the phase of provisional measures, the Court endeavoured to sidestep the 
question of the FRY’s membership in the United Nations as well as the possibility of the 
FRY having made a declaration of acceptance. That position of the Court was sharply 
criticized by some members of the Court.  According to Judge Kooijmans, the Court’s 
reasoning implied the presumption that the Yugoslavian declaration was valid, at least in the 
present phase of the proceedings.
113
 
 One could see that in that stage of the Cases concerning Legality of Use of Force, 
the Court was reluctant to examine whether a state whose membership in the UN was 
                                                 
110
 According to the Court, there was no need to decide on Yugoslavia’s membership in the United Nations and 
whether it was a party to the Statute for the purpose of deciding whether or not it could indicate provisional 
measures in that case.  
111
 On these reservations see Chapter 7. 
112
 Cf. Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures) Order of 2 June 1999. ICJ Reports 1999, 134–135 
113
 Id. 177.  Judge Kooijmans wrote: “How can the Court say that there is no need to consider the validity 
of Yugoslavia’s declaration whereas at the same time it concludes that this declaration, taken together with 
that of the Respondent, cannot constitute a basis of jurisdiction?” 
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uncertain could make a declaration of acceptance.
114
 Such an attitude reflects the Court’s 
view that the declaring state assumes, of its own will, certain surplus obligations regarding 
the Court’s jurisdiction and that the Court should take such obligations into account.  
 
 II Various forms and contents of declarations of acceptance 
 
 The idea that it would be advisable to elaborate a model for declarations of accepting 
the future Court’s compulsory jurisdiction had emerged as early as the deliberations of the 
1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists. Consequently, as was already mentioned before, a 
draft or model document for such declarations under the title “Optional Clause” was 
attached to the Protocol of Signature of the Statute. The abovementioned separate document 
on the declarations of acceptance was designated to encourage and facilitate the making of 
declarations under the optional clause by providing a framework within which states might 
cast the limitations which they desired.
115
 
 Thus, in spite of the existence of a model document regarding the declarations of 
acceptance, states—recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court—paid 
little attention to it and developed declarations of acceptance with diverse contents and 
forms in the years following the establishment of the Court. 
According to their text, the following groups of declarations can be differentiated 
                                                 
114
 The dispute about the FRY’s membership in the UN was finally ended by the Court’s Judgements on Legality of 
Use of Force cases on 15 December 2004. In these cases the Court concluded that between 1992 and 2000, 
Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro was not a Member of the United Nations, and consequently, was not, on 
that basis, a state party to the Statute of the Court.  
Cf. Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) Judgment of 15 December 
2004. ICJ Reports 2004,  291-315 
115
 Cf. Hudson (1972) 450 
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- declarations repeating the chapeau of Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute, or the model 
document, stating that the declaring state “recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, on condition of reciprocity” or “in relation to any other 
state accepting the same obligation” the jurisdiction of the Court; 
- declarations not only referring to Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute, but also enumerating 
the four categories of disputes listed in that paragraph; 
- declarations consisting of a single sentence, quite short and to the point, that the 
declaring state accepts the jurisdiction of the Court;
 
- declarations of acceptance incorporated in the instruments of ratification of the Statute 
of the Permanent Court;
 
- declarations of acceptance made in the form of a letter sent to the Secretary-General of 
the League of Nations.
 
 Considering that, as noted previously, the Statute did not provide any uniform form or 
content regarding the declarations of acceptance, in the practice of the two Courts any form of 
optional clause declaration became accepted. This was recognized by the International Court 
of Justice by stating that: “The Statute of the Permanent Court did not lay down any set form 
or procedure to be followed for the making of such declarations, and in practice a number of 
different methods were used by States.”116  
 The Permanent Court of International Justice did not deal with the form of optional 
clause declarations, however, the International Court of Justice touched upon the subject in 
several cases. In the Temple of Preah Vihear case,
117
 in which the Court sought to answer 
the question whether Thailand’s letter of 20 May 1950, addressed to the United Nations 
                                                 
116
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction of the 
Court and Admissibility of the Application) Judgment of 26 November 1984. ICJ Reports 1984, 404 
117
  On this case, see footnote 87 of that Chapter. 
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Secretary-General in accordance with Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute, could to be regarded, in 
substance and form, as recognizing compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36, para. 2 of the 
Statute,
118
  the Court held:  
 
“The precise form and language in which they do this (the declaration—V. L.) is left to 
them, and there is no suggestion that any particular form is required, or that any 
declarations not in such form will be invalid. No doubt custom and tradition have 
brought it about that a certain pattern of terminology is normally, as a matter of fact and 
convenience, employed by countries accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; 
but there is nothing mandatory about the employment of this language.”119   
 
With regard to the contents of the optional clause declarations, the Court stressed that  
 
“the sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given declaration 
does reveal a clear intention, in the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, to 
‘recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any 
                                                 
118
 In its declaration of 30 September 1929, Thailand originally accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court for a period of 10 years; in 1940 and 1950 it renewed the 1929 acceptance by the two other 
declarations, containing the same conditions and reservations as the 1929 declaration, for additional periods of 
10 years. In its first preliminary objection in the Preah Vihear case, Thailand advanced the argument, along with 
others, that in 1950 it had a mistaken view of the status of its earlier declaration of 1940 as it had renewed its 
declaration of acceptance in respect of a court that no longer existed. 
119
 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Preliminary Objections) Judgment of 26 May 1961. ICJ 
Reports 1961, 32 
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other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal 
disputes’ concerning the categories of questions enumerated in that paragraph”.120 
 
 As can be seen, the Court attached no importance to the form of declarations and 
deemed the intentions of the parties to be the determining fact. Relying on private-law 
examples, it pointed out that international law “places the principal emphasis on the 
intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to choose 
what form they please provided their intention clearly results from it.”121 All this was 
summed up by Sir Percy Spender in that case by these terms: “No requirement of form are 
called for paragraph (2) of Article 36. If consent to recognize this Court’s jurisdiction in 
terms of that paragraph is clearly manifested, it matters not in what form the declaration 
containing that consent is cast.”122 
 Since the establishment of the International Court of Justice, states have been 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in a separate declaration with very 
divergent content and lent. Some of the declarations are rather short, whilst the others, as 
will be discussed latter, contain reservations, limitations etc.  
One can state that in more than ninety years of international practice, since both the two 
Courts and the international community have recognized as valid declarations of acceptance 
with any wording, they have provided that the clear consent of the declaring state to the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction must be reflected in the declaration itself.  
 
 III Emergence of the notion of collective declarations of acceptance 
                                                 
120
 Id. 32 
121
 Id. 31  
122
 Id. 40 Sir Percy Spender’s individual opinion . 
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 For nearly seven decades subsequent to the establishment of the Permanent Court, 
states had made individual declarations of acceptance, and it was not until the end of  the 
1980s that, in the Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras),
123
 there arose the notion of collective declarations of acceptance.
124
  
In that case, the applicant state, Nicaragua, founded the Court’s jurisdiction on Art. 
XXXIof the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement also known as the Pact of Bogotá,125 
signed on 30 April 1948, and its and the respondent state’s declarations were made by 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court as provided for in Art. 36, para. 1 and 2 respectively 
of the Statute.
126
 These two instruments—serving as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, 
                                                 
123
 The case concerned a legal dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras regarding the alleged activities of armed 
bands, said to be operating from Honduras, on the border between Honduras and Nicaragua and in Nicaraguan 
territory.  
124
 On this point, see M. E. Buffet-Tchalakoff, ‘La compètence de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans 
l’affaire des “Actions frontalières et transfrontalières” (Nicaragua-Honduras)’ (1989) 93 RGDIP  623-653 
125
 Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá reads as follows: 
 “In conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the High 
Contracting Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of 
the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present 
Treaty is in force, in all disputes of a juridical nature that arose among them concerning: 
 (a) The interpretation of a treaty; 
 (b) Any question of international law; 
 (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation; 
 (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”   
126
 The Honduran declaration of acceptance was dated 2 February 1948, and was renewed several times, 
first on 24 May 1954, for a period of six years and on 20 February 1960, for an indefinite period. It was 
modified by a declaration on 22 May 1986, inserting a paragraph under which the present declaration and 
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and offering the possibility of making collective declarations of acceptance that actually 
arose in connection with them—highlight the specific feature that Art. XXXI of the Pact of 
Bogotá is virtually identical, almost word for word, to Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute.127   
Before the Court, Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá was linked by Honduras with 
declarations of acceptance under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute. According to the Memorial of 
Honduras, “this ‘optional clause’ in Article XXXI, contains a jurisdiction which can be more 
precisely defined by means of a unilateral declaration by all states which are parties to the 
Pact”, notably declarations, under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute.128 Starting with this, on the 
basis of the connection between the two documents, Honduras was of the position that any 
reservation being made to one document is automatically applicable to the other.
129
  
In that case, Honduras interpreted Art. XXXI of the Pact in two ways. Under the first 
interpretation, this article must be supplemented by a declaration of acceptance and the Court 
                                                                                                                                                        
the reservations contained therein may at any time be supplemented, modified or withdrawn by giving 
notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Nicaraguan declaration of acceptance was made 
on 24 September 1929, and its legal effect was, according to Nicaragua transmitted to the International 
Court of Justice by Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute. This Nicargauan declaration of acceptance was the same 
as that which was at issue in the legal dispute between Nicaragua and the United States of America. 
127
  The jurisdictional system of the Pact of Bogotá was lengthy discussed in the Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Preliminary Objections) Judgment of 13 
December 2007. ICJ Reports 1977.  In their applications several Lain-American states as the bases of the Court’s 
jurisdiction were refering to both the Pact of Bogotá and the optional clause. Cf. Dispute regarding Navigational 
and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragia), Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area 
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). 
128
Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions. ICJ Pleadings, vol. I 65  
129
 Id. 74.  Honduras relied on this in its objection of the Court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that, owing to 
the reservations appended to its 1986 declaration of acceptance, the Court lacked jurisdiction in the present 
case on the basis either of the optional clause or of Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá. 
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only had jurisdiction if a declaration of acceptance was also made under the optional clause. 
The Honduran view was “that declarations pursuant to Article 36, para.graph 2 were linked to 
the obligation assumed under Article XXXI of the Pact: these declarations defined the limits 
within which the State accepted the jurisdiction.”130 According to the Court, that 
interpretation was incompatible with the actual terms of Art. XXXI, since that article does not 
subject the recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction to any additional declaration made under 
Art. 36, paras. 2 and 4 of the Statute.
131
 The Court emphasized: “It is drafted in the present 
indicative sense, and thus of itself constitutes acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.”132  The 
other Honduran interpretation advanced that Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá operates as a 
collective declaration of acceptance under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute since “There might 
be a treaty obligation to make a unilateral declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2; or, 
alternatively, a treaty provision might be designed as a form of collective declaration for the 
purposes of article 36, paragraph 2.”133  
The Court did not examine this argument, however, it furthermore did not rule out 
that Art. XXXI was to be regarded as a collective declaration of acceptance made under Art. 
36, para. 2.
134
  What the Court found decisive was that the declaration was incorporated in 
the Pact of Bogotá as Art. XXXI and thus it could only be modified in accodance with the 
                                                 
130
 Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions. ICJ Pleadings, vol. I 55  
131
 Cf. Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions. Judgment of 20 December 1988, ICJ 
Reports 1988, 84  
132
 Cf. Id.  
133
 Cf. Memorial of Honduras (Jurisdiction and Admissibiliy) 23 February 1987. Case concerning Border and 
Transborder Armed Actions. ICJ Pleadings, vol. I 49.  
134
 In the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Nicaragua asserted that Art. XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá constituted a declaration under Art. 
36, para 2. Cf. Memorial of Nicaragua  (Questions of Jurisdiction and Admissibility)  ICJ Pleadings, 386 
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rules provided for by the Pact itself. 
135
 Thus the Court did not take any definite stand on 
whether it was possible or not to accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction by a collective 
declaration of acceptance. 
 To admit Art. XXXI of the Bogotá Pact as a collective declaration of acceptance 
could have entailed interesting consequences. In the first place, the Court’s  compulsory 
jurisdiction would have operated not only in the inter se relations of the contracting parties to 
the Pact of Bogotá, but also in relations between the rest of  states parties to the optional 
clause system. Moreover, it would have raised the question of how such a collective 
declaration of acceptance is related to individual optional clause declarations made by Latin 
American states. This problem should not be treated as a speculative one, for several states 
parties to the Pact of Bogotá have made individual declarations of acceptance, many of them 
with reservations appended thereto.
136
 Consequently, one should answer the question whether 
the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction is provided for by individual declarations of acceptance 
or by the Pact of Bogotá as a collective declaration of acceptance in cases where a state party 
to the optional clause system intends to institute proceedings against a state that is a party to 
the Pact of Bogotá as well. This may give rise to a problem, particularly when it is borne in 
mind that certain disputes are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction by reservations 
appended to individual declarations of acceptance, even though such disputes may still 
come under the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a possible collective declaration of 
acceptance under the Pact of Bogotá.137 
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 Cf. Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions . Judgment of 20 December 1988, ICJ Reports 
1988, 84  
136
 These are Costa Rica (1973),  Dominican Republic (1924), Haiti (1921), Honduras (1986), Mexico (1947), 
Nicaragua (1929), Paraguay (1996), Peru (2003), Uruguay (1921).   
137
  There were other cases as well were the applicant based the jurisdiction of the Court, among others, on Art. 
XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá and on the declarations of acceptance of the parties. See the Dispute regarding 
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 IV Deposition and entering into force of optional clause declarations 
 
At the San Francisco Conference, regarding the proposal of the Conference’s 
Committee IV/1, a new paragraph was added to Art. 36 (para. 4) providing that  “Such 
declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court”.  
Thus, the optional clause declarations, which are usually signed on behalf of the 
declaring state by the head of state, the minister for foreign affairs or the permanent 
representative to the United Nations, are to be sent to the United Nations’ Secretary-
General, who must transmit them to the states parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of 
the Court for publication in the Court’s Yearbooks.138  The Statute contains nothing more 
and does not specify the date at which declarations of acceptance enter into force or begin to 
take legal effect. 
According to writers of international law and the Court, Art. 36, para. 4 essentially 
refers to two distinct actions that are practically independent of each other. The first one is that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Navigational and Related Rights  (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)  on the San Juan river. However, in that case the 
respondent, Nicaragua had not raised any objections to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case. 
On the application of the Pact of Bogotá by the Court in the Nicaragua case and in the Dispute regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights see Ricardo Abello Galvis, ‘Analyse de la compétence de la Cour internationale 
de Justice selon le Pacte de Bogotá’ (2005)  No. 006 Rev. Colomb.Derecho Int. 403-441 
http://www.javeriana.edu.co/juridicas/pub_rev/international_law/ultimo_numero/11.pdf accessed  18 September 
2013 
138
  The Secretary General follows the usual practice as depositary of multilateral treaties. See Rosenne (2006) 
729-730 
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the declarations of acceptance are to be deposited by the declaring state with the Secretary-
General, which produces its effects from the moment the act is performed by the state 
concerned; the other one is the duty incumbent on the Secretary-General to convey copies of 
the declaration to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. 
The problems relevant to the deposit of declarations of acceptance with the 
Secretary-General have been considered by the International Court in several cases. The 
best-known case in this category is the legal dispute concerning the Right of Passage 
Trough Indian Territory.
139
 Portugal made its declaration of acceptance on 19 December  
1955, and submitted an application with the Court against India under the optional clause a 
few days later, on 22 December 1955. India filed preliminary objections, and contended that 
the filing of the Portuguese application violated the principles of equality and of reciprocity, 
as the Portuguese application had been filed without waiting for a brief period, between 
moment of acceptance by Portugal of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction and the instant of 
filing of the application, necessary to allow Art. 36, para. 4 to have appropriate effects, 
which, under normal circumstances, would have enabled the Secretary-General to transmit 
the Portuguese declaration to the states parties to the Statute, including India.
140
  
The Court found that the filing of the Portuguese application on 22 December 1955, 
was not contrary to the Statute and constituted no violation of India’s rights; it specifically 
stated that  
 
“by the deposit of its Declaration of Acceptance with the Secretary-General, the 
accepting State becomes a Party to the system of the Optional Clause in relation to the 
                                                 
139
  Portugal instituted proceedings against India on 22 December 1955 concerning the matter of a right of 
passage through the Indian territory claimed by Portugal to be between its territory of Daman and the Portugal 
enclaves. The jurisdiction of the Court was based on the declaration of acceptence of the two states.  
140
 See India’s second preliminary objection. www.icj-cij/docket/files/32  accessed 8 August 2013 
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other declaring States, with all the rights and obligations deriving from Article 36. …. A 
State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court must expect that an Application may be filed 
against it before the Court by a new declarant State on the same day on which that State 
deposits with the Secretary General its Declaration of Acceptance. .... The legal effect of 
a Declaration does not depend upon subsequent action or inaction of the Secretary-
General.”141  
 
The Court pointed out that  
 
“unlike some other instruments, Article 36 provides for no additional requirement, for 
instance, that the information transmitted by the Secretary-General must reach the 
Parties to the Statute, or that some period must elapse subsequent to the deposit of the 
Declaration before it can become effective. Any such requirement would introduce an 
element of uncertainty into the operation of the Optional Clause system. The Court 
cannot read into the Optional Clause any requirement of that nature.”142 
 
Several members of the Court did not concur with these passages of the judgment. In his 
dissenting opinion, Vice-President Badawi stressed that “The notification of Declarations to 
the Secretary-General, or their deposit with him and his obligation to communicate them to 
other States, are merely intended to take place of direct communication. The Secretary-
General is thus a mere depository entrusted with the duty of bringing the Declarations to 
                                                 
141
 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) Judgment of 26 
November 1957. ICJ Reports 1957, 146 
142
Id. 146-147 
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the knowledge of the other States.”143 The Vice-President stressed that since the 
declaration was made on the day of that preceding the filing of the application, no one could 
suppose that the Secretary-General had been able to transmit the declaration to the other 
states within 24 hours. In his dissenting opinion, ad hoc Judge Chagla argued that Art. 36, 
para. 4 of the Statute consisted of two parts, one making it incumbent upon the declaring 
states to deposit declarations with the Secretary-General, and the other incumbent upon the 
Secretary-General to transmit copies thereof to states party to the Statute and to the 
Registrar of the Court. The ad hoc Judge could not understand why the Court’s decision had 
deemed only the first element to be mandatory, for, in his view, it would have been 
absolutely necessary that a certain period of time should lapse between making the 
declaration and filing the application.
144
  
More than 40 years after its decision in the Right of Passage case, the Court was again 
faced with the problem of the submission of a dispute under the optional clause before the 
respondent state could have been informed of the applicant’s accession to the optional 
clause system. 
This problem arose in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria, because on 3 March 1994, Cameroon made a declaration of 
acceptance and the Secretary-General transmitted it to the parties to the Statute eleven-and-
a-half months later.
145
 Consequently, when Cameroon filed an application against Nigeria 
                                                 
143 Id. 155 
144
 Id. 169–170 
 
145
  In 1994, Cameroon instituted proceedings against Nigeria, and asked the Court to determine the question of 
sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula and over islands in Lake Chad, and to specify the course of the land and 
maritime boundary between itself and Nigeria. Cameroon founded the Court’s jurisdiction on the Nigerian 
declaration of acceptance of 14 August 1965, and on the Cameroonian declaration of acceptance of 3 
March 1994. 
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on 29 March 1994, the respondent state, Nigeria, did not know or was not in a position to 
know that Cameroon had acceded to the optional clause system. This led Nigeria to 
conclude that Cameroon “acted prematurely”, and had violated “its obligation to act in good 
faith ..., acted in abuse of the system established by Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute.” 
According to Nigeria the Court when considering the Cameroonian application should have 
arrived at a different conclusion than that reached in the Right of Passage case,
146
  which 
was an isolated one and that it was time the Court revised its findings in this case in 
connection with making optional clause declarations. It stressed that the interpretation of 
Art. 36, para. 4 of the Statute in 1957 should be reconsidered in the light of changes that had 
since taken place in the law of treaties, and in this context it referred to Art. 78 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
147
 
In response to that assertion, the Court pointed out the fact that “the régime for 
depositing and transmitting declarations of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction laid down 
in Art. 36, para. 4 of the Statute of the Court is distinct from the régime envisaged for 
treaties by the Vienna Convention.”148 Then, repeating its findings of the Case concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court emphasized that 
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  Cf. Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. ICJ Pleadings, vol. I 
paras. 1.10 and 1.28 
147
  Art. 78 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates:  
“Except as the treaty or the present Convention otherwise provides, any notification or communication to be 
made by any State under the present Convention shall:  
 ... 
 c) if transmitted to a depositary, be considered as received by the State for which it was intended only 
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the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may only be applied to 
declarations of acceptance by analogy.
149   
Indeed, the Court said nothing more, and it examined the Vienna Convention on 
notifications and communications (Art. 78), the exchange of instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval and accession (Art. 16) and the entry into force of treaties (Art. 24). 
The Court found that the provisions of the Vienna Convention did not have the scope 
that Nigeria inferred on them. Regarding Art. 78 the Court observed that this article  
 
“is only designated to lay down the modalities according to which notifications and 
communications should be carried out. It does not govern the conditions in which a State 
expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty and those under which a treaty comes into 
force, those questions being governed by Arts. 16 and 24 of the Convention.”150  
 
Accordingly, Arts. 16 and 24 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contain a 
general rule that, unless otherwise provided for by a treaty, the deposit of the instrument of 
ratification, accession, approval, etc. establishes the consent of a state to be bound by a 
treaty and the treaty comes into force in respect of that state on the day of the deposit. The 
Court held that these rules of the Vienna Convention corresponded to the solution adopted 
by the Court in the Right of Passage case and that solution should be maintained.
151
  
Thus, for its part in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, the Court maintained its 
view as set forth in the Right of Passage case and stated again that a declaring state should 
not be concerned with the actions of the Secretary-General or with his performance or non-
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performance thereof, specifically mentioning that “The legal effect of Declarations does 
not depend upon subsequent action or inaction of the Secretary-General.” Unlike other 
documents, Art. 36 of the Statute prescribes no additional requirement whatsoever, such 
as the transmission of information by the Secretary-General to reach the parties to the 
Statute or the entrance into force of a particular declaration after the lapse of a specified 
period of time.
152
 The Court noted that, in contrast to Nigeria’s contention, its decision in 
the Right of Passage case could not be regarded as an isolated one as its findings in this 
case had been reaffirmed by those in the cases concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear and 
the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.  
More recently, in the Cases concerning Legality of Use of Force the International 
Court of Justice had again been confronted with a situation similar to that which Portugal 
created in the 1955 and which brought into the limelight the Right of Passage case, namely 
that circumstance whereby a state filed an application with the Court a few days after its 
optional clause declaration had been deposited. As it was already mentioned in the spring of 
1999, when during the period of air strikes by NATO forces, specifically on 25 April 1999, 
Yugoslavia deposited its declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction and then, 
four days later, on 29 April, it instituted proceedings before the Court against ten NATO 
member states separately, “for violation of the obligation not to use of force”, and accused 
these states of bombing Yugoslav territory,
153
 and simultaneously with the application, 
Yugoslavia submitted requests for the indication of provisional measures. In the case of six 
states (Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom), the Belgrade 
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Government based the Court’s jurisdiction on the optional clause in addition to the Genocide 
Convention and, in the case of some states, on other treaties in force between the parties.
154
   
As for the Court’s decisions in these cases of greatest interest to our subject is the fact 
that, in dismissing the Yugoslav request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court 
did not even touch on the question of Yugoslavia having recognized the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction only a few days before the filing of applications. Considering the political 
background of the applications submitted by the repressive Milosević regime against the 
NATO states, one could think that if the Court had wished to depart from its earlier legal 
practice in the least measure, these cases would have offered a good opportunity for it to 
abandon its position as expressed in the Right of Passage case. In all likelihood, the 
international community would have approved of a finding by the Court that the matter—of 
whether Yugoslavia was a party to the optional clause system at the time of filing the 
applications—was under serious question, since Yugoslavia had deposited its declaration of 
acceptance only four days before and hence its right to submit disputes to the Court under the 
optional clause was strongly questionable.  
In view of the unilateral character of the declarations of acceptance, their deposit 
with the Secretary-General is a very important element, since it is the task of the Secretary-
General to secure the publicity of the declarations and to forward them to the states and to 
the Registrar of the Court.
155
 For this reason it is worthwhile to touch briefly on the 
Secretary-General’s actions connected with declarations of acceptance and chiefly on how 
similar these actions are to those regarding treaties registered or deposited with him. 
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In this context, one should examine two of the said functions related to treaties. The 
Secretary-General’s first function is the registration of treaties and conventions concluded 
by UN member states. This function is a special one, based on Art. 102 of the Charter, its 
essence consisting of securing due publicity for treaties concluded by the members of the 
Organization.
156
 The other function is related exclusively to those treaties of which the 
Secretary-General is the depositary, being governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
157
   
The Secretary-General’s duties related to declarations of acceptance are similar in 
some measure to those connected with treaties registered with him under Art. 102, of the 
Charter. In both cases, the Secretary-General receives certain documents and transmits them 
to states. His duties related to declarations of acceptance are practically fulfilled by these 
actions, but his functions as a depositary of treaties involve much more than this and are 
much more substantive.  
According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the depositary has 
the function of examining whether signatures, instruments and reservations are in 
conformity with any applicable provisions of the treaty, and, if need be, bringing the matter 
to the attention of the state in question.
158
 The Secretary-General as depositary may likewise 
have a highly important function not only in informing the states—entitled to become 
parties to the treaty—when the number of signatures, or ratifications, etc. required for the 
entry into force of the treaty has been received or deposited, but even in some cases 
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determining the date at which the treaty enters into force. However, the situation is much 
more complicated in the case of treaties which are silent concerning reservations, i.e. 
treaties whereby it is permissible to make reservations, provided they satisfy the 
compatibility test. 
159
 
In the case of declarations of acceptance, the Secretary-General’s functions are 
similar to the abovementioned practice, being limited to only receiving declarations and 
transmitting them to the Registrar of the Court and to the parties to the Statute. Declarations 
henceforward pass out from the Secretary-General’s purview, for, as mentioned above, the 
Secretary-General has no additional functions related to declarations of acceptance, owing 
among other reasons to the fact that reservations or limitations appended to declarations of 
acceptance need no approval or consent by the other states parties to the optional clause 
system.  
In light of the foregoing, it is understandable why the Court stuck to its position that 
declarations of acceptance enter into force on the day of deposit with the Secretary-General. 
The Court’s position is justified by the fact that an element of uncertainty would be 
introduced into the system
160
 by accepting, as the date of entry into force of declarations of 
acceptance, the date of receipt of declarations by the parties to the Statute or parties to the 
optional clause system, because in that case a declaration would in fact enter into force on 
different dates, depending on the time at which each state receives the same notification. 
If, however, declarations were to become effective after the lapse of a reasonable 
period of time, as was proposed by many, the question naturally arises as to what that 
reasonable period—30 days or 3 months—should be. Yet the example of Cameroon’s 
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declaration of acceptance shows that not even a few months is necessarily sufficient for 
declarations to reach the states parties to the Statute.  
With all probability, the dispute regarding the date of the effect of declarations of 
acceptance recently influenced some states to note in their declarations of acceptance that 
the document will take effect immediately or from the date of its receipt by the Secretary 
General.
161
 
 
V Transferring the legal effect of declarations of acceptance made at time of the 
Permanent Court 
 
At the San Francisco Conference, when it was decided to set up a new international 
judicial forum, the question was raised on what was to become of the declarations of 
acceptance providing for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. As noted earlier, 
the Conference discussed various proposals regarding the jurisdiction of the new Court and 
was unable to decide on the fate of declarations in force until an agreement had been reached 
to maintain the Permanent Court’s optional clause system in the new Statute. At that point a 
paragraph was adopted transferring the legal effects of the declarations which were made to 
the Permanent Court and still in force. The provision reads as follows: 
 
“Declarations made under Article 36, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the 
parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in 
accordance with their terms.” 
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This section was incorporated in Art. 36, as para. 5 and according to it, as was pointed out 
later by the International Court of Justice itself, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court, as well as the declarations of acceptance still in force, passed ipso jure on to the new 
Court. Para. 5 is completely clear at first sight, reflecting the aim to see that the declarations 
of acceptance made between the two World Wars do not become void because of the 
dissolution of the Permanent Court. The apparently clear wording is delusive, however, as the 
said paragraph permits various interpretations. 
When the Permanent Court ceased to exist, the quoted paragraph affected the 
declarations of acceptance made by some 16 states,
162
 a figure which naturally kept 
decreasing over the years, with as little as six declarations that originally provided for the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court still being in force at the end of 2013.
163
  
The question concerning the validity of declarations of acceptance made to the 
Permanent Court has been addressed by the International Court of Justice in several cases, of 
which each involved different aspects of the problems associated with declarations of the 
interwar period. 
In connection with Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute, Rosenne observes that this paragraph 
operated satisfactorily for the purpose of effecting immediate transformation of declarations 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the old Court into declarations providing the 
jurisdiction of the new Court, however, it lost its efficacy after that.
164
 
The necessity to interpret Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute in the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice arose for the first time in the Case concerning the Aerial 
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Incident of 27 July 1955. Under the optional clause, the Israeli Government instituted 
proceedings before the Court against Bulgaria with regard to the destruction of an Israeli 
civilian aircraft belonging to the El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. by the Bulgarian anti-aircraft 
defence forces and for the loss of life and property and all other damage that resulted 
therefrom.
165
 In its response to the application, Bulgaria filed preliminary objections, arguing, 
inter alia, that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, because Bulgaria's 
declaration of 1921 accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court had ceased 
to have effect with the Court's dissolution on 18 April 1946 and therefore it had been 
impossible for the legal effect of the declaration to pass on to the International Court of 
Justice in 1955, when Bulgaria was admitted to the United Nations.
166
 
Thus the Court had to decide whether Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute of the 
International Court was applicable to the 1921 Bulgarian declaration of acceptance.  
In dealing with the first preliminary objection, the Court made a distinction between 
the declarations of acceptance made by states that had both participated in the San Francisco 
Conference and become members of the United Nations before the dissolution of the 
Permanent Court on the one hand, and the declarations of states that had become parties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice after the Permanent Court had been dissolved. Art. 
36, para. 5 when considered in its application to the declarations by the states of the first 
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group, effected a simple operation: the declarations of acceptance of the Permanent Court 
were transformed into acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the new Court. Thus, in 
the case of these states, Art. 36, para. 5 maintained an existing obligation while modifying its 
subject-matter.  
Contrarily, the position of states of the other group—namely those which did not 
participate in the San Francisco Conference and were admitted to the United Nations at later 
dates—were totally different. According to the Court “the operation of transferring from one 
Court to the other acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction by non-signatory States could 
not constitute a simple operation, capable of being dealt with immediately and completely by 
Article 36, paragraph 5.”167 Art. 36, para. 5 was originally only prescribed for signatory states, 
and it was without legal force as far as non-signatory states were concerned. The Statute could 
neither maintain nor transform their original obligation, and the dissolution of the Permanent 
Court freed them from their obligations regarding the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, as was 
also the case with Bulgaria's declaration of acceptance of 1921.
168
  
The Court's view was that restricting the application of Art. 36, para. 5 exclusively to 
those original members of the United Nations was fully in keeping with the aim of this 
provision. In point of fact, it was foreseeable at the time of adoption of the new Statute that 
the Permanent Court was to be dissolved in the near future and, as a consequence, the lapsing 
of declarations accepting its compulsory jurisdiction were in contemplation. The Court 
pointed out rightly that  
“If nothing had been done there would have been a backward step in relation what had 
been achieved in the way of international jurisdiction. Rather than expecting that the 
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States signatories of the new Statute would deposit new declarations of acceptance, it 
was sought to provide for this transitory situation by a transitional provision and that is 
the purpose of Article 36, paragraph 5.”169  
 
According to the Court, if a state became a party to the new Statute long after the dissolution 
of the old Court, there is no transitory situation to be dealt with by Art. 36, para. 5.
170
 That 
provision could not in any event be operative as regards Bulgaria until the date of its 
admission to United Nations in December 1955. However, at that date, the 1921 declaration 
of acceptance was no longer in force as a consequence of the dissolution of Permanent Court 
in 1946 and the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction set out in that declaration was 
devoid of object since the Permanent Court was no longer in existence.  
One can see, that in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, the Court 
gave a narrow interpretation of Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute, ruling that only the in–force 
declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court made by those states being 
represented at the San Francisco Conference were to transfer to the International Court of 
Justice. The application of that paragraph is “subject to two conditions: (1) that the State 
having made the declaration should be a party to the Statute, (2) that the declaration of that 
State should still be in force.”171  
The judgment of the Court in that case drew criticism from many writers of 
international law. In their joint dissenting opinion Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington 
Koo and Sir Percy Spender pointed out that the Court added two further conditions to the 
applicability of Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute, notably 1) the declarant state must have 
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participated in the Conference of San Francisco; 2) the declarant state must have become a 
party to the Statute of the new Court prior to the date of the dissolution of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice on 18 April 1946.
172
 They tried to demonstrate that the 
operation of Art. 36, para. 5 was not intended to be limited to states participating in the 
Conference of San Francisco. They did not question whether the operation of that paragraph 
to states not represented at San Francisco could not have immediate and automatic effect, 
however, it was not expressed that those states were excluded from the operation of the 
paragraph, since their declarations would be transferred to the International Court of Justice 
when they became parties to the Statute.
173
  They emphasized “to attach decisive importance 
to the effect of the dissolution of the Permanent Court amounts not only to re-writing 
paragraph 5; it amounts to adding to it an extraneous condition which it was the purpose of 
that Article to exclude and to disregard.”174 
The issue of the transfer of declarations of acceptance made at the time of the 
Permanent Court to the new Court emerged in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear as well. The dispute between Cambodia and Thailand relating to the territorial 
sovereignty over the Temple of Preah Vihear was submitted to the Court by Cambodia under 
Art. 36. para. 2,
175
 Thailand protested against the proceedings instituted by Cambodia and 
raised two preliminary objections.
176
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In its first preliminary objection, Thailand contended that the declaration of May 1950 
renewing its declaration of acceptance of l929 was invalid as a whole, because the Thai 
declaration of 1929, which had been prolonged for a term of ten years in 1940, had been 
terminated upon the dissolution of the Permanent Court on 18 April 1946 and therefore it had 
been impossible to renew it in 1950.
177
 Thailand, for her part, referred to the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 and 
reasoned that her position was the same as that of Bulgaria.
178
 Hence, the Government of 
Thailand argued that when she renewed her declaration of acceptance of l929 for another ten 
years, she actually renewed a declaration which was not in force and which could not have a 
legal effect other than that of recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of a tribunal that no 
longer  existed.
179
 
The Court held that the case of Thailand was different from that of Bulgaria, and 
furthermore that Thailand, by her declaration of 20 May 1950, had placed herself in a 
different position from Bulgaria. The 1940 Thai declaration of acceptance had expired, 
according to its own terms, on 3 May 1950, two weeks before Thailand made her declaration 
of 20 May 1950. After the lapse of its declaration of 1940, Thailand was completely free to 
decide whether or not to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
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Justice. At that date, however, Thailand took a step which Bulgaria did not, namely she 
addressed a communication—embodying her declaration of 20 May 1950—to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. “By this she at least purported to accept, and clearly intended 
to accept, the compulsory jurisdiction of the present Court”180—held the judgement. 
Therefore the Court deemed the Thai declaration of 20 May 1950 to be a new declaration of 
acceptance, and that it did not relate to Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute.  
The liveliest controversy about the continuity of the declarations of acceptance made 
between the two World Wars was aroused by the 1929 Nicaraguan declaration of acceptance 
in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.
181
 
The point here was that on September 24, 1929, Nicaragua, as a member of the League 
of Nations, signed the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and concurrently, made a declaration of acceptance. However, it did not 
ratify the Protocol at the time, and it was only ten years later, on 29 November 1939, that it 
notified the Secretary-General of the League of Nations via telegram that the Protocol of 
Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court was ratified and the instrument of ratification 
would be sent in due course. According to the available documents, however, the instruments 
of ratification had never been received by the League of Nations in Geneva. 
For all these reasons, in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua, the United States in its counter-memorial concerning the questions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility, contended that Nicaragua never ratified the Protocol of 
Signature of the Statute, never became a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court, and 
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consequently the 1929 declaration never came into force.
182
 Thus, Art. 36, para. 5, of the 
Statute did not operate to pass the legal effects of the Nicaraguan declaration of 1929 to the 
International Court of Justice, because Nicaragua’s declaration was never an acceptance of the 
Permanent Court‘s compulsory jurisdiction.183 
The Court was of the view that at the time the Statute of the new Court came into force 
the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua was “though valid, had not become binding under the 
Statute of the Permanent Court”184.  
 
“Nicaragua failed to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Protocol of Signature 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court, was not party to that instrument. Consequently 
the Declaration made by Nicaragua in 1929 had not acquired binding force prior to 
such effect as Article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice might produce.”185  
 
In other words, concerning declarations of acceptance made at the time of the Permanent 
Court, the International Court of Justice made a distinction between the validity and the 
binding force of declarations. The Nicaraguan declaration was valid but did not have binding 
force because Nicaragua had failed to ratify the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court and hence was not a party to the Statute.  
It thus seems that the Nicaraguan declaration was not binding although—not being 
disputed—itcould have been had Nicaragua ratified the said Protocol of Signature prior to the 
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establishment of the new Court. In the judgment, it was emphasized that declarations similar 
to that of Nicaragua “had certain legal effects which could be maintained indefinitely.” 
According to the Court, this durability of potential effect of the Nicaraguan declaration 
derives from the fact that it was made “unconditionally”, i.e. without any limitation whatever, 
and for an unlimited period.
186
 Thus when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the new 
Court, its declaration of 1929 was valid.
187
 The Court found that Nicaragua's ratification of 
the new Statute had the same effect—with respect to its 1929 declaration of acceptance—as if 
it had ratified the Protocol of Signature of the old Statute. 
By recognizing as valid the Nicaraguan declaration of acceptance of 1929 and ruling 
that it had jurisdiction in the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States, the 
International Court of Justice stirred enormous controversy, so much so that even the writers 
discussing that decision of the Court are, as it were, far too numerous to list in the literature of 
international law.
188
 The judgement that was delivered—with regard to jurisdiction and 
admissibility in the Nicaragua case—allowed the proceedings to continue, and in its 
judgement of 1986 on the merits, the Court found, among other points, that the United States 
had acted in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the 
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affairs of another state, not to use of force against another state, not to violate the sovereignty 
of another state.
189
    
On the basis of the three cases discussed above it can be stated that with respect to the 
application of Art. 36, para. 5 the Court has attached a paramount importance that the states 
having made declarations of acceptance at the time of the Permanent Court, should have the 
continuity of being contracting parties, without interruption, concerning the two Court’s 
Statutes. In the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 it was emphatic about the 
fact that a state which had not acceded to the Statute of the new Court by 18 April 1946 was 
freed from the obligations undertaken in its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Permanent Court and that those obligations could not be revived any more.  
The situation with regard to Thailand was different. Thailand's declaration of 
acceptance made to the Permanent Court had lapsed on 3 May 1950, and it was some two 
weeks later that Thailand made a declaration to renew its previous one. The Court held that 
the expiration of Thailand's previous declaration relieved that country from the obligations 
undertaken in her declaration of acceptance made to the old Court, and that from that time 
Thailand was free to decide whether or not to make a declaration of acceptance. Within the 
meaning of the judgement, it was clearly intended by Thailand to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the new Court, as was indeed expressed in her declaration of 20 May 1950.  
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Nicaragua's declaration of acceptance involved a special problem, since there was a 
declaration of acceptance from 1929 which was valid but not in force. In the case of 
Nicaragua nobody questioned the continuity of being a contracting party to the Statutes of the 
two Courts. Nicaragua was a founding member of the United Nations, being among the first 
to duly sign and ratify the United Nations Charter on 7 July l945, and, upon becoming a party 
to the Statute of the new Court, had a valid declaration, whose entry into force was subject to 
a step still missing, notably ratification of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court. According to the International Court that requirement had been satisfied by 
the ratification of the United Nations Charter, and thus the Nicaraguan declaration of 
acceptance of 1929 thereupon attained binding force. 
When examining the Court’s conclusions in the above three cases one can discover at 
first glance certain contradictions between the three judgements, especially those delivered in 
the Aerial Incident case and the Nicaragua case, particularly with regard to the fact that in the 
Aerial Incident case the Court gave a sensu strictu (narrow) interpretation of Art. 36, para. 5 
of the Statute, a reason why it refused to recognize the applicability of that provision to 
Bulgaria's declaration of acceptance of 1929. In the Nicaragua case, on the other hand, it 
relied on that same provision in admitting the continuance of a declaration of acceptance 
which did not have binding force even between the two World Wars. In that case the Court 
gave an interpretation of Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute which covered the application of that 
provision even to declarations without binding force at the time of the Permanent Court, and 
Nicaragua's ratification of the new Statute had the same effect as if it had ratified the Protocol 
of Signature of the old Statute.
190
  
                                                 
190
 In the Nicaragua case, the Court took notice of the conduct of states and international organizations as well as 
the fact that in the Court’s publications Nicaragua was among the states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court, and that was not denied by Nicaragua nor questioned by any state. Thereby the Court actually 
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In point of fact, the aforementioned contradictions between the judgements are but 
seeming ones, for in all three cases the Court acted consistently in respect of two questions, 
(1) namely with respect to the application Art. 36, para. 5 it was necessary that the declarant 
state should have a continuous status as party to the Statutes of both Courts (2) that this 
paragraph of the Statute relates “solely to the cases in which the declarations accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court would be deemed to be transformed into 
acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the present Court, without any new or specific 
act on the part of the declarant State”.191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
accepted the doctrine of “consent by subsequent conduct” which was sharply challenged by several members of 
the Court. 
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Chapter 4 
ADMISSIBILITY OF RESERVATIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE 
 
Even the very first declarations of acceptance contained certain clauses that served to 
place limitations on the obligations that states had undertaken concerning the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction,
192
  and, as JochenFrowein points out, from the very beginning it was 
understood that states may exclude different areas from the operation of the optional clause.
193
 
In connection with the practice of placing limitations by attaching reservations to the 
declarations of acceptance, Leo Gross considers it paradoxical that “in practice states apply 
both the ‘contracting-in’ (or ‘opting-in’) principle as well as the ‘contracting-out’ (or ‘opting-
out’) principle: they ‘contract-in’ by making a declaration of acceptance and they ‘contract-
out’ by attaching reservations.”194 
The limitations or restrictions—included in the declarations of acceptance—are called 
“reservations” both in the writings of publicists and practice of the two Courts. This 
terminology is not the most suitable, chiefly because the said limitations cannot be deemed to 
be real reservations according to the interpretation used in international law regarding the law 
of treaties and, as will be discussed later, they differ in many aspects from the reservations 
made to multilateral treaties.
195
 The appearance of reservations in the declarations of 
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acceptance was somewhat “unexpected” because, in the drafting of the Permanent Court’s 
Statute, the Committee of Jurists did not anticipate any reservation being made by a declarant 
state concerning the compulsory jurisdiction.
196
 On the other hand, however, acceptance with 
reservations of the Court’s jurisdiction should not have been really so “unexpected”, as it can 
in no way be seen to be a novelty for states to accept with certain conditions the arbitral 
settlement of  international disputes, or attach, a priori, such clauses to arbitral agreements to 
exclude one or more questions from arbitration. Thus, for instance, arbitration agreements 
concluded in the 19
th
 century often included clauses to the effect that arbitral settlement was 
not to apply to questions affecting the “vital interests”, “national honour”, “independence”, 
etc. of states. At the time this was considered to be a basic assumption so much so that, 
according to Hans Wehberg, even when not definitely expressed, the clause concerning vital 
interests is included in all arbitration treaties.
197
 
 
 
I Appearance of reservations to declarations of  acceptance 
 
Art. 36, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice provides that  
“The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of 
reciprocity in relation to several Members or States, or for a certain time”.  
 
In other words, certain limitations, namely reciprocity and limitations of time, were permitted 
by the Statute itself. In 1930, the eminent British expert of international law, Hersch 
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Lauterpacht wrote the following with respect to this issue: There is no doubt that “the 
Optional Clause does not provide expressis verbis for the possibility of reservations being 
made, but there is no necessity for such an express provision.”198 As a general rule, a state 
may qualify any treaty obligation with whatever reservation it deems necessary; as is shown 
throughout their history, treaties of arbitration constitute no exception in this respect.
199
   
In his monograph published in the early 1930s, Fachiri writes that the language of Art. 
36 referring to certain reservations, does not preclude the admissibility of further reservations 
in one way or the other.
200
 In any case, one can say that the cited paragraph of the Statute  
forms the legal basis of the states’ practice to make limitations or reservations to their 
declarations of acceptance, placing limitations as to persons, subject-matters or periods of 
time on the obligations they have assumed concerning the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. 
The literature of international law from the interwar period reflected views which—
considering that Art. 36, of the Statute only contains limitations phrased like “on condition of 
reciprocity” or “for a certain time”—argued the conclusion a contrario that no other 
reservation, condition, limitation or restriction should be joined to declarations of 
acceptance.
201
 That position did not have many advocates, and, to our knowledge, Judge Levi 
Carneiro was the only member of the two International Courts to maintain the said view.
202
 
Contrary to this, the prevalent opinion was that Art. 36 had no restrictive character in this 
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respect and did not preclude the admissibility of further reservations.
203
 Moreover, as a 
consequence of the efforts to reconcile the idea of obligatory arbitration with certain 
inalienable sovereign rights of states, it was natural that the idea of implied reserves 
emerged.
204
 Another author argued that, in addition to the admissibility of reservations,  if a 
state was free to accept or not accept the obligations as laid down in the clause, then, in the 
absence of express provisions, the liberty not to accept the optional clause covers the liberty 
to place conditions on acceptance.
205
  
The disputes about the permissibility of limitations on reservations to declarations of 
acceptance were ab initio rather academic in nature, since states in practice did make use of 
the possibility to make reservations, attaching to their declarations rather varied limitations 
and reservations consisting of different contents, not only those which are mentioned in Art. 
36 of the Statute.
206
 
The question of the permissibility of reservations was also addressed by the League of 
Nations.
207
 Concerning the proposal of its First Committee and a special subcommittee
208
, the 
Assembly of the League of Nations, in its resolution of 2 October 1924, expressed the view 
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that the wording of the optional clause was broad enough for states to accede to the clause 
with such reservations as they deemed necessary.
209
   
While interpreting the above cited provision of the Statute, the First Committee stated 
that its flexibility authorises the making of any kind of reservation. Since States are free to 
accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in certain classes of disputes, but not in others, 
they are all the more free to accept the compulsory jurisdiction in only a fraction of one of 
those classes.
 210
   
  Since comparatively few states had made declarations of acceptance and some of the 
declarations had not come into force, the question of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance was brought forward, among other issues, in the course of preparations for the 
Disarmament Conference held in 1932 under the auspices of the League of Nations.  In the 
resolution of 26 September 1928, the Assembly emphasized that it wished to remove the 
obstacles preventing states from adhering to the optional clause system. The Assembly called 
the attention of states to the possibility of making reservations limiting their obligations either 
in time or in scope. Furthermore, the resolution stated that “the reservations conceivable may 
relate, either generally to certain aspects of any kind of dispute, or specifically to certain 
classes or lists of disputes, and that these different kinds of reservation can be legitimately 
combined.”211  
Some authors conceived howthat resolution of the League of Nations was an 
interpretation of the Statute, while others categorically refuted such conceptions.
212
 No matter 
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how one looks at the resolution, one thing is sure: it had no binding force but was in fact a 
political declaration. In any case, after the adoption of the resolution, several states made 
declarations of acceptance. At the same time, however, the cited position taken by the League 
of Nations on reservations to declarations of acceptance did have certain “negative” effects as 
well, because afterwards states came to make more and more complicated declarations and 
accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction with more and more limitations. According to 
Hudson, the tendency towards a more complicated form of declarations and to multiply the 
limitations on the jurisdiction recognized was encouraged not only by the abovementioned 
1928 Assembly’s resolution but by Art. 39 of the Geneva General Act of 1928, which 
enumerated three classes of disputes that could be excluded by reservations from the scope of 
application of the Treaty.
213
  
The efforts exerted by the League of Nations to have the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction accepted by as many states as possible remained a topic of discussion even in later 
decades. In the late 1990s, Judge Kooijmans noted that it was ironical that the League of 
Nations by encouraging the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, endorsed the 
making of reservations to the declarations of acceptance (although Art. 36, para. 3 of the 
Statute does not authorize declarant states to make such reservations), thereby weakening the 
system which it intended to strengthen.
214
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Statute was a separate international treaty independent of the Covenant, one that had to be ratified separately, 
while the Member States of the League of Nations were not under obligation to accede to the Statute. In reality, 
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II  Freedom to attach reservations to declarations of acceptance  
 
Regarding the question of reservations to declarations of acceptance, the San 
Francisco Conference identified itself fully with the practice established at the time of the 
Permanent Court, although ideas were voiced about the need for certain changes.  
During the debate of Subcommittee D of Committee IV/1 of the San Francisco 
Conference, Canada proposed that there should be incorporated in Art. 36, para. 2 a list of 
permitted reservations, with liberty to add others. On the other hand, Australia argued that 
there should be added an exhaustive list of  permitted reservations, along the lines of that 
adopted in the Geneva General Act of 1928. However, both proposals were rejected by the 
Subcommittee.
215
   
In its report to Committee IV/1 of the Conference, Subcommittee D stated the 
following in connection with reservations to declarations of acceptance:  
 
“The question of reservations calls for explanation. As is well know, the article (i.e. 
Art. 36, – V. L.) has consistently been interpreted in the past as allowing States 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to subject their declarations to reservations. The 
Subcommittee has considered such interpretation as being henceforth established. It 
has therefore been considered unnecessary to modify paragraph 3, in order to make 
express reference to the right of the States to make such reservations.”216  
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After the International Court of Justice had been established, states continued the 
practice of making reservations to declarations of acceptance and even “invented” additional 
reservations that became more and more complicated. As will be discussed later, several of 
these “new” reservations place much more limitations on the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
than did the reservations to interwar declarations of acceptance, with no small part of them 
finding a loop-hole of escape from the Court’s jurisdiction. For that matter, among the post-
1945 declarations of acceptance there are very few in which, similar to those declarations of 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction made by Latin American states between the two World 
Wars,  a state accepted the Court’s jurisdiction without any limitation. 
In connection with the various reservations, the question rightly arises as to what this 
can be traced to and what lies at the root of more and more complicated reservations. 
In our view, there are three reasons for this trend. 
The first reason is, as was very wittily stated in the report of the 1964 Tokyo Congress 
of the International Law Association, “almost every State has some skeletons in its closets and 
might not wish to have them exposed before the Court.”217 In addition, the report goes on to 
say, states undoubtedly believe certain difficulties to be surmountable by reservations, but are 
usually afraid they might have forgotten something important or that in the future there might 
arise some new problems that are not covered by specific reservations. This fear of unforeseen 
consequences tends to prompt states either to refrain from making a declaration accepting 
compulsory jurisdiction or to attach sweeping, open-ended reservations to their 
declarations.
218
 
The second reason is related to the development of international law. The 
advancement of science and technology requires more and more domains to be governed by 
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international law, however, due to the uncertainty of the new norms and state practice, some 
states prefer to exclude these issues from the scope of their declaration of acceptance.  
The third reason can be traced back to the fact that states have “learnt” from the 
jurisprudence of the Court in previous cases, in the sense that they have “elaborated” new 
reservations, on the basis of the opinions formulated by the Court in its judgments, in order to 
prevent a similar situation occuring in the future. This is best exemplified by the reservations 
that sought to ward off “surprise applications”, which became widespread after the Court had 
delivered its judgment on the preliminary objections in the Right of Passage case.
219
 
For that matter, the problem of reservations to declarations of acceptance has been 
repeatedly addressed by the United Nations as well. One of the most important of the relevant 
documents is Resolution 3232 (XXIX) on Review of the role of the International Court of 
Justice, which the General Assembly adopted by consensus on the basis of the proposal of the 
Sixth Committee. In that resolution, the General Assembly recognized “the desirability that 
States study the possibility of accepting, with as few reservations as possible, the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with Art. 36, of the Statute”. 
That appeal and other similar ones met with little response, and states continued the practice 
of making reservations to their declarations of acceptance, with some declarations containing 
so many and so diverse limitations that, with some exaggeration, now the question arises, as it 
were, which of the disputes come, under Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute, within the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a particular state.  
Most authors on international law recognize the freedom to make reservations, and 
only occasionally can one meet with views claiming that under the new Statute no reservation 
to or limitation on declarations of acceptance is admissible in addition to those phrased like 
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“on condition of reciprocity” and “for a certain time”, notably those mentioned in the 
Statute.
220
  
Such views are based on the fact that the provisions of the new Statute on the optional 
clause have been slightly amended, as was already mentioned, by omitting the word “any” 
from the phrase “in respect of all or any classes of legal disputes” in Art. 36, para. 2.  This 
amendment, as Waldock points out, did not impair the right to make reservations to the 
declarations of acceptance in the same way as existed in the days of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.
221
 It’s true that “…while it is no longer open to a State, in accepting  
compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, to differentiate between the classes of 
legal disputes listed in the Clause, it may still, in other ways, differentiate between categories 
of disputes with respect of which it accepts the Clause. It may still, by limitations, 
reservations and conditions, except large categories of disputes from its acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction.” 222 
The view concerning the inadmissibility of reservations not mentioned in the Statute 
was revived by Pakistan in the Case concerning Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999. In that 
dispute, the application that was submitted by Pakistan, instituting proceedings against India 
in respect of a dispute relating to the destruction of a Pakistani aircraft, was based on Art. 36, 
paras. 1 and 2 of the Statute and the declarations of acceptance of the two states. In response 
to the application, India submitted preliminary objections invoking, inter alia, the so-called 
“Commonwealth reservation” to its declaration of acceptance regarding the exclusion of 
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disputes in respect of any state which “is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of 
Nations”.223 Countering this, Pakistan argued that nothing but the reservations mentioned in 
the Statute may be made to declarations of acceptance. Limitations other than those stated in 
the Statute are regarded as “extra-statutory”, which was in excess of the conditions permitted 
under Art. 36, para. 3 of the Statute; thus according to Pakistan, the Indian reservation is 
inapplicable and the Commonwealth reservation cannot be invoked against Pakistan.
224
 
In connection with the so-called “extra-statutory” reservations going beyond the 
conditions fixed in Art. 36, para. 3 of the Statute, the Court observed that Art. 36, para. 3 had 
never been regarded as laying down in an exhaustive manner conditions under which states 
may accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. On this ground, the Court rejected the 
Pakistani argument that the Commonwealth reservations should be regarded as “extra- 
statutory”, because it contravened Art. 36, para. 3 of the Statute.225 
 In view of the foregoing it can be stated that the positions placing limitations on 
making reservations to declarations of acceptance may be considered as isolated, the majority 
view being that, according to the generally accepted interpretation of the Statute, states have 
the right to attach various limitations, reservations or conditions to their declarations under the 
optional clause. As regards the different reservations and their relationship with the Statute, 
James Crawford comes to the conclusion that, since Art. 36, para. 3, suggests that no other 
conditions were intended than those mentioned in the Statute, the “process by which 
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reservations came to be accepted is a striking case of interpretative development of Art. 36 by 
subsequent practice”.226   
The permissibility of reservations to declarations of acceptance and the freedom in 
formulating the contents thereof are similarly proved by the fact that cases are rather rare in 
which a state has protested against the declaration of acceptance by another state or the 
limitations contained therein. One such rare case occurred in the mid-1950s, when Sweden 
protested against the reservation included in the Portuguese declaration of acceptance of 19 
December 1955, which provided that “The Portuguese Government reserves the right to 
exclude from the scope of the present declaration, at any time during its validity, any given 
category or categories of disputes, by notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
and with effect from the moment of such notification.”227 That objection had little effect, as is 
best evidenced by the fact that in the Right of Passage case the Court did not even consider 
the Swedish objection to the reservation included in the Portuguese declaration of acceptance, 
although it examined the validity of the Portuguese declaration. 
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In point of fact, objections by other declarant states to reservations to declarations of 
acceptance have only been raised in concrete cases where states have tried, in the form of 
preliminary objections, to challenge reservations invoked by the opponent party. 
The question of the limits and the permissibility of certain reservations arose in the 
jurisprudence of the International Court in several cases, including—first of all in the 1950s—
the Case of Certain Nowegian Loans, the Interhandel case, the Right of Passage case, and 
recently the Case concerning Fischeries Jurisdiction.
228
 It should be emphasized that the legal 
problems emerging in these cases were not the same. In the Case of Certain Norwegian 
Loans
229
 and the Interhandel case the so-called Connally reservation (or subjective 
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reservation of domestic jurisdiction)
 
was the subject of the debate, a reservation which, 
according to most writers of international law, is contrary to the Statute and the very purpose 
of the optional clause system.
230
 In the Right of Passage case, the subject of contestation was 
a reservation permitting the withholding of the jurisdicition conferred on the Court with 
immediate effect. However, in the Fischeries Jurisdiction case, the reservation in question 
belonged to a different category, it was a valid reservation relating to conservation measures 
with respect to the sea,
231
 and, there is no question that Canada was entitled to attach that 
reservation to its declaration of acceptance. In that case, one of the crucial issues was whether 
the Canadian measures against the Spanish vessel Estai, which implied—acccording to 
Spain—the use of force, was within the sphere of the reservation attached to the declaration, 
or as Spain contended, “Canada’s reservation is invalid or inoperative by reason of 
incompatibility with the Court’s Statute, the Charter of the United Nations and with 
international law.” 
The Canadian reservation provoked a lively debate both in the literature of 
international law and in the Court, which was reflected in the opinions appended to the 
judgment.
232
  Some of these opinions, especially those of Vice-President Weeramantry and 
Judge Bedjaoui suggest that there are certain inherent limits to the freedom of states to insert 
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reservations in their declarations of acceptance.
233
 With that connection, it’s worth quoting a 
paragraph from Vice-President Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion, who rightly stated that 
 
“… any matter that arrises for adjudication within optional clause territory would be 
governed strictly by the rules of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the 
Court. One cannot contract out of them by reservations, however, framed. The basic 
principles of international law hold sway within this haven of legality, and cannot be 
displaced at the wish of the consenting State.”234   
 
 
III  Specific features of reservations to declarations of acceptance 
 
The freedom to accept compulsory jurisdiction with reservations or limitations has 
been recognized not only in the literature of international law, but also by the two 
International Courts. Where a legal dispute involved limitations on or reservations to a 
declaration of acceptance, the majority of judges have accepted the limitation and not dealt 
with the question of admissibility. They have never contested the permissibility of 
reservations to declarations of acceptance and, as will be discussed later, confined themselves 
to inquiring into the compatibility of certain reservations with the Statute and the optional 
clause system. 
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The position of the International Court of Justice on the admissibility of reservations 
or limitations is perhaps reflected most clearly in the Court’s judgment in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, whereby the Court 
held that declarations accepting its compulsory jurisdiction  
 
“are facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make it or 
not to make. In making the declarations a State is equally free either to do so 
unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with 
conditions or reservations.”235  
 
The same principle was reaffirmed by the Court in the Fischeries Jurisdiction case, 
stating “that States enjoy a wide liberty in formulating, limiting, modifying and terminating 
their declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute.”236 
 Regarding the special features of reservations attached to declarations of acceptance, 
one should take into consideration the following: 
(a) Reservations or limitations included in declarations of acceptance differ from 
reservations to treaties primarily because in the case of declarations of acceptance there is no 
treaty-like text which the contracting parties have agreed upon in the course of the 
elaboration of the instrument and which the state making a reservation wishes to depart from. 
So what is involved here is not the exclusion or amendment of a provision which was adopted 
by the contracting parties and furthermore departing from that provision would make it 
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necessary to obtain the consent of other states parties to the treaty.
237
 When making 
declarations of acceptance under the optional clause, states are completely free, as has been 
shown by more than nine decades of practice, to do so, in determining the obligations they 
assume in their declarations and the conditions they attach to them. This was expressed in the 
Court’s finding in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, in which the Court held that  
“Conditions or reservations thus do not by their terms derogate from a wider 
acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to define the parameters of the State’s 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.”238 
 
(b) Owing to the principle of reciprocity, which can be considered to be a fundamental 
element of the optional clause system,
239
 another feature of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance is that a reservation operates to modify the scope of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction not only for the declarant state, but, in principle, also for the other states parties to 
the optional clause system, whenever a state party to the system submits to the Court a dispute 
with a state, which made reservations or limitations to its declaration of acceptance. The 
principle of reciprocity means that the reservation or limitation made by the applicant state 
can be used against it by the respondent state and visa versa. All this carries an element of 
                                                 
237
 In this context we have in mind acceptance of reservations and eventual objections to them. At first sight it 
might even be asked (chiefly when one is not fully conscious of the specific features of the optional clause 
system) whether Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3 of the Statute (notably the optional clause itself) may not be regarded as 
a kind of “basic text” which States may exclude, amend, etc. by reservations to declarations of acceptance. Such 
an approach is mistaken by all means. Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3, of the Statute—as the text of a treaty adopted by 
the contracting parties, which a State may depart from by reservation—could become of relevance, if the Statute 
provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, which States would be free to “contract out” of. 
238
 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Jurisdiction of the Court) Judgment of 4 December 1998. ICJ Reports 1998, 453  
239
 On reciprocity see Chapter 6. 
 110 
uncertainty, because a state party to the optional clause system is not in a position to know 
beforehand whether in a future dispute it might be more beneficial or unbeneficial having 
reservations or limitations included in its own declaration of acceptance or accepting 
reservations or limitations joined to the declaration of another state party to the system. This 
possibility is undoubtedly not foreign to treaty law either. Thus, the reservations or limitations 
included in declarations of acceptance, serve to secure a possibility to evade those certain 
unforeseen, or perhaps very much foreseen, issues in disputes which are submitted to the 
Court’s decision. 
One can state that it is not so far from the truth in supposing that another factor behind 
the rather rare practice of raising objections to reservations or limitations by state parties to 
the  optional clause system, is perhaps the fact that the exclusion of certain disputes from 
compulsory jurisdiction meets with approval by other state parties to the system. Of course, 
all this is very difficult to exemplify, but it can easily be supposed that, for instance, 
reservations excluding disputes connected with certain armed conflicts can be placed in this 
category, and preventing the submission to the Court’s decision of these disputes meets with 
the approval of other states involved in the particular armed conflict.  
Numerous instances could be cited in respect of a reservation or limitation attached by 
a state to its declaration of acceptance being subsequently “advantageous” or 
“disadvantageous” to another state party to the optional clause system. In fact, the situation as 
to when the reservation or limitation inserted in a declaration will result in advantage or 
disadvantage to another party of the system is likely to vary from case to case. For an example 
of advantageous situation, one can refer to the case when the respondent state in its 
preliminary objection invokes a reservation attached to the declaration of acceptance of the 
applicant state and the objection is accepted by the Court. The best known case in point is the 
Certain Norwegian Loans case, in which Norway as the respondent invoked the limitation 
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contained in the applicant state’s (France) declaration of acceptance, modelled on the highly 
controversial subjective reservation to domestic jurisdiction, and the Court accepted the 
Norwegian objection and held that it—acting as the Court—was without jurisdiction.240    
 
 
IV  Classification of reservations attached to declarations of acceptance 
 
Most authors in the literature on international law differenciate between three kinds of  
limitations joined to declarations of acceptance; specifically reservations ratione personae, 
ratione materiae and ratione temporis depending on whether the limitations cite personal, 
material or temporal factors in their exclusion from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction.
241
  
 The majority of reservations joined to the declarations of acceptances are ratione 
materiae limitations, excluding from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction special disputes or 
disputes relating to certain subject matters. There is a wide variety of these limitations and the 
main types are the following: reservations excluding those disputes which should be settled by 
other methods of peaceful settlement, reservations relating to hostilities and armed conflicts, 
reservations excluding disputes relating to territorial sovereignty, reservations on 
environmental disputes, limitations affecting constitutional questions, disputes relating to a 
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specific treaty or specific treaties, reservations on foreign debts and liabilities, reservations on 
questions of domestic jurisdiction, etc.  
Already between the two World Wars reservations appeared excluding disputes 
between certain states, which are called ratione personae limitations. These limitations are 
referring either to a specially named state or states, or it could be that the reservation is 
formed in a rather general way, without mentioning by name any state or states, but  referring 
to a special group of states. These limitations concern States having special relations with the 
declarant state which could be either very close contacts (e.g. belonging to the same 
intergovernmental organization like the Commonwealth of Nations—the best-known variant 
of this type of reservation is the so-called Commonwealth reservation) or states being on bad 
terms (unfriendly  relations). As a consequence of these reservations, the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court could not be applied between two states although both are parties to 
the optional clause system. A special group of ratione personae reservations are those 
limitations which exclude disputes with non sovereign states or territories. It is difficult to 
understand the ratio of these reservations since according to Art. 34, para. 1. “Only States may 
be parties in cases before the Court”. 
The third class of reservations are limitations ratione temporis, which are based on Art. 
36, para. 3, of the Statute providing that the declarations may be made “… for a certain time”. 
On the basis of that provision a declaration of acceptance could be made either for a fixed 
period or an indefinite duration. The first group of declarations contain a clause fixing the 
period of validity. The declarations for an indefinite or unlimited duration are made either 
without reference to duration, or they provide for the duration, or the declaration declares that 
it remains in force until notice of termination or withdrawal. It should be mentioned that states 
developed several variants of clauses concerning the duration of declarations of acceptance, 
and there are reservations combining fixed and indefinite duration. One could consider as a 
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ratione temporis limitation those reservations which are excluding the retroactive effect of the 
instrument, or disputes arising at the time of war, as well as those seeking to prevent surprise 
applications.  
In the case of some reservations their classification depends largely on the wording or 
formulation of the given reservation, e.g. in the case of limitations aiming to exclude from 
compulsory jurisdiction the events of war, or hostilities. If the declaration is referring to 
disputes relating to events of war or hostilities then it could be considered as a reservation of 
ratione materiae; however, if the reservation provides for disputes arising at the time of war 
or even more precisely determines the dates of the events of war or hostilities then it is a 
reservation ratione temporis. 
 One could use other classifications of reservations as well; e.g. Arangio-Ruiz 
differentiates between horizontal  and vertical reservations.
242
 The Italian professor calls 
‘horizontal’ reservations the limitations ratione materiae, ratione personae, ratione loci and 
ratione temporis, because these clauses are concerned with distinctions between categories of 
state-to-state disputes, namely relating to  disputes arising at the level of international 
relations. According to Arangio-Ruiz, belonging to this category are such old reservations 
regarding national honour, vital interest
243
 etc. “Vertical” reservations are those which are 
intended to exclude disputes pertaining to the jurisdiction or competence of national 
authorities, and include constitutional questions, questions of domestic legislation, issues 
reserved for national tribunals, disputes relating to the sovereignty or independence of the 
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state. These reservations exclude from international consideration or decision matters, those 
disputes relating not to inter-state relations but to national law between private parties, or 
between state organs and private parties.
244
  
In the following chapters there will be a division between two categories of 
reservations, i.e. there are “generally recognized” reservations, which could be considered as 
accepted by the international community of states, including reservations to declarations of 
acceptance which are recognized or approved by individual states. The other group of 
reservations consists of the so-called disputed reservations which undermine the optional 
clause system and make illusionary the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction—these 
limitations will be called “destructive reservations”.  
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Chapter  5 
THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE SYSTEM 
 
The question concerning the legal character of the optional clause system deserves 
attention not only because it embodies a theoretical issue, but also because it is of great 
practical relevance, considering that the answers to be given to a number of important 
questions regarding declarations of acceptance—such as the rules governing the modification 
or withdrawal of declarations, the legal effects of reservations and the limitations attached to 
declarations, interpretation of declarations, etc—depend on how one looks at the legal 
character of the optional clause system.  
Considering the literature on international law, there are two basic ideas to be 
distinguished when discussing the legal character of the optional clause system. Both points 
of view start from the position that states recognize the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction by 
unilateral declarations. However, a difference between the two approaches is revealed upon 
an appreciation of the system resulting from these declarations. One view emphasizes the 
unilateral nature of the optional clause system, while the other conceives the relations as being 
like those between states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in a treaty-like 
relationship. As an extra third category of opinions, one could even highlight those authors 
who argue that the relation between states established by their declarations is a sui generis 
international engagement having bilateral and multilateral elements. Proponents of either the 
unilateral or the treaty-like nature views cite various decisions of the two International Courts, 
each of which undoubtedly contains a sentence, or half phrase, isolated from its context, that 
may appear to support one or the other points of view.  
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The problem of the legal character of the optional clause system is put by Anand in 
this way:  
 
“The question is whether such an ‘international engagement’ is constitutionally to be 
regarded as founded upon a unilateral legislative act done vis-à-vis the Court, or as 
founded upon a bilateral, consensual transaction effected by the joining together of the 
declarations of any given pair of states through the Optional Clause.”245  
 
The uncertainty with respect to the relations established by declarations of acceptance 
is well reflected in the separate opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings submitted in the Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, stating that the 
declarations of acceptance establish some sort of relationship with other states that have made 
declarations; but it is not easy to say what kind of legal relationship it is.
246
  
According to the British judge, that relationship is created by a great variety of 
unilateral declarations, all having the common element of being made within the framework 
of Art. 36, para. 2, of the Court’s Statute.  
 
“The declarations are statements of intention; and statement of intention made in a 
quite formal way. Obviously, however, they do not amount to treaties or contracts; or 
at least, if one says they are treaties, or contracts, one immediately has to go on to say 
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they are a special kind of treaty, or contract, partaking only of some of the rules 
normally applicable to such matters.”247  
 
Regarding the declarations of acceptance themselves, one can say that there is a 
common understanding that these are unilateral acts. Torres Bernárdez rightly pointed out that 
“These declarations cannot be considered, either notionally or legally, as bilateral or 
multilalaeral instruments, not even with respect to the area of coincidence of the various 
consents.”248 According to Robert Kolb an optional declaration is legally a hybrid.249 
The Permanent Court in the Phosphates in Morocco case, held that  
“The declaration, of which the ratification was deposited by the French Government 
on April 25th, 1931 is a unilateral act by which that Government accepted the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction.”250   
 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the International Court of Justice took a similarly clear 
stand, saying that  
“... the text of the Iranian Declaration is not a treaty text resulting from negotiations 
between two or more States. It is the result of unilateral drafting by the Government of 
Iran,..”251  
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In the Norwegian Loans case the International Court refered as well to the unilateral 
character of declarations of acceptance. 
252
 In the  Nicaragua case, the Court came to address 
rather extensively the legal character of the declarations of acceptance and the admissibility of 
reservations to them, emphasizing:  
“Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are facultative, 
unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free to make or not to make.”253 
After a few lines, the Court went on to pronounce that  
“In fact, the declarations, even though are unilateral acts, establish a series of bilateral 
engagements with other states accepting the same obligation of compulsory 
jurisdiction, in which the conditions, reservations and time-limit clauses are taken into 
consideration.”254 
 
The cited statements prove that the unilateral character of declarations of acceptance 
was affirmed by both International Courts. 
  
 
I The contractual character of the system 
 
The view that a multilateral treaty-like relationship is established between those states 
making declarations of acceptance is widely held in the literature of international law. It 
should be added that, in this case, the contractual relationship has been formulated by several 
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related instruments rather than by a single one. There is no doubt about the well known 
postulate of international treaty law that a treaty can be embodied not only in a single 
instrument, but in more related instruments as well.
255
 Obviously, if the optional clause 
system is seen as a contractual regime, it is to be included in the later category.  
In the jurisprudence of the two International Courts, it is the Electricity Company of 
Sofia and Bulgaria case and the Right of Passage case that are usually relied upon for 
justifying the contractual character.  
In the Electricity Company of Sofia case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
referred to the date of the “establishment of the juridical bond” between two states, Belgium 
and Bulgaria, under Art. 36 of the Statute.
256
   
The other case frequently mentioned in connection with contractual character, 
concerns the Right of Passage case. However, this case, which will be considered at a later 
stage, can be invoked to bear out the contractual character just as it can be cited in support of 
the unilateral character. In this case, the International Court of Justice certainly had in mind 
some sort of a contractual relationship between states parties to the optional clause system, 
declaring that  
“The contractual relations between the Parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court resulting therefrom are established ‘ipso facto and without special agreement’, 
by the fact of the making of the Declaration”.257  
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Statements about the contractual character of optional clause system, established by 
declarations of acceptance, are also to be found in the separate and dissenting opinions of the 
members of the two International Courts.  
At the time of the Permanent Court in his separate opinion submitted with respect to 
the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, Judge Anzilotti wrote:  
“As a result of these Declarations, an agreement came into existence between the two 
States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, in conformity with Article 
36 of the Statute and subject to the limitations and conditions resulting from the 
declarations…”258   
 
More than ten years after the Electricity Company of Sofia case, in the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Co. case, Judge Alvarez, when answering the question as to whether the Iranian 
declaration of acceptance (which he termed, not incidentally, a declaration of “adherence”) 
was unilateral or bilateral in character, wrote:  
“… the Declaration is a multilateral act of a special character; it is the basis of a treaty 
made by Iran with the States, which had already adhered and with those which would 
subsequently adhere to the provisions of Art. 36, para. 2, of the Statute of the 
Court”.259  
 
Also, in his separate opinion given in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, Sir Hersh 
Lauterpacht touched briefly upon the legal character of the declarations of acceptance. That 
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what was stated by the Court regarding the unilateral nature of the declarations of acceptance 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, was construed by Judge Lauterpacht to mean  
“… no more than that the declaration is the result not of negotiations but of unilateral 
drafting. Whether it is a treaty or a unilateral declaration, it is – if it is to be treated as a 
legal text providing a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court – a manifestation of 
intention to create reciprocal rights and obligations.”260  
 
Lauterpacht went on to compare the optional clause to a multilateral treaty concluded under 
the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly, and he visualized the declarations of 
acceptance as an accession to a multilateral treaty elaborated by the General Assembly.
261
  
 
In the South West Africa cases, Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
in their joint dissenting opinion wrote that  
“The quasi-treaty character which ‘optional clause’ declarations made under paragraph 
2 of Article 36 of the Statute are sometimes said to posses, would arise solely from the 
multiplicity of these declarations and their interlocking character, which gives them a 
bilateral or multilateral aspect. A single such declaration, if it stood quite alone, could 
not be an international agreement.”262  
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Then, the two judges stressed that declarations of acceptance can in no way be 
identified with “treaties or conventions”, referred to in Art. 36, para. 1 of the Statute or there 
would have been no need for para. 2.
263
  
Again, in a separate opinion given in the Nicaragua case, Judge Mosler adverted 
essentially to the contractual character when he said that the basis of operation for the optional 
clause is “the consensual bond”, and “that comes into being at the time at which another state 
deposits its declaration”.264 
Several prominent writers on international law refer to treaty–like relations between 
states that are parties to the optional clause system. Between the two world wars, Fachiri 
wrote that the declarations of acceptance are “in form unilateral, the rights and obligations to 
which it gives rise are multilateral.”265  
Hans Kelsen in his monumental work on the United Nations asserted that  
“The unilateral declaration of one state together with the unilateral declaration of 
another state constitute an agreement. This agreement, it is true, has not the character 
of a ‘special agreement’ within the meaning of the term used in Article 36, paragraph 
1. But it is a general agreement in so far as the states by making the declaration 
referred to in Article 36, paragraph 2, in relation to one another, agree to recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes, in case one party brings the dispute 
before the Court.”266  
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Herbert Briggs, similarly argued for the contractual character, and, in a lecture delivered at the 
Hague Academy of International Law, said that a declaration of acceptance  
“..is not a contractual engagement undertaken by the declarant State with the Court. It 
is in the nature of a general offer, made by declarant to all other States accepting the 
same obligation, to recognize as Respondent the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to 
the limitations specified in the offer.”267  
In the same lecture, Professor Briggs also spoke about a “consensual bond accepting 
compulsory jurisdiction” existing between two declarant states.268  
In connection with the views propounding the contractual character, Iglesias Buigues 
writes that, in the opinion of most authors, declarations are unilateral acts, which nevertheless 
have contractual effects (effects contractuels) in the sense that declarations contain sufficient 
elements for them to produce effects of a contractual character, albeit they remain unilateral in 
nature.
269
 According to Iglesias Buigues, it is the parties agreement on the Court’s jurisdiction 
that forms the basis of the contractual relation. This is brought into being by the fact that the 
declarations are actually offers, made by the declaring states to each other, constituting a 
chain of offers and acceptances thereof, in the sense that when a state deposits its declaration 
with the Secretary-General it is both accepting the offers of those states—that are parties to 
the optional clause system—which have made declarations and submitting, on its part, an 
offer to any other state making a subsequent declaration.
270
 According to the author, the real 
content of this agreement is determined when the declarations are applied in a concrete case, 
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and the degree to which the declarations of two states overlap becomes apparent in that 
event.
271
   
The view that accession to the optional clause system is an offer and an acceptance of 
the earlier offers, is not foreign to the members of the Court either. That idea was expressed 
by Vice-President Badawi in his dissenting opinion in the Right of Passage case in the 1950s, 
and was formulated again more than four decades later by Vice-President Weeramantry in the 
Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.  
According to Vice-President Badawi, Art. 36 of the Statute with the words “ipso facto 
and without special agreement” “stresses the conventional character of Declarations and it 
confirms that character by the expression ‘in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation’”.272 Some lines further he emphasizes the importance of the offers and the 
acceptances thereof with respect to the declarations made under the optional clause by saying 
“But what creates the agreement here, as in every other meeting of wills, is always the basic 
idea of offer and acceptance”.273 Vice-President Badawi stresses that the system of 
declarations of acceptance constitutes a contract by correspondence between the declarant 
state and the other states with the intermediary being the Secretary-General.
274
  
In the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria, Vice-President Weeramantry analyzed the question of offers and acceptances and, 
comparing the national legislation of different states, came to the conclusion that the 
acceptance of an offer was necessary for a contract to come into being, and a contract was 
made only if the offeror had been notified of the acceptance of his offer. In other words, in the 
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case of mutual obligations created on the basis of Art. 36, para. 2 the offeror must be 
informed as to whether or not his offer has been accepted, and there can be no consensus in 
the absence of the communication of an acceptance.
275
   
The contractual character of the network of declarations of acceptance is emphasized 
by Edith Brown Weiss
276
 and Stanimir Alexandrov as well. In support of the contractual 
character, Alexandrov refers to the origin and treaty–like character of the optional clause, the 
Secretary-General’s role in receiving and registering the notices of declarations made under 
the optional clause, and the practice of states in the making their declarations.
277
   
After describing the contractual character of the optional clause system, Alexandrov 
refers to certain specific features of declarations of acceptance which include the following: 
the declarations are not treaty texts resulting from negotiations, unilateral declarations include 
an element of vulnerability and unpredictability, the mutual consent of parties under the 
optional clause is determined on the basis of reciprocity, obligations assumed by declarations 
of acceptance arise only when a special dispute is submitted to the Court.
278
 
Alexandrov sees the elements of uncertainty due to the fact that, as they involve erga 
omnes obligations, the declant state runs the risk, as the Court found in the Right of Passage 
case, of being immediately sued by a newly declarant state. The Bulgarian author exemplifies 
the elements of vulnerability and uncertainty by highlighting the Nicaragua case, claiming 
that in making its declaration accepting the Cout’s compulsory jurisdiction, the United States 
was not in a position to foresee that its relations with Nicaragua would worsen so much as to 
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cause that state to submit an action against the Washington Government before the 
International Court of Justice.
 279
 
One can argue that the said elements are in fact an attribute not only of the optional 
clause system. It may happen in the case of any treaty that relations between the contracting 
parties come to deteriorate markedly over time and that, in the space of perhaps a few years, 
let alone decades, the relationship of two states may undergo a change precluding the 
application of a treaty they concluded earlier. A long list of examples could be cited of 
interstate relations in order to illustrate other similar situations. In practice, however, states 
take care to safeguard their interests in a considerable part of related treaties, and if relations 
between the contracting parties come to deteriorate to the extent that the parties do not find it 
desirable to apply a treaty inter se, they usually take steps to denounce, terminate, or amend 
the treaty concerned.  
With respect to declarations of acceptance, such “cautious” steps are rather rare, and 
even when relations between two states tend to worsen, with the exception of a few cases, 
measures aren’t taken to avoid the submission of a dispute to the Court under the optional 
clause. What is more frequent, however, is that only when a “delicate” dispute is already 
before the Court do the states try to hamper the Court’s decision-making process, among other 
things by raising preliminary objections
280
 or by resorting to amend or terminate their 
declarations of acceptance.
 281
 
One should add also that the deterioration of interstate relations—as an unforeseeable 
element in connection with declarations of acceptance—is not so strange because these 
declarations relate to the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of an international judicial 
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forum, which is clearly tantamount to states reckoning with the emergence of disputes and 
having in mind a future resort to the judicial forum for the settlement of their disputes. 
Therefore, the element of uncertainty as a source of problems ensuing from the deterioration 
of relations should not be over–emphasised, since in the case of declarations of acceptance, 
States—by making such declarations—count a priori on the emergence of future disputes, 
which entails to some degree, as it were, the deterioration of relations between the parties. Of 
course, the picture varies from case to case with regard to the degree to which relations 
between the parties worsen, before they submit their disputes to the International Court.  
Anyway, from the foregoing it becomes clear that the conception of the optional 
clause system as a contractual relation based on unilateral declarations is a rather widespread 
both among the members of the Court and the writers of international law. 
 
 
II The intermediate position 
 
As another apprehension of the legal character of the optional clause system, one 
should mention a so–called transitory view, and according to Renata Szafarz  
 
“… it is a sui generis or quasi–treaty (which is the same thing) legal structure which 
consists of contractual and unilateral elements, and which establishes a set of parallel 
bilateral relationships. Every relationship consists of contractual (both multilateral and 
bilateral) elements and a unilateral element. The provision contained in Article 36(2) 
of the ICJ Statute constitutes the multilateral element. Owing to the reciprocity 
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principle reservations constitute the bilateral element. Non-symmetrical formal 
conditions contained in declarations constitute the unilateral element.” 282  
 
Indisputably this approach reflects to some extent the reality, however, the inclusion of the 
Statute in the network of obligations is misleading, also giving a false picture regarding the 
legal character of the optional clause system. When making declarations of acceptance, the 
states are assuming obligations among themselves, and similarly when they are accepting a 
treaty containing a compromissory clause they are conferring jurisdicition on the Court—in 
both cases the Statute does not form a direct part of the network of obligations. It is true that 
the Statute provides the basis for declarations made under the optional clause, defining the 
basic elements of the system, however, the actual content of the obligations is determined by 
the declarent states themselves. The states in making their declarations of acceptance do not 
establish a contract with the Court, since the legal bound was already set up when they 
become a party to the Statute, but they do establish a network of obligations in addition to 
that assumed upon signing and ratifying the Statute itself.  
Rosenne’s approach can be classified as a transitory view as well, because the Israeli 
professor terms the optional clause system as sui generis international obligations. He wrote 
that these obligations were assumed under special rules of international law, and although 
having some affinities with the types of obligations regulated by the law of international 
treaties, they are not on all fours with them.
283
 He refers also to the fact that, in contrast to the 
process of treaty-making, no negotiations take place when declarations of acceptance are 
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made and the terms on which a state accepts the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction are not a 
matter of negotiations but follow from a unilateral act.
284
 
 
 
III The unilateral character of the optional clause system - The rejection of the 
contractual relation  
 
The partisans of the unilateral character of the optional clause system refer to the 
drafting history of the optional clause, and call attention to the “misleading effect” if the rules 
of treaty law would be applied to the system of declarations made under the optional 
clause.
285
  
 The views emphasizing the unilateral character of the optional clause system likewise 
invoke various decisions of the two International Courts, such as those in the Phosphates in 
Morocco case, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Norwegian Loans case, the Nuclear Tests  
cases, the Nicaragua case, the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between Spain and Canada, etc.  
As mentioned earlier, the Right of Passage case can also be invoked to support the 
unilateral character of the optional clause system. There is no doubt that in the judgment on 
the preliminary objections in this case, one can find sentences, as quoted previously, 
suggesting  the existence of a contractual relation (rapport contractuel) between states parties 
to the optional clause system. However, regarding the process in which such a relation is 
established, the Court leaned to the unilateral character of the system of declarations of 
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acceptance in both rejecting India’s second preliminary objection and pointing out that the 
only requirement for the validity of declarations of acceptance was that the parties should 
deposit them with the Secretary-General, there being no further obligation such as notification 
to the states parties to the Statute or lapse of a specified period of time after the deposition of 
the declaration.
 286
  
All this leads one to raise questions about whether the Court, in referring to 
contractual relations, really had in mind a genuine contractual relation between states parties 
to the optional clause system. If the Court had indeed conceived the optional clause system to 
be a contractual relation having some characteristics borrowed from the law of treaties, then 
in the Right of Passage case it would have accepted the argument of the Indian Government 
and some members of the Court
287
 that a declaration of acceptance not only had to be 
deposited with the Secretary-General, but that the Secretary-General had to transmit copies 
thereof to the parties to the Statute and the declaration was not valid until the Secretary-
General had fulfilled this obligation. This gives rise to the question of what the Court really 
meant by the terms “contractual relation” (rapport contractuel) and “consensual bond” (lien 
consensuel).  
At the end of the 1990s the legal character of the optional clause system had been 
addressed in more depth by the Court in two cases, notably the Case concerning the Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case. In 
both cases the problem of the legal character of the optional clause system arose as a result of 
the question as to whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable to 
declarations of acceptance.  
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In the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Nigeria as respondent submitted eight 
preliminary objections, with the first one relating to the legal nature of the system of 
declarations under the optional clause. Nigeria contended that its declaration of acceptance 
had been a matter of public record for some 30 years. However, Cameroon’s declaration was 
undated and had been communicated to the Secretary-General on 3 March 1994, and the 
Office of the Secretary General had transmitted copies of the Cameroonian declaration to 
Nigeria (and presumably to other parties to the Statute) nearly a year later. Nigeria 
maintained, accordingly, that when Cameroon filed the application on 29 March 1994, 
Nigeria did not know nor was not in a position to know that Cameroon had acceded to the 
optional clause system.
288
 
In this case with regard to the optional clause system, the Court pointed out that  
 
“Any State party to the Statute, in adhering to the jurisdiction of the Court in 
accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, accepts jurisdiction in its relations with 
States previously having adhered to that clause. At the same time, it makes a standing 
offer to the other States party to the Statute which have not yet deposited a declaration 
of acceptance. The day one of those States accepts that offer by depositing in its turn 
its declaration of acceptance, the consensual bond is established and no further 
condition needs to be fulfilled (my ephasised – V.L.).”289  
 
Thereupon ensued the situation, which the Court described in 1957, whereby the 
declaring states “… may at any time find itself subjected to the obligations of the Optional 
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Clause in relation to a new Signatory as the result of the deposit by that Signatory of a 
Declaration of Acceptance.”290 This notwithstanding, in the Land and Maritime Boundary 
case the Court unequivocally ruled out the requirement to give any notice to the state making 
an offer. This was reflected in its finding that “There is no specific obligation in international 
law for States to inform other States parties to the Statute that they intend to subscribe or have 
subscribed to the Optional Clause.”291 Regarding the respective case, the Court went on by 
stating that “Consequently, Cameroon was not bound to inform Nigeria that it intended to 
subscribe or had subscribed to the Optional Clause.”292 
The legal character of the optional clause system in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 
involved a difference of views between Spain and Canada about the rules on the interpretation 
of reservations added to declarations of acceptance.
293
 
According to Spain, the interpretation of reservations attached to declarations of 
acceptance was subject to the law of treaties, whereas Canada underlined the unilateral nature 
of declarations and reservations and further contended that the reservations should be 
interpreted in a natural way, with particular regard to the intention of the declaring state.  
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For its part, the Court came out once again emphasizing the unilateral nature of 
declarations when it explained that such an acceptance is a unilateral act of state sovereignty 
regardless of whether or not special limitations are placed on an acceptance, and it 
subsequently reiterated its position in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria half a year earlier. Regarding the interpretation of 
declarations of acceptance, the Court held that the rules on the interpretation of declarations 
are not identical to those established for the interpretation of treaties by the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and “the provisions of that Convention may only apply 
analogously to the extent compatible with the sui generis character of the unilateral 
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.”294 
The view of the Judges was divided in that case as well. It is worth mentioning the 
seperate opinion of Judge Oda, in connection with the unilateral character of declarations of 
acceptance, who wrote that the reservations attached to the declarations,  
 
“… must, because of the declaration’s unilateral character, be interpreted not only in a 
natural way and in context, but also with particular regard for the intention of the 
declarant State. Any interpretation of a respondent State’s declaration against the 
intention of that State will contradict the very nature of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
because the declaration is an instrument drafted unilaterally.”295 
 
The foregoing goes to show clearly that, also according to some recent decisions of the 
International Court of Justice, declarations of acceptance are not only unilateral acts, but the 
system constituted by them cannot be also regarded as relations of a contractual nature.  
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For the appreciation of the legal character of the system established by declarations of 
acceptance, it is necessary to take into consideration states’ practice and especially their 
practice in making, terminating or withdrawing declarations of acceptance as well as the 
Court’s position regarding the issue.296 
Both the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure of the two International Courts are silent 
on the withdrawal of declarations of acceptance and how states parties to the optional clause 
system can get rid of their obligations concerning the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction; it is 
entirely left to the decision of the declarant state how and under what conditions it breaks free 
from the “bonds” of the clause. Several states have certainly included in their declarations 
various provisions on termination or withdrawal, but not a single reference to them is to be 
found in a non–negligible part of any of the declarations of acceptance.  
It should be noted that in a considerable part of declarations, such provisions don’t 
even imply any real restriction, for what the declarant states do is no more than reserve the 
right to denounce their declarations with immediate effect. States have in practice availed 
themselves of this possibility and have often modified or terminated their declarations of 
acceptance with the international community taking notice of such practice. In fact, the Court 
itself has never taken a definitive stand on the matter, and all it did in the Nicaragua case was 
confine itself to spelling out that “the right to termination of declarations with indefinite 
duration is far from established.”297 
True, there exist quite a few declarations which contain provisions on certain time-
limits, period of notice, etc, concerning the termination or withdrawal of the instruments, but 
it should be stressed that it is left in every case to the declarant state to decide whether or not 
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it includes such provisions in its declaration of acceptance. Should a state choose to terminate 
its declaration with respect to certain conditions, e.g. a period of notice, its act amounts to 
nothing else more than a self-limitation of its own will. 
This is well illustrated by the 1946 US declaration of acceptance, which contained the 
clause that to “remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of 
six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.” In the Nicaragua case the 
Court held that  
“In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do so uncondionally and 
without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions or reservations. In 
particular, it may limit its effect to disputes arising after a certain date; …or what 
notice (if any) will be required to terminate it.”298  
 
By this ruling, the Court clearly confirmed the tenet that states are free to formulate the 
conditons of termination with respect to their commitments regarding the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction.   
 In contrast to the foregoing, the entry into force of treaties, as well as the conditions 
for their withdrawal or termination, are subject to the agreement of the contracting states 
determined in the course of the elaboration of the treaties, or, failing relevant provisions or 
agreement in the treaty itself, the general rules of international law apply.
299
 In the case of 
declarations of acceptance, as is indicated by what has gone on before, all these matters are 
for the declarant state to decide; the decision not being able to be restricted in any way by the 
will of other states or any norm of international law.  
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For all these reasons it would be difficult to term this system of commitments—undertaken on 
the basis of the optional clause—as being of a contractual character. The declaring states 
themselves decide on what conditions, with what reservations, limitations, etc. they accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and, as Judge Oda pointed out in his separate opinion 
submitted in the Nicaragua case,  
 
“For a treaty containing such a clause conferring a unilateral right entirely to alter or 
terminate terms of the treaty with immediate effect would surely be impossible: it 
would not be treaty. Yet this is now almost normal parctice in declarations of 
acceptance of the Optional Clause.”300    
 
No question there is a certain kind of judical link between the states making 
declarations of acceptance, however, that relationship has no treaty–like character. The states 
parties to the optional clause system undertake, by accession to that system, a unilateral 
commitment regarding the Court’s jurisdiciton, which could create a bilateral legal 
relationship at a later stage. This is activated when concrete disputes are referred to the Court, 
and the content of such a legal relationship is clearly determined by the conditions, 
reservations and other limitations, which the parties may have formulated in their respective 
declarations of acceptance.  
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Chapter 6 
RECIPROCITY AND THE SYSTEM OF OPTIONAL CLAUSE DECLARATIONS  
 
  I The Statute on reciprocity 
International law is interwoven—perhaps more profoundly than any other branch 
of law—due to reciprocity in the sense that rights are being coupled with certain obligations 
in interstate relations and there must be some sort of correlation between the rights enjoyed 
and obligations assumed by states.
301
 First of all, this is explained because in international 
law states are the law-makers who are equal and well aware that they should assume 
certain obligations in return for their rights, and vise versa. This thesis in international law 
holds true not only for law-making, but also for the application and enforcement of law. 
There is no doubt that the principle of reciprocity is most clearly manifested in the law of 
treaties, however, as will be seen in this chapter, it is also a basic element of the optional 
clause system under the Statutes of both Courts.302  
Reciprocity is covered by Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice providing that  
 
 (2) “The States to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court…”     and  
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 (3) “The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.”303  
 
At first sight, however clear these provisions appear to be, one can detect some 
confusion concerning the relationship between Art. 36, paras. 2 and 3.
304
 According to 
Kolb the relationship between these two provisions was neither very obvious nor much 
clarified when the Statute was elaborated.305 This is likely due to the fact that while both 
paragraphs cover reciprocity, they refer to different aspects thereof.  
Art. 36, para. 2 is unambiguously clear about what the fundamental characteristic of 
the optional clause system is, namely that it is a network of additional obligations and extra 
rights between a group of states parties to the Statute. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
case Judge McNair described the optional clause as being representative of “contracting–
in,” and not “contracting–out.”306 This regime operates only in the inter se relations of States 
that have made declarations of acceptance, and not in respect of all states party to the 
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Statute. Professor Waldock, in his study on the optional clause, describes all this as a 
“fundamental lack of reciprocity” between the position of states which either do or  do not 
make declarations of acceptance.307  The declaring states are continuously liable to be 
brought before the Court compulsory, however, states not making such declarations cannot 
be sued before the Court unless and until they choose to initiate proceedings before the 
Court as plaintiff and make a declaration under the optional clause.
308
  
Art. 36, para. 3 refers to reciprocity in connection with the content of declarations of 
acceptance, providing that reciprocity may be stipulated in the declarations. Thus 
“Reciprocity governs not only the relationship ratione personae between the different states 
concerned (“mutuality”), but determines also the scope ratione materiae of the jurisdiction 
of the Court”.309 
The explanation for the Statute referring twice to reciprocity is offered by the 
documents which are connected to the drafting of the Statute, and the double reference 
can, in all likelihood, be attributed to the proposals of the Brazilian jurist, Fernandes, a 
member of the 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists. Fernandes thought that states were free 
to accept the Court’s jurisdiction conditionally or unconditionally. He saw one such 
condition as being reciprocity in respect of certain states or a certain number of states, 
including certain denominated states. The Brazilian expert argued that it is impossible for a 
state to accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction without knowing the states with which it is 
to undertake such an obligation.  
Regarding Fernandes proposals, Thirlway comes to the conclusion that the 
Brazilian jurist’s draft sought to allow states to pick and choose its partners in the 
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compulsory jurisdiction relationship.
310
 At any rate, it was under the influence of 
Fernandes’s proposals that the section saying that “the declarations referred to above may 
be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain 
Member States or for a certain time” was inserted in the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. To our knowledge, the possibility for the “choice of partners ,” which 
was the essence of Fernandes’s motion, was only used by Brazil—which included in its 
1920 declaration of acceptance a formula under which its declaration of acceptance was to 
be effective “as soon as it has likewise been recognized as such by two at least of the 
Powers permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations”.311  
Waldock’s interpretation that Art. 36, para. 3, refers in fact not to reciprocity is 
essentially in harmony with Fernandes’s concept. According to the British expert, what we 
have here is a provision authorizing states to accept compulsory jurisdiction for a definite 
period of time and on condition that the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction is also accepted by 
a certain number of states or by particular named states. Thus, in the view of Waldock this 
is not a real “condition of reciprocity”, but one in which a declaration will not become 
effective until the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction has been accepted by a certain number of 
states or by certain named states.
312
 
As is provided by Art. 36, para. 2 of both Statutes, a state recognizes the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction in respect of states “assuming the same obligation”. Here it is most 
likely that the drafters of the optional clause had in mind cases in which a state accepts the 
Court’s jurisdiction in respect of only some of the four categories of disputes enumerated 
                                                 
 310 Thirlway (1984 NYIL)  103–104  
311
 According to Hudson, the condition included in the Brazilian declaration of acceptance was met on February 
5, 1930.  Cf. Hudson (1972)  684 footnote 8 
312
 Waldock (1955-56) 255    
 141 
in paragraph 2.
313
 However, what happened in practice instead, was that states, by attaching 
reservations to their declarations of acceptance, did not exclude categories (a), (b), (c) or (d) 
of the disputes enumerated in Art. 36, para. 2 but, by naming them precisely or less 
precisely, formulated conditions or reservations as to time, persons or subject-matters, etc. 
whereby they limited the scope of the obligations they undertook in respect of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction.  
Emmanuel Decaux writes that the original idea was confined to the reciprocity of 
acceptance, namely with respect to states making declarations of acceptance, and did not 
imply any sort of full reciprocity comprising of reservations and conditions.
314
 According 
to the said author, at first sight Art. 36, para. 2 allows for two extreme concepts: 
minimum reciprocity is satisfied by both parties adhering to the optional clause system, 
whereas maximum reciprocity requires the parties to make identical declarations of 
acceptance. The French author holds the view that if the making of reservations is not 
permitted, this distinction would be superfluous as states could make identical declarations 
only.
315
 He concludes that in a concrete case an absolute identity is not required, it is 
sufficient if the two declarations are partially coinciding.316  
Herbert Briggs stresses that “Any assumption that the phrase ‘accepting the same 
obligation’ requires identical Declarations or equivalent reservations would lead to the 
nullification of the system of compulsory jurisdiction” under Art. 36, para. 2 of the 
Statute, because states have wide discretionary powers to unilaterally determine the 
conditions with regard to accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.317 One can fully 
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agree with Professor Briggs
318
 that taking the passage “accepting the same obligation” 
literally implies that the system of compulsory jurisdiction would only operate between 
states having made completely identical declarations, and not in respect of other states.  
The passage “accepting the same obligation”, as Waldock points out, does not mean 
that “exactly or even broadly the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction must have been 
accepted by each State,” but, requires “complete reciprocity in the operation of  
compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause as between two States which have 
accepted the obligation in different terms.”319   
In the literature of international law, several authors emphasize that the condition of 
reciprocity in the optional clause was designed to ensure jurisdictional equality of the 
parties before the Court.320 This is especially so because, as Edit Brown Weiss goes on to 
say, the system of compulsory jurisdiction has evolved in such a way that there are 
potentially significant inequities among states who have accepted it.321  
 
  II The reference to reciprocity in declarations of acceptance 
 
A closer look at the declarations of acceptance made since the establishment of the 
Permanent Court reveals that references to reciprocity, in different formulations, can be found 
in most declarations of acceptance. There are declarations which allude to Art. 36 of the 
Statute by using the phrases: “on condition of reciprocity”, “subject to reciprocity”, “subject 
exclusively to reciprocity”, or, “on the basis of absolute reciprocity”. Also featuring has been 
the phrasing that the declaration creates an obligation in respect of “States making 
                                                 
 
318
 Id. 242–243 
319
 Cf. Waldock (1955-56). 257–258 
320
  Cf. Alexandrov (1995). 39,  Brown Weiss (1987) 98   
321
 Cf. Brown-Weiss (1987) 98-100 
 143 
identical declarations” or “States accepting the same obligation”, which is naturally 
equivalent to the aforesaid express stipulations of reciprocity. Several declarations contain the 
formula “in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation that is to say on 
condition of reciprocity”; such a formula is termed by Briggs as the “double formula of 
reciprocity”.322 A rather specific formula regarding reciprocity was included in the 2003 
declaration of acceptance of  Peru saying that the “declaration shall apply to countries that 
have entered reservations or set conditions with respect to it, with the same restrictions as 
set by such countries in their respective declarations”. The Peruvian reservation practically 
explains the meaning of reciprocity, although in taking the literal sense of the reservation, 
the question could be raised, as to what happens with the declarations of those states which 
have neglected to incorporate reservations in their declarations of acceptance. On the other 
hand, some declarations of acceptance contain no reference to reciprocity, meaning that the 
declaring states recognize the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction without providing for 
reciprocity. 
Regarding the inclusion of reciprocity in declarations of acceptance, the question 
arises as to whether reciprocity applies to all declarations of acceptance and whether it 
even applies to those cases where states fail to make a reference to reciprocity or excluding 
reciprocity.
323
 This question seems proper if only for the reason that, according to some 
authors, there is nothing to prohibit states from accepting the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction without stipulating reciprocity. The view that a distinction can be made between 
declarations of acceptance unconditionally and on condition of reciprocity is  
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associated—in the literature of international law—with Guiliano Enriques during the inter-
war years and with Hambro among other authors in later times.
324
  
According to Enriques, declarations of acceptance made with the reference to 
reciprocity imply acceptance of obligations of only those states having made identical 
declarations, whereas declarations made without referring to reciprocity apply, in the 
absence of a contrary provision, simply to obligations assumed in respect of states having 
ratified the Statute.
325
 It calls for no further explanation that, based on this view, states 
having made declarations of the latter form would assume rather far–reaching 
obligations, for they would in fact accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in respect 
of all states party to the Statute. In connection with such declarations, Bertrand Maus 
says that, in the absence of any will expressed to that effect, such declarations cannot be 
construed to imply an obligation wider than that expressed in the clause itself.
326
 
Concerning Enriques’s view, Thirlway points out that the author practically overlooks 
the reference to “reciprocity”, which is a kind of communis error, contained in a declaration 
referring to Art. 36, para. 2 and that the possibility of excluding reciprocity is only given in 
respect of paragraph 3, which, however, covers a different sort of reciprocity.
327
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The concept that reciprocity is neither a discretionary condition nor a reservation—
instead constituting the basis of the network of declarations made under Art. 36 of the 
Statute—can be considered to be the view of the majority of writers. Reciprocity is a basic 
constitutional provision of the Statute applicable to all declarations of acceptance, including 
those of states having unconditionally accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.328 
This is supported by the practice of the two Courts, which purports the statement that 
“reciprocity” has always been interpreted as applying to all compulsory jurisdiction 
declarations. For that matter, practice over more than eight decades has shown that, as is 
asserted by Shabtai Rosenne,  “ The real problem which the Court has faced was never 
whether or why reciprocity exists and within the framework of the compulsory jurisdiction, 
but how it affects the acceptance of the jurisdiction in the particular case.”329 
 
  III Reciprocity in the practice of the two Courts 
 
In the jurisprudence of the two International Courts, the question of reciprocity 
has emerged in a number of cases, with the parties, the Court and the writers not 
infrequently offering differing interpretations. The problem concerning the interpretation 
of reciprocity results from the fact that in 1920 the authors of the Statute did not 
contemplated how reciprocity would really operate with respect to reservations attached to 
declarations of acceptance, so the legislative intention  provides no guidance in this 
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matter.
330
 It is not accidental that Rosenne points to contradictions in the views of both 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and writers on reciprocity.
331
 
In the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the case of the 
Phosphates in Morocco was the first occasion that considered the question of reciprocity.332 
In that legal dispute, attention should be directed to, for the purpose of the present 
discussion, the French preliminary objection invoking the reservation to the French 
declaration of acceptance, which excluded the retroactive effect of the declaration.333 
According to the reservation, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction existed in respect of any 
dispute arising after the ratification of the declaration, i.e. after 25 April 1931, with regard to 
situations and facts subsequent to this ratification. On the basis of reciprocity, France 
claimed that the exclusion of the retroactive effect in relations between the two states—
albeit the Italian declaration contained no reservation concerning earlier facts and 
situations—was effective as from the date of ratification of the Italian declaration of 
acceptance. Thus the Court’s jurisdiction exists between the two states in respect of 
disputes arising on the basis of facts and situations subsequent to 7 September 1931. Decaux 
considers that the said objection of France not only involved reciprocity, but actually 
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transplanted the French reservation into the Italian declaration,
334
 and that France invoked 
against Italy a pseudo-reservation embodied in the Italian declaration.
335
  
For its part, the Court stated that  
 
“This (the Italian—V. L.) declaration does not contain the limitation that appears in 
the French declaration concerning the situations or facts with regard to which the 
dispute arose; nevertheless, as a consequence of the condition of reciprocity 
stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of this Court, it is recognized 
that this limitation holds good as between the Parties”.336  
 
However, the Court did not consider the question as to whether the limitation excluding the 
retroactive effect should operate from the date of ratification of the Italian or theFrench 
declaration of acceptance, as the Court held that  
“The date preferred by one or other of the Governments would not in any way 
modify the conclusions which the Court has reached. It does not therefore feel 
called upon to express an opinion on that point.”337  
 
Thus the Court recognized the application of reciprocity to reservations added to the 
declarations of acceptance made by the two states, but did not clarify the consequences 
ensuing there from. In that case, no problem was caused by this course of the Court, since 
there was an interval of a few months between the dates of the deposit of the two 
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declarations of acceptance. However, one can easily imagine a case in which the date from 
which the reservation operated could have been of great importance. 
Similarly, in the Electricity Company of Sofia case between Belgium and Bulgaria,338 
the Court was confronted with a reservation excluding the retroactive effect of the 
declarations. In that case, it was on the basis of reciprocity that the respondent state, 
Bulgaria—which in 1921 accepted the Court’s jurisdiction only on the condition of 
reciprocity—invoked the reservation to the declaration of the applicant state, Belgium. The 
respective Belgian declaration, ratified on 10 March 1926, contained a reservation that the 
declaration applied to “any disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration 
with regard to situations or facts subsequent to this ratification”. The Permanent Court 
stressed that  
 
“Although this limitation does not appear in the Bulgarian Government’s own 
declaration, it is common ground that, in consequence of the condition of reciprocity 
laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court’s Statute and repeated in the 
Bulgarian declaration, it is applicable as between the Parties”.339  
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Dealing with this decision, Alexandrov stresses that the Court expressly and irrevocably 
recognized that reciprocity applies to reservations ratione temporis.
340
  
Despite their apparent similarity, the two abovementioned cases are different. In the 
Phosphates in Morocco case, the respondent state invoked the reservation to its own 
declaration of acceptance as a bar to the Court’s jurisdiction and the Court accepted that, 
referring to reciprocity. However, reciprocity come into question again when the respondent 
state wanted to have the date of exclusion of the retroactive effect counted from the date of 
deposit, not of its own declaration of acceptance, but that of its adversary, the applicant 
state, yet that matter was not decided by the Court. On the other hand, in the case of the 
Electricity Company of Sofia, a reservation excluding the retroactive effect was contained in 
the declaration of acceptance of the applicant state, and it was invoked by the respondent 
state on the basis of reciprocity. 
The question of reciprocity has also been considered by the International Court of 
Justice in several cases.  
Chronologically, mention should be made first of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
case, which was submitted by the United Kingdom against Iran.341 In that case, the 
respondent state invoked the reservation contained in its own declaration of acceptance 
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excluding the retroactive effect of the declaration.
342
 In its judgment on the preliminary 
objections, the Court emphasized that  
 
“By these Declarations jurisdiction is conferred on the Court only to the extent to 
which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it. As the Iranian Declaration is 
more limited in scope than the United Kingdom Declaration, it is the Iranian 
Declaration on which the Court must base itself. This is the common ground 
between the Parties”.343 
 
In connection with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, Briggs notes that, since the 
respondent state was invoking the reservation to its own declaration as a bar to 
jurisdiction, there was no need for the reference to reciprocity, and it is likely that the 
Court and its President addressed that point “as an elucidation provided by the Court on a 
question argued at some length by the Parties in the pleadings.”344 
The above–cited statement regarding the “coincidence” of declarations of 
acceptance has been repeatedly invoked by the Court; most recently in the case of Land and 
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Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (preliminary objections)
 345
 and in the 
Legality of the Use of Force cases at the end of the 1990s.  
Perhaps of greatest interest concerning the application of reciprocity with respect to 
declarations of acceptance is the Certain Norwegian Loans case instituted by France against 
Norway, which involved a subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction.346 The declaration 
of acceptance made by France contained a reservation under which the declaration did not 
apply to differences “relating to matters, which are essentially within the national 
jurisdiction as understood by the Government of the French Republic”. In the Norwegian 
declaration of acceptance there was no such limitation, but, in its first preliminary objection, 
Norway contended that the International Court did not have jurisdiction in that case because 
by virtue of the declarations of acceptance, the Court had jurisdiction only with respect to 
legal disputes falling within one of the four categories  enumerated in Art. 36, para. 2, of the 
Statute and relating to international law. However, the subject-matter of the dispute, as 
stated in the French application, related to the national law of Norway. In the second part of 
the objection, Norway relied on the principle of reciprocity in referring to the above–quoted 
reservation on national jurisdiction which was joined to the French declaration of 
acceptance.
347
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Concerning the abovementioned issue relating to its own jurisdiction, the 
International Court of Justice stated that  
 
“… in the present case the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the Declarations 
made by the Parties in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute on 
condition of reciprocity; and that, since two unilateral declarations are involved, 
such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court only to the extent to which the  
Declarations coincide in conferring it. A comparison between the two 
Declarations shows that the French Declaration accepts the Court’s jurisdiction 
within narrower limits than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the common 
will of the Parties, which is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction, exists within these 
narrower limits indicated by the French reservation”.348   
 
Referring to the statements of its predecessor in the Phosphates in Morocco case and The 
Electricity Company of Sofia case, as well as its own findings in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
case, the International Court of Justice stressed that  
 
“In accordance with the condition of reciprocity to which acceptance of the 
compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in both Declarations and which is provided 
for in Article 36, paragraph 3, of the Statute, Norway, equally with France, is 
entitled to except from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood 
by Norway to be essentially within its national jurisdiction”.349 
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In connection with the Norwegian Loans case, Decaux writes that it would have been 
possible to consider two concepts of reciprocity in this dispute; the first being an objective 
one, under which France has no discretionary power—by virtue of its reservation invoking 
national jurisdiction—but is bound by good faith. As the matters relating to loans do not 
belong to French national law, they thus cannot fall within Norwegian national law on the 
basis of reciprocity.
350
 By contrast, under the subjective concept, the position of France is 
less important; the law operating between the two parties is constituted not by the content of 
the French reservation, but by the Norwegian Government’s interpretation thereof whereby 
it is as if the reservation had been made by Norway. However, the French author claims that 
this was not expressed by Norway, but by the Court’s judgment in its stead.351 Rather than 
consider the positions of France and Norway on international bonds, the Court based itself 
on the assumption that the determination of matters falling within national jurisdiction 
was subjective and the parties’ declarations were sufficient , falling outside the 
consideration by the Court.
352
 
Thirlway likewise holds that, with respect to the scope of reciprocity, the Court went 
rather far in the Norwegian Loans case as it had not simply “written” into the Norwegian 
declaration a reservation of the French declaration of acceptance, but it had also adapted the 
declaration to its new environment in the sense that it had turned matters understood by the 
French Government to be within national jurisdiction into ones understood by the 
Norwegian Government to fall within Norwegian national jurisdiction.
353
 
Regarding the above–cited passage of the judgment in the Norwegian Loans case, 
Briggs raises the question as to why, in relation to the condition of reciprocity contained 
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in the declarations, the Court referred to para. 3, and not para. 2, of Art. 36 although the 
issue ocassionally emerged that reciprocity was not an absolute condition of Art. 36 of the 
Statute, because para. 3 thereof permits unconditional declarations as well as those 
subject to reciprocity.
354
 Regarding that matter, in its earlier judgments, the Court argued 
for the statutory condition of reciprocity contained in Art. 36, para. 2, as it also appeared in 
the Court’s opinion in the Norwegian Loans case. Therefore, Briggs is of the view that the 
reference to para. 3 instead of para. 2 is thus probably an error.
355
  
On the other hand, Renata Szafarz’s conclusion is that the reference in this case to 
para. 3 instead of para. 2 is to a certain degree inconsistent with the Court’s earlier 
decisions, but may also justify the inclusion of the condition of reciprocity in declarations, 
regardless of the fact that reciprocity is covered by Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute.
356
 The 
Polish professor emphasizes that the reservation in this case underwent a significant 
transformation, as the principle of reciprocity enabled Norway to invoke the relevant 
reservation not in its original form, notably in its applicability to France, but in a modified 
form to allow its content to be applied to Norway. She adds that the effects of reservations 
in declarations of acceptance differ essentially in this respect from reservations attached to 
treaties, and the effects of the principle of reciprocity have much more far–reaching 
implications for reservations attached to declarations of acceptance.
357
 
Alexandrov takes a more understanding attitude towards the Court and writes that  
 
“The only way to apply reciprocity was to allow Norway to exclude the same 
category of disputes as regards Norway.  .… since the class of matters which could 
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be determined by France to be within its domestic jurisdiction would not necessarily 
coincide with the class of matters which another State could determine to be within 
its own domestic jurisdiction.”358 
 
  It should be mentioned that the Court has faced strong criticism for its decision in 
the  Norwegian Loans case, however, one should acknowledge that the Court did not have 
much choice in terms of ways to pronounce itself, for if it had decided that the French 
reservation “relating to matters, which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as 
understood by the Government of the French Republic” was either admissible or inconsistent 
with the Statute, its decision would have most likely produced harmful effects on the system 
of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. To avoid such pernicious consequences, the Court 
came to a decision by widening the scope of the principle of reciprocity to an undoubtedly 
significant level, thus also creating a good opportunity to demonstrate the backlash effect of 
the French reservation. 
Shortly after the judgment rendered in the Norwegian Loans case, the Court had to 
decide again on the question of reciprocity in two other cases. 
The first was the Interhandel Case between Switzerland and the United States 
regarding the restitution by the United States of the assets of the Société internationale pour 
participants industrielles et commerciales S.A. (Interhandel). Within the time–limit fixed for 
the filing of the Counter–Memorial, the United States filed four preliminary objections.359 
Of interest to our subject is the second objection, in which the United States contested the 
Court’s jurisdiction by contending that the dispute had arisen before the Swiss declaration 
of acceptance became binding, i.e. on 28 July, 1948. Referring to what had been stated by 
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the Court in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, namely that declarations should coincide 
with respect to conferring jurisdiction, the Washington Administration argued that since 
the United States’ declaration of acceptance contained a clause limiting the Court’s 
jurisdiction to disputes “hereafter arising”, given the Swiss declaration contained no such 
clause, according to the principle of reciprocity, between the United States and Switzerland, 
the Court’s jurisdiction should be limited to disputes arising after 28 July 1948—the date 
the Swiss declaration came into force. The Court rejected the objection and pointed out 
the following:  
 
“Reciprocity in the case of Declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court enables a Party to invoke a reservation to that acceptance which it has not 
expressed in its own declaration but which the other Party has expressed in its own 
Declaration. … Reciprocity enables the State which has made the wider acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the Court to rely upon the reservations to the acceptance laid 
down by the other Party. There the effect of reciprocity ends.  It cannot justify a 
State, in this instance, the United States, in relying upon a restriction which the other 
Party, Switzerland, has not included in its own declaration”.360 
 
Thus in the Interhandel Case, the United States sought a double application of reciprocity. 
Decaux wrote: the double application of reciprocity, which, contrary to its single application 
securing the equality of the parties, is creating inequality, and Washington wanted the 
application of a Swiss (non-existent) reservation, excluding the retroactive effect and 
conferring advantage to the United States only.
361
 However, by rejecting the American 
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stand, the Court created a clear situation, defining the limits of reciprocity and blocking the 
way to the potential abuse of double reciprocity.
362
 
When considering the issue of limitations to declarations of acceptance, the Court, 
in dealing with the Interhandel Case, faced a similar situation to that in the Phosphates in 
Morocco Case. Unlike its predecessor, however, the Court examined the question 
thoroughly, clearly determining the aforementioned limitations with respect to the 
application of reciprocity. 
The question of reciprocity was considered by the International Court of Justice in 
the greatest detail in the Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory. As has 
already been mentioned, a specific feature of this case was that Portugal submitted an 
application against India three days after the deposit of its declaration of acceptance.363 In 
response, India filed six preliminary objections, some of which related also to the question 
of reciprocity.364  
In that case the subject of debate was, among other topics, a limitation included in the 
Portuguese declaration of acceptance (the third condition of the declaration of Portugal) 
providing that   
 
“3) The Portuguese Government reserves the right to exclude from the scope of the 
present declaration, at any time during its validity, any given category or categories 
of disputes, by notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with effect 
from the moment of such notification.”   
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India contended that the cited condition was incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
optional clause, and was invalid among other reasons because it stood against the basic 
principle of reciprocity underlying the optional clause, as it gave a right to Portugal, which 
was denied to the other declaring states that accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
without such a condition.365 India maintained also that Portugal had violated the principle of 
“equality, mutuality and reciprocity” when it filed its application before the Secretary-
General had time to transmit copies of the Portuguese declaration of acceptance, to the 
other parties to the Statute, including India.366  
The Court rejected the Indian objections and held that the third condition caused no 
uncertainty and did not contradict the basic principle of reciprocity underlying the optional 
clause, since any such reservation, by virtue precisely of the principle of reciprocity, must 
become automatically operative against the declaring state in relation to other signatories of 
the optional clause.
367
  
The Court likened reservations about the right to modify declarations with 
immediate effect to clauses covering the right of denunciation by simple notification with 
immediate effect, stating that there is no essential difference between the situations created 
by these clauses, with regard to the degree of certainty, and the third condition of the 
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Portuguese declaration which leaves open the possibility of a partial denunciation.
368
 In 
connection with the modification of declarations of acceptance, the Court pointed out that 
“when a case is submitted to the Court, it is always possible to ascertain what are, at that 
moment, the reciprocal obligations of the Parties in accordance with their respective 
Declarations”.369  It stressed that the manner of filing the Portuguese application did not, in 
respect of the third Portuguese condition, violate the rights under Art. 36 of the Statute 
concerning reciprocity in such a way as to constitute an abuse of the optional clause.
370
  The 
Court concluded that the manner of filing the Portuguese application was neither contrary to 
Art. 36, nor in violation of any right of India under either the Statute or its declaration of 
acceptance.
371
   
Dealing with the position of the Court in the Right of Passage case, Decaux states 
that, in effect, it would have been possible to interpret reciprocity in either a wider or 
narrower sense. According to the wider interpretation, maintained by India, reciprocity 
generally applies to all obligations and rights deriving from declarations made under the 
optional clause. On the other hand, according to the narrower interpretation appearing in the 
Court’s decision, the determinant factor concerning the reciprocal rights and obligations of 
the parties is the time that the proceedings are instituted.
372
 
During the 1980s, new problems emerged regarding the application of reciprocity in 
the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Actions in and against Nicaragua. 
In the legal dispute submitted by Nicaragua against the United States, one of the 
most important points of controversy between the parties arose out of the fact that three 
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days before Nicaragua filed its application the United States, by a note to the International 
Court, had modified its 1946 declaration of acceptance to exclude from the Court’s 
jurisdiction certain disputes relating to Central America and Central American States.
373
 The 
United States declaration of acceptance originally fixed six months’ notice for the 
termination of the declaration; Nicaragua’s declaration contained no such restriction. The 
United States claimed that it had modified its declaration of 1946 by its notification dated 6 
April 1984, thus the Court was without jurisdiction on 9 April 1984, the date on which 
Nicaragua filed its application. The Washington Administration invoked reciprocity in an 
effort to render its 1984 notification immediately effective. That argument sought to ensure 
that since the Nicaraguan declaration, being indefinite in duration, was subject to a right 
of immediate termination, without previous notice by Nicaragua, the United States’ 
declaration thus could also be terminated with immediate effect by virtue of the principle 
of reciprocity regardless of the six months’ notice proviso in the United States declaration. 
The Court refused to accept the American argument and emphasized that  
 
“The maintenance in force of the United States  Declaration for six months after 
notice of termination is a positive undertaking, flowing from the time-limit clause, but 
the Nicaraguan Declaration contains no express restriction at all. It is therefore clear 
that the United States is not in a position to invoke reciprocity as basis for its action 
in making the 1984 notification which purported to modify the content of the 1946 
Declaration.”  
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In that case the Court made a very important statement regarding reciprocity by stating that  
“The notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and substance of the 
commitments entered into, including reservations, and not with the formal conditions 
of their creation, duration or extinction. It appears clearly that reciprocity cannot be 
invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a State’s own declaration, 
whatever its scope, limitations or conditions.”374  
 
In other words, the Court held that the six months’ notice formed an integral part of the 
American declaration of acceptance and constituted a condition which must be taken into 
account, regardless of whether it related to the termination or modification of the 
declaration. 
The Nicaragua case provoked, if for no other reason than its political relevance, a 
great deal of discussion in the literature of international law. The Court’s findings regarding 
reciprocity and the limits thereof were consistent with the view, as expounded in the 
majority of writings published before the Nicaragua case, that reciprocity cannot be applied 
to the formal conditions, duration, or extinction of the declarations of acceptance. 
In connection with the Nicaragua case, mention should be made of Spain’s 
declaration of acceptance of 1990, which extended the principle of reciprocity to the 
conditions for the termination of the declaration. Spain, most certainly guided by an 
endeavour to avoid a situation similar to that in which the United States found itself  in the 
Nicaragua case, fixed not only six months’ notification for the withdrawal of the 
declaration, but added another paragraph as well stating that  “… in respect of States which 
have established a period of less than six months between notification of the withdrawal of 
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their Declaration and its becoming effective, the withdrawal of the Spanish Declaration 
shall become effective after such that shorter period.”375  
Thus, Spain intended to apply reciprocity to the withdrawal of the declaration. Up to 
now, that condition as laid down by the Spanish declaration has not yet been referred to in a 
case, but, at any rate, it would be of interest to know the position of the Court regarding that 
condition, especially because it contradicts what was stated in the Nicaragua case, seeing 
that it applies reciprocity to the procedural aspects of the declaration.  
It is another question as to how reciprocity could function in those cases submitted 
under the optional clause where there are more than two parties involved in the litigation.  
As Rosenne points out, one could expect that in those cases the application of the principle 
of reciprocity would be applied mutatis mutandis as in the cases with two parties. 376 
 
 
  IV Consequences of reciprocity 
 
One can say that the principle of reciprocity forms part of the optional clause system 
by virtue of the express terms of Art. 36 of the Statute, however, this entails several 
consequences, of which only a few can be highlighted now. 
                                                 
375
  According to Pastor Rodruejo, that reservation was not included in the draft of the declaration 
elaborated by a group of experts, but was suggested by the Consejo de Estado, who wondered that in view 
of the principle of reciprocity “when would the withdrawal of the Spanish declaration take effect  compared 
to a State that set a shorter notification period or one that set no period at all.”   
Cf. José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, ‘The Spanish Declaration of Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice’ (1991) 1  Spanish Yearbook of International Law (Brill 1991) 19-34  
29 
376
  Cf. Rosenne (2006) vol. .II 737 
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  As noted earlier, the reference to reciprocity in Art. 36, para. 3, was incorporated in 
the Statute on the basis of the proposal by Fernandes. At the time, through the inclusion of 
reciprocity, Fernandes sought to ensure that states knew exactly the other states, in respect 
of which, they had assumed obligations concerning the compulsory judicial settlement of 
disputes. By doing so, the Brazilian jurist thus wanted to eliminate an element of 
uncertainty. At that time, however, no one thought that there was another implication of 
reciprocity which, according to Rosenne, “…operates to crystallize and determine the scope 
of the jurisdiction in the concrete case”.377 All this means that so long as a concrete legal 
dispute is not submitted to the Court, there is some uncertainty accompanying the 
obligations of states under the optional clause and it is only in principle that the Court’s 
jurisdiction exists in respect of disputes covered by declarations of acceptance.  No state is 
in a position to know in advance which dispute will in practice be actually subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction and no state can be absolutely certain that the Court’s jurisdiction will 
really extend to a particular dispute covered by its declaration of acceptance, for, in the last 
analysis, the Court’s jurisdiction always depends also on whether the particular dispute is 
covered by the opponent state’s declaration of acceptance. It could occur that a state has 
recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a rather wide range of 
disputes, but this notwithstanding the Court may in practice deal with a much narrower 
range of legal disputes by reason of the fact that the opponent parties have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a much more limited scope of disputes.   
This was reflected in the Court’s judgment in the Nicaragua case by saying:  
 
“The coincidence or interrelation of those obligations thus remain in a state of flux 
until the moment of the filing of an application instituting proceedings. The Court 
                                                 
377
 Id. 736 
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has than to ascertain whether, at that moment, the two States accepted ‘the same 
obligation’ in relation to the subject-matter of the proceedings”.378  
 
If the system of obligations established by the optional clause is broken down to a bilateral 
level, one can practically find no two identical scopes of  reciprocal obligations, and the 
extent to which obligations are assumed by each declaring state in respect of the other states 
parties to the optional clause system is essentially different. 
In order to ensure the equality of the parties to the fullest extent, reciprocity has also 
been applied to reservations attached to declarations of acceptance. This has gone the length 
of entitling the states, which have recognized the Court’s jurisdiction unconditionally, to 
avail themselves of the benefits of reservations to declarations of acceptance provided by 
the opponent party. And as Briggs points out “The result is that application of the 
condition of reciprocity tends to equalize Declarations made with or without 
reservations.”379  
In other words, a state making its declaration of acceptance without reservations or 
with some specific reservations recognizes the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in all other 
matters not affected by the reservations. This means also that it has made an offer to the 
other states party to the optional clause system to the effect that it can be sued before the 
Court in any other matter. If a dispute is brought before the Court, and the declaration of 
acceptance of the applicant state contains reservations, the possibility exists for the 
respondent State to avail itself of the benefits of reciprocity and to invoke, if it so wishes, 
the reservations contained in the applicant state’s declaration of acceptance. It is precisely 
                                                 
378
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Admissibility of the Application) Judgment of 26 November 1984. IC.J Report 1984, 420–421 
379
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the principle of equality of the parties that limits the reference to the reservations contained in 
the declaration of an opponent party on the basis of reciprocity, and, as is also exemplified by 
the Interhandel Case, the application of double reciprocity was rejected by the Court relying 
on the principle of equality. 
Considering that a state may, by virtue of reciprocity, invoke the reservation to a 
declaration of an opponent party, reservations tend, in practice, to make their effect felt more 
often than not, precisely against the state making a reservation, which is to say that this is a 
double–edged weapon.380 Such has been the case whenever the Court established the lack of 
its jurisdiction on the basis of a reservation contained in the declaration of an applicant state, 
and the respondent state, relying on reciprocity, succeeded the rejection of the 
application.
381
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
380
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 This is what happened e.g. in Certain Norwegian Loans case. 
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Chapter 7 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED RESERVATIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
As has already been mentioned, in the last more than ninety years states had elaborated 
a great variety of different reservations and limitation to their decalarations of acceptance and 
thus narrowing its obligations under the optional clause.
382
 Most of these reservations and 
limitations gain currency in the international community, however, they are also reservations 
which are unquestionably destructive to the whole optional clause system. For this reason in 
this present work, the classification of different reservations attached to declarations of 
acceptance will be made according to both their acceptance by the international community of 
states and their influence on the optional clause system. In this chapter those reservations will 
be discussed which are considered to be limitations generally accepted by the international 
community of states. 
 
 
I Reservations excluding the retroactive effect of declarations of acceptance 
 
Within national laws and international law it is a well established principle that—with 
the exception of some very special cases—the commencement of obligations do not have 
retroactive effects. 
                                                 
382
  On these reservations see also Harold J. Owen, ‘Compulsory Jurisidiction of the International Court of  
Justice: A Study of its acceptance by Nations’ (1968-69) 3 Ga. L. Rev. 704 713-726 
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In the case of declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice and its predecessor (the Permanent Court of International Justice) the 
situation is just the opposite. The retroactive effects of declarations of acceptance are the 
general rule and, in order to exclude the retroactive effect, the declaring state should expressly 
stipulate this in its declaration of acceptance. 
This is the reason why among the reservations added to declarations of acceptance one 
frequently meets with limitations whereby states try to prevent the submission of disputes 
which have emerged before the making of declarations under Art. 36. para. 2 of the Statute or 
arisen in times previous to certain dates (the so-called: exclusion date, or critical date), or 
dated back in origin to such periods. In connection with such limitations, the Permanent Court 
of International Justice pointed out in the Phosphates in Morocco Case that the limitation was 
intended 
  
“… a revival of old disputes, and to preclude the possibility of the submission to the 
Court by means of an application of situations or facts dating from a period when the 
State whose action was impugned was not in a position to foresee the legal 
proceedings to which these facts and situations might give rise.”383   
 
The limitations excluding any retroactive effect of declarations of acceptance are 
typical ratione temporis reservations. However, depending on whether the reservation 
concerns disputes or a state itself one can speak of two kinds of reservations excluding a 
retroactive effect. One is material in nature and can be linked to a dispute or the emergence of 
facts and situations giving rise to disputes. The other is personal due to its characteristics and 
related to the international legal status of a state in the sense that a declaration applies or does 
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not apply to disputes reaching back to the time of the earlier international legal status of the 
declaring state, or those conflicts dating back to another political system of that state. 
Shabtai Rosenne, too, distinguishes retroactivity ratione personae and retroactivity 
ratione materiae. The eminent Israeli professor, however, makes this distinction according to 
a different approach than what was stated above, emphasising that a clear distinction must be 
maintained between retroactivity ratione personae and retroactivity ratione materiae. He 
differentiates “between retroactivity as regards the period of time during which the obligation 
as such to accept the jurisdiction of the Court is in existence, and retroactivity as regards the 
period of time comprised within the scope of that obligation.”384  
 
(a) Excluding retroactivity ratione materiae 
 
Taking into consideration more than ninety years of states’ practice one can see that 
the reservations excluding retroactive effect are encountered with various wordings. The most 
frequent version is that where the declaration applies only to “future disputes” or ones arising 
after the declaration is made or “in the future”,385 or those legal disputes arising out of facts 
and situations subsequent to or continuing to exist after the entry into force of the 
declaration.
386
 Under another formula the declaration does not apply to disputes occurring 
prior to the date the declaration was made, “including any dispute the foundations, reasons, 
facts, causes, origins, definitions, allegations or bases of which existed prior this date, even if 
                                                 
384
 Shabtai Rosenne, The Time Factor in the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (Leyden, A. W. 
Sijthoff, 1960) 53-54 
385
 E.g. see the declarations of Barbados (1980), Gambia (1966), Liberia (1952), Paraguay (1996), the 
Philippines (1972), Senegal (1958).  
386
 E.g. see the declarations of Bulgaria (1992), Canada (1994), Germany (2008), Hungary (1992), Lithuania 
(2012), Luxembourg (1930), Malawi (1966) and Slovakia (2004).  
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they are submitted or brought to the knowledge of the Court hereafter”.387 Also known are 
declarations which specify that the Court has no jurisdiction over disputes prior to the 
exclusion date, nor disputes that have arisen out of facts or situations prior to the exclusion 
date.
388
 Similarly, there are declarations which apply to disputes, situations, etc. subsequent to 
or after the exclusion date.
389
 In some declarations the critical date is defined by days, months 
and years, whilst in others the critical date is the date of the signature, ratifications, deposition, 
etc. of the declaration of acceptance. Very often the critical date is an important event in the 
history of the declaring state.
390
 One can find a rather interesting formula in the 1987 
declaration of acceptance of Suriname saying that it recognises the jurisdiction of the court 
“in all disputes, which have arisen prior to this Declaration and may arise after this 
Declaration”; thus it creates a clear situation that Suriname recognises the retroactive effect of 
its declaration of acceptance. A special variant of the reservation was included in the 2005 
declaration of acceptance of Portugal excluding those disputes which refer “to territorial titles 
                                                 
387
 See, e.g., the declaration of India (1974).  
388
 On this point, see the declaration of Poland (1996).  
389
 See the declarations of Columbia (1937), Guinea (1998), Japan (2007), Kenya (1965), the Netherlands (1956), 
Pakistan (1948), Sudan (1958), Sweden (1957) and the United Kingdom (2004). In the declarations of Japan, 
Pakistan and Sweden the dates referred to in the declarations of acceptance were the dates when their first or 
previous declarations of acceptance were made. The Governments of the Netherlands and Columbia even 
referred to the dates that they accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice; being 5 August 1921 and 6 January 1932 respectively.  
390
  See e.g. the declarations of Guinea and Sudan where the critical dates were the day of independence (Sudan), 
or a date very close to the day when the independence was declared (Guinea).  
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or rights or to sovereign rights or jurisdiction, arising before 26 April 1974 or concerning 
situations or facts prior to that date“.391  
The reservations precluding the retroactive effect of declarations are one of the most 
frequent limitations in declarations of acceptance, and such reservations are included in about 
40% of the declarations currently in force. 
The reservations excluding retroactivity ratione materiae can be consigned, on the 
authority of Rosenne, to three types, notably 
a) limitation of the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to future disputes 
(simple formula of exclusion); 
b) limitation of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to disputes arising out of 
future facts and situations; 
c) a more sophisticated formula of the limitation under b) limiting the acceptance 
of compulsory jurisdiction to disputes occurring in the future and arising out of 
future facts and situations.
392
 
 Rosenne refers to the reservations under paras. b) and c) as the “double exclusion 
formula”.393    
Regarding these reservations, Alexandrov rightly points out that while it may present a 
practical problem in establishing the exclusion date, it is far more complicated to establish the 
date when a specific dispute has arisen.
394
 According to Anand, the reservation has led to 
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 The date of the bloodless military coup, known as the Carnation Revolution, opened the way to the restoration 
of democracy in Portugal.  
392
 The 1925 Belgian declaration of acceptance was the first one having the formula “in any disputes arising after 
the  ratification of the present declaration with  regard to situations or facts subsequent to this ratfication.”   
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 Cf. Rosenne (1960) 36  
394
  Alexandrov (1995)  44 
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considerable indefiniteness.
395
 Withinn the literature of international law, authors have been 
raising several questions regarding reservations, e.g. “Does the verb refer to the time at which 
the injurious event occurs? Or to the time when the claim is first put forward through 
appropriate channels? Or when the claim has been rejected and the parties have finally 
disagreed?”  What does the situation prior to ratification mean?396 How can the relations 
between situations or facts and the dispute be determined? How can the relations between 
situations and facts and the critical date be determined?
397
   
The answers to some of these questions were given by the two International Courts.  
From the jurisprudence of the two International Courts in connection with the 
exclusion of retroactive effect of declarations of acceptance, one should allude first of all to 
the Mavrommatis Palestine Concession case,
398
 despite the fact that in the dispute the 
Permanent Court’s jurisdiction was founded, not on declarations of acceptance, but on a treaty 
provision. In its judgment, the Court held that  
 
“in case of doubt, jurisdiction based on an international agreement embraces all 
disputes referred to it after its establishment. …. The reservation made in many 
arbitration treaties regarding disputers arising out of events previous to the conclusion 
                                                 
395
 Cf. Anand (2008)  228   
396
 Id. 230 
397
  Cf. Maus (1959) 136-138  
398
  The dispute was submitted by Greece against Great Britain, alleging the refusal of the Palestine Government 
and consequently the refusal of the British Government to recognize the rights of a Greek national (Mr 
Mavrommatis) regarding the concessions for public works in Palestine. 
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of the treaty seems to prove the necessity for an explicit limitation of jurisdiction (in 
order that it may not apply to all disputes — V. L.).399 
 
In that decision the Permanent Court has in fact decided that, with respect to 
declarations of acceptance, “retroactivity is a rule.”  Thus in the absence of express 
provisions excluding previous situations, facts or disputes, the Court’s jurisdiction is not 
limited to the disputes arising after the establishment of the Court or after the date of the 
adoption of the instrument conferring jurisdiction.
400
  
After that judgment, the states formulated their declarations of acceptance even more 
carefully in order to make their undertakings regarding the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
abundantly clear. One could say that, although there are some obscure and vague reservations 
added to the declarations of acceptance, states are trying to include reservations referring to 
the time–framing of the declarations which are as clear as possible. 
In the Phosphates in Morocco case the Permanent Court of International Justice 
interpreted a reservation on excluding the retroactive effect of a declaration of acceptance. 
In that dispute the Court’s jurisdiction was based, among other things, on the parties’ 
declarations of acceptance, however, the French declaration contained the reservation that its 
declaration was to apply “for all disputes arising after ratification with regard to situations or 
facts subsequent to ratification”, i.e. after 25 April 1925. In its preliminary objection the 
French Government acknowledged that the dispute had indeed arisen after the said date, but 
asserted that the situations and facts giving rise to the dispute had preceded that date.  
                                                 
399
 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concession (Objection to the jurisdiction of the Court) Judgment of 30 August  
1924. PCI.J Series A,. No.2  35.  
400
 Cf. Rosenne (1960), 54-55  
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In its judgment on the preliminary objections, the Court found that, as the dispute did 
not arise with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the ratification of the French 
declaration of acceptance, it therefore had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
401
  The 
Court interpreted the reservation attached to the French declaration of acceptance as 
excluding the retroactive effect and held that   
“… the only situations or facts falling under the compulsory jurisdiction are those 
which are subsequent to the ratification and with regard to which the dispute arose, 
that is to say, those which must be considered as being the source of the dispute.”402  
 
The Court went on and stated that in regard to each concrete case it is necessary to 
decide separately whether a particular situation or fact is prior or subsequent to a certain date. 
In answering these questions, however, one should always keep in mind the will of the state; 
it having accepted compulsory jurisdiction subject to certain limits, and hence only 
recognizing this compulsory jurisdiction in respect of  disputes which have arisen out of 
situations and facts subsequent to its declaration.
403
 
The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria Case involved similar issues, and the 
Permanent Court recalled what was said in the Phosphates in Morocco case, emphasising that 
only those situations or facts must be taken into account which are considered to be the source 
of the dispute.
404
 In connection with facts and situations giving rise to disputes the Court held: 
                                                 
401
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“It is true that a dispute may presuppose the existence of some prior situation or fact, 
but it does not flow that the dispute arises in regard to that situation or fact. A situation 
or fact in regard to which a dispute is said to have arisen must be the real cause of the 
dispute”.405 
Subsequently, the International Court of Justice has likewise dealt with similar issues in 
several other cases. 
In one of its preliminary objections filed in the Right of Passage Case, the Indian 
Government as the respondent claimed that its declaration of acceptance made on 28 February 
1940 applied to disputes arising out of situations or facts subsequent to 5 February 1930,
406
 
but the dispute referred to the Court by the Portuguese application concerned situations and 
facts prior to the aforementioned date.
407
  
 In its judgment on the merits the Court in answering that objection emphasized that  
 
“The dispute before the Court, … could not arise until all its constituent elements had 
come into existence. Among these are the obstacles which India is alleged to have 
                                                                                                                                                        
Appealing to the principle of reciprocity inserted in the Belgian declaration of acceptance of 25 September 1925, 
Bulgaria claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction in the case because the dispute had arisen out of a situation 
occurring previous to the entry into force of the Belgian declaration. 
405
 Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Preliminary Objection), Judgment of 4 April 1939. PCIJ Series 
A/B, No. 77. 82 
406
 That was the date when India made its previous declaration of acceptence, which was renewed in 1940. 
407
 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections of the Government of India.  
ICJ Pleadings, 185 
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placed in the way of exercise of passage by Portugal in 1954. The dispute therefore as 
submitted to the Court could not have originated until 1954”.408 
 
The Court also examined India’s preliminary objection from the angle that the dispute 
was one with regard to facts and situations prior to 5 February 1930—referring to the 
judgment of the Permanent Court in the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case—and 
made a clear distinction, “between the situations or facts which constitute the source of the 
rights claimed by one of the Parties and the situations or facts which are the source of the 
dispute.”409 The Court in its judgment of the Right of Passage case pointed out that these two 
elements were constituted by both the existence of the right of passage between the enclaves 
and—concerning the part of India—the obstacles raised to the exercise of that right; the 
dispute submitted to the Court arose from all of the said elements and, although some of its 
parts originated in earlier times, this whole came into existence only after 5 February 1930.
410
 
The Interhandel Case similarly concerned reservations excluding the retroactive effect 
of declarations of acceptance. In its first preliminary objection the United States contended 
that the International Court of Justice had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters 
raised by the Swiss application because the dispute between the parties arose before the entry 
into force of the United States’ declaration of acceptance on 26 august 1946.411 
After a thorough examination of the antecedents of the case, the Court concluded that 
the dispute had arisen after the entry into force of the US declaration of acceptance and 
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rejected the preliminary objection by stressing that “the facts and situations which have led to 
a dispute must not be confused with the dispute itself”.412 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case there emerged problems as to whether the Court’s 
jurisdiction only covered disputes with regard to situations or facts relating directly or 
indirectly to the application of treaties concluded by Iran arising after the ratification of the 
declaration of acceptance, or whether it extended, as was argued by the United Kingdom, to 
all disputes connected to the application of all treaties concluded by Iran at any time. In point 
of fact, the phrase “and subsequent to the ratification of the present declaration”—included in 
the Persian declaration of 1930—may refer alike to “the treaties and conventions accepted by 
Persia” and to the words “regarding situations and facts”.413 The Court considered the 
declaration of acceptance according to the rules of grammatical interpretation and, further 
considering the intent of the Iranian Government expressed at the time of accepting the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, it came to the conclusion that the Persian declaration of 
acceptance was limited to disputes relating to the application of treaties and conventions 
concluded by Iran after ratification of the declaration of acceptance.
414
 
The application of reservations excluding the retroactive effect of declarations of 
acceptance has likewise emerged in the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force between 
the former Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro) and ten NATO States. Immediately after 
the filing of applications against ten NATO States, Yugoslavia requested for an indication of 
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provisional measures, but the Court in its Orders of 2 June 1999 rejected the request in all the 
ten cases.
415
  
Of special interest to our subject are five cases—namely those which Yugoslavia 
instituted against Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom—, as 
in those cases the respondent states relied on reciprocity for invoking the ratione temporis 
reservation to the applicant state’s declaration of acceptance excluding the retroactive effect 
of the declaration.
416
 The Court accepted the arguments of the respondent states and held that 
it had no prima facie jurisdiction to entertain the applications submitted by the Belgrade 
Government, since the NATO air strikes giving rise to the disputes started on 24 March 1999, 
whereas the Yugoslav declaration of acceptance containing the reservation excluding the 
retroactive effect of the instrument was dated on 25 April 1999. 
 
(b) Excluding retroactivity ratione personae 
 
As mentioned earlier, the other limitation excluding the retroactive effect of 
declarations of acceptance is connected to the international status of the declaring state and it 
refers to disputes originating at the time of the earlier international status of the declaring 
state—thus the reservation relates to either retroactivity before the date on which the state 
commenced its existence as an independent international personality, or a former political 
regime of the given state.  
                                                 
415
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According to Rosenne, the practice of the states—that had emerged in the wake of 
World War I—differed in this respect from that of the states that were created after  World 
War II.
417
 Since several new states—having emerged in the wake of World War I—did not 
limit the scope of their declarations of acceptance only to disputes arising subsequent to their 
independence, these declarations of acceptance thus did not contain any exclusion clauses 
excluding the retroactive effect of the declaration. By contrast, the majority of new states that 
came into being shortly after   World War II excluded disputes arising before, or relating to 
events occurring before their independence, by precisely referring to the date of 
independence.
418
 
Interestingly, this tendency ceased to be typical of declarations occurring at a later date, 
with the declarations of acceptance made by some former colonial territories not containing 
exclusion stipulations regarding disputes originating in their pre–independence period.419 
However, one is able to find instances of an opposite practice as well, e.g. Nigeria added to its 
1998 declaration of acceptance an exclusion clause stating that the declaration did not apply 
to “disputes in relation to matters which arose prior to the date of Nigeria’s independence 
period, including any dispute the causes, origins or bases of which arose prior to that date”. 420 
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At first sight, the practice of several former colonial states, being not to preclude from 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction any disputes reaching back to colonial times, contradicts 
the endeavour of these states—which was revealed, for instance, during the negotiations 
concerning both the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties, as well as the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts—to pursue the “clean slate” rule to liberate themselves from 
their obligations originating in colonial times. Acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
eventual disputes reaching back to colonial times can in all certainty be traced back to the fact 
that these states have had much more “accounts to settle” with the old colonial powers than 
the latter have had with them, and the International Court of Justice appeared to be a suitable 
forum for settling various disputes stretching back even to the colonial period.
421
  
The question regarding the retroactive effect of declarations of acceptance is of special 
interest in respect of those states that have experienced a change of political system in the 
1990s or a revolution. 
In this context, it is worthwhile taking into account the practice of the former socialist 
states, of which several have made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice after 1990. A reservation excluding the retroactive effect of a 
declaration of acceptance can be found in those of Poland (1990, 1996), Bulgaria (1992), 
Hungary (1992), Lithuania (2012) and Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro (1999). It is 
interesting to note that no such limitation is contained in the declarations of acceptance of two 
former members of the former Soviet Union: Estonia (1991) and Georgia (1995). The 
declarations of these states consequently apply to disputes which have arisen during the 
                                                 
421
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period of pre–independence, and include those disputes which extend back into Soviet times. 
In the case of Estonia, this can to some extent be explained by the fact that the 1991 
declaration of acceptance of Estonia is almost identical to the Estonian declaration made in 
1923.  
The Hungarian, Polish, Slovak and Yugoslav declarations of acceptance contain the 
“double exclusion formula”, as these states have sought to ensure the applicability of their 
declarations only to disputes relating to future facts and situations.  
One could believe that—considering the 20th century history of Central and Eastern 
European states, fraught as it has been with trials and afflictions—it stands to reason that the 
declarations of acceptance by these states have sought to exclude disputes relating to past 
facts and situations. 
In summing up the reservations that exclude retroactive effect, it can be stated that the 
practice of the two International Courts goes to show that in the absence of an express 
reservation excluding retroactive effect, declarations also cover either disputes arising before 
the making of a declaration or those disputes relating to facts and situations occurring before 
the state became party to the optional clause system (retroactivity ratione materiae). Shabtai 
Rosenne, too, distinguishes retroactivity ratione personae and retroactivity ratione materiae. 
The eminent Israeli professor uses this distinction to  emphasise that a clear distinction must 
be maintained between retroactivity ratione personae and retroactivity ratione materiae, he 
differentiates “between retroactivity as regards the period of time during which the obligation 
as such to accept the jurisdiction of the Court is in existence, and retroactivity as regards the 
period of time comprised within the scope of that obligation.”422   
  
II Reservations preventing surprise applications 
                                                 
422
 Rosenne (1960) 53-54 
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It was after the judgment of the International Court of Justice regarding the 
preliminary objections in the legal dispute between Portugal and India concerning Right of 
Passage over Indian Territory in 1957 that reservations appeared which were aimed at 
preventing unexpected or surprise applications. As mentioned previously, Portugal submitted 
an application against India three days after the deposit of its respective declaration of 
acceptance, and the Court recognized that step as a lawful one, stating that  
“A State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court must expect that an Application may 
be filed against it before the Court by a new declarant State on the same day on which 
that State deposits with the Secretary-General its Declaration of Acceptance.”423 
 
With a view of preventing the occurrence of such cases, a new type of reservation 
appeared in the model of the reservation included in the United Kingdom’s 1957 declaration 
of acceptance. The reservation to the British declaration excludes from the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction any disputes with states that have adhered to the optional clause 
system only for the purpose of bringing a given dispute before the Court (ad causam 
acceptance), or where the declaration of acceptance was deposited or ratified less than twelve 
months prior to the filing of the application.
424
 Accordingly the aim of the reservation was to 
prevent a “surprise application” and to hamper a newly declarant state from filing an 
application against a state—already party to the optional clause system—right after, or within 
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 Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 26 November 
1957. ICJ Reports 1957, 146 
424
 This reservation was further complicated by Israel. On this point, see Israel’s declaration of acceptance of 
1956 as modified in 1984. The wording of the modification differs from the British formula or the one contained 
in other declarations of acceptance as Israel fixed the twelve months’ time–limit not only for acceptance of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, but also for an amendment of a declaration. 
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a short time of, the deposit of its declaration of acceptance, perhaps even before the 
respondent state concerned would be able to learn that the newly declarant state had adhered 
to the optional clause system.
 425
 
Over the course of time, reservations preventing surprise applications have become 
widespread and more than a quarter of the declarations in force contain such a stipulation 
which has come to be known in two variants.
 
 
One type includes those reservations preventing surprise applications which, like the 
formula used in the United Kingdom’s declaration of acceptance of 1957, actually consist of 
two parts.
426
 According to the first part, the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction does not cover 
disputes whereby any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court “only in relation to or for the purpose of such dispute”, while the second part 
provides for the Court lacking jurisdiction in cases where any other party to the dispute 
deposited or ratified its declaration of acceptance less than twelve or six months prior to the 
filing of the application bringing the dispute before the Court.
427
  
The other variant of reservations preventing surprise applications contains only the 
second part of the reservation mentioned above; namely it only excludes disputes in respect of 
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 For an analysis of the problems connected with this, see Waldock (1955-56) 280-283 
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 Among the declarations of acceptance falling within this class are those of Australia (2002), Bulgaria (1992), 
Cyprus (2002), Germany (2008) Hungary (1992, India (1974), Japan (2007), Lithuania (2012), Malta (1966), 
Mauritius (1968), New Zealand (1977), Nigeria (1998), the Philippines (1972), Poland (1996), Portugal (2005), 
Slovakia (2004), Somalia (1963), Spain (1990), the United Kingdom (2004).  
  
427
Such a reservation was included in the 1988 declaration of Cyprus, which stipulated a period of six months. 
The 2002 declaration of Cyprus, like all the other declarations nowadays in force, provides for a twelve month 
period. 
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those where one of the parties accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction less than six or 
twelve months prior to the filing of the application.  
The two variants of reservations preventing surprise applications produce rather 
different legal effects. The six or twelve months limitation entails a suspension for six or 
twelve months of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction between a state that has added such a 
reservation to its declaration of acceptance and a newly declarant state, since the two states 
cannot institute proceedings against each other under the optional clause during the 
abovementioned periods. After the lapse of the six or twelve month period, however, this 
limitation terminates, meaning that reservations preventing surprise applications cease to be 
an obstacle in submitting a dispute to the Court’s decision. 
The reservations preventing surprise application imply, furthermore, that there is the 
possibility for a state unwilling to see a dispute with a newly declarant state brought before 
the Court to withdraw its declaration of acceptance within a period of twelve or six months, if 
faced with an application that it considers lacking bona fides,
428
 thus barring a particular 
dispute from being nonetheless brought before the Court even after the lapse of the said 
periods. Of course, the “success” of such acts also depends on the provisions relating to the 
amendment or termination of the given state’s declaration of acceptance, for if the declaration 
has fixed a period of six or twelve months for amendment or termination as well, the need is 
certainly pressing to amend or terminate the declaration lest the deadline be missed.  
The situation is more complicated with regard to the other group of reservations 
preventing surprise applications, where the limitation is intended to prevent the Court from 
deciding on the dispute of a state which has made a declaration of acceptance precisely for the 
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 Judge Oda referred to this in his individual opinion appended to the orders on provisional measures in the 
Case concerning Legality of Use of Force. See Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. 
Belgium), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures. Order of 2 June 1999. Separate Opinion of Judge 
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purpose of submitting the given dispute to the Court.
429
 Here, in fact, there arise two 
questions; firstly, whether the reservation makes it impossible for a given dispute to ever be 
brought before the Court, and secondly, whether it can be proved that a state has accepted 
compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause only in relation to or for the purpose of the 
dispute to be submitted to the Court. 
The problem of reservations preventing surprise applications has emerged in two of 
the cases concerning the Legality of Use of Force; notably in the dispute between Yugoslavia 
and Spain, and between Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom, since reservations with twelve 
month exclusion clauses were contained in the declarations of acceptance of both Spain and 
the United Kingdom.
430
 
The twelve month requirement preventing surprise applications was considered in 
connection with the preliminary objections in the Legality of  Use of Force case between 
Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom, as the Yugoslavian Memorial acknowledged that the 
application against the United Kingdom failed to meet the twelve month requirement of the 
British declaration of acceptance, however the Belgrade Government further argued that the 
requirement would be satisfied if the oral hearings on the merits started after 25 April 2000. 
431
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 See the declaration of acceptance of the Marshall Islands (2013). 
430
 In both cases these reservations came into question in connection with the fact that Yugoslavia made a 
declaration of acceptance on 26 April 1999 and filed an application with the Court against ten NATO states three 
days later, i.e. on 29 April 1999.   
It should be mentioned that the respondent states invoked the reservation preventing surprise applications 
already in connection with the Yugoslavian request for the indication of provisional measures.  
431
 See Case concerning Legality of Use of Force. Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom. Oral 
Proceedings, public sitting held on 19 April 2004.  http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/113/4453.pdf accessed 23 
October 2013.  
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According to Belgrade, the twelve month reservation in respect of a newly declarant 
state was to pass until the commencement of the oral proceedings rather than the filing of the 
application. That argument evidently ignores that—under the well–established practice of the 
Court—the date of filing an application is the critical date, or the threshold of the case at 
which the Court’s jurisdiction must be established. So, as a consequence of the twelve month 
requirement of the British declaration of acceptance, the Court would have jurisdiction 
between Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro and the United Kingdom only in respect of 
disputes submitted after 25 April 2000. 
The reservation to prevent surprise applications raises the question of its time limits, 
namely of how long one can refer to that part of the reservation excluding disputes with states 
which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of submitting a 
particular dispute or disputes to the Court. It would obviously be odd to refer to this 
reservation months or perhaps years after the making of a declaration containing the 
abovementioned limitation, although there is the possibility that the declarant state acted 
“with foresight” and indeed made a declaration of acceptance in view of a conflict evolving. 
At the same time, however, any state that, shortly after depositing its declaration of 
acceptance, proceeds to file an application with the Court against any other state party to the 
optional clause system would be easy to charge with having made a declaration of acceptance 
only for the purpose of bringing a particular dispute before the Court. States having made 
declarations of acceptance with the purpose of bringing particular disputes before the Court 
have generally been charged with bad faith.
432
 One can challenge this argument by saying that 
the Court’s mission is to help states in their settlement of disputes by peaceful means and for 
this very reason, it appears to be stretching things to term a state as acting in bad faith or 
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 This charge was laid against Yugoslavia by the United Kingdom in the cases concerning the Legality of use of 
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abusing rights by making use of a possibility of resolving a conflict by peaceful means and in 
accordance with international law. 
In the literature of international law there are views questioning the issue as to whether 
reservations preventing surprise applications do actually protect effectively against abuse.
433
 
Since states are free to formulate their declarations of acceptance, they may tailor a 
declaration in such a way as to conceal their intention with regard to accepting the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction—which may only be for the purpose of bringing a particular dispute 
before the Court—while the twelve month exclusion clause as fixed in the British, Indian and 
other declarations of acceptance could be evaded by playing for time, because after the lapse 
of the prescribed six or twelve months a newly declarant state may resort to the Court even 
against a state whose declaration of acceptance contains a reservation preventing surprise 
applications. 
Reservations preventing surprise applications have come to be fully accepted in 
present days, as is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that in the Case concerning the Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria the Court, in its judgment on 
preliminary objections, pointed out that  
“In order to protect itself against the filing of surprise applications, in 1965, Nigeria 
could have inserted in its Declaration an analogous reservation to that which the 
United Kingdom added to its own Declaration in 1958.”434  
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One can consider as a special variant of the reservations preventing surprise 
applications the limitation found in the French declaration of acceptance of 1959, which 
excludes from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction  
 
“Disputes with any State which, at the date of occurrence of the facts or situations 
 giving rise to the dispute, has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
 International Court of Justice for a period at least equal to that specified in this 
declaration“(i.e. the French declaration of acceptance of 1959 – V.L.).   
 
This respective French reservation is a special combination of limitations serving to 
prevent surprise applications and exclude retroactive effects. The first part of the reservation 
protects France against such actions as Portugal followed in the Rights of Passage case, 
because the declaration must have already been submitted to the UN Secretary General at the 
time of either the occurrence of the disputed events or the situation giving rise to legal 
dispute.
435
 There is a difference between that part of the French reservation and the other 
limitations preventing surprise actions, as the French reservation totally excludes the 
submission of a dispute to the Court, if the adverse party was not a party to the optional clause 
system at the date of occurrence of the facts or the time of the situation giving rise to the 
dispute, however, as has already been discussed, the reservations preventing surprise 
applications do not exclude the possibility of submitting a given dispute to the Court, they 
only require the lapse of a period fixed in the reservations themselves. The second part of the 
French reservation refers to the time limitation of the adverse party’s declaration of 
acceptance, requiring the state to have recognized the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction for at 
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least as long period as France has, which means three years under the terms of the first 
paragraph of the 1959 French declaration of acceptance.
436
 
Thus, the reservation contained in the 1959 French declaration of acceptance is 
essentially a refined version of those reservations that were made to prevent surprise 
applications, to the degree that it makes it insufficient for a certain period to lapse between the 
date of accession by the adverse party—which is having a dispute with France—to the 
optional clause system and the date of filing an application, furthermore it is also necessary 
that such a state should be a party to the Court with respect to the optional clause system at 
the time of the emergence of facts and situations giving rise to the legal dispute. The latter 
phrase actually makes the reservation similar to limitations excluding retroactive effect. 
Precisely for this reason, one of the problems related to the said reservation is the serious 
difficulty in ascertaining the date of the emergence of facts and situations serving as a basis 
for the dispute. The fact that such a reservation is nowadays contained in no single declaration 
of acceptance is in all probability accounted for by the complexity thereof and the difficulties 
in its eventual application. In the mid-1960s France, too, withdrew its declaration containing 
the reservation and omitted that limitation from its 1966 declaration of acceptance. 
  
 
III  Reservations referring to special relations with given states  
 
(a) The Commonwealth reservation 
 
                                                 
436
 The 1959 French declaration was for a term of three years and thereafter was to remain in force until 
notification of termination. 
 189 
Limitations seeking to exclude from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction any dispute 
with either states having especially close relations to declaring states, or those states having 
no diplomatic relations with a declarant state or not being recognized by that state, can all be 
mentioned as typical examples of ratione personae reservations. 
The so–called Commonwealth reservation represents the best–known variant of 
reservations of this class. As early as the interwar period, the member states of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, except Ireland, joined to their declarations of acceptance, on the 
basis of the “inter se” doctrine, a limitation to the effect that the declaration does not apply to 
“disputes with the Government of any other Member of the League which is a member of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the 
parties have agreed or shall agree”.437 That limitation refers to the special relations between 
the member states of the British Commonwealth, and, as was stressed by Sir Austen 
Chamberlain in his often–quoted address to the British Parliament, the related disputes are 
“such as should be solved by ourselves”.438  
Today, with the disintegration of the British Empire, it may appear anachronistic for 
declarations of acceptance to include the “Commonwealth reservation”, yet such reservations 
are still in force and, as was shown by the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10th August 
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1999, they continue to be applied.
 439
 In the proceedings instituted by Pakistan against India, 
the Delhi Government in its preliminary objection requested the rejection of the application 
on the grounds, inter alia, that one of the reservations in the 1974 Indian declaration of 
acceptance excludes all disputes involving India from the jurisdiction of the Court in respect 
of any state which “is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations”.440 Pakistan 
contended that the Commonwealth reservation was in breach of good faith as well as various 
provisions of the Charter and the Statute of the Court—being ultra vires of Art. 36, para. 3—
and as such had no legal effect. It was furthermore an extra–statutory reservation which had 
lost its raison d’ếtre, making it obsolete.441 
 In its interpretation of the Indian declaration of acceptance the Court stated that since 
1947 all of India’s declarations of acceptance had contained the Commonwealth reservation 
and that at the time it made its declaration of 1974 India had even modified that reservation to 
the effect that the limitation applied not only to disputes with the present members of the 
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British Commonwealth of Nations, but also to disputes with the government of any state 
which “has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.442  The Court stated that 
 
“While the historical reasons for the original appearance of the Commonwealth 
reservation in the declarations of certain States under the optional clause may have 
changed or disappeared, such considerations cannot, however, prevail over the 
intention of a declarant State, as expressed in the actual text of its declaration.”443  
 
Thus the Court reaffirmed its position, asserted several times, that the determinant 
factor in the interpretation of declarations of acceptance was the will of the declaring state and 
that even if a declaration contained a reservation which might at first sight appear to be 
anachronistic, the Court must observe and apply it.  
 
(b) Reservation excluding specially mentioned states 
 
A reservation similar to the Commonwealth one can be found in Iraq’s 1938 
declaration of acceptance. That limitation excluded from the Permanent Court’s jurisdiction 
“Disputes with the Government of any Arab State, all of which disputes shall be settled in 
such a manner as the Parties have agreed or shall agree.” Interestingly, a similar reservation 
did not appear in the declaration of acceptance made by any other Arab state. 
In all likelihood, the Commonwealth reservation inspired the Government of Ireland to 
include in its 2011 declaration of acceptance a reservation excluding “any legal dispute with 
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the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in regard to Northern Ireland.”  
The peculiarity of that reservation is that in respect of another state it excludes only a special 
category of disputes, i.e. those which relate to Northern Ireland.  
 
(c) Reservations referring to recognition or diplomatic relations  
 
The limitations concerning states which the declaring state has not recognized or with 
which there are no diplomatic relations are in essence the opposite of the reservations 
mentioned above. These reservations similarly originated in the interwar period. According to 
available data, the 1930 declarations of acceptance of Yugoslavia and Romania included such 
limitations. The Romanian declaration specifically stated that “it accedes to the Optional 
Clause … in respect of the Governments recognized by Romania”.  There is a high 
probability that in formulating that reservation the Romanian Government primarily had in 
mind the Soviet Union. Even nowadays there are declarations of acceptance containing such a 
reservation.
444
  
A limitation substantially akin to the abovementioned reservation appeared in Poland’s 
declaration of 1931, with the difference, however, that in that case the declaring state shifted 
upon any opponent state a decision on the existence of diplomatic relations inasmuch as the 
declaration excluded disputes “arising between Poland and States which refuse to establish or 
maintain normal diplomatic relations with Poland.”  
 A limitation identical with the Polish reservation was included in Israel’s 1950 
declaration of acceptance.
445
  In connection with such reservations, Alexandrov writes that the 
term “normal relations” is so broad in meaning that it allows removal from the Court’s 
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jurisdiction disputes practically with any state.
446
 In 1956, Israel replaced the said declaration 
with a new one modifying and clarifying the cited limitation in the sense that the new 
declaration was not to apply to  
 
“any dispute between the State of Israel and any other State whether or not a member 
of the United Nations which does not to recognize Israel or which refuses to establish 
or to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel and the absence or breach of 
normal relations precedes the dispute and exists independently of that dispute;”  
 
A reservation relating to non–recognition by the declarant state can be found in India’s 
declaration of acceptance of 1974, which excludes from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction 
“disputes with the Government of any State with which, on the date of an application to bring 
a dispute before the Court, the Government of India has no diplomatic relations or which has 
not been recognized by the Government of India.” 
The reservations referring to the absence of diplomatic relations or to non–recognition 
are by all means indicative of bad relations between states, and it is therefore a welcomed 
development that such a reservation is now only contained, using identical wording, in the 
declarations of acceptance of India and Djibouti. 
 
(d) Reservations excluding non–sovereign states or territories 
 
Only two declarations of acceptance in force provide for the exclusion of non–
sovereign states or territories; these are the declarations of acceptance of India (1974) and 
Djibouti (2005). With these reservations the declaring states didn’t want to exclude disputes 
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with colonial territories—nowadays being an anachronism—but to exclude disputes with 
states having the status of nasciturus.  
 
 
IV Reservations concerning other methods or means of peaceful settlement of 
disputes 
 
(a) Different variants of the reservation 
 
Soon after the Permanent Court of International Justice was established, the very first 
declarations of acceptance contained reservations limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to disputes 
where “the parties have not agreed to have recourse to another method of dispute 
settlement”.447 In later times, these reservations appeared having a broader meaning that 
applied not only to agreements already in existence, but also to future ones stipulating the use 
of other methods of peaceful settlement. The reservations concerning other methods of 
peaceful settlement have become one of the limitations that is most frequently resorted to and 
found in a large part of the declarations made in both the interwar and post World War II 
period. 
The drafters of the United Nations Charter were also mindful of the possibility of 
conflicting treaty clauses on jurisdiction, as is reflected in Art. 95 of the Charter, which runs 
as follows: 
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 This type of limitation first appeared in the Netherlands’ declaration of acceptance of 1921, which excluded  
disputes “in regard to which the parties have not agreed to have recourse to some other means of friendly 
settlement.”    
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“Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from 
entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements 
already in existence or which may be concluded in the future”. 
 
On this provision, Kelsen writes that it allows member states “to submit their disputes 
in accordance with pre–existing or newly concluded treaties to ad hoc tribunals of arbitration 
or to establish—for instance by regional agreements—another permanent court of justice”448. 
They can even submit their disputes to special courts having compulsory jurisdiction, thereby 
excluding the jurisdiction of any other court even that of the International Court of Justice.
449
  
By including in their declarations of acceptance reservations regarding other methods 
of peaceful settlement, states are trying to avoid possible collisions between different methods 
of dispute settlement in respect of a particular dispute, in such a way that they accord 
precedence to other methods of peaceful settlement over proceedings before the International 
Court under the optional clause.    
In practice, states have devised a number of variations of reservations concerning other 
methods of peaceful settlement, and such reservations can be consigned to the following 
groups.
450
 
i.The first group includes clauses of a general nature, with limitations covering other 
methods of peaceful settlement in general terms
451
 and relating to any other methods 
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like negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, etc., also known as declarations 
which enumerate other methods of dispute settlement.  
ii. The second group of reservations relates to a more restricted set of means by 
referring not to all “other methods of peaceful settlement”, but only to disputes 
entrusted to other tribunals by the parties by virtue of an agreement already in 
existence or which may be concluded in the future.
452
  
iii. As a third group, one can mention a rather special type of reservation which 
excludes from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction disputes which are ruled out in 
advance from judicial settlement or arbitration by a treaty, convention, agreement, etc. 
Thus in that case the reservation relates not to another court or tribunal but to those 
matters which under a treaty in force could not be settled by a judicial fora.
453
 
The reservations concerning other methods of peaceful settlement are not to be confused with 
those limitations preventing the parties from instituting proceedings before the Court unless 
they have previously conducted negotiations or resorted to conciliation. Such clauses 
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resemble reservations relating to other methods of peaceful settlement in that they also 
provide for recourse to other means when settling disputes, however, in such a case the clause 
entails a requirement for the parties to first resort to that method of dispute settlement, the 
Court being open to them only in case of exhausting those means of settling their dispute. By 
contrast, the reservations concerning other methods or means of peaceful settlement involve 
the obligation for the parties to use other methods or means to resolve their dispute, and not 
submit the dispute to the Court under the optional clause. So in one case the proviso 
practically delays the submission of the dispute to the Court, with negotiations, conciliation, 
etc. to be first resorted to before instituting proceedings before the Court, whereas in the other 
case the reservation is intended to exclude the submission of a particular dispute or disputes to 
the Court under the optional clause. 
 With their reservations concerning other methods or means of peaceful settlement, the 
parties may stipulate to resolve their disputes not only by negotiation, conciliation and the like, 
but also by ad hoc arbitration or by another tribunal instead of the International Court of 
Justice.
 454
 One may count on a growing number of such clauses in the future, if not only for 
the reason of the fact that there exist today several international fora to settle interstates 
disputes. 
 Among the currently functioning international tribunals specific mention is deserved 
for three institutions, notably the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, and the mechanisms of conciliation and arbitration 
established within the framework of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). 
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There is no doubt that the Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 may in principle be 
“competitive” with the International Court of Justice, but that forum, during its existence of 
more than a century, had never been a rival of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
and has not been a competitor to its successor, the International Court of Justice, and no single 
clause is known to have given precedence to the Permanent Court of Arbitration over the two 
International Courts. In fact, just the opposite is the case, as William E. Butler points out, 
“ the relative success of both the PCIJ and ICJ in attracting cases, albeit also experiencing 
periods of recession, has diverted work away from the Permanent Court of Arbitration,”455 
and this situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future.
456
 
The CSCE Dispute Settlement System, the pan–European mechanism for conciliation 
and arbitration as established within the framework of OSCE in the mid–1990s is applicable 
to a rather wide range of international disputes.
457
 A specific feature of this mechanism is that 
it is only residual according to Art. 19 of the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. As 
it has been pointed out in the literature, that subsidiary serves to confine the application of the 
OSCE Convention on Dispute Settlement to a rather narrow field,
458
 and hence there is little 
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likelihood of it coming into conflict with the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. 
With regard to the clause concerning other tribunals, it is worthwhile taking into 
account the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, chiefly because the competence of 
that court covers general and traditional maritime disputes—which are also in the competence 
of the International Court—and it has repeatedly dealt with such cases.459 
The establishment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was supported 
first of all by the developing countries during the negotiations concerning the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
460
 At that time, which were under the influence of the 
International Court’s decisions in the cases concerning South–West Africa and Northern 
Cameroon—called for the creation of a new tribunal on the law of the sea in which they were 
to have more seats than in the International Court of Justice.
461
  
The Convention on the Law of the Sea as in the case of other conventions provides for 
the settlement by peaceful means of a dispute between contracting parties concerning the 
interpretation and the application of the Convention.
462
 Regarding the means of peaceful 
settlement, the Convention is rather wide–ranging, embracing all methods from negotiations 
to judicial settlement. At the same time, however, the Convention leaves a wide scope open 
for the International Court of Justice to decide on disputes regarding the law of the sea, a fact 
proved in practice as well, for there have been several such disputes referred to the 
                                                 
459
 Cf. Elihu Lauterpach,:Aspects of the Administration of International Justice. (Grotius Publications Limited 
1991) 20 
460
 The proposal for the establishment of a tribunal of the law of the sea. was originally made by the United 
States. 
461
 Cf. Gilbert Guillaume,‘La Cour Internationale de Justice. Quelques propositions concrètes à l’occassion du 
Cinquantenaire’ (1996) 100 RGDIP  323 329-330 
462
 Cf. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts. 279 and 283.   
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International Court of Justice since the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea.   
If states choose not to turn to the International Court of Justice, but instead seek any 
other tribunal, such a choice can be seen as a typical clause within the ambit of reservations 
on other means of peaceful settlement. The same is the case with disputes in which the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea exercises exclusive jurisdiction.
463
  
The possible tension between declarations of acceptances—excluding other means or  
methods of peaceful settlement—, the Law of Sea Convention and the 1993 Convention for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, emerged in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case 
(Australia and New Zealand v. Japan),
464
 especially because the applicant states, Australia and 
New Zealand, cold unilaterally refer the dispute to International Court of Justice, however, 
they preferred to submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII. Art. 
287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
 465
   
 
(b) The reservation in practice 
 
There are several questions raised by reservations concerning other methods of 
peaceful settlement of disputes. First of all, does the reservation exclude once and for all the 
proceedings before the Court in the disputes involved? 
                                                 
463
 Such disputes are, e.g., those relating to the immediate release of vessels and their crews, and therefore not 
amenable to a decision by the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, the disputes mentioned in Arts. 187 
and 292 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot be brought before the International Court of Justice, 
because they are disputes between private people, who may not have recourse to the International Court of 
Justice.  
464
 Cf. Bernard H. Oxman ‘Complementary Agreements and Compulsory jurisdiction’ (2001) 95 AJIL 277 298 
465
 Cf. Shany (2004) 30 
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In his study analyzing the 1929 British declaration of acceptance
466
 Lauterpacht put 
forward questions as to whether the effect of the reservation is “merely suspensive or does it 
altogether exclude recourse to arbitration”, what happens in case of a failure of the 
conciliation procedure, and what occurs when the parties are unwilling to accept it. “Does the 
signature of the Optional Clause become operative, or is the abortive procedure of 
conciliation tantamount to a final fulfilment of the duty of peaceful settlement?”467 Although, 
to the best of our knowledge, this issue has not yet arisen in the jurisprudence of the two 
International Courts; the eminent British expert being right in pointing out that “The wording 
of the reservation does not warrant a confident answer to these questions.”468  
The reservations relating to other methods of peaceful settlement exclude the 
possibility for disputes affected by them to be submitted to the two Courts only under the 
optional clause. However, the reservations raise no obstacle to the situation in which the 
parties bring the dispute before the Court in some other way, e.g. by compromise or by an 
agreement to be concluded in the future. Such an alternative could easily be envisaged if the 
parties were unable to resolve their dispute by using other methods or means of peaceful 
settlement as originally envisaged, in the case, for instance, mediation or conciliation were 
failing. Since the reservation relating to other methods of peaceful settlement is contained in 
the parties’ declaration of acceptance, the foregoing makes it clear that the dispute affected by 
the reservation cannot be brought before the Court under the optional clause. At the same 
time, however, nothing forbids the parties from referring the dispute to the Court via a 
compromise. 
                                                 
466
 The 1929 British declaration of acceptance excluded among other things from the scope of the declaration 
“Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other 
method of peaceful settlement.” 
467
 Lauterpacht (1930)  147 
468
 Id. 
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In connection with reservations on other means of peaceful settlement, Anand deals 
with another question, notably that of what will happen in case of a conflict between the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction and a clause relating to other methods of peaceful settlement. 
On this point he distinguishes two cases depending on whether special treaties concerning 
pacific settlement of disputes were concluded by the states before or after having accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court.
469
 With regard to treaties concluded after 
the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, Anand concurs with Hambro’s view, 
that in such cases a situation may arise where one of the parties would like to bring the matter 
before the Court under the optional clause, whereas the other state would prefer to use any 
other method or means of peaceful settlement, as provided for by the treaty concluded later. 
The author holds that such cases are governed by the general rules on conflicts between 
treaties, namely “that the later treaty abrogated the earlier, or special treaty abrogated the 
general one.”470 Referring to Hambro’s statements, Anand notes that one may even argue that, 
since the Statute forms an integral part of the Charter, a declaration of acceptance is to be 
virtually regarded as an obligation under the United Nations Charter, and that obligation, 
according to Art. 103 of the Charter, precedes other obligations.
 471
  
The effects of future treaties concerning other methods or means of peaceful 
settlement on jurisdiction under the optional clause are dealt with by Merrills as well. The 
British professor maintains that if the reservation on other methods or means of peaceful 
settlement covers treaties to be concluded in the future—providing for other methods or 
means of settlement—, it allows the parties to agree on an alternative procedure even after a 
                                                 
469
 Anand (2008) 233 
470
 Id, 234 
471
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dispute has been referred to the Court under the optional clause.
472
 In that event, however, 
according to Merrills, the parties need not invoke the reservation relating to other methods of 
peaceful settlement, because during the course of proceedings they may at any time agree to 
discontinue the proceedings in order to resolve their dispute by another means. Thus in these 
situations it is not necessary for a state to refer to the reservation, and as a result it is likely to 
be rather rare in practice for the reservation to be relied upon.
473
   
 Despite their rather high incidence, the reservations concerning other methods or 
means of peaceful settlement have received little attention before the two International Courts. 
There is but one example, the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, which 
can be mentioned since the commencement of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In 
that legal dispute the applicant state, Belgium, referred the Court’s jurisdiction to the optional 
clause declarations of the two states and the Treaty of conciliation, arbitration and judicial 
settlement of June 23, 1931 which entered into force on February 4, 1933. The Belgian 
declaration of acceptance  the optional clause contained a reservation relating to other 
methods of peaceful settlement, whereas the Belgian–Bulgarian Treaty of 1931 included the 
following provision:  
 
“All disputes with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective rights 
shall be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless 
the Parties agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral 
tribunal.” 
 
                                                 
472
 Merrills (1993) 225 
473
 Id. 
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Since in its preliminary objection Bulgaria contested the Court’s jurisdiction, the 
aforementioned case gave rise to the questions of how the declarations of acceptance and the 
Treaty of 1931 were interrelated from the point of view of the jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice
474
 and to what extent the 1931 Treaty, while in force, had 
influenced the Court’s jurisdiction under the optional clause.475 The Permanent Court 
provided no answers to these questions. The Court seems to have borne in mind only that its 
jurisdiction was based on the optional clause and Art. 4 of the Treaty of 1931, paying no 
attention to the reservation of the Belgian declaration concerning other methods or means of 
peaceful settlement on the one hand and, on the other, giving no consideration to the sentence 
in Art. 4 of the Treaty of 1931 to the effect that the Permanent Court of International Justice 
as a forum of dispute settlement was open to the parties only if they failed to agree on arbitral 
settlement. In his dissenting opinion, Judge van Eysinga pointed out that the Belgian 
declaration of acceptance was in fact subsidiary and it was not to apply to cases for which the 
parties had provided some other method of peaceful settlement.
476
 A similar conclusion was 
reached by Judge Hudson, who in his dissenting opinion explained that since the two systems, 
namely the jurisdiction based on the optional clause and the Treaty of 1931, were different, 
and furthermore the parties had agreed topursuing recourse with respect to other means of 
                                                 
474
 The Belgian–Bulgarian Agreement of 1931 remained in force until 3 February 1938. Bulgaria’s declaration of 
acceptance was dated 12 August 1921, and Belgium’s declaration of acceptance was dated 10 March 1926.   
475
 It should be noted that this did not become so clearly apparent from what the parties themselves had stated. In 
his dissenting opinion, Judge van Eysinga rightly observed that in their arguments the parties did not state clearly 
the problem of concurrent sources of jurisdiction. Cf. The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria 
(Preliminary Objection), Judgment 4 April 1939. Dissenting Opinion by Jonkheer van Eysinga. PCIJ Series A./B.  
Fascicule No. 77. 111  
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peaceful settlement, for precisely that reason the Court’s jurisdiction in that case may be 
based only on the Treaty of 1931.
477
 
From the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice one should refer to two 
cases in which the Court was confronted with the questions concerning reservations relating 
to other methods or means of peaceful settlement, however, as we will see the substance of 
the problems connected with these reservations was not dealt in these cases. 
The first one was the Case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru. In 1989, 
Nauru—known to be one of the world’s smallest states, situated in the archipelago of 
Micronesia—filed an application against Australia on the basis of the optional clause in 
respect of a “dispute… over the rehabilitation certain phosphates lands (in Nauru) worked out 
before Nauruan independence.”478 In its preliminary objection Australia invoked the 
reservation to its own declaration of acceptance concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement as well as the fact that the matter of rehabilitation had been repeatedly raised at 
different fora of the United Nations before Nauru finally waived, as was alleged at least by 
Australia, its claims to rehabilitation of the phosphate lands in an agreement between the 
Nauru Local Government Council on the one side and Australia, New–Zealand and the 
United Kingdom on the other side on 14 November 1967. In view of all this, Australia 
claimed that with regard to the matters raised in Nauru’s application, Nauru and Australia had 
                                                 
477
 Cf. Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hudson. 124 
478
 The application founded the Court’s jurisdiction on the declarations of acceptance of the two states which 
were submitted by Australia on 17 March 1975 and Nauru on 29 January 1988. For the application, see 
http.//www.icj-cij.org/icj www/icases/iNAUSpleadings/inaus-application.,  accessed 17 July 2013 
According to Professor Tomuschat, Nauru made an optional clause declaration only with the purpose of being 
able to file an application against Australia, and after doing so did not see any advantage in maintaining its 
submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and did not renew its declaration made for a fixed period. 
Cf. Tomuschat in Zimmermann-Tomuschat-Oellers-Frahm (2006)  634 
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agreed “to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement” within the meaning of 
the reservation, and therefore, on the strength of the reservation attached to the Australian 
declaration of acceptance, the Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the dispute.
479
 The Court 
did not find it necessary to examine what Australia had stated concerning other methods of 
peaceful settlement, because declarations made under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute relate 
only to disputes between states, and Nauru had not yet been an independent state at the time 
the 1967 agreement was concluded.
480
   
The other case is the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea–Bissau v. Senegal). The 
dispute which concerned the maritime boundary between the two African states was 
considered at the end of the 1980s by an Arbitration Tribunal consisting of three arbitrators. 
More specifically, Bissau–Guinea, which challenged the existence and validity of the arbitral 
award of 31 July 1989, instituted proceedings against Senegal on 23 August 1989 on the basis 
of the declarations of acceptance of the two states.
481
 No reservation was attached to Guinea–
Bissau’s declaration of acceptance; however, Senegal’s declaration contained reservations 
including one that  
                                                 
479
 For the Australian preliminary objection, see http://www.icj-cij.org/icj 
www/icases/iNAUSpleadings/Pobjaustralia, accessed 17 July 2013 
480
  For all these reasons the Court held that there was but one question to be answered regarding the matter, 
namely that as to whether after 31 January 1968—when Nauru acceded to independence—Australia and Nauru 
had concluded an agreement whereby they undertook to settle the dispute relating to rehabilitation of the 
phosphate lands by resorting to an agreed procedure other than recourse to the Court. There being no such 
agreement, the Court rejected the objection raised by Australia and, as was already mentioned, didn’t deal with 
the reservation on other methods of peaceful settlement. Cf Case concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru 
(Preliminary Objections) Judgment of 26 June 1992.  ICJ Reports 1992, 246-247 
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 Senegal’s declaration of acceptance regarding compulsory jurisdiction was dated 2 December 1985 and that  
of Bissau–Guinea was dated 7 August 1989. For the application, see http://www.icj-cij.org/icj 
www/icases/idm/idmiorders/idm.iapplication. 23 October 2013 
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“Senegal may reject the Court’s competence in respect of:  
- Disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed to have recourse to some other 
method of settlement;” …. 
and specified that the declaration was applicable solely to “all legal disputes arising after the 
present declaration…”.   
On that basis, Senegal argued that if Guinea–Bissau were to challenge the arbitral 
decision on the merits, it would be raising a question excluded from the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction by way of Senegal’s declaration of acceptance, as the parties had, in the 
Arbitration Agreement of 12 March 1985, made a provision that disputes concerning the 
maritime delimitation were to be subject to the Arbitration Agreement. Consequently the 
dispute submitted to the Court fell into the category of disputes excluded by the reservation on 
“other means of settlement” that was included in the Senegal’s declaration of acceptance. 
Again, in that case the Court did not dwell on the reservation concerning other means 
of peaceful settlement, because it held that the reservation in question did not affect its 
jurisdiction as the parties had agreed, during the proceedings, to draw a distinction between 
the substantive dispute relating to maritime delimitation, and the dispute relating to the Award 
rendered by the Arbitration Tribunal. The subject of the proceedings before the Court 
included only the latter dispute; arising after the Senegalese declaration of acceptance, and not 
able to be deemed an appeal against or revision of the Award. It was the dispute over the 
maritime boundary between the two states that was referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, 
whereas proceedings before the Court concerned the existence and the validity of the Arbitral 
Award and did not involve the merits of the delimitation dispute.
482
 
 
                                                 
482
 Cf. Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989. Judgment of 12 November 1991. ICJ Reports 1991, 
61-62  
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V Reservations relating to hostilities and armed conflicts 
 
(a) Different variants of the reservation 
 
The limitations concerning disputes that arise out of different hostilities and armed 
conflicts may appear as either ratione materiae or ratione temporis reservations and date as 
far back to the period between the two World Wars. In the 1920s, in most declarations of 
acceptance, the exclusion of disputes relating to different hostilities or armed conflicts was 
not directly referred to in the scope of compulsory jurisdiction, because these disputes were 
already covered by those time limitations stipulating that the Court’s jurisdiction was to apply 
to future disputes only. Such exclusion clauses, as Rosenne points out, were designed to 
prevent retroactive application of the declarations of acceptance.
483
 In doing so, states were 
seeking to prevent disputes—connected with the World War I—from being submitted to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. According to Rosenne, that matter was of particular 
significance and importance especially in view of the measures of economic warfare and 
warfare at sea adopted by both sides—the legality of which was being seriously contested by 
each other and by neutrals.
484
  The author holds the view that the initial hesitation of the 
United Kingdom and other Great Powers in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court, “was due to their concern regarding the consequences of the compulsory 
jurisdiction on their exercise of belligerent rights, especially in economic warfare.”485 
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A limitation per definitionem relating to war–time events was first formulated in 
Poland’s declaration of acceptance of 1931 to the effect that the declaration was not to apply 
to disputes “connected directly or indirectly with the World War or with the Polish–Soviet 
war”.486 
After the outbreak of the Second World War, from September 1939, a number of 
states like France, the United Kingdom and several members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations (Australia, Canada, India, New–Zealand, South Africa) first announced by Notes that 
their declarations of acceptance were not to apply to disputes connected with the current 
hostilities, and then they made new declarations of acceptance excluding from the operation 
of their declarations “disputes arising out of events occuring during the present war” or 
“disputes arising out of events occuring at a time when His Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdon were involved in hostilities”.487 The core and substance of their argument 
was that the system of collective security established by the Covenant of the League of 
Nations for the preservation of peace, of which the Permanent Court of International Justice 
had also been a part, had collapsed and they could not maintain their obligations after the 
change in circumstances.
488
  
After 1945, limitations and reservations concerning hostilities and armed conflicts 
grew in frequency and, over time, even became more extensive and more complicated, 
bringing within the scope of reservations a widening range of disputes, as the later 
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  That declaration never entered into force. 
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 See the declarations of Australia (1940), India (1940), New–Zealand (1940), the Union of South Africa 
(1940) and the United Kingdom (1940).  
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 As has already been mentioned objections against these reservations were presented by Belgium, Brasil, 
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On the objections, see, Sixteenth Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice, (June 1.5th, 1939-
December 31st, 1945) PCIJ Series E. No. 16. 333  
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reservations came to exclude from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court not only disputes 
relating to war–time events, disputes connected with hostilities, or conflicts with the 
involvement of declaring state in war, but also those hostilities relating to individual and 
collective self–defence, action against aggression, and participation in peace–keeping 
missions, etc.
489
 
With regard to reservations on disputes connected with armed conflicts, hostilities, etc., 
Maus writes that the declarations generally used two criteria, a temporal and a causal, for the 
definition of disputes covered by these reservations.
490
 He mentions e.g. the Canadian 
declaration of acceptance as modified in 1939 and the British declaration of 1957, in which 
the reservations relate to disputes arising out of events that occurred during World War II, 
regardless of whether or not they were connected with the hostilities. The said declarations 
accordingly refer to certain events that occurred at a specified time, defined so minutely as to 
fix the period using the exact dates of 3 September 1939 to 2 September 1945 in the UK 
declaration. This example was followed by Israel, whose declaration of acceptance of 17 
October 1956 excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction “Disputes arising out of 
events occurring between 15 May 1948 and 20 July 1949." 
A wider range of disputes is covered by those reservations which refer, not to disputes 
that arose at the time of a specific armed conflict, but generally to disputes that arose out of 
events occurring at a time when the declaring state “was or is involved in hostilities.“491 As 
                                                 
489
 Among the declarations currently in force, reservations concerning hostilities, armed conflicts, etc. can be 
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can be seen, the said limitations apply not only to armed conflicts during World War II, but to 
all kinds of conflicts, including domestic ones. With regard to the application in concrete 
cases of reservations concerning hostilities and armed conflicts, Maus emphasizes that in such 
cases special attention should be given to whether or not the particular state was involved in 
the hostilities at the time of the events that gave rise to the dispute and whether there is a 
causal link, direct or indirect, between the said events and the dispute.
492
 
One of the most complicated types of reservations relating to hostilities and armed 
conflicts can be found in Israel’s declaration of acceptance of 17 October 1956,493 which 
contains, along with the reservation excluding the events between 15 May 1948 and 20 July 
1949, a rather wide limitation, practically embracing all armed conflicts taking place with 
Israeli involvement.
 494
 That reservation reads as follows: 
 
"disputes arising out of, or having reference to, any hostilities, war, state of war, 
breach of peace, breach of armistice agreement or belligerent or military occupation 
(whether such war shall have been declared or not, and whether any state of 
belligerency shall have been recognized or not) in which the Government of Israel are 
or have been or may be involved at any time."  
 
                                                 
492
 Maus (1959) 144-145 
493
  That declaration of acceptance replaced another one dated 4 September 1950, which was expressed to be for 
a period of five years.  
494
 Israel terminated this declaration on 21 November 1985 and has not since made a new declaration of 
acceptance.  Not long before the termination, Isreal amended its 1956 declaration of acceptance by a declaration 
on 28 February 1984. 
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Again, in this respect, a similar reservation, rather complicated and comprising a wide 
range of armed conflicts, was attached to the 1992 declaration of acceptance of the Republic 
of Hungary, with the reservation applying to all disputes other than  
 
“c) disputes relating to, or connected with, facts or situations of hostilities, war, armed 
conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in self–defence or the discharge of any 
functions pursuant to any resolution or recommendation of the United Nations, and 
other similar or related acts, measures or situations in which the Republic of Hungary 
is, has been or may in the future be involved”.  
 
By making that reservation Hungary was seeking to exclude from the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction any dispute connected with any armed action, irrespective of how the Republic of 
Hungary might be involved in a particular action. The inclusion of this limitation in the 
Hungarian declaration of acceptance can be explained—in addition to the general arguments 
in favour of such reservations—by the fact that at the time the declaration was made the war 
in the Balkans was raging a few kilometres from the Hungarian border and Hungary, while 
striving to stay clear of that conflict, wanted to avoid in any way becoming a party to any 
dispute before the Court in connection with the Balkan war. 
A rather new version of the reservation can be found in the declaration of acceptance 
of Germany (2008) explicitly excluding from the scope of the declaration of acceptance not 
only any dispute relating to, arising from, or connected with the deployment of armed forces 
abroad, or disputes relating to the involvement in such deployments or decisions thereon, but 
also those disputes relating to, arising from or connected “with the use for military purposes 
of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, including its airspace, as well as maritime 
areas subject to German sovereign rights and jurisdiction.” 
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(b) The Court’s jurisprudence regarding the reservation 
 
The reservations relating to armed conflicts have received scant attention before the two 
Courts.  
 
In the Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, instituted by 
Nicaragua against Honduras in the 1980s, the respondent state, Honduras referred to the 
reservation contained in its declaration of acceptance that was associated with armed conflicts, 
but the Court, in its judgment on jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application, did not 
deal with that reservation.
495
 
It should be added that a reservation concerning armed conflicts appeared in 
Honduras’s 1986 declaration of acceptance, which replaced the one made on 20 February 
1960.
496
 According to Merrills, Honduras modified its declaration of acceptance because it 
sought to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of disputes involving allegations of armed 
incursions into Nicaraguan territory from Honduras.
497
 This seems to be supported, 
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 In the Case concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, the International Court of Justice in the end 
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 Cf. Merrills (1993) 233 
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furthermore, by the fact that the Honduran declaration of acceptance was modified on 22 May 
1986 and Nicaragua filed an application with the International Court of Justice against 
Honduras on 28 July 1986.  
   
In connection with the Case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and 
Montenegro v. United Kingdon) one could raise the question as to whether in that dispute the 
British Government could have invoked the reservation relating to armed conflicts as 
contained in its the 1963 declaration of acceptance if that declaration had still been in force at 
the time of the cases concerning the NATO air strikes.
498
 
Nowadays, when armed forces of different nations act on behalf of the international 
community of states and take part in different actions of humanitarian intervention—including 
peace–creating, peace-keeping, peace–enforcement, etc. actions—, reservations relating to 
hostilities and armed conflicts seem to be concurrently included in more and more 
declarations of acceptance, and an increasing frequency of references to such reservations 
cannot be ruled out either. 
 
 
VI Reservations excluding disputes relating to territorial sovereignty  
 
The reservations excluding territorial disputes represent, according to the traditional 
classification of reservations, a typical limitation of ratione materiae. The concept of 
territorial sovereignty is to be broadly interpreted in respect of these reservations, and if there 
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 That reservation was under para. V of the 1963 British declaration of acceptance which excluded “disputes 
arising out of, or having reference to, any hostilities, war, state of war, or belligerent or military occupation in 
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is a general reference to territorial sovereignty then it covers the land territory, maritime zones 
and air–space of the declaring state. 
Such a reservation can be said to have first appeared in the Greek declaration of 
acceptance of 1929, in which the Hellenic Government excluded from its acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction any “disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece, including 
disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of communication”. A 
similar limitation was included in the declarations of acceptance of Iran in 1930 and Iraq in 
1938, with the difference that the Persian declaration referred to rights of sovereignty over “its 
islands and ports” instead of “ports and lines of communication”, while the Iraqi declaration 
mentioned sovereign rights over “its waters and communications”. The limitation in the 
Romanian declaration of 1930 was broader inasmuch as it excluded from compulsory 
jurisdiction “any question of substance or of procedure which might directly or indirectly 
cause the existing territorial integrity of Romania and her sovereign rights, including her 
rights over her ports and communications, to be brought into question.”  
It is not accidental that between the two World Wars, reservations excluding territorial 
disputes were to be found in the declarations of acceptance precisely by the aforementioned 
states. From the beginning of the 20
th
 century Iran had territorial disputes with Great Britain 
over the Bahrain islands in the Persian Gulf
499
, whereas Greece and Romania acquired 
considerable territories in the wake of World War I. It appears, therefore, that the 
beneficiaries of territorial changes after World War I were seeking to avoid submission to the 
Permanent Court with regard to disputes relating to territorial questions. In the case of 
Romania, the inclusion of clauses concerning communications and ports was also motivated 
by the fact that Romania was struggling for jurisdiction and control of the upriver stretch of 
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the Danube between Galatz and Braila against the European Commission of the Danube, and 
the Permanent Court in its advisory opinion on the Jurisdiction of the European Commission 
of the Danube, held that under the law in force the European Commission possessed the same 
powers regarding the maritime sector of the Danube from Galatz to Braila as the sector below 
Galatz.
500
 In all likelihood that decision in Bucharest was considered as an offence to the 
sovereignty of Romania, and the Romanian Government was trying to prevent, by means of a 
reservation, any related dispute being referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
After World War II, the practice continued of including in the declarations of 
acceptance reservations excluding territorial disputes, and, over the course of time, more and 
more complicated variants of the reservation were formulated.
501
 These reservations expressly 
stated that limitations apply—in addition to territorial and border disputes, and delimitation 
and demarcation of frontiers—to disputes concerning maritime zones and air–space. 
Moreover, certain declarations refer not only in general terms to maritime zones, but specify 
those distinct areas affected by the reservation, namely excluding from the scope of 
compulsory jurisdiction disputes relating to bays, islands, territorial sea, contiguous zones, the 
exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf,
502
 as well as matters concerning the 
superjacent air–space of territorial waters.503 
                                                 
500
 See Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube. Advisory Opinon, 8t December 1927. PCIJ 
Series B. No. 14. 
501
 The reservations referring simply to “disputes with respect to or in relation with the boarders of the Republic 
of Suriname” (Suriname, 1987).  or excluding “disputes with regard to the territory or State boundaries” (Poland, 
1996) are rather scarce. 
502
 Rather complicated reservations concerning maritime disputes and disputes over different marine zones can 
be found in the declarations of Australia (2002), Honduras (1986), India (1974), Malta (1983),  Nigeria (1998) 
and  the Philippines (1971). 
503
 On this score, see the declarations of Honduras (1986), India (1974) and Nigeria (1998). 
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The growing number of reservations excluding disputes relating to the law of the sea is 
in all certainty due to the recodification, in the 1970-80s, of the law of the sea on the one hand 
and, in the case of the latest declarations, due to the fact that the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea was established in 1996.  
The inclusion in declarations of acceptance of reservations concerning territorial 
sovereignty was related in some cases to concrete legal disputes, as is exemplified by Nigeria, 
which in 1999 modified its declaration of 1965 by adding additional reservations, one of them 
being a rather comprehensive limitation affecting territorial disputes that applied to land and 
maritime zones as well as its air–space.504 We are not far from the truth in supposing the 
inclusion of that limitation in Nigeria’s declaration of acceptance to have been related to the 
fact that regarding the land and maritime boundaries between Cameroon and Nigeria the 
former had instituted proceedings against the latter under the optional clause in 1994 and in its 
judgment of 1998 the Court rejected Nigeria’s preliminary objections, while ruling that it had 
jurisdiction.
505
 
One of the most peculiar reservations concerning territorial disputes can be found in 
the declaration of acceptance of Djibouti (2005) covering any dispute with the Republic of 
Djibouti relating to its territorial status, frontiers etc, as well as its maritime zones, islands, 
bays, gulf, airspace etc.
506
 
                                                 
504
 Para. viii of the 1998 Nigarian declaration of acceptance reads as follows: 
“disputes concerning the allocation, delimitation or demarcation of territory (whether land, maritime, 
lacustrine or superjacent air space) unless the Government of Nigeria specially agrees to such  
jurisdiction and within the limits of any such special agreement;” 
505
 See the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria  (Preliminary 
Objections), Judgment of 11 June 1998. ICJ Reports  1998, 275-327 
506
 The declaration of acceptance provides that  
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Despite the fact that a large part of legal disputes submitted to the two International 
Courts concerned territorial disputes existing before the Courts, few references were made to 
reservations relating to territorial sovereignty or territorial disputes. This may suggest, among 
other things, that the said reservations contain fairly clear and unambiguous limitations in 
general on the one hand and, on the other hand, the  disputes relating to territorial sovereignty 
belong to the class of interstate disputes which the International Court of Justice is the most 
generally accepted and most suitable forum to decide. 
The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
Case provides guidance in the interpretation of reservations concerning territorial sovereignty, 
albeit the Court’s jurisdiction was not based on optional clause declarations, but instead on the 
1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes read with Art. 36, para. 
1, and Art. 37 of the Statute.
507
  
                                                                                                                                                        
“ this declaration shall not apply to: 
……………. 
7. Disputes with the Republic of Djibouti concerning or relating to:  
(a) The status of its territory or the modification or delimitation of its frontiers or any other matter concerning 
boundaries; 
(b) The territorial sea, the continental shelf and the margins, the exclusive fishery zone, the exclusive economic 
zone and other zones of national maritime jurisdiction including for the regulation and control of marine 
pollution and the conduct of scientific research by foreign vessels; 
(c) The condition and status of its islands, bays and gulfs; 
(d) The airspace superjacent to its land and maritime territory; and 
(e) The determination and delimitation of its maritime boundaries.” 
507
 In its application, Greece relied on, firstly, Art. 17 of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, and Art. 36, para. 1 and Art. 37 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and 
secondly, the Greek–Turkish joint communiqué issued at Brussels on 31 May 1975. The Greek Government 
contended that the Act must be presumed to be in force between Greece and Turkey. According to Greece, Art. 
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In 1976, Greece instituted proceedings against Turkey in respect of a dispute 
concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf pertaining to each of the two states in the 
Aegean Sea and their rights thereover. Both the Greek and Turkish instruments of accession 
to the 1928 General Act were accompanied by declarations with reservations, and one of the 
reservations included in the Greek instrument of accession excluded  
 
“b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes relating to the territorial 
status of Greece, including disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports 
and lines of communication.”  
 
The Turkish Government took the position that, whether or not the General Act is 
assumed to be still in force, reservation b) of the Greek instrument of accession would 
exclude the Court’s competence with respect to the dispute submitted by Greece. Thus, in that 
case the Court had to determine whether questions connected with continental shelf 
boundaries in the Aegean Sea should be covered by the above–cited reservation and what was 
to be understood by the phrase “disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece”.508  
The Greek Government argued that a restrictive view of the meaning should be taken, 
where the territorial status was not to be conceived of in abstracto, as it was bound up with 
the territorial settlements established after World War I.
509
   
                                                                                                                                                        
17 of the General Act contained a jurisdictional clause which, read in combination with Art. 37, and  Art. 36, 
para. 1 of the Statute, sufficed to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.  
508
 Cf. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. Observations of the Government of Turkey on the Request by the 
Government of Greece for Provisional Measures of Protection. ICJ. Pleadings, 73  and Memorial of Greece 
(Questions of Jurisdiction) Id. 239-245   
509
 Id.  248-251 
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 In interpreting the cited reservation of the Greek instrument of accession to the 
General Act, the Court considered the Greek declaration of acceptance made in 1929 as well, 
only two years before Greek’s accession to the General Act, because the 1929 declaration of 
acceptance contained the reservation of “disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece”. 
The Court examined that reservation in the context of the Greek reservation to the General 
Act and reasoned that it was hardly conceivable that at the time of acceding to the General 
Act, Greece, in its instrument of accession to the General Act, should have intended to give to 
its reservation of “disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece” a scope which differed 
fundamentally from that given to it in its declaration of acceptance made some two years earlier. 
The Court even dismissed the Greek argument which claimed that the concept of the 
continental shelf was completely unknown in 1928—which was when the General Act was 
adopted—and 1931—which was when Greece became a party to the General Act—, and 
regarding the concept of territorial status the Court provided that: 
 
“Once it is established that the expression ‘the territorial status of Greece’ was used in 
Greece’s instrument of accession as a generic term denoting any matters comprised 
within the concept of territorial status under general international law, the presumption 
necessarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and 
to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at any 
given time.”510   
 
In its findings, the Court consequently held that the phrase “disputes relating to the territorial 
status of Greece” must be interpreted in accordance with the rules of international law 
                                                 
510
 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case  (Jurisdiction of the Court) Judgment of 19 December 1978. ICJ Reports 
1978, 32 
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existing today—not those existing in 1931.511 The judgment given by the International Court 
of Justice in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case points to a broad interpretation of the 
concept of territorial disputes. It suggests the conclusion that if in a particular case reference 
is made to an earlier reservation of a general nature concerning matters of the law of the sea, 
the evolution of the law of the sea and the evolution of the coastal state’s rights of exploration 
and exploitation over different maritime zones should all be taken into account.  
 
 
 VII Reservations relating to environmental disputes   
 
From the 1970s onwards several states have inserted in their declarations of 
acceptance limitations relating to environmental disputes. One can distinguish between two 
classes of these reservations. One group contains limitations that apply in general to all 
disputes over environmental issues. The other group consists of reservations that refer to a 
special group of environmental disputes which in most cases include disputes relating to 
certain maritime zones. 
One of the first reservations of a general nature virtually encompassing all 
environmental disputes was to be found in Poland’s declaration of acceptance of 1990, which 
excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction “disputes with regard to pollution of the 
environment, not connected with the treaty obligations of Poland.” This reservation 
concerning environmental issues was reiterated by Poland in its new declaration of acceptance 
of 1996, with the difference being that the new declaration refers to disputes relating to 
“environmental protection” on the one hand and omits the phrase “not connected with treaty 
obligations” on the other. This in turn—as is also recognized by Renata Szafarz—results in 
                                                 
511
 Id. 33-34  
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the formula of the declaration of 1996 being broader in scope than the formula of the 
declaration of 1990,
512
 and thus it applies to a wider range of environmental disputes. Another 
Polish expert, Wojciech Góralczyk considers the reservation excluding environmental 
disputes in the Polish declaration of acceptance of 1990 to be the most controversial part of 
the declaration
513
 and the reason behind the exclusion of disputes connected with the pollution 
of the environment lies in the fact that customary environmental law had not yet sufficiently 
crystallized and Poland might be feared to be declared liable for unpredictable environmental 
damages.
514
 This reasoning is hard to accept, and it is a pity that rather than abandoning its 
reservation excluding issues of environmental pollution, Poland widened the scope of the 
reservation in its 1996 declaration of acceptance. 
Among the new declarations under the optional clause it is Slovakia’s 2004 
declaration of acceptance that also contains a comprehensive reservation concerning 
environmental issues. 
As mentioned earlier, the other group of reservations concerning environmental 
disputes excludes from compulsory jurisdiction only environmental issues affecting certain 
specific areas. A typical example of such a limitation is to be found in Canada’s 1970 
declaration of acceptance  providing that the declaration does not apply to  
 
“disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by 
Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the living 
                                                 
512
 Cf. Renata Szafarz, ‘The Modification of the Scope of I.C.J. Jurisdiction in Respect of Poland’ in Ando-
McWinney-Wofrum (2002) vol. I, 546 
513
 Wojciech Góralczyk, ‘Changing Attitudes of Central and Eastern European States towards the Judicial 
Settlement of International Disputes’ in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.) Le réglement des différends internationaux en 
Europe: Prospectives d’avenir ( Colloque à La Haye, 6-8 septembre 1990)  (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 494 
514
 Id. 
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resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution or 
contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of 
Canada.” 
 
Subsequently, similar reservations appeared in the declarations of Barbados (1980)
515
 and 
Malta (1966 amended 1983)
516
.  
In the 1994 Canadian declaration of acceptance, a new reservation was introduced that 
further excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court  
“(d) disputes arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures 
taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, as 
defined in the Convention on Future Multilateral Co–operation in the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries 1978, and the enforcement of such measures.”517  
 
                                                 
515
 The reservation added to Barbados’s declaration of acceptance is identical word for word  with the Canadian 
reservation.  
516
 The new reservation attached to the 1966 declaration of acceptance of Malta reads as follows: 
“ the acceptance of the Government of Malta of the jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to all disputes with 
Malta other than 
 …. 
(d) the prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas 
adjacent to the coast of Malta.” 
517
 On 10 May 1994, the same day of the deposition of its declaration of acceptance, the Canadian Government 
submitted to the Parliament Bill C-29 amending the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act by extending its area of 
application to include the Regulatory Area of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Bill C-29 
was adopted by Parliament, and received Royal Assent on 12 May 1994. The Coastal Fisheries Protection 
Regulations were also amended, on 25 May 1994, and again on 3 March 1995.  
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The reservation of the 1994 Canadian declaration was lengthily discussed in the Fischeries 
Jurisdiction case, as the Court had to establish whether that reservation applied to the dispute 
submitted by Spain. Thus, one of the crucial questions was whether the measures taken by 
Canada, including the enforcement measures and use of force, could constitute “conservation 
and enforcement measures” under the reservation. 
The incompatibility of para. 2 (d) of Canadian declaration with the Statute or the 
Charter was not raised. However, according to Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez, the 
interpretation of the reservation was in a manner contrary to the Statute, the United Nations 
Charter and international law.
518
  
The Court interpreted the reservation “in a natural and reasonable way, having due 
regard to the intention of (Canada) at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court”, and it found that the dispute submitted by Spain  
 
“constitutes a dispute ‘arising out of’ and ‘concerning’ ‘conservation and management 
measures taken by Canda with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area’ and ‘the enforcement measures’.  It follows that this dispute comes within the 
terms of the reservation contained in paragraph 2 (d) of the Canadian declaration of 10 
May 1994. The Court consequently has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present 
dispute.”519 
 
                                                 
518
  Cf. Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada) Jurisdiction of the Court. Judgment  4 December 1998. 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez. ICJ Reports 1998, 636  
519
 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada) Jurisdiction of the Court. Judgment  4 December 1998.  ICJ 
Reports 1998, 467 
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Anyway, it is regrettable that as mankind has become increasingly aware of 
preservation of the environment, there are some states which have included in their 
declarations of acceptance reservations on environmental matters.
520
 
 
 
VIII Reservations concerning disputes under consideration by the Council of the 
League of Nations, or the Security Council  
 
It is the French declaration of acceptance of 1924 that contained the limitation 
stipulating that if one of the parties summoned the other party before the Council of the 
League of Nations under Art. 15 of the Covenant, then during the attempt to settle the dispute 
by conciliation, neither party was entitled to have recourse to the Court.
521
  It was in essence 
this reservation that inspired those reservations referring to the proceedings before the 
Council of the League of Nations—exemplified initially in the 1929 declaration of the United 
Kingdom and then subsequently in those declarations of other states such as Iran (1930), 
                                                 
520
 It should be mentioned that in 1993 the Court established a special Chamber for Environmental Matters 
composed of seven members for environmental cases under Art. 26, para. 1 of the Statute. The chamber was 
periodically reconstituted until 2006, however, no single case was referred to the chamber and in 2006 the Court 
decided not to hold elections for the bench of that chamber. 
521
 According to the 1924 French declaration of acceptance, it has adhered to the optional clause of Art. 36,  para. 
2 of the Statute of  the Court, “subject to the observations made in the First Committee of the Fifth Assembly to 
the effect that ‛one of the Parties to a dispute may summon the other before the Council of the League of Nations, 
with a view to an attempt to effect a pacific settlement as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant 
and, during this attempt to settle the dispute by conciliation, neither Party may summon the other before the 
Court of Justice’."  That declaration was never ratified by France, so it never entered into force,and in 1929 
France made a new declaration of acceptance.   
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France (1929) and the Member states of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
522
 With these 
reservations the declaring states reserve themselves the right to request suspension of the 
proceedings before the Permanent Court of International Justice in respect of disputes which 
have been submitted to the Council of the League of Nations or are under the consideration 
thereof. The reservations in declarations made by the Member states of the Commonwealth of 
Nations differed from the reservation joined to the 1924 French declaration mainly in that 
they reserved the right to suspend proceedings with certain time limitations. According to 
these reservations, the request for suspension was to be made within ten days of notification 
of the initiation of proceedings before the Court and the duration of suspension was not to be 
longer than twelve months except when the parties had so agreed or all members of the 
Council of the League not involved in the dispute had so decided.
523
   
                                                 
522
 See the declarations of Australia (1929, 1940), Canada (1929), India (1929, 1940), New–Zealand (1929, 
1940), South Africa (1929, 1940), and the United Kingdom (1940). 
Several writers believe that the British reservation was inspired by the discussions held in a committee of the 
Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, as in recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction a state may 
“reserve the right of laying disputes before the Council of the League of Nations with a view to conciliation in 
accordance with paragraphs 1-3 of Article 15 of the Covenant, with the proviso that neither party might, during 
the proceedings before the Council, take proceedings against the other in the Court.” Cf. Anand (2008), 235 and 
Hudson (1972)  470 
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 The reservetion in the declarations of acceptance of the Commonwealth States were identical reserving “the 
right to require that proceedings in the Court shall suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted 
to and is under consideration by the Council of the League of Nations, provided that notice to suspend is given 
after the dispute has been submitted to the Council and is given within ten days of the notification of the 
initiation of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that such suspension shall be limited to a period of 
twelve months or such longer period as may be agreed by the parties to the dispute or determined by a decision 
of all Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute.”  
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The greatest danger in connection with the said reservations is their implication of the 
possibility of removing a case from the Court, particularly if one considers that the parties 
may agree on a suspension longer than twelve months as stated in the reservations. The 
double–edged nature of playing for time is referred to by Lauterpacht, too, who writes that the 
state including such a reservation in its declaration may happen to be an applicant, and “see 
the justice of her claims delayed as the result of the very same reservation which she 
formulated in order to strengthen her position as defendant”.524 
With regard to the reservation in question, Anand refers to the Memorandum 
accompanying the 1929 British declaration of acceptance and states, inter alia, that there are 
certain disputes “which are really political in character though juridical in appearance.” 
According to the Memorandum, disputes of this kind could be dealt with more satisfactory by 
the Council and the aforementioned reservation was inspired by that very reason.
525
 Anand 
asserts, moreover, that since the reservation provides no definition as to the disputes to be 
referred to the Court, states are in fact completely free to decide what they consider to be 
“really political in character”.526    
Furthermore, reservations affecting the Council of the League of Nations produced 
another variant appearing in Italy’s 1929 declaration of acceptance; the limitation therein 
expressing that the Court’s jurisdiction is only to be accepted in disputes that have proved 
impossible to solve through diplomatic channels or as a result of the action of the Council of 
the League of Nations. Reservations of the same meaning were contained in the declarations 
of Czechoslovakia (1929), Peru (1929) and Romania (1930, 1936), the respective reservations 
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  Lauterpacht (1930) 159   
525
 Anand (2008) 236 
526
 Id. 236 
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expressing that the declaring state reserved itself the right to submit the dispute to the Council 
of the League of Nations before having recourse to the Court.   
In connection with reservations referring to the procedure before the Council of the 
League of Nations the question has arisen as to how after World War II—since the effect of 
the declarations of acceptance providing for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court should be regarded as conferring jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice under 
Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute—the reservations are to be applied and whether the Security 
Council can be interpreted as replacing the Council of the League of Nations.
527
 In any case, 
this question is no longer of relevance because not a single declaration containing a 
reservation on the procedure before the Council of the League of Nations is in force today. 
After the establishment of the International Court of Justice, similar reservations to the 
aforementioned limitations were formulated, and in these reservations the Security Council 
figured instead of the League’s Council.528 It should be added that nowadays there is not a 
single declaration containing that reservation. Anyhow, these reservations raise questions 
regarding the relationship between the Security Council and the Court in the first place and, 
more specifically, the question as to whether the same dispute can be considered concurrently 
by the Court and the Security Council.  
It is clear that the purpose of the reservation was to avoid the same dispute being 
considered by the Court and the Security Council simultaneously, and in this respect the 
reservation gives certain liberty to the parties. It should be mentioned that in the Case 
concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, the Nicaragua case 
and the Lockerbie cases, the Court dealt with situations where the same dispute was 
                                                 
527
 Kelsen affirms that the wording of Art. 36, para. 5 of the Statute does not admit an interpretation that the 
Council of the League of Nations can be replaced by the Security Council in respect of the limitation in question.  
Cf. Kelsen (1951)  528 
528
 See eg. Australia’s declaration  of 1954. 
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considered simultaneously by both the Court and the Security Council, however, the 
reservation in question was not brought up in those cases, since the declarations of acceptance 
of the parties did not contain such a limitation.
529
  
Again, there is a further problem connected with this reservation. The limitation 
regarding the suspension of proceedings differs from the other reservations attached to 
declarations of acceptance which are reservations on substantive law. Such a reservation is a 
procedural clause by which the declaring state reserves itself the right to request suspension of 
proceedings before the Court in certain situations. This is worthy of attention chiefly because 
suspension of proceedings is neither provided for by the Statute nor the Rules of Court. There 
is no doubt that in certain cases proceedings before the Court often happen to be “dormant” 
because at the request of the parties the Court sets rather long time–limits or intensive 
negotiations progress between the parties with the prospect of reaching a settlement out of 
court. At any rate, suspension of proceedings as an institution of procedural law is unknown 
in proceedings before the International Court,
530
 which is a reason why the question of 
compatibility with the Rules of Court arises in connection with reservations providing for 
suspension of proceedings before the Court in cases where the same dispute is under 
consideration by the Security Council.   
.  
IX Objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
Reservations excluding questions of domestic jurisdiction have become one of the 
limitations most frequently resorted to in our days. A distinction can be drawn between two 
                                                 
529
 On this score, see Alexandrov (1995) 106-112  
530
 On this score, see  Gerhard Wegen, ’Discontinuance and Withdrawal’ in Zimmermann-Tomuschat-Oellers-
Frahm (2006) 1258-1260 
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types of such reservations. One category includes what may be called “objective” criterion, 
meaning that in most of these declarations stats are referring to international law as a 
comparatively objective “criterion” for defining the disputes which are excluded from the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction; in the literature of international law such limitations are 
termed “objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction”. The other category consists of 
reservations by which the declaring states explicitly reserve themselves the right to determine 
matters of domestic jurisdiction, a reason why such reservations are commonly referred to as 
“subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction”.531 Reservations of the latter category have 
only appeared after the Second World War. 
 
(a) Variants of the reservation 
 
Under the terms of objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, questions relating 
to domestic jurisdiction, according to international law, are excluded from the scope of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.  
Limitations of this type appeared in declarations of acceptance of the Permanent Court 
in the late 1920s for the first time, and in 1929;this is exemplified by the actions of Australia, 
Canada, India, New–Zealand, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom, which after 
mutual consultations attached to their respective declarations of acceptance a uniform 
reservation to the effect that the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court did not apply to 
“disputes with regard to questions which by international law fall exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of” the United Kingdom, South Africa, etc. Other states were soon to follow the 
                                                 
531
 Cf. Henryk de Fumel, Les réserves dans les déclarations d’acceptation de la jurisdiction obligatoire de la 
Cour Internationale de Justice. Université de Nancy, Publications de Centre Européen Universitaire. Nancy, 
1962, 14,  and Rosenne (2006) Vol. I. 393-395. 
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example of the United Kingdom and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
with such a limitation being attached to their declarations of acceptance.
532
 
A considerable part of the declarations of acceptance made after World War II contain 
objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction.
533
 Today the objective reservations of 
domestic jurisdiction are worded in various ways. One of the variants follows the formula of 
matters or questions falling “exclusively” within the domestic jurisdiction of the declarant 
state by international law,
534
 which originated, as Merrills point out, of Art. 15, para. 8 of the 
Covenant.
535
 Another group of states reproduces the terminology of Art. 2, para. 7 of the 
Charter, referring to matters falling “essentially” or “exclusively” within domestic 
jurisdiction.
536
 The third group simply refers to disputes with regard to matters falling or 
subject to domestic jurisdiction; either mentioning “under international law” or making no 
reference to international law.
537
  Merrills is of the view that the variance of the wording 
makes no substantial difference, and these types of reservations are otherwise superfluous 
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 There is no  reference to international law in the declaration of  Cyprus (2002). 
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because under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute the Court’s competence is confined to matters of 
international law.
538
 
In the case of these declarations and others as well the question emerges as to what 
should be covered by the term “domestic jurisdiction,” especially because in several cases 
international law provides no clear guidance as to what falls within the domestic jurisdiction 
of states.
539
 Among the reservations of domestic jurisdiction, however, the real problem 
isposed not by objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, but by the “refined” versions 
thereof, i.e. the subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction.
540
 
 
(b) The jurisprudence of the two Courts regarding the reservation 
 
The question of domestic jurisdiction was considered by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for the first time—although not in connection with optional clause 
declarations—in an advisory opinion on the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco 
(French Zone)
 541
. The question before the Court for an advisory opinion was that of whether 
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 The Institut de droit international dealt with that question and according to its resolution adopted at the 
Session of Aix–en–Provence in 1954, reserved domains are those state activities where state’s competence is not 
bound by international law, and the extent of that depends on international law and it changes with the 
development of that. Institu de droit international ,  Session d'Aix-en-Provence – 1954, resolution „La 
détermination du domaine réservé et ses effets” (Art. 1. para. 1 and 2.) 
540
 These reservations will be discussed in Chapter 8 
541
 The request for an advisory opinion was referred to the Court by the Council of the League of Nations and 
concerned the Decrees of 8 November 1921 issued by the Bay of Tunis and the President of the French Republic 
on the one hand, and by the Sheriff of Morocco and the President of the French Republic, on the other, 
concerning the nationality of certain persons born in Tunis and Morocco. Since early 1922 the British 
Government protested against the French Government regarding the abovementioned decrees and their 
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the dispute between France and Great Britain regarding the national decrees issued in Tunis 
and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8, 1921, and their application to British subjects, is 
or is not, by international law, a matter of domestic jurisdiction under Art. 15, para. 8 of the 
Covenant. 
In its advisory opinion the Court made two important statements. In connection with 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction the Court held that “whether a certain matter is or is not 
solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the 
development of international relations.”542  
Regarding Art. 15, para. 8 of the Covenant, it emphasized that “The words ‘solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction’ seem rather to contemplate certain matters which, though 
they may very closely concern the interests of more than one State, are not, in principle, 
regulated by international law.”543 
Two contentious cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice, notably the 
Losinger and Co. case and The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, similarly 
involved the question of domestic jurisdiction. 
In 1935 Switzerland filed an application against Yugoslavia in the Losinger and Co. 
case under the optional clause in connection with the contract for the construction of certain 
railways in the District of Pozarevac in Yugoslavia.
544
  
                                                                                                                                                        
application to British nationals. The case was placed on the agenda of the Council which decided to request an 
advisory opinion from the Court. 
542
 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8, 1921.  Advisory Opinion 
February 7, 1923.  PCIJ  Series B. Advisory Opinion No.4. 24 
543
 Id. 23-24 
544
 Switzerland’s declaration of acceptance was registered in 1921, and on 1 March 1926 the Swiss Government 
renewed  it for an additional ten years. The Yugoslavian declaration was dated 16 May 1930. 
 234 
The Yugoslavian declaration of acceptance of 1930 contained a limitation excluding 
“disputes with regard to questions which, by international law, fall exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia”.  
Yugoslavia raised a preliminary objection, asking the Court to declare that it had no 
jurisdiction, claiming that the dispute did not affect questions of international law. 
Incidentally, the Yugoslavian argument was not based so much on the reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction in its declaration of acceptance, as rather Art. 36, para. 2, subparas b) and c) of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court, under which the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction covers only 
questions of international law. The Court did not decide on the problem raised by Yugoslavia, 
because the proceedings had been interrupted at the request of the parties.
545
 This case is 
nevertheless of interest because it was the first in which the Court’s jurisdiction was based on 
a declaration of acceptance containing a reservation of domestic jurisdiction, although the 
Court declined to regard the reservation as one depriving it of its jurisdiction in limine litis.
 546
 
In The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, reference was likewise made 
to the issue of domestic jurisdiction, although the reservation of domestic jurisdiction was not 
included in the declarations of acceptance of the parties. In the proceedings instituted by 
Belgium against Bulgaria the latter submitted a preliminary objection declaring that the object 
of the dispute was a matter within its domestic jurisdiction as it did not fall within any of the 
categories of Art. 36 of the Statute, which is a general provision enumerating legal disputes 
for which the Court has jurisdiction. In other words, Bulgaria referred to the article of the 
Statute as one preventing the Court from dealing with matters of domestic jurisdiction. The 
Court found that the Bulgarian objection was related to the merits of the case, for the 
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argument that the dispute contained no international elements was so fundamental that this 
plea couldn’t be regarded as possessing the character of a preliminary objection.547 
On the basis of the foregoing it can be stated that while the problem of domestic 
jurisdiction was touched upon before the Permanent Court of International Justice, little 
mention was made regarding objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. The cases 
mentioned above hold some interest solely for taking an approach with respect to the concept 
of domestic jurisdiction, and both the Permanent Court and the parties were chiefly concerned 
with the relationship between domestic jurisdiction and Art. 36 of the Statute. 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, reference to an objective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction was made in the Anglo–Iranian Oil Co. Case. Both the 
declarations of acceptance of the United Kingdom and Iran contained the objective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction, and the 1930 Persian declaration of acceptance excluded 
from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction “(c) disputes with regard to questions which, by 
international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Persia”. 
In that legal dispute Iran put forward that the Persian declaration had been made at the 
time of the League of Nations and it applied only to disputes within exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction under international law. However, since the 1930s international law has 
undergone changes, this reservation is considered as “having regard to the substitution of 
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations for Article 15, paragraph 8 of the 
Covenant of the League of  Nations, must be understood as extending to questions which are 
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States”. Thus the Iranian declaration of 1930 
should be seen as if it used the wording of Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter.
548
   
The International Court of Justice, for its part, did not pronounce on the question 
raised by Iran concerning Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter, since it accepted Iran’s preliminary 
objection referring to a reservation excluding the retroactive effect of the Persian declaration 
of acceptance.
549
 
In the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company Case the question of domestic jurisdiction 
emerged in another context as well. In its first preliminary objection submitted to the Court, 
Iran contended that under Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter, the Court should declare that it lacks 
jurisdiction ex officio, because the matters dealt with by the Iranian nationalization laws of 
1951, challenged by the United Kingdom in that case, were essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, and no organ of the United Nations had power to interfere them. The 
Teherani Government maintained that, the Statute of the International Court of Justice formed 
an integral part of the Charter, and as the International Court of Justice was a principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations, Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter applied to the Court as well 
and clearly restricted the Court’s jurisdiction in matters at issue. 550 
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In connection with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, mention 
should also be made of the Right of Passage case, in which reference was likewise made to 
the domestic jurisdiction of states. In the fifth preliminary objection India relied on the 
reservation of its declaration of 1940 in which it expressly excluded from India's acceptance 
of compuIsory jurisdiction all “disputes with regard to questions which by international law 
fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of India”, and argued that the dispute which was the 
subject–matter of the Portuguese Application fell within the terms of this exception.551 
This argument was not accepted by the Court, and its judgment on the merits found 
that the matter could not be deemed to come within the domestic jurisdiction of India by 
virtue of international law, for in that case reference was made to a Treaty of 1779, the 
practice of states, international customs and the principles of international law as it interprets 
them, The Court held that the parties had placed themselves on the plane of international law.
 
552
 It did not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of India to decide upon either the 
existence of a right of passage of Portugal as against India, or such an obligation of India 
towards Portugal, or the alleged failure to fulfil that obligation.
553
  
 
(c) The reservation of domestic jurisdiction and the Covenant  
 
At the time of the Permanent Court, reservations of domestic jurisdiction were based 
in some measure on Art. 15, para. 8 of the Covenant, which ran as follows: 
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“If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the 
Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no 
recommendation as to its settlement.” 
 
In connection with that paragraph Waldock writes that this provision of the Covenant 
determined the content of the reserved domain by reference to international law and departed 
from the completely subjective phrases of old formula.
554
 Thus it can be seen as a novelty that 
efforts were made to rely on international law with respect to defining the matters of domestic 
jurisdiction, since as Laurence Preuss rightly points out,  
 
“Recourse to international law as a criterion for the determination of matters of 
domestic jurisdiction constituted an innovation in international organization, for 
practice prior to the League had established no standard other than that of the political 
judgment of the interested state. The substitution of an objective legal standard must, 
therefore, be regarded as making an immense progress through the elimination of that 
element of arbitrariness which had therefore made the entire process of peaceful 
settlement of disputes dependent upon the transient interests, necessity or good–will of 
every party to a dispute.” 555 
 
Moreover, the relevant wording of the Covenant not only left it to the subjective 
appreciation of the parties to the dispute to decide on whether the reservation applied to the 
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particular case, but expressly referred to the decision of the Council or the Assembly.
556
 The 
quoted paragraph of the Covenant undoubtedly applied only to conciliation by the Council 
and the Assembly, whilst not affecting other methods of dispute settlement, including 
international adjudication. Still, it had an influence on the judicial settlement of disputes too, 
inasmuch as states inserted into their arbitration agreements and declarations of acceptance 
such reservations that copied the phrases used by the Covenant rather than the old formulas 
referring to “vital interests, independence and the honour” found in general treaties of 
arbitration in the pre–League period.557 
As regards the objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, the United Kingdom 
declared at the time that “this is merely an explicit recognition of a limitation on the 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court which results from international law itself”.558 As early as 
the interwar period the literature of international law contained different views regarding the 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction, and one particular author argued that the reservation 
included in the 1929 British declaration of acceptance had a rather adverse effect on the 
system of the optional clause declarations. In his famous and often–quoted study, published 
soon after the making of the British declaration of acceptance, Hersch Lauterpacht was 
sharply critical of the reservation of domestic jurisdiction, stating that such reservations 
created great uncertainty mainly in respect of who was competent in deciding whether a 
question fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
559
 On the object of the 
reservation, the eminent British expert, later a member of the International Court of Justice, 
took a risk in making the observation that  “unless it was meant to have the effect of 
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preventing the Court from deciding on the question of its jurisdiction in these matters, it is 
difficult to see what is the object of the reservation.”560  
 
I t should be noted that at the time Lauterpacht stood quite alone with this opinion. The 
contemporary thinking on reservations of domestic jurisdiction is better reflected by Hudson’s 
contention, who, in his monograph published between the two World Wars, wrote this:  
“It is difficult to see what is accomplished by this exclusion; if a dispute relates to 
questions which fall within exclusively national jurisdiction, it does not fall within one 
of the classes enumerated in paragraph 2 of Article 36.”561 
 
From this it follows that if the Court should find that the object of the dispute before it falls 
within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the parties, then by virtue of international law, it 
must ex officio reject the application. 
 
(d) The reservation of domestic jurisdiction and Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter 
 
The provision of the Charter on domestic jurisdiction (Art. 2, para. 7) is held by many 
authors to be one of the most controversial provisions of the entire instrument and one of the 
most frequently quoted at different fora of the United Nations.
562
  
The difficulties connected with the said paragraph originate mainly from the fact that 
while Art. 15, para. 8 of the League Covenant attributed the decision as to whether a matter 
regarding the domestic jurisdiction of states fell to the League’s Council, the proposal 
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submitted to the San Francisco Conference did not address the question, and thus paved the 
way for a vivid discussion.
563
 Efforts were made on several occasions to fill this gap by way 
of interpretation, which resulted in further confusion. Watson maintains that it was an 
intentional omission by the founders that Art.2. para 7 contains no language relating to the 
power of authoritative interpretation of that provision,
564
 as at the San Francisco Conference 
the representatives of several states proposed a precise provision entrusting the International 
Court of Justice with the duty of deciding on the matters falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, but that proposal was rejected.
565
  
Against this background it is understandable that opinions in the literature on 
international law are deeply divided on who is authorized to decide on matters falling within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states on the one hand and, on the other hand, the extent to which 
the International Court of Justice is affected by Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter. Particularly 
questionable is the relationship between this provision of the Charter and that in Art. 36, para. 
6 of the Statute, which lays down the well established rule that “In the event of a dispute as to 
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.” 
The uncertainty surrounding Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter is clearly illustrated by the 
fact that according to Kelsen both interpretations are possible when considering whether the 
Court is bound by the statement of a state accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction and 
claiming that a given dispute has arisen out of matters which are essentially within the Court’s 
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jurisdiction or the Court has the power to decide this question independently of the party.
566
 
Others believe that Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter does not affect Art. 36, para.. 2 of the Statute, 
which practically makes an exception of the general rule laid down by Art. 2, para. 7.
567
 
A considerable proportion of the authors in the literature of international law take the 
view that it is for the states to determine what belongs to their domestic jurisdiction, also 
emphasizing that the deliberations at the San Francisco conference on Art. 2, para. 7 go to 
show that states sought to widen the scope of domestic jurisdiction.
568
  
Watson founds this view on the fact that at the San Francisco Conference, “at a time 
when most nations of the world were at a high–water mark of cooperation, they balked at the 
idea of surrendering their power of autointerpretation.” 569 
The inclusion of Art. 2, para. 7 in the Charter was with the intention of limiting the 
competence of political organs of the United Nations—these competences had greatly 
increased in comparison to those of the League of Nations. International law as a criterion 
was left out of the new formulation and the word “exclusive” was replaced with “essentially” 
in order to enlarge the sphere of domestic jurisdiction.  
After the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company case the literature on international law 
experienced a surge of debate on the relationship between Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter and 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
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In one of his studies Waldock writes that Iran’s argument in the Anglo–Iranian Oil Co. 
Case does not hold water because the different provisions of the Charter show that, although 
the Statute is an integral part of the Charter, “the internal evidence of the Charter and the 
Statute suggest that in either instrument the word ‘Charter’ is used to denote only the articles 
of the Charter itself.”570 Waldrock goes on to argue that if one interprets Art. 2, para. 7 of the 
Charter in the way propounded by Iran, it does not follow at all that the effect of this 
provision of the Charter is to apply to a reservation dealing with “matters essentially within 
domestic jurisdiction” when considering the Court’s jurisdiction in contentious cases. There is 
in the wording of Art. 2, para. 7 nothing to prevent the Court or any other organ of the United 
Nations from intervening in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state, given that the states concerned have authorized it to do so in an instrument dehors 
of the Charter.
571
 Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter has no relevance for matters in dispute before 
the Court, since neither the Charter nor the Statute confer any authority to the Court to decide 
on or entertain any contentious matter without the consent of the parties. The situation would 
be different, however, if the Charter provided for obligatory jurisdiction.
572
 In other words, 
Waldock holds that Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter in no way affects the Court’s jurisdiction in 
that case. 
Waldock’s view is shared by Shihata, who believes that Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter 
does not seem to be relevant to the work of the Court, for if the Court once does find that the 
parties have accepted its jurisdiction to adjudicate on a case, it will not be precluded from 
exercising its jurisdiction in view of Art. 2, para. 7.
573
 If, however, the Court concludes that 
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the parties have not accepted its jurisdiction, it need not resort to Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter 
in order to justify its lack of jurisdiction.
574
 According to the author, this provision of the 
Charter cannot serve but as a subsidiary argument in favour of renouncing jurisdiction in 
cases where the parties’ consent is not beyond doubt and the matter is not clearly of an 
international character. In such cases the Court may declare that as an organ of the United 
Nations it is not authorized to deal with issues within the domestic jurisdiction of states which 
have not been clearly submitted to it.
575
  
A position contrary to the preceding ones was taken by Henri Rolin, who represented 
Iran in the Anglo–Iranian Oil Co. case. The eminent Belgian expert of international law 
argued that under Art. 92 of the Charter the Statute forms an integral part of the Charter and 
the two instruments are essentially deemed to be one treaty. The phrase “the present Charter” 
in Art. 2, para. 7 should also be understood to mean the Statute annexed thereto. Consequently, 
Art. 2, para. 7 which forbids the United Nations from intervening in matters which are within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states, accordingly applies to the International Court of Justice as 
well, which is a principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
576
 
The same view is held by Dubisson, who interestingly bases his position on the 
advisory opinion in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania and concludes by adducing arguments a contrario that the Court feels itself bound 
by Art. 2, para. 7, of the Charter.
577
  
Arangio–Ruiz takes an approach to reservations of domestic jurisdiction different from 
that of the above–cited authors and, drawing upon the jurisprudence of the two International 
Courts with regard to the plea of domestic jurisdiction, is of the opinion that neither Court 
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really applies the “international law as a criterion”, for the only way to apply that criterion 
would be to examine the merits of the given cases in order to decide whether the objecting 
state was or was not bound by the international obligation in question.
578
 
As regards the relationship between objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction and 
Art. 2, para. 7 of the Charter, one could say that the authors who emphasize the existence of a 
close relationship between the two instruments are justified in doing so. There is no doubt that 
during the interwar period the Covenant and the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice were two separate instruments, but the situation has been different since 
the entry into force of the Charter, as it appears from the report on the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice adopted at the San Francisco Conference, which was also 
referred to in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, that stated precisely that the Court would be the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its Statute, to be annexed to the Charter, 
would be an integral part thereof and all members of the International Organization should 
become ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court.
579
 It seems, however, that when the 
decision was made to interlink the two instruments, the amendments ensuing from the linkage 
were not reflected in the texts of the instruments. This accounts for the fact that wherever the 
words “Charter” or “Statute” are used, they are always understood to mean one of the two 
instruments only. 
Returning to the objective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, it could be maintained 
that, since states are free to submit their disputes to international adjudication, and 
contemporary international law does not provide for compulsory settlement of international 
disputes by the International Court, the determinant factor is above all the position taken by 
the parties. At the same time, however, if in a concrete dispute a state claims that the 
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particular matter is within its domestic jurisdiction by virtue of international law, the Court 
must have the right and duty to decide on that question. Considering that today international 
law is more developed and governs a much wider range of questions than it did fifty or sixty 
years ago, the related matters are much easier to decide upon at present. Whenever the Court 
finds that a particular matter in dispute belongs to the ambit of international law under treaty 
and customary law, it will continue the proceedings, but in the case where a dispute brought 
before the Court affects question of domestic law, the Court naturally must renounce the case 
and rule that it lacks jurisdiction. 
 
X Limitations affecting constitutional questions 
  
The declarations of acceptance by certain Latin–American States during the interwar 
period referred to constitutional questions as a limitation to the Permanent Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction. Such a restriction appeared first in Salvador’s instrument of 
ratification
580
 of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court, and the 
reservation in question reads as follows: 
“The provisions of this law do not apply to any disputes or differences concerning 
points or questions which cannot be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the 
political constitution of this Republic”.581  
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Hudson believes that the origins of this reservation can be traced to the Arbitration 
Agreement of 1899 between Argentina and Uruguay, which excluded from arbitration any 
dispute affecting the “constitutional principles of the State”.582 A reservation likewise relating 
to constitutional questions is to be found in the declarations of Brazil (renewed 1937) and 
Argentina (1935), with the difference that, under the terms of these declarations, the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction does not apply to disputes which by “international law fall within the 
local jurisdiction”, the court’s jurisdiction or relate to the constitutional regime of each state. 
The first questions to arise in connection with these reservations include those of who, 
in a concrete legal dispute, will be competent to decide that a given matter cannot be 
submitted to an arbitral tribunal under the constitution of a particular state, and what is to be 
regarded as a question relating to the constitutional régime.583 If such a decision lies with the 
Court, which is in conformity with the provisions of Art. 36, para. 6 of the Statute, the result 
would be an interpretation by the Court of the constitutions of the parties. If, however, the 
parties insist on interpreting their own constitutions, as follows from the principle of state 
sovereignty, the Court would be deprived from deciding on its own jurisdiction, which 
contradicts Art. 36. para. 6 of the Statute. 
Incidentally, no plea of constitutional question has ever been invoked in the disputes 
submitted to the two International Courts, so the two Courts have evaded ever having to 
pronounce on such a rather problematical reservation. A similar limitation is contained in no 
other declaration of acceptance that is presently in force. 
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XI Reservations linking the declaration of acceptance to those of other states 
 
In its declaration of acceptance of 1921 Brazil tied the recognition of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction to the condition that compulsory jurisdiction was accepted by at least 
two of the powers permanently represented on the Council of the League of Nations, 
specifically providing that  
 
“we declare recognize as compulsory, in accordance with the said resolution of the 
National Legislature, the jurisdiction of the said Court for the period of five years, on 
condition of reciprocity and as soon as it has likewise been recognized as such by two 
at least of the Powers permanently represented on the Council of the League of 
Nations.” 
 
As mentioned already, this passage of the Brazilian declaration is ascribable to the proposal of 
the Brazilian jurist, Fernandes, who, in the course of negotiations on the Permanent Court’s 
Statute presented the draft article on the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction which provided that 
states were free to accede to the optional clause unconditionally or under certain conditions, 
and one of the conditions could be the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by a certain 
number of states or specifically named states. This version of the clause was rejected, but, 
obviously owing to Fernandes, it was nonetheless incorporated into Brazil’s declaration of 
acceptance. Because of that limitation, the 1921 Brazilian declaration of acceptance entered 
into force rather late, for, among the permanent members of the Council of the League, 
Germany and the United Kingdom were the first to ratify their declarations of acceptance in 
1928 and 1930, respectively.
584
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XII Reservations on disputes relating to a specific treaty or treaties 
 
Some of the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court contained limitations excluding from the Court’s jurisdiction any dispute relating to a 
specific treaty. Of particular interest in this context is the Polish declaration of 1931, which, 
obviously owing to Poland’s political situation after World War I, excluded disputes resulting 
directly or indirectly from provisions of the Treaty of Peace between Poland and Bolshevnik 
Russia and Soviet Ukraine, signed at Riga on 18 March 1921.
585
  
To some extent also falling under this category is the limitation included in India’s 
1974 declaration of acceptance which relates to disputes where the Court’s jurisdiction “is or 
may be founded on the basis of a treaty concluded under the auspices of the League of 
Nations, unless the Government of India specially agrees to the Court’s jurisdiction in each 
case.” Due to that reservation, the Indian Government actually suspended the application of 
the compromissory clause of quite a few treaties concluded between the two World Wars, 
only allowing the application thereof on condition of India’s special consent to the 
proceedings in such cases.   
Egypt’s declaration of acceptance of 22 July 1957 similarly contains a stipulation 
concerning a specific treaty, providing that  
 
“the Government of the Republic of Egypt accept as compulsory ipso facto, on 
condition of reciprocity and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice in all legal disputes that may arise under the said 
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paragraph 9 (b) of the above Declaration (on the Suez Canal and the arrangements for 
its operation. – V.L.) dated 24 April 1957, with effect as from that date.”  
 
As a result of the 1957 Declaration referred to in Egypt’s declaration of acceptance, 
occurring shortly after the Suez crisis, Egypt unilaterally recognized the validity of the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888—which concerned the legal status of the Suez Canal—
and the provisions of the Security Council’s Resolution of 13 October 1956. Thus, the 1957 
Egyptian declaration of acceptance conferred jurisdiction on the Court over disputes relating 
to the application of only a single treaty. From this point of view, the declaration is more like 
a compromissory clause of a treaty, with the difference being, however, that, on the one hand, 
it formally appears in a declaration of acceptance and, on the other hand, the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction connected with the treaty relates not only to the contracting parties of 
the particular treaty, but also to states party to the optional clause system. 
The making of the Egyptian declaration of acceptance was by all means of great 
political significance, since until the conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel, dated 26 
March 1979, Egypt had relied precisely on the Constantinople Convention for obstructing free 
navigation of merchant vessels to or from Israel, claiming that doing so in time of war was 
admissible under that Convention.
586
 
One can say that the 1957 Egyptian declaration of acceptance contradicts the 
provisions of Art. 36 of the Statute. On the one hand, as was noted earlier, states are required 
by the new Statute to accept the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in respect of all disputes 
enumerated in subparagraphs a) to d) of paragraph 2, whereas it was only during the existence 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice that states were allowed to limit the scope of 
their declaration of acceptance to some classes of disputes mentioned in paragraph 2. On the 
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other hand, Art. 36. para. 3 permits the inclusion of certain limitations or reservations to the 
declarations of acceptance. The Egyptian declaration, however, contains no reservation or 
limitation derogating from an obligation of a broader scope, but instead one which recognizes 
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction only in relation to a single treaty.  
These questions involved in respect of the Egyptian declaration of acceptance were not 
raised at the time the declaration was deposited, in all probability because, among other things, 
that declaration of acceptance provided a certain kind of added guarantee that Egypt would 
assure free navigation in the Suez Canal. 
 
XIII Reservations relating to foreign debts and liabilities 
 
The 1980 declaration of acceptance by Poland included a rather peculiar reservation to 
the effect that disputes relating to “foreign liabilities or debts” were not regarded as falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Prior to the Polish declaration of acceptance a reservation relating to debts was 
contained in only one document, namely that of Salvador’s instrument of ratification of the 
Protocol on the Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court, which excluded disputes “to 
pecuniary claims made against the Nation”.  
For that matter, the reservation relating to foreign debts did not figure in the draft 
declaration of acceptance elaborated by the Polish Section of the International Law 
Association.
587
 The said limitation was in all likelihood “devised” by the political decision–
makers concerned with the declaration, bearing in mind the foreign debts of Poland in 
formulating the reservation. 
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The reservation relating to foreign debts is also to be found in Poland’s 1996 
declaration of acceptance. 
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Chapter  8 
DESTRUCTIVE RESERVATIONS 
 
I Subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction (Connally reservation)  
(a) Appearance of the reservation and its variants 
 
Among the reservations to declarations of acceptance, the most disputable are 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. This type of reservation is otherwise termed 
as “self–judging reservation”, “automatic reservation”, or “Connally reservation”. 
The term “automatic reservation”—as applied in reference to subjective reservations 
of domestic jurisdiction—owes its wide acceptance to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s separate 
opinion appended to the judgment on the preliminary objections in the Norwegian Loans case 
According to Judge Lauterpacht, the term “automatic reservation” is a good indication of the 
“automatic” operation of the reservation in the sense that the Court’s function concerning 
such reservations is confined to registering the decision of the defendant state, which is not 
subject to review by the Court.
588
 
The origin of these reservations goes back to 1945, when the Senate of the United 
States dealt with the US declaration of acceptance.
589
 Senator Morse, who introduced the 
relevant bill, had prepared the draft of the American declaration in cooperation with Manley 
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 254 
D. Hudson, who was one of the most prominent experts on the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. In its original version the draft declaration contained an objective 
reservation of domestic jurisdiction. 
 The debate in the Senate over the draft focussed attention on the question of who was 
to decide on matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States. According to 
Preuss, the debate in the Senate revealed that little was known about domestic jurisdiction 
“except its extreme sanctity.”590 Several members of the Senate voiced concern over 
extending the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction to matters relating to immigration, the tariff, 
etc, and the like. It was on this point that Senator Connally of Texas came forward with the 
proposal that the phrase “as determined by the United States of America” should be added at 
the end of the reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
591
 Connally argued that under the UN 
Charter the United Nations could not intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of 
states, whereas the provisions of the Charter would allow the Court to hold that such sensitive 
subjects like immigration, tariffs, the Panama Canal be deemed as international ones.
592
 
Senator Connally’s amendment was subject to a fair share of sharp criticism from several 
members of the Senate, which nevertheless adopted the Connally amendment, on 2 August 
1946.
593
 Shortly afterwards, on 26 August 1946, the United States made a declaration 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The document  
 
“Provided that this declaration shall not apply to 
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(a) Disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by 
virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the 
future; or 
(b) Disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States 
of America; or….” 
 
The reservation with the Connally amendment became “popular” immediately. The 
example of the United States was followed by a number of states, with comparable or even 
word for word limitations being included specifically in the declarations of acceptance by 
France (1947), Mexico (1947), Liberia (1952), the Union of South Africa (1955), The 
Philippines (1971), Pakistan (1948, 1957), Sudan (1957), Malawi (1966) and the United 
Kingdom (1957), whose declaration can practically be consigned to this category and about 
which it we will have more to say later. 
 The declarations of acceptance containing similar reservations to the US declaration 
are generally classified in three groups.
594
 
i. The first group consists of declarations which confer to the declaring state the 
decision to “determine” the matters which are essentially in domestic jurisdiction. 
Such are the declarations of the United States (1946), South Africa (1955), Malawi 
(1966), Pakistan (1957) and Sudan (1958), which accordingly follow the “original” 
American formula.  
ii. The second group includes declarations referring to domestic jurisdiction with 
phrases like “understood” or “considered” by the declaring state or in the “opinion” of 
the declaring state. Such a formula first appeared in the 1947 French declaration of 
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acceptance and was included in the declarations of Liberia (1952), Mexico (1947) and 
The Philippines (1972). Accordingly these limitations can in point of fact be termed as 
reservations under the “French formula”.595  
iii. The third group is characterized by the British declaration of April 1957 excluding 
from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction all disputes “relating to any question which, 
in the opinion of the Government of the United Kingdom, affects the national security 
of the United Kingdom or of any of its dependent territories”.596 This limitation can be 
referred to as the “British formula”597  
(b) First appraisals of the reservation  
 
                                                 
595
 In the case of France one may speak of three declarations of acceptance, which actually served to vary the 
reservations concerning domestic jurisdiction. 
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Almost from the first moment the United States declaration of acceptance and the 
Connally amendment thereto aroused the interest of, and even came under attack from 
international law writers.
598
 Lawrence Preuss wrote that “The effect of the Connally 
Amendment is to give to the United States a veto upon the jurisdiction of the Court after a 
dispute has been referred to it by an applicant state.” 599  Edvard Hambro puts it in a more 
diplomatic way when he points out that such reservation may obviously become a source of 
great danger.
600
 
Soon after the Senate’s debate on the Connally amendment an American author wrote 
that “It might be optimistic to assert that United States would never abuse its privilege and 
never attempt to evade an obligation to adjudicate before the International Court on colorable 
grounds. It is to be hoped that it will never declare that an issue which another party seeks to 
adjudicate before the Court concerns a matter which is essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction, unless evidence of the law of nations as revealed in the acquiescence of States 
generally sustains its decision.”601 Even Hudson, one of the most authoritative American 
experts in international adjudication disagreed with the reservation added to the United States 
declaration of acceptance. In one of his articles he notes that the introduction by other states 
of a reservation similar to the American one in their declarations of acceptance will constitute 
a distinctly backward step.
602
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For all this, the American declaration of acceptance containing the Connally 
reservation remained in force for almost 40 years, albeit at the end of the 1950s there was a 
campaign to withdraw the said reservation.
603
 Those advocating repeal of the limitation 
substantiated their arguments by appealing to the interests of the United States, claiming, inter 
alia, that the United States, being one of the countries with the highest record of investments 
abroad, might much more frequently need to protect its claims in a world court. In such cases, 
however, the adverse party may simply rely on reciprocity for invoking the Connally 
reservation of the United States declaration of acceptance, thereby removing the case from the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.604 Another argument was that since the judgments of the 
International Court of Justice could not be enforced except through the Security Council, 
whenever the Court would be seized of a matter within domestic jurisdiction, rendering a 
judgment thereon, the United States as a permanent member of the Security Council could 
veto any recommendation for action by the rest of the Security Council, thus preventing any 
effect being given to the judgment.
605
 Nevertheless, these arguments failed to convince the 
                                                 
603
 The United States declaration of acceptance was also addressed by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Senate on several occasions. The experts heard were trying to convince the members of the Committee that 
withdrawal of the Connally reservation would not cause the United States to lose control over matters like 
immigration, regulation of tariffs and duties, navigation of the Panama Canal, etc. All these efforts were of little 
avail, and the Committee finally adopted no resolution to withdraw the reservation. For that matter, withdrawal 
was advocated by such political figures as Attorney General William P. Rogers and Senator Hubert Humphrey, 
who served as Vice–President of the United States between 1965 and 1969.  
604
 Cf. John Dixon Jr,’The Connally Amendment - the Conflict between Nationalism and an Effective World 
Court’ (1964) 53 Kentucky Law Journal 164 169  
605
 Cambrell: The United Nations, the World Court and the Connally Reservation. 47. A.B.A. Journal 57. (1961), 
quoted by Dixon (1964) 169-170 
 259 
Washington Government, and the declaration containing the said reservation remained in 
force until 1986.
606
 
 
(c)  The reservation in the jurisprudence of the Court 
 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice the dispute between France 
and the United States concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 
Morocco was the first case in which the Court’s jurisdiction was founded on the declarations 
of acceptance containing subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction of both parties. 
Interestingly, however, neither party advanced any argument in connection with that 
reservation.
607
 During the proceedings the only reference made to the said reservation was in 
the memorandum of the United States stating that although it did not concur with the 
allegations concerning the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court that were presented by the 
French Government, “its abstaining from raising the issue does not affect its legal right to rely 
in any future case on its reservations contained in its acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court.”608  
The United States declaration of 1946 is usually referred to as the paradigm of 
declarations of acceptance containing subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, yet the 
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first and thorough consideration of such reservations before the Court took place in relation 
not to the United States declaration, but the French declaration of acceptance of 1947, notably 
in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans. 
 As has already been mentioned, in 1955, France filed an application against Norway 
with the International Court of Justice in the interest of French nationals, regarding the case of 
certain Norwegian loans issued on the French market and other foreign markets by Norwegian 
banks. The application based the Court’s jurisdiction on Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute of the 
Court and the declarations of acceptance made by France and Norway. The French 
declaration contained a reservation providing that “This declaration does not apply to 
differences relating to matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as 
understood by the Government of the French Republic”, whilst in the Norwegian declaration 
of acceptance there was no such limitation. Norway submitted preliminary objections, and in 
the first objection it referred to the principle of reciprocity in order to rely upon the restriction 
placed by France on her own undertakings, i.e. the subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction added to the French declaration acceptance.
609
 The Court accepted the Norwegian 
argument and, basing itself on the limitation of the French declaration of acceptance, found 
that it was without jurisdiction. In its judgment the Court stressed that “In accordance with the 
condition of reciprocity to which acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction is made subject in 
both Declarations  ... Norway, equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory 
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jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially within its national 
jurisdiction”.610 
A few months after the Court’s judgment in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans the 
World Court came to be seized by a legal dispute in which the Connally reservation was 
invoked by the very United States which had “invented” the subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction. 
 The respective case was the Interhandel Case, brought before the Court by 
Switzerland against the United States of America in 1957. The applicant requested the Court 
to declare that the United States was under an obligation to restore to the Swiss company, 
named Interhandel, its assets vested in the United States during the Second World War.
611
 
The question of the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction in the Interhandel 
Case was first raised in connection with the Swiss request for indication of interim measures 
of protection, arguing that as long as the case was pending the United States should not part 
with the disputed assets and not sell them. The United States challenged the Court’s 
jurisdiction, on the one hand, arguing that the sale or disposition of the vested stock of the 
company at issue were matters exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the United 
States
612
 and, on the other hand, the seizure and retention of stock in an American corporation, 
done in the exercise of the war powers, were not matters of international law but rather were 
recognized by international law to be within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.
613
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The Swiss reply to the American preliminary objections and during the course of the 
oral proceedings Professor Guggenheim dealt at length with the admissibility and validity of 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction.
614
 But the Court did not, even in connection 
with the preliminary objections, consider the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction, 
for it upheld the third preliminary objection for the reason that Interhandel had failed to 
exhaust the local remedies available in the United States.
615
  
The subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction were touched upon in connection 
with one of the cases regarding the aerial incident of 27 July 1955. With respect to the tragedy 
of the Israeli aircraft of 27 July 1955 on Bulgarian territory, proceedings against Bulgaria 
were instituted before the Court not only by Israel,
 616
 but also by the United States of 
America and Great Britain, because the casualties included American and British nationals.
617
  
For the purpose of the present discussion, this dispute is of interest in so far as the 
Government of the United States of America, in its observations and submissions on the 
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preliminary objections of Bulgaria, maintained, in contrast to its position stated in the 
Interhandel Case, “that the reservation in question does not permit the Government of the 
United States, or any other government seeking to rely on this reservation reciprocally, 
arbitrarily to characterize the subject matter of a suit as ’essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction’”, even though the subject matter is quite evidently one of international concern 
and has been so treated by the parties to the case.
618
 
Mention of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction before the International 
Court of Justice has been made in yet another dispute, notably the Case concerning military 
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. However, the reservation was not relied 
upon by either party in that dispute. On the other hand, in its Counter-memorial of 17 August 
1984 presented to the Court, the Washington Government made essentially the same 
statement it had made over 30 years earlier in the Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the 
United States of America in Morocco, notably to the effect that in the present case the United 
States does not invoke para. b) of its declaration of acceptance of 1946 (the so—called 
Connally Reservation). “This determination is without prejudice to the rights of the United 
States under that provisio in relation to any subsequent pleadings, proceedings or cases before 
this Court.”619  
It should be added that the Court’s decision in the Nicaragua case revived the 
discussion not only on the Connally reservation and but on the necessity of the optional clause 
system as well.
620
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Thus, among the aforementioned cases, it was only in the Norwegian Loans case and 
the Interhandel Case that the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction was considered. It 
should be added, however, that the Court had in fact sidestepped the question of how far 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction were admissible and valid, but some judges 
did make a detailed study of the matter in their separate and dissenting opinions. Especially 
oft–quoted is the British Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s separate opinion appended to the 
judgment in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans which took a most definite stand against 
the Connally reservations. 
The attitude of the International Court of Justice was particularly disputable in the 
Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, since in that legal dispute the Court recognized, without 
stating the reasons, as a priori valid a reservation on whose lawfulness and admissibility there 
were set forth strongly divided views in the literature on international law. In that case as Sir 
Robert Jennings, who later became a member and even President of the Court, points out the 
question of the validity of a subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction was not directly 
raised by the parties in their submissions, but was raised indirectly by Norway in relying upon 
the incriminated reservation.
621
 However, the Court took the position that, since the validity of 
the reservation had not been questioned by the parties,  
 
“the Court has before it a provision which both Parties to the dispute regard as 
constituting an expression of their common will relating to the competence of the 
Court. The Court does not therefore consider that it is called upon to enter into an 
examination of the reservation in the light of considerations which are not presented 
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by the issues in the proceedings. The Court, without prejudging the question, gives 
effect to the reservation as it stands and as the Parties recognize it”.622  
 
Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht sharply criticized that attitude of the Court stating that 
“the fact that she (Norway – V. L.) did not raise(d) the particular issue of the validity of the 
French Acceptance as a whole cannot endow with validity an instrument otherwise invalid. … 
The defendant State cannot, by refraining from raising objections, grant dispensation from 
invalidity. No one could do it—including, perhaps, the Court itself.”623 
According to Briggs, the most satisfactory aspect of the Norwegian Loans case was 
that “the peremptory reservation worked to the detriment of the State which had introduced it 
into its Declaration”.624 The Norwegian Loans case had one more “happy consequence”, 
namely the fact that the Court’s decision prompted France to make a new declaration of 
acceptance in 1959, omitting the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction and replacing 
it with an objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. 
 
(d) The reservation as an escape clause 
 
Regarding subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction the literature on 
international law reflects a unanimity of views that states should act in good faith when 
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declaring—by referring to this reservation—that a matter falls within domestic jurisdiction. 
As noted above, it was practically this same point which the United States stressed in the case 
instituted against Bulgaria regarding the aerial incident of 27 July 1955 saying that reservation 
b) of the United States declaration of acceptance “does not permit the United States or any 
other State to make an arbitrary determination (i.e. on matters of domestic jurisdiction - V. L.), 
in bad faith”.625 
But what is the situation where a state invokes in bad faith the subjective reservation 
of domestic jurisdiction? Can the Court examine whether a state acted in good faith or not? 
Many authors answer this question in the affirmative, believing that a key to solving the 
problems of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction lies in conferring on the Court the 
right to review whether a state has invoked such a reservation in good faith.
626
 
Maus writes that the American declaration of acceptance did not expressly accord this 
right to the Court. He maintains, however, that the Court may decide whether a state has acted 
in good faith. If a state invokes the reservation in bad faith, it virtually steps beyond the 
boundaries of its right to determine the Court’s jurisdiction, and in that event the general rule 
laid down in Art. 36,  para. 6 of the Statute comes into operation.
627
 That is to say that “In the 
event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court”. The author holds that refusal to confer on the Court the right to 
impartially examine whether states have acted in good faith actually amounts to recognizing 
the right of states to misuse the reservation. Regarding this point he refers to the finding of the 
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Court in the Corfu Channel Case that the Court is not bound by the decision of a state which 
has declared in bad faith that a matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction.
628
 
Maus, too, seems to feel the weakness of his view, as seen from the angle of practice, 
and then goes on to dwell on the question of whether matters exist which can be said to have 
been declared—to be within domestic juridiction—in bad faith by a state. On this score he 
points out the following: the right of the Court to decide whether a state has invoked its 
domestic jurisdiction in bad faith is difficult to apply in practice. Referring to Lauterpacht’s 
separate opinion added to the Court’s judgment in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 
Maus asserts that subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction are worded in such broad 
terms as to practically cover any dispute which the state concerned wishes to declare to be 
within its domestic jurisdiction.
629
  
In the view of another author, Crabb, the borderline for the Court’s decision would no 
longer be whether the dispute was domestic as a matter of law, “but whether it had been 
determined to be so reasonably and in good faith by the defendant State”.630 He believes that 
since in such cases the function of the Court “would be determining in a substantial way the 
question of its own jurisdiction, and not merely registering a veto”, Art. 36, para. 6 of the 
Statute is not violated either.
631
  
According to Shihata “The question of domestic jurisdiction is elastic enough to allow 
a wide use of the reservation, which is not necessarily an abuse of it.” Anyhow, he concludes 
                                                 
628
 Id.   
629
 Id. 159-160 
630
 Crabb (1961) 539 
631
 Id. 538 
 268 
that the Court will have to decide, at least on a prima facie basis whether the reservation was 
properly invoked.
632
 
A position diametrically opposed to these views is taken by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 
who, in his separate opinion delivered in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, firmly 
opposes having the Court vested with the right to examine whether a state claimed bona or 
mala fide that the particular matter was within its domestic jurisdiction. In taking this position 
Judge Lauterpacht based himself, on the one hand, on the intent of states making such 
reservation and, on the other hand, starting from practical considerations, on the difficulty in 
separating “domestic” from “international” matters. On this score he writes that “it is possible 
for a State to maintain, without necessarily laying itself open to an irresistible charge of bad 
faith, that practically every dispute concerns a matter essentially within its domestic 
jurisdiction”.633 A few lines below he goes on to assert that “The Court has no power to give a 
decision on the question whether a State has acted in good faith in claiming that a dispute 
covers a matter which is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction”.634 
In point of fact, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht repeated the same position in his dissenting 
opinion in the Interhandel Case, adding that the Court must exercise the greatest caution in 
attributing to a sovereign state bad faith, an abuse of right, or unreasonableness in the 
fulfilment of its obligations.
635
  
Sir Percy Spender, in his separate opinion appended to the judgment in the Interhandel 
Case, came to a similar conclusion, arguing that the Court would, by examining whether a 
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state invoked in good faith the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction to the American 
declaration, virtually modify that reservation in such a way that the declaration would be read 
as containing the words “‘provided it is so determined by the United States of America in 
good faith.’ There is no room of redrafting the reservation and giving it a different meaning to 
what its words bear and which they clearly enough were intended to bear.”636 
It is abundantly clear that where an international obligation is involved the Court has 
the right and duty to consider the regularity of the argument advanced. In other cases the 
situation is much more difficult to handle, because lack of good faith is hard to prove, and, as 
is referred to the arbitral award in the Lac Lenoux Case by Jean-Pierre Cot, it is a well 
crystallized legal principle that bad faith cannot be presumed.
637
 One could say that the 
examination of bona or mala fide pleas of the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
is a rather heavy responsibility, complex and delicate.
638
 So it appears that Anzilotti was 
justified in writing, in connection with the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria Case 
that the theory of abuse of rights is an extremely delicate question, and a judge should hesitate 
in applying it to such a question as the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
639
  
In addition, the question arises as to what the Court would achieve by finding that the 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction was invoked in bad faith by a state. 
If the Court should find a state to have acted in bad faith by alleging a dispute before 
the Court to be within its domestic jurisdiction, such a decision would doubtlessly be hotly 
debated in view of the authority of the International Court of Justice; it being doubtful 
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whether it would serve to promote the peaceful settlement of the particular dispute. A decision 
of the Court establishing a bad faith plea of domestic jurisdiction would, in a considerable 
number of cases, result in the Court declaring that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. It is 
nonetheless questionable whether that decision would be accepted by the state concerned. 
So, if one is to take a realistic approach to subjective reservations of domestic 
jurisdiction, two factors must be kept in mind. Firstly, both the states and the International 
Court of Justice have, in the last analysis, recognized as valid the reservations in question and, 
secondly, these reservations open up the possibility for abuse and evading the obligations 
undertaken in respect of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. It was not by chance that in his 
Report of 1956-57 the Secretary–General of the United Nations stated that the subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction “render the whole system of compulsory jurisdiction 
illusory”. 
 
(e)  The reservation and  the Statute   
   
The objection most frequently raised is that subjective reservations of domestic 
jurisdiction are inconsistent with Art. 36, para. 6 of the Statute, which provides that “In the 
event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court”. 
The best–known proponent of this view is Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who, in his separate 
opinion written in the Norwegian Loans case, explains that the automatic reservation to the 
French declaration of acceptance is in conflict with Art. 36, para. 6 of the Statute, because the 
French declaration leaves it to the Government of the French Republic to determine which 
matters fall within national jurisdiction in a concrete dispute, and more notably which matters 
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are excluded from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht says 
that 
 
“The French reservation is thus not only contrary to one of the most fundamental 
principles of international—and national—jurisprudence according to which it is within 
the inherent power of a tribunal to interpret the text establishing its jurisdiction. It is also 
contrary to a clear specific provision of the Statute of the Court as well as to the general 
Articles 1 and 92 of the Statute and of the Charter, respectively, which require the Court 
to function in accordance with its Statute”.640 
 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht holds that automatic reservations actually deprive the Court of 
its power to determine its jurisdiction, since in the case of declarations containing such a 
reservation the Court’s jurisdiction is decided by the state invoking the reservation, and the 
Court, by taking notice of the reservation, does not but practically “register” the position of 
the state concerning the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The eminent authority on international law emphasizes that  
 
“Governments are under no compulsion, legal or moral, to accept the duties of 
obligatory judicial settlement. When accepting them, they can limit them to the barest 
minimum. But the existence of that minimum, if it is to be a legal obligation, must be 
subject to determination by the Court itself and not by the Government accepting it”.641 
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He argues these reservations operate to debar the Court from deciding on its jurisdiction, 
because the question of jurisdiction is settled once a state has invoked its domestic jurisdiction. 
If the state appealing to the reservation has decided that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the 
reservation, the question of jurisdiction cannot be contested any more. In other words, Art. 36, 
para. 6 of the Statute no longer has any relevance, and the application of this paragraph is 
confined to registration of the fact that the defending state has taken a decision on the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
642
 
In like manner, Judge Guerrero in his dissenting opinion added to the judgment in the 
Norwegian Loans case by stating that “The great defect of this reservation is that it does not 
conform either to the spirit of the Statute of the Court or to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 
6 of Article 36”.643 He pointed out that the principle embodied in Art. 36, para. 6 of the 
Statute is common to all international arbitral and judicial tribunals and the International 
Court of Justice would perhaps be the only tribunal that would be compelled to prevent itself 
from dealing with a dispute submitted to it once the subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction had been invoked by one of the parties.
644
  
Sir Percy Spender comes to the same conclusion in the Interhandel Case.
645
  President 
Klaestad and Judge Armand-Upon likewise underlined that the reservation was in conflict 
with the Statute.
646
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Views similar to those of the Judges are also met with in publications appearing after 
the Court’s decisions, with several authors contending that subjective reservations of domestic 
jurisdiction are contrary to the Statute.
647
  
Waldock is of the view that “By looking only at the form and not the substance of the United 
States reservation, it may perhaps be possible to reconcile it with the letter, although not the 
spirit, of Article 36 (6) of the Statute”.648  
Other authors claim that these reservations do not deprive the Court of its right to ultimately 
decide on the question of jurisdiction.
649
 As Crawford writes “No doubt the making of such a 
reservation demonstrates little faith in the Court, but enough, one would have thought, to 
leave to the Court the competence to determine whether an automatic reservation had in fact 
been invoked”.650  
One should agree with that view, since the reservation does not formally deprive the 
Court of its competence to decide on jurisdiction. If in a concrete case one of the parties 
invokes the reservation and the opponent party contests it, the Court remains competent to 
“decide” on the dispute, albeit in that event it should decide in favour of the state referring to 
the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. Thus, although the Court doesn’t have 
much choice in legal disputes when one of the parties refers to a subjective reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction as being a bar to the Court’s jurisdiction, even in those cases the Court 
nevertheless retains, one should stress, a rather small measure of discretion as to a decision—
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since it is for the Court to decide on the justification for the invocation, the existence of the 
reservation, etc.  
 
II Multilateral treaty reservation (Vandenberg reservation} 
 
(a) Appearance of the reservation 
 
The appearance of a multilateral treaty reservation—otherwise known as the 
Vandenberg reservation—is similar to the 1946 US declaration of acceptance, and the history 
of its elaboration resembles that of the Connally reservation. 
The origin of this limitation can be traced back to the Memorandum which John Foster 
Dulles—head of the United States’ delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and 
later Foreign Secretary of State—sent to a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the Senate on 10 July 1946. In his Memorandum, Dulles explained that in the case of disputes 
under multilateral treaties a matter at issue might arise in relations not only between two 
states—party to the given multilateral treaty—which are parties before the Court, but also 
between the other contracting parties to that treaty. In view of such matters it would be 
necessary to make it clear that it was not compulsory to submit to the Court a dispute arising 
under that multilateral treaty solely on the grounds that certain states party to the treaty were 
required to do so under the optional clause, the reason being that the other states party to the 
treaty had not undertaken to resort to the Court and thereby become parties, so they were not 
bound by Art. 94 of the Charter providing that each Member of the United Nations 
“undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to 
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which it is a party”.651 It was on the basis of the Dulles Memorandum that—on the proposal 
of Senator Vandenberg—the Senate decided to also include in the United States’ declaration 
of acceptance a limitation providing that the declaration shall not apply to “disputes arising 
under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also 
parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to 
jurisdiction”.  
It was characteristic of the Senators that, as is pointed out by Briggs, they had adopted 
the reservation without clarifying debate and without understanding its meaning and 
implications.
652
  
According to Judge Ruda, the Washington Government intended, by making that 
reservation, to avoid a situation in which it would be obliged to apply a multilateral treaty in a 
certain way in line with the Court’s judgment, while the other states party to the treaty and not 
participating in the proceedings remained free to apply the treaty in different ways from that 
determined by the judgment of the Court, since according to Art. 59 of the Statute the 
decision of the Court had no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the 
particular case.
653
 
Relying on the related Senate documents, Maus writes that the Senators were not 
aware at the time of the reservation modifying the jurisdiction already conferred to the Court 
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and believed that by making that reservation they actually settled an issue.
654
 However, the 
solution to the problem is unresolved, for the reservation is vague and, as will be seen later, 
lends itself to various interpretations. 
For that matter, Kelsen asserts that the wording of the reservation was modelled on Art. 
62, para. 1 of the Statute, which refers to “an interest of a legal nature which may be affected 
by the decision in the case”, having the meaning that all parties to the multilateral treaty 
which may be affected by the decision of the Court are also parties to the case before the 
Court.
655
  
The example of the Vanderberg reservation was followed once again by other states, 
with certain variations of the reservation found in several declarations of acceptance made 
under the optional clause.
656
 
 
(b) The notion of “being affected” 
 
The multilateral treaty reservation, given its uncertainty and vagueness, was criticized 
by numerous authors in the literature on international law. What was most frequently written 
in criticism was that the reservation withdrew, at the will of the declaring  state, a large 
fraction of legal disputes arising under multilateral treaties covered by the optional clause.
657
   
The vagueness of the reservation is manifested chiefly in the first part of the limitation 
and linked to the phrase “all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the 
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case before the Court”. This passage raises the question of who or what should be understood 
by the word “affected”; all the parties to the treaty or the multilateral treaty itself?658 If the 
reference is to the parties, then an answer should be given to the question of when a party to 
the treaty is to be deemed “affected”.659 If, on the other hand, it is the treaty that is to be 
considered “affected”, then “'affected” are, under the reservation, all parties to the treaty and 
hence all of them should participate in the proceedings before the Court. In other words, it is 
not clear whether the authors of the multilateral treaty reservation had in mind the 
participation in proceedings, over a dispute arising under a multilateral treaty, of all parties to 
that treaty or only the parties affected by the dispute. This possibility of two different 
interpretations allows for a restrictive and broader conception of the reservation, depending on 
whether the reference is to all parties to a multilateral treaty or only the states affected by the 
dispute. 
If the authors of the reservation wanted to secure participation in the proceedings of all 
parties to a multilateral treaty, attainment of that aim is next to impossible in practice, since, 
in some cases, it would call for ensuring the presence of as many as fifty or a hundred states 
before the Court, the examination of their written submissions, etc. This in turn would present 
a task almost impossible to perform, not to mention that there would also be the uncertainty 
surrounding the intention of all states party to the treaty to become parties to the case before 
the Court, for it may well be imagined that several contracting parties have no interest 
whatever in having the given dispute decided by the Court.  
Later on the multilateral treaty reservations came to be formulated in clearer terms. 
Thus, for instance, the declarations of Djibouti (2005), India (1974) and The Philippines 
(1972) contain the literally uniform text that “all parties to the treaty are also parties to the 
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case before the Court”.  In this way the said reservations make it unambiguously clear that all 
states party to the multilateral treaty are to participate in the proceedings before the Court, 
which is to say that the states mentioned above included in their respective declarations the 
broader meaning of the reservation. In connection with these reservations a statement by 
Judge Sette-Camara in the Nicaragua case should be referred to; he observed that the broader 
meaning of the reservation might have rather far–reaching consequences and such 
reservations would require the appearance before the Court of all member states of the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States, e.g., in the Nicaragua case, together with 
the original parties in the case.
660
   
Judge Sir Robert Jennings, in his separate opinion delivered on the preliminary 
objections in that same case termed as bizarre the idea that as many as twenty to thirty states 
participate in the proceedings, but, for all that, he considered that the declaring state was 
entitled to make such a reservation, the practical result being that the Court had no jurisdiction 
in the absence of special agreement.
661
 In his dissenting opinion appended to the judgment on 
the merits of the case he emphasised that, in spite of the difficulties connected with the 
reservation, the Court had to respect and apply it.
662
 
In the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, multilateral treaty 
reservations were considered for the first time in the Case concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 
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In its Memorandum presented in response to Nicaragua’s application and during the 
course of the oral proceedings the United States advanced the point that Nicaragua had 
invoked in its application four multilateral treaties, the United Nations Charter, the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties 
of States and the Havana Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil 
Strife. The Washington Government argued that since the dispute submitted to the Court “had 
arisen” under the treaties listed, the Court, according to the multilateral treaty reservation 
contained in the United States declaration of acceptance, could only exercise jurisdiction if all 
parties to the treaty affected by the decision of the Court were also parties to the case. For its 
part, the Washington Government did name the said states (Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Honduras) and maintained that if only one of them was found by the Court to be “affected”, 
the United States reservation would take full effect.
663
 
In the judgment on preliminary objections the Court acknowledged that the 
multilateral treaty reservation included in the United States declaration of acceptance was 
vague and lent itself to two different interpretations; it pointed out that it was not clear as to 
what was ‘affected’, according to the terms of the proviso, the treaties themselves or the 
parties to them.
664
 So, in fact, the Court did nothing else than repeat the question formulated 
in the literature of international law with respect to the reservation. The matter was not, 
however, resolved by the Court, for two reasons. Firstly, because, according to the judgment, 
the reservation had been interpreted by the United States itself as applying only to states 
affected by the decision (i.e. Washington sought to apply the restrictive concept of the 
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reservation), and the three neighbouring states that might be affected had also been indicated 
by Washington.
665
 Secondly, the Court found that the multilateral treaty reservation did not 
affect its jurisdiction in that case, as Nicaragua invoked a number of principles of customary 
and general international law, which had been enshrined in conventions relied upon by 
Nicaragua. The Court emphasised: “The fact that the above mentioned principles, recognized 
as such, have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does not mean that they 
cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law, even as regards countries that are 
parties to such conventions.”666  
By taking this view the Court practically avoided the application in the concrete case 
of the multilateral treaty reservation. 
Over and above these points, the Court’s judgment covered the question as to who was 
to decide whether a state was or was not “affected”, by a future decision of the Court. The 
Court held that should a state consider itself affected by the decision, it would either file an 
application itself or submit a request for intervention. The Court could identify the states 
“affected” only when the general outline of judgment to be given became clear.667 “Certainly 
the determination of the states ‘affected’ could not be left to the parties but must be made by 
the Court”.668 This line of the Court’s reasoning is similar to that of Kelsen, who, shortly after 
the multilateral treaty reservation had appeared in the United States’ declaration of acceptance, 
wrote that the question as to which states were affected by a decision of the Court can be 
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decided “only after the Court had assumed and exercised jurisdiction in the dispute 
concerned”.669 
The question of “affected” states was likewise considered by the Court in dealing with 
the merits of the case. The Court for convenience first dealt with the case of El Salvador, as 
there were certain special features regarding the position of this state.
670
 The United States did 
not participate in that phase of the proceedings, but the Court considered at length the United 
States’ contention based on the multilateral treaty reservation. In connection with the 
reservation the Court stated that “the reservation does not require, as a condition for the 
exclusion of a dispute from the jurisdiction of the Court, that a State party to the relevant 
treaty be ‘adversely’ or ‘prejudicially’ affected by the decision, even though this is clearly the 
case primary at view.”671  
In other words, application of the reservation does not require determining whether the 
state is adversely or otherwise “affected”; “the condition of the reservation is met if the state 
will necessarily be ‘affected’, in one way or the other.”672 The Court held that in the concrete 
case the multilateral treaty reservation operated as a bar to certain documents being invoked 
as multilateral treaties, but it did not in any way affect the consideration of Nicaragua’s claims 
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based on customary international law.
673
 That is to say according to the Court, it had 
jurisdiction under Art 36, para. 2 of the Statute to consider the claims of Nicaragua based on 
customary international law, but it had to exclude from its jurisdiction the consideration of the 
claims upon the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of 
American States. As for this finding, Judge Oda, in his dissenting opinion expressed the view 
that the Court should have proved, not that it could apply customary and general international 
law independently, but that Nicaragua’s claims had not arisen under the above–mentioned two 
multilateral treaties.
674
 
At any rate, the Court’s decision on the merits of the Nicaragua case similarly failed 
to answer several important questions relating to multilateral treaty reservations, and, as is 
pointed out by Briggs, the Court disregarded the fact that a reservation stipulating that “all 
Sstates party to a multilateral treaty and affected by the decision shall also participate in the 
proceedings” has a destructive effect on international adjudication and is inconsistent with the 
Statute of the Court. Instead, the Court stuck to the term “affected state” without thoroughly 
examining whether El Salvador’s rights were affected by the case at all or what was meant by 
that term in the context of Art. 59 of the Statute, which provided that the decision of the Court 
was binding only on the parties to the case.
675
 According to the well–known American 
professor,  the Court satisfied itself that El Salvador was “affected”, but it did not make such a 
finding regarding Honduras, albeit that country was the base of operations against 
Nicaragua.
676
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In recent years, in the Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999, the 
multilateral treaty reservation was touched upon. In response to Pakistan’s application, India 
filed preliminary objections invoking, inter alia, the fact that both its declaration of 
acceptance of 1974 and Pakistan’s declaration contained a multilateral treaty reservation, 
which barred Pakistan from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction against India.677 India contended 
that the United Nations Charter, on which Pakistan founded its claims, belonged exactly to the 
category of multilateral treaties to which the reservation applied. 
The multilateral treaty reservation was not considered in that case since, as mentioned 
earlier, the Court found that the Commonwealth reservation included in the Indian declaration 
of acceptance was validly invoiced in that legal dispute and it had no jurisdiction to entertain 
the application filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
678
 
 
(c) Problems regarding the participation of third states in the proceedings 
 
Those who defend the multilateral treaty reservation usually argue that this limitation 
serves to protect the interests of third states party to a given multilateral treaty. Such 
reasoning is not convincing because Arts. 62 and 63 of the Statute expressly provide for 
safeguarding the interests of third states by entitling those states to intervene in the 
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proceedings before the Court.
679
 Therefore, as is rightly stated by Professor Joe Verhoeven, 
the reservation defends the interests of only one state, that which has written the reservation 
into its declaration of acceptance.
680
 
A closer look at multilateral treaty reservations leads us to make the point that in 
certain cases protecting of the interests of third states may prove all too strong an asset, since 
a state or states party to a multilateral treaty may happen to have no interest whatsoever in 
having a dispute regarding e.g. the interpretation or application of the treaty decided by the 
Court. On a broader meaning of the multilateral treaty reservation, the consent even of these 
states is required in respect of proceedings before the Court, yet, under the reservation, these 
states are not obliged to participate in the proceedings, that is to say they may refuse their 
participation. By so doing they undoubtedly protect their own interests, but, at the same time, 
they jeopardize the interests of those states party to the treaty which, on the other hand, seek 
to have the dispute decided by the Court. At any rate, the reservation gives states a measure of 
manoeuvre to decide, despite their commitment undertaken with respect to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, and actually on a case–by–case basis, whether a particular legal 
dispute may be dealt with by the Court.  
In exploring a solution to these problems arising out of the multilateral treaty 
reservation Louis Sohn suggested that the reservation should be reworded
681
 to exclude from 
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compulsory jurisdiction “disputes relating to a multilateral treaty, unless all the parties to that 
treaty have agreed that any decision rendered in any such dispute between two or more of 
them will be binding upon all of them ...”.682 Professor Lori Damrosch is critical of Sohn’s 
suggestion, which she believes to have more disadvantages than advantages, and she raises 
the question of its compatibility with Art. 94 of the United Nations Charter and Art. 59 of the 
Court’s Statute. She is of the view that Professor Sohn’s proposal purports to derogate from 
the binding character of the Court’s decisions in contentious cases, because the unanimous 
consent as mentioned in the proposal can hardly be expected to be given by states with no 
interest in a particular matter.
683
  
According to the Statute and the Rules of Court, intervention is a procedural device by 
which the interests of a third state, not party to the proceedings before the Court are protected. 
Without dwelling on questions of intervention one can state that there exists in fact two 
methods of intervention, depending on whether intervention is based on Art. 62 or Art. 63 of 
the Statute.   
Under Art. 62 states are empowered to intervene in a case if they consider that a legal 
interest of theirs may be affected; in such case the state can request that the Court be 
permitted to intervene. The permission may be granted or refused, upon the decision of the 
Court, considering whether or not the intervening state's legal interests are affected by the 
proceedings instituted.  
On the other hand, Art. 63 covers precisely those cases, which involve the 
interpretation of a multilateral treaty before the Court, and in which, other states party to the 
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treaty are permitted to intervene, along with the parties involved in the case.
684
 Intervention 
under Art. 63 thus accords to the states party to the multilateral treaty a right to intervene. 
Participation by third states in proceedings before the Court under a multilateral treaty 
reservation has some similarities with intervention under Art. 63 nevertheless, there are 
significant differences between the two cases. 
 (i) According to the multilateral treaty reservation, proceedings before the Court 
cannot take place unless the other states party to a multilateral treaty also participate therein— 
whether only the states affected by the Court’s decision or all states party to the multilateral 
treaty should participate has no relevance here—, with the reservation practically exercising 
some sort of pressure on these states to get involved and participate in the proceedings, since 
the Court cannot decide on the legal dispute without their presence. By contrast, in the case of 
intervention under Art. 63 it is exclusively for the interested state to decide whether or not to 
make use of its right to intervene. 
 (ii) Under the general rule governing intervention, it is for the Court to decide on 
intervention, even in the case of intervention under Art. 63. Whereas in the case of a 
multilateral treaty reservation the Court is actually left without discretion to decide on the 
participation in the proceedings of states other than the original parties to the case, because 
the reservation makes it to some extent an obligation of the states affected to participate in the 
proceedings or else the proceedings before the Court cannot take place at all. 
In connection with the multilateral treaty reservation, the question also arises as to 
what will be the position in the proceedings of the other states party to the multilateral treaty. 
                                                 
684
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This is an open question, all the more so since the position in the proceedings of the 
intervening state is similarly awaiting full clarification. 
It was in 1992, for the first time since the establishment of the International Court of 
Justice, that the Court permitted a third state to intervene in the Case concerning the Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. Until this case the literature on international law was 
also rather uncertain about the position in the proceedings of the intervening state.
685
 Precisely 
for that reason the ad hoc Chamber—composed of members of the Court—, when permitting 
Nicaragua’s intervention in the legal dispute between El Salvador and Honduras,686 found it 
appropriate to give some indication of the extent of the procedural rights acquired by 
Nicaragua as a result of that permission.
687
 The Chamber held that the intervening state does 
not become a party to the proceedings, and does not acquire the rights, or become subject to 
the obligations (which attach to the status of a party, under the Statute), the Rules of Court 
and the general principles of procedural law. At the same time, however, the intervening state 
is also vested with certain rights, such as the right to be heard, but this does not carry through 
with regard to the obligations of being bound by the decision.
688
   
With respect to multilateral treaty reservations this means that, on a broader meaning 
of the reservation, for instance, all states party to a multilateral treaty (which may number 20 
or 30 or even more) should participate in proceedings over a particular case, all having the 
right to be heard by the Court! It needs no further explanation that this would not be a viable 
path in practice. 
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If, on the other hand, the intervening state is a non–party in the case, the Court’s 
decision is not binding on it. In the Case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute this reasoning was also practically upheld by the Chamber, which concluded that in 
the circumstances of the present case the Chamber’s judgment was not res judicata for 
Nicaragua.
689
 In dealing with this matter Rosenne points out—similar to the declaration made 
by Judge Oda in that case
690—that, since the case concerned a territorial dispute, the 
Chamber’s judgment was binding not only on the parties; it was valid erga omnes. Precisely 
for this reason, Professor Rosenne stated that it was difficult to understand why the Chamber 
did not somehow refer in the judgment to Nicaragua’s declaration—which was made at the 
time it submitted its request for intervention—stating that “Nicaragua intends to subject itself 
to the binding effect of the decision to be given.”691 
In respect of the multilateral treaty reservation all this leads to the conclusion that if 
the Court should be seized of a dispute under a declaration of acceptance containing a 
multilateral treaty reservation and the states party to the treaty in question also wish to 
participate in the proceedings before the Court under the terms of the multilateral treaty 
reservation, it can be taken as very likely that, having regard to the judgment in the Case 
concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, these states would be considered 
by the Court as non–parties in the proceedings and not bound by the judgment of the Court. It 
is not sure, of course, that in a dispute regarding a multilateral treaty the Court would by 
analogy apply its jurisprudence regarding intervention, and it is also unlikely that under the 
multilateral treaty reservation the Court would recognize for third states participating in a case 
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more rights than it had conceded to the intervening state in the Case concerning the Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute.  
 
(d) The consent to the proceedings 
 
The second part of the multilateral treaty reservation as contained in the United States 
declaration of acceptance and stipulating in fact an alternative condition, provides that in a 
dispute arising under a multilateral treaty the Court may not have jurisdiction unless “the 
United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction”. This practically means nothing else 
than disputes as to multilateral treaties cannot be brought before the Court solely under the 
optional clause and the consent of the state having the multilateral treaty reservation in its 
declaration
 
of acceptance—and, on the basis of reciprocity, the consent of even the opponent 
party—is required in such proceedings. 
Hudson asserts that this clause of the reservation shows a confusion of thought, for if 
the United States agrees to jurisdiction, it is virtually that consent which, functioning, as it 
were, as a special agreement, constitutes the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, and there would 
be no question of applying the declaration of acceptance.
692
 One can say that in respect of the 
reservation it is unclear whether the special consent of the United States practically replaces 
the declaration of acceptance and that lack of its consent deprives the Court of its compulsory 
jurisdiction in disputes arising under multilateral treaties. Waldock referring to Lauterpacht’s 
view,  writes that if his view is correct, the reservation practically operates to preclude the 
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United States from being brought before the Court in a dispute regarding a multilateral treaty 
unless the United States specifically consents to jurisdiction after the case has arisen.
693
 
In respect of multilateral treaty reservations the question also arises as to how 
reciprocity affects this limitation, especially that part of it which requires even a separate 
consent from the declaring state regarding the Court’s jurisdiction, since according to the 
principle of reciprocity a reservation may be invoked by the opponent party as well.  
 
(e) Compatibility of the reservation with the Statute   
 
Also, the question of compatibility with respect to obligations under the Statute and 
the optional clause arises in connection with multilateral treaty reservations, both with the 
first part of the reservation on account of its vagueness, as has been discussed already, and the 
second part thereof, which requires the declaring state’s special consent regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This part of the reservation is clearly contrary to the obligation 
undertaken under Art. 36, para. 2 of the Statute and even the spirit of the optional clause, 
which provides that states “declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without 
special agreement” the jurisdiction of the Court. Owing to the second part of multilateral 
treaty reservation the parties’ declarations of acceptance become useless, since the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction cannot come into play in disputes arising under multilateral treaties, 
and such disputes cannot be decided by the Court unless the state having that reservation in its 
declaration—and, the opponent party, on the basis of reciprocity —specially agrees to submit 
the legal dispute to the Court. 
One can say that with this part of multilateral treaty reservations, the declaring state 
nullifies the obligations undertaken in respect of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, by its 
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accession to the optional clause system. As mentioned earlier, this is practically the case with 
subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction as well. However, one could think that this is 
perhaps even more readily perceptible with multilateral treaty reservations than subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction. 
From the foregoing it becomes clear that multilateral treaty reservations have a 
destructive effect on the compulsory jurisdiction system as the subjective reservations of 
domestic jurisdiction have, chiefly because the broad concept of interpretation of the 
“affected” states, barred proceedings before the Court over disputes arising under multilateral 
treaties. As for the other part of these reservations, by the said stipulation, declaring states 
unquestionably take back the compulsory jurisdiction which they conferred on the Court. All 
this is detrimental to the judicial settlement of international disputes, all the more so since 
multilateral treaty reservations expressly concern disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of treaties, and a considerable part of the cases brought before the Court involve 
precisely such disputes. 
As it was already said the Court while applying a subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction retains a certain measure of discretion to decide on its own jurisdiction and—in 
the context thereof—its competence under Art. 36, para. 6 of the Statute. If in a legal dispute 
submitted to the Court a state decides not to invoke the subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction, the Court may go on with the proceedings, as the application of the reservation is 
not automatic and parties should refer to it before the Court. In the case of multilateral treaty 
reservations, especially with regard to the second part of such reservations, the parties have no 
such “discretion” and, if one clings strictly to the wording of these reservations, the Court 
may not, in matters covered by the reservations, assume jurisdiction unless the parties 
specially agree thereto. Of course, it may also happen that multilateral treaty reservations are 
not invoked, but in that event the Court’s jurisdiction is practically founded not on 
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declarations of acceptance, since under these the Court could not deal with a particular matter 
in any way; instead the Court would deal with it on the forum prorogatum, i.e. on the parties’ 
consent to jurisdiction in  a given dispute.
694
   
 
III The Court’s position towards destructive reservations 
 
One can see that destructive reservations added to declarations of acceptances raise a 
number of important questions. It would be primarily for the Court to decide on questions 
concerning limitations with disputable clauses especially because these limitations are 
contrary to the spirit and the letters of the optional clause. This relates to subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction and multilateral treaty reservations as well. However, in 
dealing with a variety of matters the Court has in fact avoided giving clear answers to these 
questions. Nevertheless, several members of the Court have argued that the Court had to 
examine ex officio the validity of the disputed reservations. 
In his separate opinion submitted in the Norwegian Loans case, Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht emphasized that the Court would have had to examine ex officio the validity of 
the French reservation, since the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be founded on anything but valid 
documents. For this very reason he claims, the fact that the defendant state did not raise “the 
particular issue of the validity of the French Acceptance as a whole cannot endow with 
validity an instrument otherwise invalid.”695 In the Interhandel Case, Judge Sir Hersch 
Lauterpach was even more determined to not have the Court postpone the decision on the 
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validity the automatic reservation and the manner of its exercise, because of the applicant 
state raising these questions in that legal dispute.
696
   
In the Norwegian Loans case Judge Guerrero, too, expressed the view that the Court 
would have to take a position on whether the French reservation was compatible with the 
Statute.
697
 He stressed that the consensus of the parties was not sufficient for establishing the 
Court’s jurisdiction and that it was also necessary to ascertain “whether that consensus is(was) 
compatible with the provisions of the Statute and whether it can be applied without the 
Court’s being obliged to depart from those provisions”.698 Judge Guerrero referred to the fact 
that in an analogous situation, notably the case of the Free zones of Upper Savoya and the 
district of Gex, the Permanent Court of International Justice decided ex officio on the 
incompatibility of the Franco–Swiss Agreement with respect to the provisions of the Statute 
and did not wait for the parties to raise that question.
699
  
It would have been another problem if an eventual decision of the Court held that a 
declaration of acceptance containing the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction also 
had an effect on the declarations of a number of states which have had no opportunity to 
express their view on the matter. According to Judge Lauterpacht, under Art. 63 of the Statute, 
as was already mentioned, it would have been preferable to give to the states having the 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction in their declarations of acceptance the 
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opportunity to intervene in the case before the Court. Since it failed to do so, the states 
concerned could take the position that by virtue of Art. 59 of the Statute the authority of the 
Court’s decision was limited to the case at hand and “they are at liberty to assert their attitude 
on the matter on another occasion.”700 
The problem of the invalidity of multilateral treaty reservations was referred to by 
Judge Mosler in the Nicaragua case.
701
 Judge Mosler pointed out that the Court never had the 
opportunity to decide whether a whole declaration under the optional clause may be invalid 
because an ineffective reservation had to be considered an essential part of it.
702
  
Those who challenge the International Court of Justice for having failed to take a 
different stand on the question of the validity of those reservations which contain rather 
disputable contents are undoubtedly right at first glance, but if one examines this problem 
more carefully and probes into it, in light of the Court’s possible findings on the matter, one 
must admit that the International Court of Justice was right to refrain from taking a definitive 
stance on these delicate issues. 
Had the Court decided on the validity of destructive reservations, it could have 
concluded either the validity or invalidity of the reservations. If the Court had decided on the 
invalidity of such reservations then it would have had to decide also on the severability of 
these invalid reservations from the declarations themselves.  
Had the Court decided that multilateral treaty reservations, subjective reservations of 
domestic jurisdiction or the declarations containing such limitations were valid, it would have 
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obviously exposed itself to sharp criticism on the one hand and undermined its own prestige 
and authority on the other, since in connection with these reservations it would have explicitly 
acknowledged that its competence to decide on the question of its own jurisdiction had shrunk 
to a rather narrow scope. In addition, a definitive stance of the Court on clearly accepting as 
valid the contested reservations and the declarations of acceptance containing such 
reservations would by all means have afforded for states a kind of “encouragement” to attach 
such limitations to their declarations of acceptance.   
 The other avenue open to the Court would have been a pronouncement on the 
invalidity of destructive reservations. Here, as was already mentioned, other questions arise,  
 
i.) whether there exists the possibility of severing the invalid reservation from the 
declaration of acceptance,  
ii.) whether the invalidity of a reservation affects the whole declaration of acceptance.  
 
Both the views of the judges of the International Court of Justice and the position of 
writers on international law are divided as to the extent to which an invalid reservation affects 
the declaration of acceptance itself. According to one view, invalidity bears upon the 
declaration of acceptance as a whole, whereas the other view argues that invalidity has no 
effect on the declaration itself. In the case of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction a 
distinction may be drawn even within the second view according to the few words "as 
determined by the United States of America”—as invalidity is regarded as going to the 
“automatic clause” only—or the reservation as a whole. 
In the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans Sir Hersch Lauterpacht comes to the 
conclusion that an invalid condition cannot be severed from the declaration as a whole, 
because that possibility can only be entertained in the case of provisions or conditions which 
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are not essential elements of the undertaking. According to Lauterpacht the declaring state 
considers the subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction as being an essential limitation 
on obligations, and should the Court find the declaration to be valid without the reservation, it 
would be ignoring an essential and deliberate condition of the declaration.
703
  
In the Interhandel Case Judge Lauterpacht restated his arguments concerning the invalidity of 
automatic reservations,
 704
 and a similar position was adopted by Judge Sir Percy Spender.
705
 
It can be observed that Lauterpacht’s reasoning did not run along quite the same lines in the 
two cases. In the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans he asserted that the invalidity of the 
automatic reservation to the French declaration had rendered the French declaration of 
acceptance invalid ab initio, whereas in the Interhandel Case he expressed the opinion that so 
long as the reservation of the United States declaration of acceptance was not declared invalid 
by the Court in appropriate proceedings, the limitation had to be deemed to exclude the 
Court’s jurisdiction on the merits. All this led Briggs to conclude that in the Case of Certain 
Norwegian Loans the Court could not, according to Lauterpacht, have jurisdiction because the 
reservation was invalid, although in the Interhandel Case, the Court lacked jurisdiction 
because the invocation of the reservation had to be treated as valid.
706
   
In the literature of international law a similar view to Lauterpacht’s opinion in the 
Norvegian Loans case was taken by Waldock
707
 and Dubisson, the latter author maintaining 
that subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction are null and void and that if the 
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reservation in question constitutes a substantial element of the declaration of acceptance, the 
very declaration is equally null and void.
708
 
Maus considers that a declaration containing the Connally reservation is to be deemed 
null as it runs counter to the object of the optional clause.
709
 The same point is stressed by 
Robert Jennings who argues that “Once it is decided that the reservation is void there would 
seem to be no choice but to regard the Acceptance as void”. The British professor goes on by 
saying that should only the reservation, and not the declaration be found invalid by the Court, 
such a finding would result in precisely the opposite of that which had been intended by the 
declaring state, for the Court would establish its jurisdiction in matters which the state 
concerned had clearly indicated its unwillingness to submit to the Court.
710
  
Again, the problem of invalidity and the question of severability of an invalid clause 
from the rest of the declaration arise in connection with multilateral treaty reservations, but 
this set of problems has received much less attention than the subjective reservations of 
domestic jurisdiction have. In the Nicaragua case Judge Mosler asks whether the declaration 
of acceptance as a whole is affected by the invalidity of the multilateral treaty reservation.
711
 
He, too, leaves this question unanswered, however, confining himself to stating that if the 
answer is yes, then its effect would be worse than applying the reservation and maintaining 
the rest of the declaration.
712
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 The views that an invalid reservation is severable from the declaration, and apart from 
the invalid part, the rest of the declaration of acceptance remains in force, disregard a very 
important aspect of the problem. If a reservation or a clause appended to a declaration of 
acceptance is deemed non–existent, whilst the rest of the declaration is considered valid, the 
obligations of the declaring state are extended without the consent thereof—this is not in line 
with the jurisprudence of the two International Courts;  that subscribes to jurisdiction only 
existing with respect to the questions consented by the parties! This was expressed in the 
judgment of the Permanent Court in the Chorzów Factory Case and reiterated by both Courts 
in several other cases, stating that “the Court’s jurisdiction is always a limited one, existing 
only in so far as States have accepted it;”713   
 The issue of the severability of a reservation from the declaration of acceptance 
emerged in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case as well. According to President Schwebel if the 
declaring state treats a reservation as an essential element without which the declaration 
would not have been made, the Court is not free to hold the reservation invalid or ineffective 
while treating the remainder of the declaration to be in force.
714
 
As mentioned already, the International Court of Justice did not decide upon the 
validity of either the subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction or the multilateral treaty 
reservations.  
To declare null and void optional clause declarations containing subjective 
reservations of domestic jurisdiction or multilateral treaty reservations would have resulted in 
depriving such declarations of acceptance even of the limited legal effect they have retained 
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despite these limitations with respect to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice.  
The reason being that if, in the Norwegian Loans case and the Interhandel Case, the 
Court had found that the French and American declarations of acceptance were invalid as a 
whole on the grounds of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction, a decision to that 
effect would have affected a number declarations of acceptance in force containing the 
subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht himself suggested, 
the form in which the invalidity of those declarations would have been spelled out would have 
been a different matter, of course.
715
 At any rate, the Court’s pronounciation that a declaration 
of acceptance is to be invalid on the grounds of a subjective reservation of domestic 
jurisdiction in the cases before it would have affected, directly or indirectly, the declarations 
of some seven other states.
716
 Thus, in the last analysis, all these points would have combined 
to increase the adverse effects of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction on the 
optional clause system. Pronouncing the invalidity of declarations containing such 
reservations would have operated to rule out even the theoretical possibility of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction coming into play over matters which were not affected by the 
reservations or, situations whereby the parties still had not invoked the said reservation in a 
concrete case, as happened in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in 
Morocco case.  
 Therefore, in the light of the considerations discussed above, it could be maintained 
that the Court was wise to hand down no decision on the validity of the disputed reservations. 
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 The only solution to the problems connected with destructive reservations could be 
achieved by states abandoning the practice of including such limitations in their declarations 
of acceptance.
717
 It should be noted that some progress has been made in this field in so far as 
the declarations of acceptance containing such reservations have decreased in number, and 
several states—France in 1974, Pakistan in 1960, the Republic of South Africa in 1967 and 
the United States in 1986—have withdrawn their respective declarations of acceptance 
containing subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction. The only flaw in the withdrawal of 
declarations containing such reservations is that in the majority of cases the said states 
brought themselves to take that step by reason either of proceedings formally started (see e.g. 
the withdrawal of the United States declaration in connection with the Nicaragua case)
718
 or 
the Court’s decision going against the declaring state. At any rate, subjective reservations of 
domestic jurisdiction are to be found at present in the declarations only of Liberia (1952), 
Malawi (1966}, Mexico (1947), the Philippines (1972) and Sudan (1958).  
The decrease of subjective reservations of domestic jurisdiction is likewise indicated 
by the fact that since the 1970s no single state has made a declaration under the optional 
clause containing such a limitation. The number of multilateral treaty reservations has also 
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decreased and in the last twenty years there was only one state, Djibouti, who added that 
limitation to its declaration of acceptance.  
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Chapter  9 
TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT OF DECLARATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE 
 I The silence of the two Statutes on termination and amendment 
 
Notwithstanding that neither the Statute of the Permanent Court, nor the present 
Court’s Statute contain provisions on the termination and amendment of declarations of 
acceptance, the states have made great use of the possibility for terminating, withdrawing, 
denouncing,  modifying, or amending their declarations of acceptance.
719
  They have not only 
inserted provisions on termination, amendment, etc, in their declarations of acceptance, but 
also taken the opportunity to terminate or amend their declarations.  
Before going on further it should be mentioned that the terminology used by states 
regarding the termination of their declarations of acceptance is far from uniform and the terms 
“termination”, “denunciation” and “withdrawal” are used alternately by states intending to 
end their declaration of acceptance. 
In the law of treaties one can find similar terms, but there is a sharp distinction made 
between the termination and denunciation of a treaty. “Termination” is the broader term, 
meaning the ending of a treaty—by whatever method that may involve—either by the act of 
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one or all of the contracting parties or the operation of the relevant treaty provision or law in 
certain events, such as state succession or war.
720
  There are several circumstances in which 
treaties come to an end, these include: execution, breach of the treaty, conclusion of a new 
treaty, fundamental change in circumstances, supervening impossibility of performance, 
expiry of the period fixed for the duration of the treaty, occurrence of a particular event as 
provided for in the treaty itself—denunciation being but one of these expedients. 
“Denunciation” is a unilateral act by one of the contracting parties which is aimed at 
terminating the treaty, in relation to itself, in accordance with the intent of the contracting 
parties either expressed or understood by interpretation. In the case of a bilateral treaty, lawful 
denunciation terminates the treaty itself.
721
  Denunciation is also resorted to in respect of 
multilateral treaties, although withdrawal would be the correct term in this case. At any rate, 
denunciation of a multilateral treaty by one of the contracting parties does not generally mean 
termination of the treaty itself.
722
   
If one is to be precise, the terms termination, denunciation and withdrawal could also 
be distinguished in the case of declarations of acceptance. Here, too, termination is the 
broader term, meaning that, on the one hand, a declaration loses effect on expiry of the 
specific period therein and, on the other hand, the declaring state, by denouncing or 
withdrawing its declaration of acceptance is getting rid of its obligations undertaken in respect 
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. However, the distinction between denunciation 
and withdrawal is of no relevance to declarations of acceptance, because a particular 
declaration ceases to be in effect in both cases owing to the act of the declaring state. There 
are no other grounds for termination in the case of declarations of acceptance, if only the 
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International Court decides to declare null and void a declaration. Although denunciation and 
withdrawal, as previously stated, have the same meaning in respect of declarations of 
acceptance, here–in–after, in concrete cases, the same terms applied by a given state for the 
termination of its declaration of acceptance will be used. 
  
II Declarations of acceptance on termination and amendment 
 
Regarding the duration of declarations of acceptance, one can find in the Statute of the 
of two Courts one single provision in Art. 36, para. 3 reading: “The declarations referred to 
above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or 
certain states, or for a certain time”. 
This paragraph admits of two specific instances regarding the duration of declarations: 
a declaration of acceptance is made either for a fixed period or for indefinite duration. In 
practice, however, the situation is more complicated than that, as states have developed 
several variants of clauses concerning the duration of declarations of acceptance.
 723
  
       The divergence of declarations of acceptances in that respect was recognized by the 
Internaional Court when it held that: “Nor is there any obligation, notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 
3 of Article 36, to mention such matters as periods of duration, conditions or reservations, and there 
are acceptances which have in one or more, or even in all, of these respects maintained silence.”
724
  
The declarations of acceptance made after the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice were either made for a fixed period of years (initially five and later 
                                                 
723
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fifteen or even twenty years) or an indefinite period, and some declarations did not specify 
any period at al1 for the duration of the instrument. A great part of these declarations were 
silent about termination, withdrawal, denunciation and amendment. The 1929 British 
declaration of acceptance, being the first valid declaration of acceptance, contained a formula 
that was to remain in force for ten years and “thereafter until such time as notice may be given 
to terminate the acceptance.” This formula came to be included in the declarations of 
acceptance of several members of the British Commonwealth and later in the declarations of 
acceptance of other states as well.  
It should be noted that in his oft–cited study published in 1930 Hersch Lauterpacht, 
referring to the above quoted formula of the 1929 British declaration of acceptance, raised the 
following questions: 
 
“Will Great Britain than be at liberty to terminate it (the declaration of acceptance – 
V.L.) at any moment which may suit her convenience, for instance, to avoid an 
impending action before the Court? And, in view of the operation of the rule of 
material reciprocity, will other States be in a position to adopt a similar course as 
against Great Britain?”725  
 
As has already been mentioned, states have developed different variants of the 
provisions on the duration and termination, withdrawal or denunciation of their declarations 
of acceptance. Thus there are declarations which are made for an indefinite duration or fixed 
period, but are silent on termination; others provide for termination with immediate effect, or 
termination occurring on the day of publication of the related note or upon receipt of 
notification thereof by the Secretary–General of the United Nations; finally, a great number of 
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declarations stipulate that termination does not become effective except after a lapse of a 
specified period or at the expiration of a certain period of notice. 
The provisions of the declarations of acceptance regarding the amendment of the 
instruments are more or less in line with those on termination. Thus one can find declarations 
which are silent regarding amendment, and others either containing a six month notice, or 
stipulating the right to amend the instrument with immediate effect or taking effect on the date 
of the receipt of the note on amendment by the Secretary General.
726
 In most instances the 
conditions for the amendment of declarations are the same as those relating to termination, e.g. 
states which fix a six months’ notice for termination are also stipulating a six months’ notice 
for the entry into force of the amendment.
727
 However, there are also declarations where the 
stipulations relating to termination or amendment of declarations differ, thus e.g. the 1946 US 
declaration of acceptance provided for termination but there was no provision on the 
amendment of the instrument. 
 
III  States’ practice and motivations  
 
Since the establishment of the Permanent Court the majority of  states amended, 
terminated, withdrew etc. their declarations of acceptance, and some of them more than 
once.
728
 Several declarations of acceptance have been terminated either due to expiration of 
the instruments or as a consequence of the withdrawal or denunciation of the declarations by 
the declaring states. After the termination of their declarations, states frequently made new 
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ones either changing the conditions for the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction or 
amending the reservations attached to their declarations. It should be added that sometimes 
amendments of declarations of acceptance, or the substitution of existing declarations by new 
ones may also have the merit that the wording of the instruments become clearer and, as has 
also happened, certain complicated and practically inapplicable limitations are omitted from 
the instruments. 
Although states have often amended their declarations of acceptance, or replaced by a 
new one, there are few cases of leaving the optional clause system. Since the establishment of 
the International Court of Justice till August 2013 eighty three states recognized the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by declarations of acceptance, while during that period 
fifteen states left the optional clause system.
729
 
Regarding the causes of termination or amendment of declarations of acceptance, in 
some instances the intention of the states was clear and evident, in others one could only 
guess the intent of the states in question. In several cases states terminated or amended their 
declarations of acceptance in order to prevent proceedings being instituted against them in 
respect of a dispute. In other cases it is quite obvious that either the submission of a given 
dispute to Court, or the decision of the Court in a dispute affected the declaring state, thus 
prompting it to terminate or amend its declaration of acceptance.  
While discussing the cases of termination of declarations of acceptances and the 
motivations behind them it is worth differentiating between instances when a state is 
withdrawing its declaration of acceptance and making a new one, amending the instrument 
anticipating a dispute to be submitted to the Court’s decision, or intending to completely 
withdraw from participation in the optional clause system.   
                                                 
729
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At the beginning of World War II in 1939-40 several states like France, the United 
Kingdom and some members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (Australia, Canada, 
India, New–Zealand and South Africa) notified the Secretary–General of the League of 
Nations that, in view of the changes in circumstances, they would not be regarding their 
acceptance of the optional clause as covering disputes arising out of events occurring during 
hostilities under way
730
, and a few months most of them made new declarations of acceptance 
containing reservations relating to hostilities and armed conflicts, or amended their 
declarations.
731
 At the time some states expressed their reservations with regard to these 
actions
732
. Norway and Sweden proposed that the Permanent Court pronounce on the legal 
effects of these denunciations,
733
 but, obviously enough, the Court could not do so, as it had 
no power to determine similar matters except in concrete cases.
734
  Although the instances 
mentioned above are usually examined together, it is necessary to make some distinction 
between the actions of the members of the British Commonwealth compared to the actions of 
France.
735
  
The difference lies in the fact that the declarations of the members of the 
Commonwealth were made in 1929-1930 for a ten–year period and it was exactly at the 
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expiry of that period that they withdrew their declarations, making new declarations with 
reservations relating to hostilities and war events. A different situation obtained for France, 
since the French declaration of acceptance was set to expire in 1941, however,  the 
notification of the French Government relating to hostilities and the amendment of its 
declaration of acceptance was dated on 11 September 1939.
736
 Thus France in contrast to the 
members of the British Commonwealth—which withdrew their declarations practically on the 
expiry of their terms—amended its declaration made for a fixed period before the expiry of 
that period.  
The characrteristic of the above mentioned instances were that the members of the 
British Commonwealth and France were not compelled by a concrete dispute to withdraw or 
amend their declarations. In addition, they terminated or amended declarations made for fixed 
periods and did not turn their backs on the optional clause system, remaining parties thereto 
but excluding from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction such disputes as might be related to 
war events under way. 
To illustrate the termination of declarations of acceptance as a preventive measure 
from states’ practice after World War II, one could mention that in 1954 the Australian 
Government withdrew its declaration of 1940,
737
 in the face of the danger of Japan  instituting 
proceedings before the International Court regarding pearl fisheries in the seas between the 
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two states. The 1940 declaration was replaced by a new one excluding “disputes arising out or 
concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised by Australia  – (a) in respect of the 
continental shelf of Australia and the territories under the authority of Australia, as that 
continental shelf is described or delimited in the Australian Proclamations of 10 September 
1953 or under the Australian Pearl Fisheries Acts”. According to Judge Oda, Australia took 
that step a few months after the two countries had agreed to jointly submit to the International 
Court of Justice their dispute on Japanese pearl–fishing on Australia’s continental shelf 
subject to successful negotiations on a modus vivendi.
738
 Thus, in all probability, Australia 
terminated its declaration of acceptance and made a new one in an effort to prevent 
proceedings from being eventually instituted by unilateral application while the negotiations 
were in progress.  
It was for similar reasons in respect of preventing the submission of a dispute to the 
Court’s decision that in 1955 the United Kingdom terminated its declaration, which was made 
a little short of five months before, subsequently substituting it with another one containing a 
new reservation excluding “disputes in respect of which arbitral or judicial proceedings are 
taking, or have taken place with a state which, at the date of the commencement of the 
proceedings, had not itself accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice”. According to writers of international law, the text of that reservation suggests that 
the United Kingdom suddenly amended its declaration of acceptance in order to prevent the 
submission to the Court of its dispute with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis after a 
breakdown in attempted arbitration.
739
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Mention may also be made of Canada, which in 1970 amended its declaration of 
acceptance to insert a new reservation with a view of avoiding disputes that seemed likely to 
question the lawfulness of Canada’s 1970 legislation establishing an anti–pollution zone with 
respect to claimed Canadian jurisdiction extending 100 miles off its northern coast into Arctic 
waters.
 
 Again, in 1994, Canada terminated its 1985 declaration and made a new one which 
included a new reservation by reason of the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. It was 
precisely that step which was contested by Spain in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between 
Spain and Canada.  
Malta in the 1980s amended its declaration of acceptance two times in two years. The 
1966 Maltese declaration contained no reservation concerning territorial disputes. However, 
in 1981, shortly before it attempted to intervene in the dispute between Tunisia and Libya in 
the Continental Shelf case, Malta had amended its declaration to make it clear that the 
declaration applied also to disputes over the continental shelf.
740
 The Court nevertheless 
dismissed  Malta’s request for permission to intervene in the legal dispute between Tunisia 
and Libya.
741
 Again, in 1983, Malta amended its 1966 declaration to insert rather detailed 
reservations relating to its territory, including the territorial sea, and the status thereof; the 
continental shelf or any other zone of maritime jurisdiction, and the resources thereof, etc. 
Professor Merrills asserts that this modification by the Maltese Government served to prevent 
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Italy from instituting any action against Malta, since the Italian request for permission to 
intervene in the Continental Shelf case (Libya/Malta), was dismissed by the Court.
742
  
 One could also refer to the amendment of the 1929 Nicaraguan declaration of 
acceptance which involved adding a reservation in 2001, thus excluding “any matter or claim 
based on interpretations of treaties or arbitral awards that were signed and ratified or made, 
respectively, prior to 31 December 1901.” Costa Rica objected formally to the reservation 
fomulated by Nicaragua and stated, among other points, that the above mentioned reservation 
intended to avoid the submission of a claim by Costa Rica against Nicaragua before the Court 
for its failure to abide according to the provisions agreed upon by both countries in the 
Cailas–Jerez Treaty of  1858 and the Cleveland Award of 1888.743 
Thus one of the characteristics of the above mentioned cases was that although the 
states had tried to tailor their declarations of acceptance by amendment or replacing by a new 
declaration in order to avoid the submission of a dispute to the Court’s decision, nevertheless 
they remained a party to the optional clause system via their amended declaration of 
acceptance or new declaration of acceptance. 
As was already mentioned, some states withdraw their declarations of acceptance 
without making new ones, thus the termination of declarations of acceptance results in a 
complete withdrawal of these states from the optional clause system. Although these cases 
have not been numerous, some of them have had a considerable impact on the optional clause 
system. 
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In most cases here again the motivation of the states’ actions was the anticipation of 
proceedings before the Court, or a decision given by the Court, however, the states’ reaction 
to in these cases was to leave the system of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. 
At the time of  the Permanent Court among the well–known cases of a termination of a 
declaration of acceptance one could refer to Paraguay which in 1938 withdrew with 
immediate effect its declaration of acceptance made wihout reference to duration and being 
silent about withdrawal. According to contemporary news, Paraguay withdrew its declaration 
which was made in 1933, because it had anticipated that Bolivia would institute proceedings 
against it before the Permanent Court in connection with the Gran Chaco border dispute. 
Incidentally, Paraguay justified the termination of its declaration of acceptance by, inter alia, 
its withdrawal from the League of Nations.
744
 The above mentioned action of Paraguay was 
criticized at the time by several states, not only Bolivia, which was directly affected by the 
withdrawal.
745
 The Permanent Court of International Justice never took a position on 
Paraguay’s withdrawal of its declaration, and Paraguay continued to be listed, even after after 
World War II, among the states recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
746
  
As an example when the termination of a declaration of acceptance had the effect of a 
complete withdrawal of a state from the optional clause system, it is worth mentioning the 
case where the South African Government terminated its 1955 declaration of acceptance by a 
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note of 12 April 1967.
 747
 There is every likelihood that this action may have been related to 
the fact that in the years of 1950 and 1960 the International Court of Justice had dealt with the 
problems connected with the former Mandate of South West Africa (Namibia) in contentious 
cases and in advisory opinions as well. True, the Court in its decision of 1966 rejected the 
application filed by Liberia and Ethiopia, two former member states of the League of Nations, 
against South Africa, yet the Government of South Africa, evidently wanting no new 
proceedings regarding the former mandate before the Court chose to terminate its declaration 
of acceptance. South Africa has not since that time made a declaration of acceptance.  
 
Also, in 1974, France terminated its 1966 declaration of acceptance while it was  a 
respondent before the Court in the Nuclear Test cases instituted by Australia and New–
Zealand separately in 1973. In both cases France failed to appear before the Court and did not 
put forward its argument,
748
 and on 2 January 1974 it terminated  its declaration of 
acceptance.
749
 Since 1974, France is not a party to the optional clause system. 
After 1984 a great deal of discussion was provoked by the United States firstly 
amending and then terminating its 1946 declaration of acceptance while the Case concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua was under consideration by the 
Court. As mentioned earlier, the United States by its notification of 6 April 1984, which was 
signed by the United States Secretary of State, Georges Shultz (the so–called Shultz Letter), 
amended its 1946 declaration of acceptance, stating that “the declaration shall not apply to 
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any dispute with any Central American State or arising out of or related events in Central 
America, the modification shall take effect immediately and shall remain in force for two 
years.”  Subsequently, in a notification received by the Secretary–General on 7 October 1985, 
the Government of the United States of America gave notice of the termination of its 
declaration of 26 August 1946. That step had a big echo not only from legal point of view, but 
becuase this time again a great power withdrew its consent to the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction. The possibility of accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction by a new 
declaration of acceptance by the United States has been dealt with by several committees, 
experts, etc. however, till October 2013 the United States hadn’t returned to the optional 
clause system.
750
  
One could also suppose that the termination by Colombia of its 1932 declaration of 
acceptance by a note registered on 5 December 2001 had some connection with its dispute 
against Nicaragua regarding the sovereignty of certain islands and their surroundings 
[Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)], which was submitted to the 
Court’s decision by Nicaragua one day after the termination of the Columbian declaration of 
acceptance, on 6 December 2001.This situation reminds us of what happened in the 
Nicaragua case, that the United States of America via the Shultz Letter amended its 
declaration of acceptance three days prior to the submission of the Nicaraguan application. 
However, in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute, in contrast to the Nicaragua case, the 
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Court found no purpose in examining whether the parties’ declarations of acceptance could 
have provided a basis for its jurisdiction since it first examined the preliminary objection 
raised by Colombia to the Court’s jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá and concluded that it 
had jurisdiction on the basis of Article XXXI of the Pact.
751
  
  
IV Permissibility to terminate or amend of declarations of acceptance 
 
The problem of termination of declarations of acceptance was treated in the literature 
of international law already before World War II, and that time in connection with the 
withdrawal of Paraguay’s declaration of acceptance in 1938.752 Opposed to the step of 
Paraguay, Fachiri argues that the object of the optional clause is to be an efficient system of 
compulsory jurisdiction and that this object “would be entirely defeated if it were open to 
accepting States to withdraw at will, since withdrawal at will means that the submission of 
any given dispute to the Court can always be prevented.”753 The author holds that declarations 
of acceptance made for an indefinite period cannot be withdrawn except when the other states 
party to the optional clause system consent thereto.
754
 Other authors assert that the states party 
to the optional clause system enter into a contractual arrangement and that denunciation of 
declarations of acceptance must, by analogy, be under the control of the rules governing the 
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termination of treaties.
755
  According to Waldock “there is no right of unilateral termination of 
a declaration under the Optional Clause unless the right has been expressly reserved in the 
declaration.”,756 this also holds for variation or modification of a declaration previously made 
which is still in force.
757
  
Later on the view on the permissibility of unilateral termination of declarations with 
indefinite duration becomes generally accepted, and not the permissibility, but the conditions 
of termination of declarations were the subject of the dispute. Especially, whether is it 
permitted to terminate a declaration of acceptance with immediate effect or is it necessary to 
insert a reasonable period of notice. 
In connection with the permissibility of terminating, withdrawing, denouncing 
declarations of acceptance made for an unlimited period and being silent about the right to 
terminate one must not overlook the fact that the optional clause was adopted in place of a 
general treaty regarding compulsory international adjudication. At that time it was believed 
that the optional clause system was an important step in the way of introducing compulsory 
international adjudication in interstate relations. What happened instead was that only a 
limited number of states made declarations of acceptance, with many of them instead 
recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice but 
for a fixed period, and making declarations of acceptance with growing numbers of more and 
more complicated limitations and reservations. The states recognizing the Permanent Court’s 
or the International Court’s compulsory jurisdiction without limitations provided faith that 
compulsory international adjudication would become general, and, adhering to the optional 
clause system, they believed that other members of the international community would follow 
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suit. If it wasn’t allowed or the states which had made declarations of acceptance 
unconditionally were restricted to terminate declarations, they would be placed at a 
disadvantage in comparison to those states that were much more distrustful or reluctant of 
compulsory adjudication. Therefore, not to permit the termination of declarations of 
acceptance or to restrict the termination of those declarations which were made without time 
limitations and unconditionally would be a punishment inflicted on the states which have tried 
to promote the judicial settlement of international disputes and the establishment of a 
universal system of international adjudication under the optional clause.   
It should be added that although the amendment of a declaration of acceptance has a 
different effect than the termination of the instrument, especially in those cases where the 
termination of a declaration of acceptance has had the result of the complete withdrawal of the 
state’s consent from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, nevertheless, both in the literature of 
international law and the Court’s practice, the issues of termination or amendment of 
declarations were treated together. 
That was clearly reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence when in the Right of Passage 
case it considered the reservation included in the 1955 Portuguese declaration of acceptance 
by which the Portuguese Government reserved itself the right to exclude from the scope of the 
declaration of acceptance, at any time during its validity, any given category or categories of 
disputes. According to the Court the uncertainty resulting from the right of Portugal to avail 
itself at any time to amend the conditions of its declaration of acceptance, was  substantially 
the same as that created by the right claimed by many states, to terminate their declarations of 
acceptance by simple notification without notice.
758
  In the view of the Court, there was no 
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essential difference regarding the degree of uncertainty between a situation resulting from the 
right of total denunciation and that resulting from a condition in a declaration of acceptance 
leaving open the possibility of a partial denunciation.
759
   
 The same view was expressed by the Court in the Nicaragua case when it stated on 
the Shultz Letter which was presended by the United States as an amendment to its 1946 
declaration of acceptance. In its judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility of the Nicaraguan 
application, regarding the Shultz Letter the Court’s view was that there is no difference 
whether the note of 6 April was seen as a modification or termination of the 1946 US 
declaration of acceptance.
 760
 
 
V Immediate effect v. period of notice  
 
In the International Court’s practice, the problem of a notification with immediate 
effect emerged in the Right of Passage case when India in its first preliminary objection 
contended that the reservation included in the Portuguese declaration of acceptance—in which 
Portugal reserved itself the right to exclude from the scope of its declaration any given 
category or categories of disputes, at any time during its validity, by notifying the Secretary–
General, with such exclusion becoming effective from the moment of such notification—was 
                                                                                                                                                        
were absent from the 1940 declaration; according to the Court with that “India achieved, in 
substance, the object of Portugal's Third Condition.”  
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incompatible with the object and purpose of the optional clause, with the result that the 
declaration of acceptance was invalid.
761
 In the Rights of Passage case the Court didn’t 
investigate all aspects of the question raised by India and confined itself to stating that the 
words used in the condition of the Portuguese declaration of acceptance, construed in their 
ordinary sense, meant simply that a notification under that condition applied only to disputes 
brought before the Court after the date of the notification, and no retroactive effect could thus 
be imputed to such a notification.
762
 
In the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
the question of the period of notice and the problem of termination or amendment of a 
declaration with immediate effect was addressed in detail. Before the Nicaragua case, as was 
indicated by Judge Mosler
763
, the Court formerly had not considered this issue but 
pronounced on the reverse situation, notably in the Right of Passage case, when it dealt with 
the question whether Portugal had the right to institute proceedings against India a few days 
after the submission of the Portuguese declaration of acceptance. 
In the Nicaragua case one of the most important questions about the 1984 notification 
was whether the United States was free to disregard the clause of its declaration of acceptance 
providing that “the present Declaration shall remain in force for a term of five years and shall 
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thereafter continue in force for six months from notification of its denunciation.” On that 
point the Court stated 
 
“Although the United States retained the right to modify the contents of the 1946 
Declaration or to terminate it, a power which is inherent in any unilateral act of a 
State, it has, nevertheless assumed an inescapable obligation towards other States 
accepting the Optional Clause, by stating formally and solemnly that any such 
change should take effect only after six months have elapsed as from the date of 
notice.”764   
 
Thus the Court in the Nicaragua case clearly expressed that the period of notice for 
the termination, withdrawal etc. of declarations of acceptance was subject primarily to the 
particular declaration itself, that is, the termination, withdrawal or amendment of a declaration 
of acceptance could not become effective except upon expiry of the period stated in the 
declaration itself, and a state could not, even by invoking reciprocity, depart from the period 
of notice as stipulated in its own declaration of acceptance.
765
 
Regarding the possibility of terminating a declaration of acceptance with immediate 
effect the Court held that 
 
                                                 
764
 Id. 419   
765
 The Court also rejected the US Government’s argument adduced by reliance on 
reciprocity in an effort to disregard the six–month period of notice and ensure the 
immediate effect of its 1984 notification . As has been mentioned in connection with 
the principle of reciprocity, the Court firmly stated that reciprocity did not apply to the 
formal conditions of the creation, duration, extinction of declarations of acceptance.  
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“But the right of immediate termination of declarations with indefinite duration is far 
from established. It appears from the requirements of good faith that they should be 
treated, by analogy, according to the law of treaties, which requires a reasonable time 
for withdrawal from or termination of treaties that contain no provision regarding the 
duration of their validity.”766 
 
In his individual opinion appended to the judgement, Judge Mosler added to the 
Court’s decision that from the “nature” of declarations of acceptance made “unconditionally” 
it does not follow that they may be terminated at any time and with immediate effect.
767
 
Referring by analogy to Art. 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Judge 
Mosler pointed out that the termination of an obligation must be governed by the principle of 
good faith, and the withdrawal without any period of notice does not correspond with this 
principle if a particular declaration was made unconditionally.
768
 
It appears that the Court’s finding quoted above served to evade even the appearance 
of accepting the permissibility of terminating declarations with immediate effect, and the 
Court in endeavouring to block avenues of abuse opened by immediate termination of 
declarations of acceptance was referring to the law of treaties with this end. 
The Court’s statement rejecting the immediate termination of declarations of 
acceptance was the subject of sharp criticism both by several members of the Court and 
authors of international law. 
                                                 
766
 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application), Judgement 26 November 
1984. ICJ Reports 1984, 420 
767
 Id. Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler. 467 
768
 Id. 
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Some members of the Court, thus Judges Oda, Sir Robert Jennings and Schwebel, 
disagreed with the Court’s findings not only regarding the termination or amendment of 
declarations of acceptance, but on the period of notice as well. Judge Oda, making a detailed 
analysis of the declarations of acceptance that have been deposited since the foundation of the 
Permanent Court, concluded that in 1956 Portugal established the precedent of reserving the 
right to exclude with immediate effect any category of disputes from the scope of a 
declaration of acceptance and that example has been followed by a number of states, so much 
so that at the time of the Nicaragua case that right had been reserved by fifteen states.
769
  
Taking into consideration states’ practice Judge Sir Robert Jennings pointed out that  
 
“States now—though the position was probably different during the earlier, more 
promising period of the Optional Clause jurisdiction—have the right, before seisin of 
the Court, to withdraw or alter their declaration of acceptance, with immediate effect, 
and, moreover, even in anticipation of a particular case or class of cases.”770  
 
Judge Schwebel reached the same conclusion and tried to demonstrate that even, assuming 
that Nicaragua’s declaration of acceptance was binding, Nicaragua could terminate it at any 
time with immediate effect, and by operation of the rule of reciprocity the United States 
likewise could terminate its adherence to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, vis-à-vis 
Nicaragua, with immediate effect.
771
 
Refering to what was said by the Court, at first sight, the reasoning relying on the law 
of treaties seems to be a good analogy regarding the period of notice. However, it is a 
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 Id.  Separate Opinion of Judge Oda.  508-509 
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 Id. Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings. 553 
771
 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel. 616-627 
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different matter whether the aforesaid reference proves substantiated enough upon close 
examination, especially if one considers that not even the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties failed to provide an absolute rule on the question of unilateral denunciation of 
treaties; and the Convention, according to a commentator, “provided a rule of uncertain 
content and ambit and may have clouded the issue for ever.”772 
In the Nicaragua case the International Court of Justice referred to those rules on the 
termination of treaties which stipulate for a certain “reasonable period of notice” in respect of 
terminating treaties concluded for an unlimited period. The question is therefore one that is 
concerned with whether the rules on a reasonable period of notice are applicable to 
declarations of acceptance. 
With regard to the period of notice it is worthwhile considering in the first place the 
relevant provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Art. 56, para. 2 of 
the Convention provides a twelve–month period of notice for treaties containing no provision 
on termination, denunciation and withdrawal, but the right of denunciation or withdrawal may 
be implied by the nature of the treaty. This twelve months’ notice cannot, however, be 
considered prevalent, as is expressed first of all in the comments of the International Law 
Commission on the final draft of the Vienna Convention, where the Commission stated 
“Where the treaty is to continue indefinitely subject to a right of denunciation, the period of 
notice is more usually twelve months, though admittedly in some cases no period of notice is 
required.”773 However, this document makes no reference to specific cases in which the 
period of notice can be disregarded. 
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 Cf. Kelvin Widdows, ‘The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No 
Denunciation Clause’  (1982) 53 BYIL. 83   
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 Cf. Rauschning (ed)  (1978)  394 
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The period of notice in the law of treaties serves to ensure, inter alia, that a 
contracting party or parties does or do not enter upon or make preparations in the performance 
of a treaty, especially in cases where one of the other parties is considering the denunciation 
of the given treaty. In other words, the bona fide contracting party should have time to prepare 
itself for the termination of the treaty in the foreseeable future or withdrawal of certain 
contracting parties therefrom.  
In the case of declarations of acceptance this appears to be otherwise, compared to the 
case of treaties. The essence of the obligations assumed in declarations of acceptance is that 
disputes with other parties to the optional clause system, and covered by the scope of the 
declarations, could be referred by unilateral application to the Court’s decision. Thus, in the 
case of declarations of acceptance a state meets its duties deriving from its declaration by 
subjecting itself to the Court’s jurisdiction. To meet this obligation does not call for 
“preparations” of the kind referred to in respect of treaties. Of course, it is important for states 
party to the optional clause system to be aware of two things: which states are parties to the 
system and how long the bond between them exists, in other words, how long they can count 
on submitting to the Court’s decision their dispute with another state party to the system. Thus, 
one could conclude that the aforementioned justifications for a period of notice to the 
performance of treaties do not up hold well in respect of unilateral declarations of acceptance.  
One could say that regarding the immediate termination of declarations of acceptance the 
Court was in a difficult situation, states’ practice on the provisions for terminating 
declarations of acceptance was divided. The declarations of acceptance of a group of states 
reflected a certain kind of established practice, however, another tendency had been emerging 
with the endeavour that the declarations of acceptance might be terminable with immediate 
effect. The Court being aware of the influence of the immediate termination of declarations of 
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acceptance on the optional clause system decided on the maintenance of the solution which 
would be less harmful to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.774 
The Nicaragua case had not only a big echo, but influenced states’ practice when 
composing their declarations of acceptance. Regarding that connection one could refer to the 
fact that since 1990 twenty eight declarations of acceptance were submitted and in the 
overwhelming majority of the declarations, thus in twenty declarations, the declaring states 
reserved the right to terminate the instrument at any time and with immediate effect.
775
 Thus 
states’ practice contradicts what was said by the Court regarding the immediate termination of 
declarations of acceptance. One could say that the majority of declaring states not only 
wanted to create a clear situation and secure themselves the liberty in the termination of their 
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 It should be mentioned that well before the Nicaragua case both the Institute of 
International Law and the International Law Association dealt with the termination of 
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declarations of acceptance, but they also tried to show their disagreement with what was said 
by the Court. 
.  
VI Amendment or termination of declarations of acceptance while a proceeding 
is under way   
 
           From states’ practice one can also find several instances where the declaring state 
amended or terminated its declaration of acceptance after it had been made respondent in 
proceedings before the Court and the amendment or the termination of the declaration was the 
consequence of the proceedings in question.  
As an example of such instances one could refer to Iran which, after the Court had 
indicated provisional measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, in 1951 terminated 
its 1930 declaration of acceptance which provided that it was to remain in force for a term of 
six years and thereafter “it shall continue to bear its full effects until notification is given of its 
abrogation”. A similar situation obtained in connection with the Case concerning Right of 
Passage over Indian Territory, where shortly after the filing of the Portuguese application 
India withdrew its declaration of 1940, which was without time limitation, and replaced it 
with a new one of 7 January 1956 containing reservations absent from its previous 
declaration.
776
  
These actions raised the question of the consequence of terminating or amending 
declarations of acceptance in respect of the proceedings under way.  
In the Right of Passage case with regard to such situations the Court held that  
                                                 
776
 Portugal instituted proceedings against India on 22 December 1955. The Indian 
Government’s note on withdrawal  and its new declaration of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction was dated 7 January 1956.  
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“It is a rule of law generally accepted, as well as one acted upon in the past by the 
Court, that once the Court has been validly seised of a dispute, unilateral action by 
the respondent State in terminating its Declaration, in whole or in part, cannot divest 
the Court of jurisdiction.”777  
 
The International Court made it clear that such a notification could not have 
retroactive effect and it apples only to disputes brought before the Court after the date of the 
notification, thus it could not cover cases already pending;
778
 the Court added that this 
principle applies both to total denunciation, and partial denunciation.
 779
  
That decision was in line with the Court’s statement in the Nottebohm case instituted 
by Lichtenstein against Guatemala a few years before the Right of Passage case.
780
 In the 
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 Case concerning Rights of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) 
Judgement 26 November 1957. ICJ Reports 1957, 142   
778
 Id.  
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780
 The Nottebohn case was a legal dispute between Lichtenstein and Guatemala. In 
December 1951Lichtenstein had filed an application instituting proceedings against 
Guatemala, claiming that the Government of Guatemala had acted contrary to international 
law and incurred international responsibility by the unjustified detention, internment and 
expulsion of Friedrich Nottebohm, a Lichenstein national, and as a result of the sequestration 
and confiscation of his property. Lichtenstain demanded restitution and compensation  from 
Guatemala for the various measures against Mr Nottebohm and his property. The application 
referred to the declarations by which both parties had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court.  
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proceedings, since the Guatemalan declaration of acceptance expired a few weeks after the 
filing of the application by Liechtenstein, Guatemala as a result contested the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
781
 In its judgement delivered on the preliminary objections the Court stated:  
 
“Once the Court has been regularly seised, the Court must exercise its powers, as 
these are defined in the Statute. After that, the expiry of the period fixed for one of 
the Declarations on which the Application was founded is an event which is 
unrelated to the exercise of the powers conferred on the Court by the Statute,…. 
An extrinsic fact such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration, by reason of the 
expiry of the period or by denunciation, cannot deprive the Court of the jurisdiction 
already established.”782 
 
This same rule applies to the amendment of declarations of acceptance. Proceedings 
are also not affected by one of the parties amending its declaration of acceptance and 
excluding from the scope of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction a certain dispute or disputes 
through the insertion of a new reservation in the declaration of acceptance. The Court’s 
                                                 
781
 The preliminary objection filed by Guatemala was to the effect that the declaration by 
which Guatemala had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had been made on 27 
January 1947 for five years and had therefore expired on 26 January 1952, exactly five and a 
half weeks after Liechtenstein had submitted its application on 17 December 1951. Guatemala 
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jurisdiction should be established at the time of the saising of the Court; if at that time the 
Court has jurisdiction to deal with a dispute, the termination or modification of a declaration 
of acceptance has no influence on the case under consideration by the Court. 
A special problem is posed by a situation when after the termination or amendment of 
a declaration of acceptance one of the parties subsequently modifies its claims in a case 
already under consideration by the Court, requesting the Court’s decision on matters not 
covered by the original application.   
From the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice as an example one can cite 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case, in which Iran claimed that one of the British 
memorandums submitted to the Court after the denunciation of the Persian declaration of 
acceptance covered such issues which were not mentioned in the original application of the 
British Government and, therefore, the Court was without jurisdiction to decide on them 
because they had been submitted after the termination of the Persian declaration of 
acceptance.
783
 The Court didn’t consider that particular question raised by Iran as it found that 
it lacked jurisdiction.
784
 On the basis of the foregoing it can be stated that after the termination 
or amendment of a declaration of acceptance the Court can deal only with the submissions of 
the original application and it has no jurisdiction to decide on matters subsequently raised by 
one of the parties. 
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Report 1952, 99  
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Chapter 10 
OBJECTING TO THE COURT’S JURISDICTION  
 
I Procedural means to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction 
 
Since in most cases the saising of the Court under declarations of acceptance happens 
years after the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction by the parties to a dispute, 
thus states very often find themselves faced with proceedings instituted before the Court in 
legal disputes which they may never have thought to be ever submitted to the Court’s 
decision. In such cases one should not be suprised that the respondent states are challenging 
the Court’s jurisdiction in the form of preliminary objections, which is a procedural 
institution covered by the Rules of the Court.It should be noted that this action is typical not 
only for disputes submitted on the basis of declarations of acceptance, but also for cases 
where the title of the Court’s jurisdiction is a treaty provision. 
  The raising of a matter of jurisdiction by a preliminary objection is a legal right of 
states which forms part of their litigation strategy, and as Rosenne points out “no valid 
reason, legal or political, can exist to require a state to refrain from exercising its right if it is 
so minded”.785   
The procedure to be followed when the respondent is exercising that right is regulated 
in a rather detailed manner by the Rules of the Court. Under Art. 79 of the Rules one could  
differentiate between either objection to the jurisdiction of the Court or admissibility of the 
application.
786
 Thus preliminary objections could relate either that the Court having no 
jurisdiction to consider the dipute, or they could be concerned with the application not 
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corresponding to the requirements.
787
  Both in the practice of the Permanent Court and the 
International Court in several cases, the respondents had based their preliminary objections 
on the reservations joined to their own or, by reference to reciprocity, the adverse party’s 
declaration of acceptance.  
At the time of the Permanent Court, declarations of acceptance have been relied upon 
as founding the jurisdicition of the Court in eleven cases.
788
 From these eleven cases only in 
five instances—the Losinger case, the Phosphates in Morocco, the Panevezys-Saldutiskis 
Railway, the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case, the Pajzs, Csáky, Esterházy 
case—did the respondent state raise preliminary objections.789 However, it was only in the 
Losinger case that the Court rejected the preliminary objection, in the other cases it upheld 
the objections,
790
 which proves that at the time of the Permanent Court the preliminary 
objections were well founded. 
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 The consequence of the raising of preliminary objections is that according to Art. 79. para. 5 of the Rules of 
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 These were the following: Denunciation of the Belgian–Chinese Treaty; Eastern Legal Status of Greenland 
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 The Court upheld the objection in the Phosphates in Morocco, the Panevezys–Saldutiskis Railway, and in part 
the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria cases; however, in the Pajzs, Csáky, Esterházy case the objections 
were joined to the merits.  
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  After World War II, the raising of preliminary objections became a wide spread 
practice and according to Dame Rosalyn Higgins, former President of the Court, in the first 
62 years of its existence nearly half of the disputes submitted to the Court required separate 
hearings on jurisdictional issues.
791
 It should be added that the overwhelming majority of 
these cases were disputes submitted under declarations of acceptance.
792
 
No question that the raising of preliminary objections delays the Court’s decision on 
the merits of the dispute, but since the Court has no general compulsory jurisdiction, its 
jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties, and no state is compelled to submit its 
dispute to the Court’s decision. Thus if a state is of the opinion that the Court has no 
jurisdiction it is quite normal that it refers to that fact and tries to challenge the Court’s 
jurisdiction. 
It should be emphasized that presenting preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of 
the Court could not be considered as any kind of mistrust in the World Court. It is quite 
normal that a litigant is trying to defend its case and there could be situations when the best 
means seems to be challenging the Court’s jurisdiction.793 
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Although the Court having well established procedural rules and long standing 
jurisprudence on the cases of preliminary objections, their growing number have caused 
scepticisms regarding the optional clause system.  
 
II The non-appearance 
 
The other practice which was used in several occasions by states to demonstrate the 
lack of the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a case has been the refusal to appear before the 
Court. According to Elkind “Failure to appear and failure to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court are both aspects of the same problem, a refusal to accept the principle 
of third–party settlement of disputes.”794  
In most cases of failure to appear before the Court there were some, at least apparent, 
grounds for the jurisdiction of the Court, nevertheless, one of the parties didn’t take part in the 
proceedings before the Court. Thus in those cases the parties in one way or another had 
already accepted the Court's jurisdiction and still failed to appear before the Court. Practically 
this is when one can speak of non–appearance, and the provisions of Art. 53 of the Statute 
apply to such cases. 
 In respect of the failure of a party to appear in the proceedings of the two International 
Courts, Art. 53 of their Statutes provide practically with identical paragraphs.
795
 That 
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 Jerome B. Elkind, Non-appearance before the International Court of Justice.  Functional and Comparative 
Analysis (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984) 187 
795
 Art. 53. of the Statute of the International Court reads as follows:  
"1. Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party 
may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.  
"2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with 
Article 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law." 
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provision was included in the Statute of the Permanent Court on the basis of a draft of the 
1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists.
796
2When formulating Art. 53, the framers of the Statute 
anticipated such situations which are well known in municipal laws and they provided the 
course as to how to proceed in such cases and excluded the default judgment. Thus both 
Courts “in harmony with modern procedural law does not treat a party in default as guilty, and 
is far from regarding failure to appear as a ficta confessio”.797 As for the reasons with regard 
to rejecting the default judgment, the Committee of Jurists stated that before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice  
 
"the contesting parties are States, and that it is a particularly serious matter to 
pronounce sentence against them, in the event of their denying the Court's right to try 
them. To make the Court's judgments, even in the event of a refusal to appear, 
acceptable to the sensitiveness of sovereign States, the sentence pronounced on the 
State at fault must rest upon all desirable guarantees to give it moral force, and 
consequently to ensure that it is respected and more easily put into execution."
798
 
 
A closer look at Art. 53 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice shows that it 
contains two provisions clearly separable in substance. Para. 1 essentially puts at some 
disadvantage the state failing to appear as it entitles the state which appears to call upon the 
Court to decide in favour of its claim. Para. 2 of Art. 53 on the other hand, is an instruction 
for the Court, before deciding on the request of the party which appears, to satisfy itself that 
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the claim is well founded in fact and law. Art. 53 does not at all make the task of the Court 
easier in considering the request of the party which appears, since in the absence of one of 
the parties, the Court must act as if both parties had taken part in the proceedings. Thus para. 
2 of Art. 53 of the Statute practically weakens the provision of para. 1 and protects the 
interests of the party which does not appear, trying to secure the process as if both parties 
participated in the proceedings before the Court. 
 
(a) The Court on non–appearance  
 
It happened in several contentious cases brought before the two International Courts, 
submitted either on a treaty provision, or under declarations of acceptance, that one of the 
parties, in particular the respondent did not take part in the proceedings. In that respect one 
could differentiate between two situations, namely that when the respondent state did not take 
part in any stage of the proceedings, and that when one of the parties was absent from a 
certain phase of the proceedings.  
From the time of the Permanent Court one could refer to two cases where obviously 
non–appearance has happened, however, in these cases the provisions of Art. 53 were not 
applied.
799
 
From the jurisprudence of the International Court one can mention eleven cases where 
one of the parties failed to appear before the Court either at any phase of the proceedings or 
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  These were the Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, between China and Belgium  case, in which 
the respondent, China, appointed no agent, nor did it any time take part in the proceedings. The other was 
Electricity Company of Sofia case, where in December 1939 the public hearing was held in the absence of the 
Bulgarian agent and Bulgaria did not file a written rejoinder within the period set, nevertheless the Court adopted 
an order fixing a date for the commencement of the oral proceedings. 
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 337 
only at certain phases.
 800
 
801
 Among these cases there were five instances (the two Nuclear 
Tests cases, the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company case, the Nottebohm case and the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case) in which the Court’s jurisdiction was 
based either exclusively, or subsidiary on declarations of acceptance made under Art. 36. para. 
2 of the Statute.  Thus the cases of non–appearance under optional clause declarations were 
not numerous, however, as will be discussed later, some of these instances had considerable 
influence on the evaluation of that practice. Anyway, what is fortunate is that since the 
Nicaragua case there was no single instance of real non–appearance. 
  It should be noted that Art. 53 of the Statute was not applied in the Anglo–Iranian Oil 
Co. case nor the Nottebohm case, with all probability because, although the respondents failed 
to participate in the first phase of the proceedings, they later appointed their agents and took 
part in the proceedings before the Court. Art. 53 was also not mentioned in the Court’s 
judgment delivered in the two Nuclear Test cases, where in both cases the respondent, France 
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refused to take part in any stage of the proceedings and had not appointed its agent. In all 
other cases of non–appearance, including those where the Court’s jurisdiction was founded on 
compromissory clauses, Art. 53 was applied. In these cases the Court expressed its regret that 
the respondent states did not take part in the proceedings instituted by the applicants; and by 
reference to Art. 53 the Court held that, in accordance with the Statute and its settled 
jurisprudence, it must examine proprio motu the question of its own jurisdiction and should 
consider also the objections which might be raised against the Court’s jurisdiction.802  
There is no question that from the non–appearance cases, the Nicaragua case has 
excited the greatest world–wide interest. That could be explained among other factors not 
only because this time the non–appearing state was a big power and one of the most powerful 
states of the world, but that respondent ceased to take part in the proceedings after the 
judgment rendered by the Court on 26 November1984 on the questions of the jurisdiction of 
the Court (to entertain the dispute) and the admissibility of Nicaragua's application; and in 
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United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Judgment 24 May 1980. ICJ Reports 1980, 9 
It is interesting to mention that in the Nuclear Test cases, where France failed to take part in any stage of the 
proceedings the Court didn’t refer to Art. 53, however, in its 1974 judgments delivered in these cases the Court’s 
statements regarding the failure of the respondent to take part in the proceedings were almost identical with what 
were said in the cases when Art. 53 was applied.  
Cf. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment od 20 December 1974. ICJ Reports 1974, .257 and Nuclear 
Tests (New Zealand v. France) Judgment of 20 December 1974. I.CJ Reports 1974, 461 
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that judgment the World Court declared that the application was admissible and the Court had 
jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the case.
803
  
In the judgment on the merits, the Court, by refering to its previous statements on 
non–appearance in other instances, stated that it  
 
“regrets even more deeply the decision of the respondent State not to participate in the 
present phase of the proceedings, because this decision was made after the United 
States had participated fully in the proceedings on the request for provisional measures, 
and the proceedings on jurisdiction and admissibility.” 804  
 
In connection with the cases of non–appearence the question emerges whether states have a 
legal duty to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings before the Court and 
whether non–appearance before the Court could be considered as an action contrary to 
                                                 
803
 Not long after the Court’s judgment on 18 January 1985, the agent of the United States in its letter stated  
“that the judgment of the Court was clearly and manifestiy erroneous as to both fact and law. The 
United States remains firmly of the view, for the reasons given in its written and oral pleadings that the 
Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and that the Nicaraguan application of 9 April 
1984 is inadmissible.  …. the United States intends not to participate in any further proceedings in 
connection with this case, and reserves its rights in respect of any decision by the Court regarding 
Nicaragua's claims.” 
Letter of the Counsellor for Legal Affais of the Embassy of the United States of America to the Registar, 18 
January 1985. Military and ParamilitaryActivities  in and against Nicaragua Correspondence. .408  
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9635.pdf  accessed 28 August 2013 
804
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). 
(Merits) Judgment of 27 July 1986. ICJ Reports 1986,  23 
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international law. According to a well known scholar, Fitzmaurice
805
 states have a duty to 
appear before the Court, other experts, thus Rosenne,
806
 Gros,
807
 Thirlway,
808
 Elkind
809
 
maintain that there is no such a duty.
810
 One could say that not only were authors rather 
divided on this issue but even the opinions of the members of the Institute of International 
Law varied
811
 when discussing its resolution on „Non–Appearance Before the International 
Court of Justice” at its session of 1991 held in Basel.812  
 
After the Court’s decision on the merits of the Nicaragua case one could say that the 
above mentioned dispute could be considered as resolved, since the Court, although it 
expressed its regret of the non–appearance of the United States of America, recognized that a 
                                                 
805
 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice ‘The problem of the Non-Appearing Defendant Government’  (1980) 51 BYIL  89 
106-15 
806
 Rosenne (2006) 1360 
807 Cf. Dissenting opinion of Judge Gros. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland). (Merits.) 
Judgment 25 July 1974. ICJ Reports 1974, 126 
808
 Cf. H.W.A. Thirlway, Non–Appearance before the International Court of Justice (CUP 1985)  64-82 
809
 According to Elkind, states cannot be compelled to appear before the Court, however, both the opposing party 
and the Court have a right to insist that the respondent state appear. See Jerome B. Elkind, ’The Duty of Appear 
before the International Court of Justice’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 674  681   
810
 In the literature of international law, authors draw a distinction between non–appearance and default. Cf. Elkind (1984) 
79-82 and Pierre Michel Eisemann,: ’Les effets de la non-comparution devant la Cour internationale de Justice’ 
(1973)   19 AFDI 351 355-356 
811
 On the discussion, see Stanimir A. Alexandrov, ‘Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice’ 
(1995)  33 Colum. J. of Transnat’l  L.  41 45 
812
 Resolution of the Institute of International Law, Session of Basel, 1991 on “Non-Appearance Before the 
International Court of Justice”. 
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state party to the proceedings before the Court may decide not to participate in them
813
 and 
didn’t declare a non–appearing state as acting contrary to its duties under international law. 
 
The Court’s findings in the Nicaragua case regarding the non–appearance of a party 
could be summarized as follows: 
- the case will continue without the participation of the non–appearing state; 
- the non–appearing state remains a party to the case;814 
- the non–appearing state is bound by the eventual judgment in accordance with Art. 59 of 
the Statute; 
- there is no question of a judgment automatically in favour of the party appearing; and 
- the Court is required to “satisfy itself” that the appearing party's claim is well founded in 
fact and law.815 
Comparing what was said by the Court in the Nicaragua case to its previous 
statements regarding non–appearance, one should underline the passage stating that the non–
participation of a party in the proceedings at any stage of the case cannot effect the validity of 
the Court’s judgment. The importance of that pronouncement lies in the fact the although, 
even before the Nicaragua case there was a sound understanding that the non–appearance of  
a party had no effect on the validity of the Court’s judgment, however, as Alexandrov pointed 
out, there is a strong link between non–appearance and non–compliance of international 
                                                 
813
  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Merits) Judgment of 27 July 1986. ICJ 
Reports 1986,  23 
814
 On the question whether a non–appearing state is a party to the proceedings of the Court, see Thirlway (1985) 
46-63  
815
 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. (Merits) Judgment of 27 July 1986. ICJ 
Reports 1986, 24 
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judgments,
816
 and in most cases the unarticulated motivation of the non–appearing party was 
to separate itself from the Court’s future judgment. Thus it is not accidental that the United 
States in its letter of 18 January 1985 stated not only that it intended not to participate in the 
proceedings of the Nicaragua case before the Court, but reserved “its rights in respect of any 
decision by the Court regarding Nicaragua's claims.” It is obvious that the Court had to react 
to that statement and had to make it clear that the non–appearing state would be bound by the 
future judgment of the Court. Some years later that Court’s statement was reaffirmed by the 
resolution of the Institute of International Law by pronouncing that “Notwithstanding the 
non–appearance of a State before the Court in proceedings to which it is a party, that State is, 
by virtue of the Statute, bound by any decision of the Court in that case, whether on 
jurisdiction, admissibility, or the merits.”817 
 
(b) The real cause of non–appearance—the lack of confidence 
 
Regarding the causes of non–appearance, one could agree with those views which 
mention a certain distrust and lack of confidence in the impartiality of the Court, whenever a 
state refuses to participate in a case.
818
 However, instead of alluding any distrust, in most 
cases states are in fact contesting the jurisdiction of the Court, or arguing on the non–
justiciability of the case, and quite often give a detailed analysis of treaties, reservations, or 
the legal situation. As examples one could refer to the Fischeries Jurisdiction cases, the 
Nuclear Tests cases or the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case.   
                                                 
816
 Alexandrov (1995) 68 
817
 Art. 4. Resolution of the Institute of International Law, Session of Basel, 1991 on “Non-Appearance Before 
the International Court of Justice”. 
818
 On the the willingness of states and the causes of lack confidence in the impartiality of the Court, see Elkind 
(1984) 171-206 
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Thus in the Fischeries Jurisdiction case in different documents Iceland was claiming 
that the 1961 Exchange of Notes had taken place at a time when the British Royal Navy had 
been using force to oppose the 12–mile fishery limit; the compromissory undertaking for 
judicial settlement by the parties was not of a permanent nature; the object and purpose of the 
provision for recourse to judicial settlement had been fully achieved; the Icelandic 
Government had also alluded  to “the changed circumstances resulting from the 
everincreasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland”; and as a 
conclusion in its letter of 29 May 1972 it was stated that an agent will not be appointed to 
represent the Government of Iceland.
 819
   
In connection with the Nuclear Test cases it should be mentioned the communication 
of 16 May 1973 sent to the Court by the French Ambassador to The Hague contained a rather 
detailed legal analysis of the lack of the Court’s jurisdiction in these cases. France argued that 
neither the 1928 General Act, nor Art. 36. para. 2 of the Statute could serve as the basis of the 
Court’s jurisdiction for the French nuclear essays introduced by Australia and New Zealand, 
since the 1928 General Act is no longer in force any more, and the declaration of acceptance 
of the Court's jurisdiction made by the French Government on 20 May 1966 excludes from 
the Court’s jurisdiction “disputes concerning activities connected with national defence.”820 
According to the French Government the Court was manifestly not competent in these cases 
and it could not accept the Court's jurisdiction, and accordingly the French Government did 
not intend to appoint an agent. 
                                                 
819
 See Correspondence 374-376.  www.icj-c.i.j.org/docket/files/55/9401.pdf. accessed 13 September 2013 
820
 See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Correspondence  347-357. the same communication was sent in the 
case between New Zealand v. France. www.icj-c.i.j.org/docket/files/58/11007  accessed 13 September 2013 
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In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Turkey in its communications to the Court 
of 25 August 1976, 24 April 1978, and 10 October 1978
821
 expounded its legal position that 
the General Act of 1928, invoked by Greece, was no longer in force. Even assuming that the 
General Act was still in force, and applicable as between Greece and Turkey, it would be 
subject to a reservation made by Greece that would exclude the Court's competence.
822
   
The Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran differed 
from the above mentioned four cases since in that instance Iran argued on the non–
justiciability of the case at hand. In its notes addressed to the Court, the Iranian Government 
stated that the dispute was not one of interpretation and application of the treaties upon which 
the American Application is based and “the Court cannot examine the American Application 
divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between 
Iran and the United States over the last 25 years.” 823 
The Nicaragua case was again different, because in the first phase of that case the 
United States made use of all the possibilities in a normal procedure to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the Court, nevertheless the Court pronounced that it had jurisdiction. Thus in 
the second phase of the proceedings, from which the United States was absent, the 
Washington Government had not much to say on the question of jurisdiction except that in its 
                                                 
821
  The last–mentioned communication was received in the Registry on the morning of the second day of the public 
hearings. 
822
 The communication of 25 August 1976 was submitted at the provisional measures stage and since it was precisely 
the procedural document requred by the Rules, and at the appropriate time, accoding to Thirlway it seems impossible 
to contend that Turkey at the relevant time was failing to appear and defend its case. Cf. Thurlway (1985) 79. 
But no pleadings were filed by the Government of Turkey, it was not represented at the oral proceedings and no 
forma1 submissions were made.  
823
 Cf. Notes of Iran  of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980. 
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1984 judgment the “Court was clearly and manifestly erroneous as to both fact and law.”824 
Thus in that phase of the proceedings, almost nine months after the termination of its 
declaration of acceptance and pronounciation that it would not take part in the phase of the 
merits of the Nicaragua case, the United States in an unofficial communication bearing the 
title of the “Document  Informally Made Available to Members of the Court by the United 
States Information Office in the Hague” treating the political aspects of its conflict with 
Nicaragua, and interpreting the political situations and events in Central-America, thus 
practically trying to defend its position.
825
 
One could see that States non–appearing before the Court tried to explain their 
conduct either on the non–justiciablity of the dispute or by challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Court on legal grounds, even with respect to reservations to their declarations of acceptance 
as happened in the Nuclear Test cases and the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. These 
arguments appeared in letters, communications, notifications, etc., sent to the Court, or were 
made public. For these documents there are no rules, time–limits and the states are 
presenting these documents at any time. Nevertheless one could say that when states absent 
from the proceedings of the International Court of Justice object, as expressed in their 
various documents, to the jurisdiction of the Court, their action to some extent fulfills a 
function similar to a preliminary objection relating to lack of jurisdiction of the Court, but 
without observing the provisions on these objections in the Rules.
826
 The International Court 
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 See the letter of 18 January 1985 of the Counselor for Legal Affairs of the Embassy of the United States of 
America to the Registar. 
825
 See http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9633.pdf  accessed 13 September 2013 
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 According to Thirlway if the communication from the non–appearing state raises questions of jurisdiction or 
or admissibility, it should be treated by the Court as a preliminary objection.  Cf. Thirlway (1985) 174 
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of Justice, for its part, examined these pleas of the non–appearing states, with the exception 
of the Nuclear Tests cases and the Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War.
827
 
Non–appearing before the Court instead of filing a preliminary objection is always a 
demonstrative action, and, irrespective of the arguments advanced by the non–appearing 
state, it expresses in a very strong manner the dissatisfaction of a state with the Court and 
the whole mechanism of third party settlement of international disputes.  
 
(c) The Consequences of Non–Appearance 
 
Having examined the cases of non–appearance the question emerges as to what the 
consequences are of the non–appearance of respondent states. These consequences relate first 
of all to the proceedings before the Court, but affect in some degree also the position of the 
parties to the dispute.
828
 
As regards the proceedings, a consequence of the attitude of the defaulting states is 
that the proceedings before the Court actually divide in two, and first of all the Court has to 
consider and satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction. As a consequence of the non–appearance, 
therefore, the proceedings have some similarities to those cases where one of the parties is 
raising preliminary objections, since, in view of the provisions of Art. 53 of the Statute, the 
Court first should be satisfied of its jurisdiction in the case at hand.  
                                                 
827
 This happened because in the cases concerning the French nuclear tests the Court dealt with the object of the 
applications and not the question of jurisdiction. The Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War was removed from the 
Court's list before the expiry of the time–limits set for the submission of written memorials. 
828
 It should be added that the non–appearing state divests itself also of the possibility of nominating a judge ad 
hoc.   
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           Another consequence of non–appearance is that it deprives the proceedings before the 
Court of their contradictory character, since the real debate is missing from these proceedings 
as a consequence of the absence of one of the parties. The situation remains the same even  
if the non–appearing States in letters, telegrams and other documents are expressing their 
 observations, arguments, etc. regarding the dispute, especially because the non–appearing 
 party submits such documents upon the opening of the proceedings, usually in reply to the 
                       application, thus depriving itself of the possibility of challenging the arguments put forward 
by the applicant later in the written or oral  proceedings. Thus a withdrawal from a case might 
have an unfortunate product with  respect to the appearing State, as happeend according to 
some authors—in the merits of  the Nicaragua case the United States view was not adequately 
considered by the Court.
829
  
 
In cases of non–appearance, particularly as regards the merits of the disputes, the 
character of the Court’s task changes to a certain extent, since in such cases a considerable 
part of the work of the Court consists, aside from examining the more or less well founded 
and very subjective arguments of the non–appearing party appeared in letters and other 
documents, but also in deducing the arguments, or at least parts of the arguments which might 
be raised by the non–appearing  party. 
There is no question that the non–appearance before the Court either in the whole or 
only in a phase of the proceedings is a tactical decision of a state. The real motivations behind 
such steps are much more political than legal, and such an attitude of a state, as it was already 
said, is nothing else than a certain kind of demonstrative political action.  
                                                 
829
  Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, ‘Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-
Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance’ Dambrosch (1987) 291 
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As one could see, the failure to participate by one of the parties at the Court’s 
proceeding hinders the good administration of justice. Although, there is no duty for the states 
to take part in the proceeding before the Court, there is however a duty to cooperate with the 
Court. Exactly that was refered by the Intitute of International Law in its resolution of 1991 
by stating that  “In considering whether to appear or to continue to appear in any phase of 
proceedings before the Court, a State should have regard to its duty to co–operate in the 
fulfillment of the Court's judicial functions.”830  
The duty of cooperation is the consequence of the legal principle of good faith which 
has a legal foundation in Art. 2, para. 2 of the United Nations Charter integrating that 
principle into both the law of the Charter
831
 and the Statute forming, under Art. 92 of the 
Charter an integral part of that. Thus States are bound to fulfill their obligations deriving from 
the Statute in good faith which includes also the obligation, not to hinder, but to act so as to 
enable the Court in fulfilling its tasks connected with the good administration of justice. 
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 Art. 2. Resolution of the Institute of International Law, Session of Basel, 1991 on “Non-Appearance Before 
the International Court of Justice”. 
831
 Jörg P. Müller, ‘Article 2(2)’ in Bruno Simma in collaboration with Hermann Mosler, Albrecht Randelzhofer, 
Christina Tomuschat, Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) The Charter of  the United Nations. A Commentary  (C.H. Beck 
1994) 92 
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Chapter  11 
RECONSIDERING THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE SYSTEM 
 
  I Ninety years of partial obligatory adjudication  
 
With the establishment of both the Permanent Court and the optional clause in its 
Statute a good framework seemed to be created for the introduction of compulsory 
international adjudication.  
Although a great deal of controversy surrounded the elaboration of the provisions of 
the optional clause, the hopes of the founding fathers were not without justification; that being 
a new system of partial obligatory adjudication, having strong roots in the documents adopted 
at the very successful Hague Peace Conferences, and based on the voluntary acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction thus fully observing the sovereignty of states.   
Those who were the partisans of generally obligatory international adjudication were 
convinced that with the establishment of the Permanent Court an important step had been 
taken towards a regime of generally obligatory international adjudication. Mankind was in the 
aftermath of an unprecedented terrible war lasting more than four years, and there was the 
expectation that the idea of peaceful settlement of international disputes would find more 
supporters than ever before. That was upheld also by the fact that, after the entry into force of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, states had started to deposit 
declarations of acceptance under Art. 36. para. 2.  The fact that in most cases declaring 
states had renewed their fixed–term declarations or even replaced them with ones for an 
unlimited period was a further encouraging phenomenon. 
However, one could witness another development as well. Namely that there appeared 
limitations and reservations in the declarations of acceptance and already in the early years of 
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the Permanent Court some states introduced limitations to their declarations. As one could 
see from the previous chapters, over the course of time the reservations to declarations 
of acceptance have grown in complexity, with states “inventing” new reservations 
drafted with great legal skills, which, in some cases, were the result of a Court’s 
decision. Thus more and more limitations appeared in the declarations of acceptance over 
and above both the reciprocity and time limitations which were mentioned in the Statute 
itself. 
Thus the states’ practice diverged from that what was expected and, instead of an end 
to the “provisional solution” reflected in the optional clause832 and the growth of a system of 
general international obligatory adjudication, a very complicated and fragmented network of 
declarations of acceptance developed. 
The international community of states consented to the acceptance of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction with different reservations. Although states parties to the optional 
clause system could challenge the reservations to declarations of acceptance, the instances 
were scarce. In most cases the parties disputed the permissibility of certain reservations only 
in concrete disputes before the Court. Thus one could say that states were reluctant and there 
were very few instances where a state objected against a reservation that was included in a 
declaration of acceptance of a state newly adhering to the optional clause system. That 
passivity of the international community of states was due to two facts. Firstly, as has already 
been said before, the network of optional clause declarations does not form a treaty like bond 
between states, and the states that are party to the optional clause system are in reality 
confronting with a declaration of another declaring state—in that case where a concrete 
dispute with that state is submitted to the Court’s decision. As the second reason, one could 
mention that several states—although having concerns regarding some reservations in a newly 
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 Torres Bernárdez called the system as provisional. Cf.Torrres Bernardez (1992) 293 (footnote 2) 
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declaring state’s declaration of acceptance—didn’t want to poison their relations with that 
state, and in most cases they kept silent regarding a rather disputed reservation.  
If states would be more active and more often challenged some reservations added to 
the newly declaring states’ declarations of acceptance, it is not clear what the result would be 
of such objections. In the case of declarations of acceptances, in contrast to the law of treaties, 
there are no rules or established practice what are the consequences of objections to a 
reservation added to a declaration of acceptance, and also it is not clear what the 
consequences might be if a state were to introduce in its declaration of acceptance a 
reservation which contradicted the object and purpose of the optional clause.  The 
jurisprudence of the Court shows us that the World Court avoided deciding on the 
permissibility of any reservation to declarations of acceptance or the compability of a 
reservation with the object and purpose of the optional clause system in all cases whereby a 
disputed reservation came into question. It gave effect to the reservations as they stood and as 
parties adopted them.
833
 Taking into consideration all the circumstances, one could say that, it 
was a wise decision of the Court to refrain in concrete cases from ruling on the 
permissibility of certain reservations to declarations of acceptance, since any decision 
would have adversely affected the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Any decision on the 
admissibility of certain reservations would have given some sort of “encouragement” to 
the inclusion of such reservations in the declarations of acceptance; while any decision on 
the inadmissibility of certain rather disputed reservations might have considerably influenced 
the outcome of the concrete case before the Court. Not to mention that it might have led 
other states party to the optional clause system to withdraw those declarations of acceptance 
containing similar reservations to that being declared by the Court as inadmissible. 
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In the last ninety years, especially during the 1950-60s the optional clause system had 
as Waldock called a “period of decline.”  Rather few cases were submitted to the Court’s 
decision, more and more so–called destructive reservations appeared in declarations of 
acceptance, in concrete cases before the Court the parties referred to these reservations in 
order to evade the Court’s decision in their dispute,  and it became wide spread practice for 
the respondent to fail to appear before the Court.  
One could say that the dark years are now gone.  The hands of the Court are full with 
work, more and more cases are submitted to the Court’s decision;834 and the optional clause 
was never before so popular as nowadays. 
At the end of 2013 there were 80 states’ declarations of acceptance in force, thus more 
than 41% of the United Nations member states had valid declarations of acceptance. It is true 
that at the time of Permanent Court there was a year, 1935, when from the 58 the member 
states of the League of Nations 42 states made declarations of acceptance. However, one 
should not forget that the League of Nations was less universal than the United Nations, and 
between the two World Wars there was great instability in the membership of the League of 
Nations, since after some years of membership several states left the organization. The same 
holds true for the optional clause system, at that time some states were parties to the system 
only for a rather short period. In contrast to that, the United Nations is really universal, but 
what is even more important for our subject is that there is a great stability in the composition 
                                                 
834
 That is also thanks to the Secretary–General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes 
through the International Court of Justice etablished in 1989, see http://www.un.org/law/trustfund/trustfund.htm 
accessed 17 Ocotber 2013. On the Fund, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘International Legal Aid: The Secretary 
General’s Trust Fund to assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice’ in 
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Several developing states with the help of the Fund submitted their disputes to the Court’s decision.   
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of the states party to the optional clause system. That can be proved by the fact that since 
1946, thus in almost seventy years only seven states’—Bolivia (1953), Brazil (1953), El 
Salvador (1988), Guatemala (1952), Nauru (1998), Thailand (1960) and Turkey (1972)—
declarations of acceptance have expired without submitting a new one, and  eight states—
China (1972), Columbia (2001), France (1974), Iran (1951), Israel (1985),  South Africa 
(1967), Serbia (2008), the United States of America (1986)—have withdrawn their 
declarations of acceptance. 
Regarding the actual states that are parties to the optional clause system what is 
important is that since 1990 twenty eight declarations of acceptance were deposited, and 
among them there were several states which either had never before made a declaration of 
acceptance or, for various reasons, left to expire or terminated their declarations of acceptance 
with them now returning to optional clause system.
835
 It is also a welcome change that several 
former socialist states, breaking the policy of their governments in more than forty years, 
made declarations of acceptance and even submitted their disputes to the Court’s decision. No 
question that one of the weakest points of the system is that the United Kingdom is the only 
great power having a declaration of acceptance in force, and two other great powers, France 
and the United States after withdrawing their declarations in 1974 and 1986 respectively 
didn’t deposit new declarations of acceptance. The People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation (or its predecessor the Soviet Union) have always stood aside from the 
optional clause system. 
The majority of the writers of international law are recognizing the importance of 
thoptional clause system in the settlement of international disputes and in that connection 
                                                 
835
 Among the recently adhering states, one could mention Cyprus (2002), Djibuti (2005), Commonwealth of 
Dominica (2006), Germany (2008), Ireland (2011), the Ivory Coast (2001), the Marshall Islands (2013), Slovakia 
(2004), Timor–Leste (2012). 
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some of them have drawn conclusions from the link between compliance and jurisdiction, and 
tried to conclude that the willingness of the states to execute the Court’s decisions has been 
bigger in cases brought under compromissory clauses or under special agreements than in 
cases under declarations of acceptance.
836
 In an article analysing 129 cases between 1947-
2003, the authors came to the conclusion that the compliance rate with the Court’s judgement 
was 85.7% in cases submitted by special agreement, 60% in cases brought under 
compromissory treaty clause and only 40% in cases submitted under declarations of 
acceptance.
837
 Without entering into detail it should be mentioned that the situation is much 
more complicated than is reflected in that study because well founded conclusions regarding 
the compliance rate of the Court’s decisions should be made only after very careful analyses 
of all the details of each case as well as the events following the Court’s judgments even after 
years of the decision.
838
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 See Tom Ginsburg and Richard H. McAdams, ‘Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of 
International Dispute Resolution’ (2004) Wm.  & Mary L. Rev. 1229-1339 
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 One could only regret that in Tom Ginsburg’s and Richard McAdams’s very valuable article there are errors 
regarding the jurisdictional bases of several cases (see table at 1330-1339). Thus e.g. in the Certain Norwegian 
Loans case the Court’s jurisdiction was based not on a treaty provision but on the parties declarations of 
acceptance; the same holds for the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear which was also a dispute 
submitted to the Court’s decision under Art. 36. para. 2 of the Statute. On the other hand, the South–West Africa 
cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa and Liberia v. South Africa) were not cases under the optional clause but 
disputes referred to the Court on the basis of the Mandate’s compromissory clauses concluded at the time of the 
League of Nations. The situation regarding the Fischeries Jurisdiction cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland and 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland) is the same, these were disputes brought under compromissory clauses, 
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Since the adoption of the Permanent Court’s Statute in 1921, the optional clause 
system has been unchanged, with the exception of the provisions introduced in the Statute at 
the San Francisco Conference accommodating and transferring the declarations of acceptance 
in force to the new Court. In the different rounds of UN reforms the questions connected with 
the Court’s jurisdiction were not on the agenda, and the reform documents made suggestions 
in most cases regarding the composition of the Court, the election of judges and the access to 
the Court.
839
 Apart from this, already at the time of the Permanent Court, in different 
documents of the League of Nations, resolutions of United Nations organs, and international 
scientific associations, there appeared statements that states should adhere to the optional 
clause system or add less limitations to their declarations of acceptances,
840
 but the essence of 
the existing system of compuslory jurisdiction was not addressed.
841
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and the applications based the Court’s jurisdiction on Art. 36, para. 1 of the Statute and the 1961 Exchange of 
Notes between the parties. Another major error one could find regards the ten Legality Use of Force cases 
between the former Yugoslavia and the  NATO states, since only in six of these cases were the Court’s 
jurisdiction based not only on Art. IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide but on the parties declarations of acceptance as well. 
839
 Cf.
 ’Reforming the United Nations: What About the International Court of Justice? ABILA Committee on 
Intergovernmental Settlement of Disputes’ (2006), 5 Chinese Journal of International Law  39 42  
doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jml001 accessed 19. October 2013  
840
 Here one should refer to UN Res. No. 3232 (XXIX) on “Review of the Role of the International Court of 
Justice,” 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3232(XXIX)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION;  
and UN Doc. No. A/47/277 “Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit 
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992”, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F47%2F277&Submit=Search&Lang=E. accessed 23 
October 2013. See also Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, adopted by the 
UN General Assembly on 15 November 1982 (37/10) stating in II. Part para. 5  that  
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One could think that after more than 90 years of states’ practice and the jurisprudence 
of the two International Courts it is high time to reconsider the optional clause system, 
especially the system of reservations to declarations of acceptance; not only because the 
actual wide spread of reservations is a phenomenon that was not envisaged by the founding 
fathers, but because some of the reservations undermine the optional clause system. 
 
 
II A posible solution  
 
As has already been mentioned the Court has never contested the admissibility of 
reservations to declarations of acceptance, although the need has been felt in several 
instances to disallow certain reservations or to place a limitation on making them.  
In the literature of international law Leo Gross was one of the authors who dealt 
withthe question of how to resolve the problem of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance.
842
 According to that author the General Assembly could eventually adopt a 
                                                                                                                                                        
“States should bear in mind   
….. 
(b) That it is desirable that they: 
   (ii) Study the possibility of choosing, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, to recognize as compulsory 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 36 of its statute”  
841
  See ‘The International Court of Justice Efficiency of Procedures and Working Methods’. Report of the Study 
Group established by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law as a contribution to the UN 
Decade of International Law.  D. W. Bowett, J. Crawford, I. Sinclair, A. A. Watts.  (1996)  45 ICLQ Supplement. 
On different reform suggestions, see also Kolb (2013) 1205-06. 
842
 Leo Gross, ‘The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the 
International Legal Order’ (1971) 65 AJIL 253  
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resolution on the subject of reservations ratione temporis
843
; or, it may be desirable to 
consider, in connection with the revision of the Statute, whether the Court itself should not 
have been able to rule on the conformity of some declarations of acceptance within the 
optional clause system, either ex officio or at the request of any state being a party to the 
system of compulsory jurisdiction.
844
  
One could agree with the American author that taking into consideration the 
importance and central position of the General Assembly in the United Nations Organization 
any decision of that organ on reservations to declarations of acceptance would have great 
authority. However, the General Assembly is a political organ and the problem of reservations 
to declarations of acceptance and the compability of certain reservations with the optional 
clause system is a very complicated legal problem which necessitates a decision by experts of 
international law and not political organs; it not being a political decision or compromise. 
By the amendment of the Statute it might be possible to introduce some limitations 
regarding  making reservations. However, taking into consideration the reluctance of states to 
amend either the Charter, or the Statute, which according to Art. 69 could be amended by the 
same procedure as the Charter, one should admit that any amendment of the Statute doesn’t 
have much chance in the foreseeable future. 
Thus problems of reservations to declarations of acceptance should be resolved by the 
Court itself and within the framework of the exisiting legal rules. According to the present 
author the problems connected with  reservations to declarations of acceptance could be the 
subject of an advisory opinion given by the Court. 
                                                 
843
 Id. 314-15 
844
 Id. 316 
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The appropriateness of an advisory opinion on the question of reservations to 
declarations of acceptance might not be questioned. The international community of states has 
established a system which has been functioning for more than ninety years and although it 
has had some dark years at present it is flourishing to the satisfaction of the international 
community of states. Nevertheless, the system is faced with the problem of a growing number 
of reservations to declarations of acceptance which are making illusory the acceptance of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. One should also not forget that, although now the problems 
connected with some of the disputed reservations seem to be slipping, one can never know 
when a state could come forward again by formulating either its declaration of acceptance, or 
a concrete dispute with a reservation or limitation being destructive to optional clause system.   
In connection with an advisory opinion on reservations to declarations of acceptance the first 
question which emerges is who should request that opinion. It would be self–vident that the 
most appropriate institution would be the Secretariat of the United Nations or the Secretary 
General himself being the depository of declarations of acceptance. However, as it is well 
known, with that issue being raised on several occasions, that right was not accorded either to 
the Secretariat or the Secretary General,
845
 although the Secretariat, with the Secretary 
General as its head, is the only principal organ not empowered to make requests for advisory 
opinions.  
The other appropriate organ might be the General Assembly, since the General 
Assembly may request advisory opinions ex lege on the basis of Art. 96, para. 1 of the Charter 
on any legal question within the scope of its activities. The problems of reservations to 
declarations of acceptance include questions connected with the peaceful settlement of 
disputes covered by Art. 2. para. 3 of the Charter which formulates one of the main principles 
                                                 
845
 Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, ‘A comment on the current health of Advisory Opinions’ in Lowe-Fitzmaurice (1996) 
568-571; Kolb (2013) 1049-50 
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of the Organization, which, “is a cornerstone of the contemporary world order.”846 The 
jurisprudence of the Court shows us that in its advisory opinions the Court had to examine the 
implications of the requirement whether the matters of the requested opinion were “arising 
within the scope” of the requesting organs acitivities, thus whether the requesting organ had 
not acted ultra vires.
847
  In the case of the General Assembly that issue could not be raised 
since the General Assembly has the power to discuss and deal with any matters within the 
scope of the Charter. Thus the question of reservations to declarations of acceptance is in the 
purview of the General Assembly. 
The motion to the General Assembly for the request of an advisory opinion from the 
Court might come either from a delegation or any Committee of the General Assembly. There 
are no special rules regarding the preparation of a request or the majority required to pass a 
resolution on an advisory opinion from the Court.
848
 The only requirement that one can find in 
the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly is that if any Committee contemplates 
recommending the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion it may refer the matter to 
the Sixth Committee for advice and the drafting of the request.
 849
 The voting record on some 
of the relevant advisory opinions in the General Assembly show us that these resolutions were 
passed by a majority.
850
 One could hope that a recommendation regarding the request of an 
                                                 
846
 Cf. Chistian Tomuschat, ‘Article 2(3)’ in   Simma-- Mosler- Randelzhofer- Tomuschat-Wolfrum (1994) 99  
847
 Cf. Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of Specific International Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 
215 
848
 Cf. Hermann Mosler, ‘Article 96’ in Simma- Mosler- Randelzhofer- Tomuschat-Wolfrum (1994) 1011 
849
 Cf. Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly  (embodying amendments and additions adopted by the 
General Assembly up to September 2007)  A/520/Rev.17  ANNEX II  Methods and procedures of the General 
Assembly for dealing with legal and drafting  questions 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/520/rev.17&Lang=E accessed  20 October 2013 
850
 The voting records of the General Assembly on the resolutions requesting advisory opinions in some relevant 
cases were the following: Reservations to Multilateral Conventions  on 16 November 1950  (47 votes in favour,  
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advisory opinion on the reservations to declarations of acceptance might reach the necessary 
majority in the General Assembly. 
The subject matter of a request of an advisory opinion concerning reservations to 
declarations of acceptance would be a request on a legal question of a general nature which is 
unrelated to a concrete problem awaiting a practical solution. Thus it would have some 
similarities to the advisory opinion of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
which was the first advisory opinion of a general nature not having a specific dispute 
regarding the subject matter at question. Since according to Art. 65 of the Statute the Court 
has discretion whether to give an advisory opinion or not,
851
 in connection with the advisory 
opinion of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, some states and members of 
the Court tried to persuade the Court that in the exercise of its discretionary power it should 
decline to render the opinion requested by the General Assembly; nevertheless the Court met 
the request. According to the Court it might not be an obstacle for giving the requested 
opinion if the request does not relate to a special dispute.
852
  Repeating his statement made 45 
years before in the advisory opinion of the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania, the Court stated that “The purpose of the advisory function is not to 
settle at least directly disputes between States, but to offer legal advice to the organs and 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 against, 5 abstentions, 3 non–voting, total voting membership: 60); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons  adopted on 15 December 1996 (78 votes in favour, 43 against, 38 abstentions, 26 non–voting, total 
voting membership: 185); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory adopted on 8 December 2003 at the Tenth Emergency Special Session (90 votes in favour, 8 against, 
74 abstentions, total voting membership: 172). 
851
  Cf. Jochen Abr. Frowein – Karin Oelers-Frahm, ’Advisory Opinions’  in  Zimmermann - Tomuschat - 
Oellers-Frahm  (2006) 1411 
852
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. ICJ  Reports 1996, 236  
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institutions requesting the opinion.”853 It added that “The fact that the question put to the 
Court does not relate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the Court to decline to 
give the opinion requested.”854 One could expect that in the case of an advisory opinion 
regarding reservations to declarations of acceptance the Court would follow the same 
reasoning.  
In view of the importance and effect of a possible advisory opinion on the problems of 
reservations to declarations of acceptance, it might be said that it is even an advantage that the 
problems connected with reservations to declarations of acceptance actually do not emerge 
and, let’s hope it would not emerge in the near future, in a concrete dispute before the Court 
and thus the Court’s opinion would not influence derectly any concrete case on its agenda. 
Regarding the question to be put to the Court, there might be two variants. The first 
one involves formulating to the Court a very general question as it was in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the second possibility is to draft several more detailed 
questions as was done in the request of the advisory opinion of the Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
As a general question it is possible to formulate the following 
“are there any limitations to joining reservations to declarations of acceptance”. 
Or these questions might be put to the Court 
- “which reservations might be considered as unpermitted and being in contradiction 
with the object and purpose of the optional clause”; 
                                                 
853
 Cf. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First Phase), Advisory Opinion of 
30 March 1950., ICJ Reports 1950,  71 
854
   Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. ICJ  Reports 1996,  
236 
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- “what are the consequences of an invalid reservation, and would the invalidity affect 
the whole declaration of acceptance or only the reservation itself”;  
- “are there any limitations regarding the termination or amendment of declarations of 
acceptance;” 
- “are there any limitations in the number and scope of reservations to declarations of 
acceptance” 
The problem of the number and scope of limitations or reservations to declarations of 
acceptance is a rather complicated one. No question that thanks to the permissibility of 
reservations to declarations of acceptance the optional clause system is more flexible and 
offers the opportunity for more states to join, and it is also generally admitted that states are 
free in making their declarations of acceptance and to join limitations or reservations on their 
own will.  However, one could expect that, if there is a real wish to join to the optional clause 
system by a declaring state, than that state should act bona fides and should not add so many 
reservations to its declaration of acceptance which make only in name the acceptance of the 
Courts compulsory jurisdiction.  According to the present author there should be a reasonable 
limit to the reservations and limitations to declarations of acceptance, and that should be 
determined by the Court itself. 
It would be premature to predict how the Court will evaluate the rather disputed 
reservations, but one could suppose that it will declare unpermitted and invalid some of these 
reservations. In that case the Court may state that the invalidity effects the whole declaration 
of acceptance or only the reservation which might be severed from the declaration itself. In 
that case the question emerges as to what should happen with those declarations in force 
which contain such invalid reservations. Regarding the future of these declarations the 
solution might be found in the “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties” adopted by the 
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International Law Committee in 2011.
855
 Although, as was said before, the reservations to 
declarations of acceptance differ from the reservations to multilateral treaties, but the 
solutions in the Guide regarding invalid reservations might have relevance. Thus, following 
the Guide, it might be stated that a declaring state making an invalid reservation might have 
some time e.g. one year to either withdraw the reservation, thus maintaining its declaration of 
acceptance without the benefit of the invalid reservation, or leave the optional clause system. 
The Court’s advisory opinion on reservations to declarations of acceptance wouldn’t 
resolve all the problems connected with the optional clause system and would not terminate 
the provisional solution created by the clause nor introduce compulsory international 
adjudication; but it will increase the credibility of the whole system, create a clear situation 
and possibly encourage some states, which were reluctant especially due to some uncertainties 
connected with the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, to deposit their declarations of 
acceptance under Art. 36. para. 2 of the Statute. Thus, the Court’s advisory opinion would 
contribute to increasing the role of the optional clause system in the settlement of 
international disputes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
855
 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. Sixty-third session (26 April-3 June 
and 4 July-12 August 2011). That instrument put an end to a long dispute between the International Law 
Commission and the Human Rights Committee and recognized the competence of that Committee to assess the 
permissibility of reservations.  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/word_files/english/commentaries/1_8_2011. accessed 13 August 2013 
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ANNEX 
 
DECLARATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE MADE BETWEEN 1921 AND 2013 
 
 
State  Date of 
deposition  
Duration Reservations, limitations 
ALBANIA 17. 09. 1930 
(ratification 
17.09.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
07.11.1935 
 
5 years,   
from ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
17.09.1935 
- ratification 
-reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- excluding disputes relating to territorial status of 
Albania 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement  
ARGENTINA 28.12.1935
856
 10 years, 
from ratification 
-ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement  
- excluding questions already settled, or by 
international law belonging to local jurisdiction, or 
constitutional questions  
AUSTRALIA 20.09.1929 
(ratification 
18.08.1930.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modification 
07.09.1939 
 
02.09.1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
06.02.1954 
 
10 years, 
thereafter until 
denunciation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years,  
as from 
21.08.1940, 
thereafter until 
notice of 
termination   
 
until notice of  
termination 
 
 
-ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
 - reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement  
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 18.09.1930) 
 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- reservation concerning other methods of pacific 
settlement  
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
 
- reservation concerning events occurring at the 
time of hostilities 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
                                                 
856
 No ratification has been deposited. 
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 06.02.1954 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17.03.1975 
 
 
 
22.03.2002 
until notice of  
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
withdraw 
 
 
until notice of 
withdraw 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 19.08.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement  
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
-reservation concerning events occurring at the 
time of hostilities 
-reservation concerning natural resources of 
seabed, subsoil of continental shelf, including 
products of sedentary fisheries 
- reservation concerning jurisdiction or rights in 
respect of Australian waters, within the meaning of 
the Australian Pearl Fisheries Acts 
- reservation to require suspending  proceedings in 
respect of disputes under consideration by the UN 
Security Council 
- reciprocity 
 - reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement  
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement  
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- excluding disputes concerning delimitation of 
maritime zones, and on exploitation of any 
disputed area of or adjacent to any such maritime 
zone  
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
 
AUSTRIA  14.03.1922 
 
renewed  
12.01.1927 
 
 
renewed 
22.03.1937 
 
19.05.1971 
5 years 
 
10 years, from 
ratification 
(13.03.1927) 
 
5 years, as from 
13.03.1937 
 
5 years, thereafter 
until notice on 
termination  
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
BARBADOS 01.08.1980 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- disputes concerning conservation, management 
or exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or 
in respect of prevention or control of pollution or 
contamination of marine environment in marine 
areas adjacent to the coast of Barbados 
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BELGIUM 25.09.1925 
(ratification   
10.03.1926) 
 
 
 
10.06.1948 
(ratification  
22.06.1948) 
 
 
 
03.04.1958 
(ratification  
17.06.1958) 
15 years 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, thereafter 
until termination 
- ratification 
-reciprocity  
-excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
-reservation concerning other method  
of pacific settlement 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
-excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 13.07.1948) 
- other method of pacific settlement 
 
BOLIVIA 07.07.1936 
 
05.07.1948 
(ratification 
16.07.1948)
857
 
10 years 
 
5 years 
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
BOTSWANA 16.03.1970 no time limitation - reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
BRASIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01.11.1921 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
13.07.1926 
(ratification 
26.01.1937) 
 
 
renewed 
12.02.1948
858
 
 (ratification 
12.03.1948) 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
10 years 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
- reciprocity 
- on condition that compulsory jurisdiction is 
accepted at least two of the Powers permanently 
represented on the Council of  the LoN
859
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding questions which by international law 
fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
Brazilian Courts of law or which belong to the 
constitutional regime of each state 
 
- reciprocity 
BULGARIA 29.07.1921 
 
24.06.1992 
 
 
no time limitation 
 
5 years, thereafter 
until termination  
(6 months period of 
notifice) 
 
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation preventing surprise application 
- excluding retroactive effect 
-  reserving the right to amend at any time with 6 
months period of  notice 
                                                 
857
 After 5 years the declaration was expired. 
858
 After 5 years the declaration was expired. 
859
 That condition was met on 5 February 1930. 
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CAMBODIA 19.09.1957 10 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- reservation on other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
judicial settlement or compulsory arbitration by 
any treaty or international instrument 
CAMEROON 03.03.1994 5 years, thereafter 
until notification 
on termination 
- reciprocity 
    
CANADA 20.09.1929 
(ratification 
28.07.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modification
07.12.1939 
 
07.04.1970 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.09.1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.05.1994 
 
10 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes concerning conservation, 
management or exploitation of the living resources 
of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or 
control of pollution or contamination of the marine 
environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast 
of Canada 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- disputes concerning conservation and 
management measures with respect to vessels 
fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area, and the 
enforcement of such measures 
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- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
CHINA 
 
 
10.05.1922 
 
26.10.1946
860
 
5 years  
 
5 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination (6 
months period of 
notice)  
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
COLOMBIA 06.01.1932 
 
30.10.1937
861
 
no time limitation - reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 06.01.1932) 
 
COSTA RICA 28.01.1921
862
 
 
05.02.1973 
 
 
5 years, thereafter 
tacitly renewed for 
5 years, if not 
denounced before 
expiration of  any  
5 years period 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 07.08.1989 unlimited,  until 
termination (6 
months period of 
notice) 
- reciprocity 
CYPRUS 29.04.1988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
03.09.2002 
no time limitation - reciprocity 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction  
- reservation preventing surprise application 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding interpretation of treaties concluded 
before 16.08.1960, or binding on Cyprus by 
succession  
- reservation preventing surprise application 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
CZECHOSLO-
VAKIA 
19.09.1929
863
 10 years, from 
ratification 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
- reserving the right of either party to a dispute to 
submit it, before any recourse to the Court, to the 
Council of LoN  
DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF 
08.02.1989 until notice of 
revocation 
- reciprocity 
                                                 
860
 On 5 September 1972 the Government of the People’s Republic of China indicated that it didn’t to recognize 
the statement of 1946 concerning the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.  
861
 By a  note registered on 5 December 2001 Colombia terminated its declaration of acceptance. 
862
 Costa Rica withdrew from the League of Nations even before the ratification of the Protocol of Signature, 
thus her signature of the Protocol and the optional clause have lapsed.  
863
 No ratification has been deposited. 
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CONGO 
DENMARK 28.01.1921 
(ratification 
13.06.1921) 
 
renewed 
11.12.1925 
(ratification 
28.03.1926) 
 
renewed 
04.06.1936 
 
10.12.1946 
 
 
10.12.1956 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
13.06.1926 
 
 
 
10 years, as  from  
13.06.1936 
 
10 years, as from 
10.12.1946 
 
5 years, thereafter 
further periods of 5 
years if not 
denounced 6 month 
before any 5 years 
period 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
-ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
DJIBOUTI 
 
 
02.09.2005 5 years -reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement 
 - objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 - reservation concerning hostilities 
- multilateral-treaty reservation 
- excluding disputes with states not having 
diplomatic relation or not recognized 
- excluding disputes with non sovereign states 
- excluding disputes with the Republic of Djibouti 
- excluding disputes  concerning status of territory, 
boundaries, etc., different marine zones, status of 
islands, bays, gulfs, maritime boundaries 
- excluding disputes concerning airspace, 
superjacent  to its land and maritime territory 
- reserving the right to terminate or amend with 
imemdiate effect 
DOMINICA, 
COMMON-
WEALTH OF 
31.03.2006 no time limitation  
 
 
 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
30.09.1924 
(ratification 
04.11. 1933) 
no time limitation - reciprocity 
EGYPT 30.05.1939
864
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.07.1957 
5 years, as from 
ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactivity (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
- excluding disputes relating to the rights of  
sovereignty of Egypt 
-objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect  
                                                 
864
 No ratification has been deposited. 
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- declaration covering only disputes arising under 
para. 9 (b of) the 1957 Declaration of Egypt on 
"the Suez Canal and the arrangement of its 
operation” 
EL SALVADOR 
 
 
19.12.1930 
(ratification 
29.08.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26.11.1973 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27.11.1978
865
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
extended for 10 
years from 26.11. 
1978 
- excluding disputes concerning questions which 
cannot be submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the political constitution of Salvador 
- excluding disputes which arose before the 
signature, and pecuniary claims made against the 
nation 
- reciprocity only in regard to states which accept 
the arbitration in that form 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactivity (double formula) 
- reservation  concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning disputes on status of  El 
Salvador’s territory, frontiers, etc. 
- excluding disputes concerning territorial sea, 
continental slope, continental shelf, etc. islands, 
bays, gulf, etc., airspace superadjacent to lands and 
maritime territory, 
- reservation on hostilities, 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
- reserving the right to amend at any time 
 
ESTONIA 02.05.1923 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
25.06.1928 
 
renewed 
06.05.1938 
 
21.10.1991 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
02.05.1928 
 
10 years, as from 
02.05.1938 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding disputes entrusted to other tribunals 
ETHIOPIA 12.07.1926 
(ratification 
16.07.1926) 
 
 
renewed 
15.04.1932 
 
 
renewed 
19.09.1934 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
prolongation for 5 
years, as from 
16.07.1931 
 
extension 2 years, 
as  from 
18.09.1934, 
with retrospective 
effect covering 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
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  The declaration expired in 1988. 
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period 18.07.1933-
19.09.1934 
FINLAND 1921 
(ratification 
06.04.1922) 
 
renewed 
03.03.1927 
 
renewed 
09.04.1937 
 
21.06.1958 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
06.04.1927 
 
10 years, as from 
06.04.1937 
 
5 years, as from 
26.06.1958 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactivity (double formula) 
- tacitly renewable for the same duration, unless 
denounced not later than 6 month before the expiry 
of 5 years 
FRANCE 02.10.1924
866
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.09.1929 
(ratification 
25.04.1931) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
11.04.1936 
 
amended 
10.09.1939 
 
18.02.1947 
(ratification 
03.02.1947) 
 
 
 
 
10.07.1959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
25.04.1936 
 
 
 
 
5 years, from 
01.03.1947, 
thereafter until 
termination 
 
 
 
3 years, thereafter 
until termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- reservation excluding the Court’s proceedings 
during the attempt to settle the dispute by 
conciliation, as provided in Art. 15. para. 3 of the 
Covenant 
- reserving the right to terminate the declaration if 
the 1924 Protocol on arbitration, security and 
disarmament cease to be in effect 
 
- ratification 
-reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning disputes which cannot  be 
settled by conciliation or by the Council according 
to Art. 15. para. 6 of the Covenant 
- reservation concerning other method of arbitral 
settlement 
 
 
 
 
- reservation excluding disputes arising out of 
events occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning disputes arising out of 
any war, hostilities, or of a crisis affecting the 
national security   
- excluding disputes  with any State which, at the 
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 No ratification has been deposited. 
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16.05.1966
867
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until termination 
date of occurrence of the facts or situations giving 
rise to the dispute, has not accepted the Court 
compulsory jurisdiction for a period at least equal 
to that specified in the 1959 French declaration 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning another mode of pacific 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning disputes arising out of 
war, international hostilities, or of crisis affecting 
national security, and disputes concerning 
activities connected with national defence 
- excluding disputes with a state which, at the time 
of occurrence of the facts or situations giving rise 
to the dispute, had not accepted the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
GAMBIA 22.06.1966 until termination - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other settlement of 
disputes 
- Commonwealth reservation 
 - objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
GEORGIA 20.06.1995 no time limitation - reciprocity 
GERMANY 
 
 
 
 
 
23.09.1927 
(ratification 
29.02.1928) 
 
 
 
renewed 
09.02.1933 
(ratification 
05.07.1933) 
 
30.04.2008 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
01.03.1933 
 
 
 
until withdrawing 
with immediate 
effect 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- any disputes relating or connected with 
deployment of armed forces abroad, involvement 
in such deployments or decisions thereon 
- reservation concerning disputes connected with 
the use for military purposes of the territory of 
Germany, including its airspace and maritime 
areas subject to German sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
GREECE 
 
 
 
 
 
12.09.1929 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding disputes relating to the territorial status 
of Greece, including its rights of sovereignty over 
its ports and lines of communication 
-disputes relating to the application of treaties 
accepted by Greece and providing another 
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 The declaration was terminated on 2 January 1974. 
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renewed  
12.09.1934 
 
renewed  
08.09.1939 
(ratification 
20.02.1940) 
 
10.01.1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
5 years, as from 
12.09.1939 
 
 
 
5 year, thereafter 
until termination 
 
 
 
procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding disputes relating to defensive military 
action taken by the Hellenic Republic for reasons 
of national defence 
GUATEMALA 17.12.1926
868
 
 
 
27.01.1947
869
 
(ratification 
10.02.1847) 
no time limitation 
 
 
5 years 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
-reciprocity 
- excluding disputes with the United Kingdom 
regarding the territory of Belize 
GUINEA, 
REPUBLIC OF 
11.11.1998 no time limitation - reciprocity 
-excluding retroactive effect (critical date 12.12. 
1958) 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend or withdraw at any 
time 
GUINEA- 
BISSAU 
07.18.1989 unlimited (6 
months of notice of 
termination) 
- reciprocity 
HAITI 04.10.1921 no time limitation  
HONDURAS 
 
 
02.02.1848 
(ratification 
10.02.1949) 
 
renewed 
19.04.1954 
 
renewed 
10.03.1960 
 
 
06.06.1986 
 
 
6 years, as from 
10.02.1948 
 
 
6 years, as from 
24.05.1954 
 
for indefinite 
duration 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other means of the pacific 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning armed conflicts affecting 
the territory of Honduras 
- reservation concerning disputes referring to:   
(i) territorial questions with regard to sovereignty 
over islands, shoals and keys; internal waters, 
bays, the territorial sea and the legal status and 
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 No ratification has been deposited. 
869
 After 5 years the declaration was expired. 
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limits thereof 
(ii) sovereignty regarding  contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone and  continental shelf 
and the legal status and limits thereof 
(iii) airspace over the territories, waters and zones 
referred above 
- reserving the right to amend or withdraw by 
notice at any time  
 
HUNGARY 14.09.1928 
(ratification 
13.08.1929) 
 
renewed 
12.07.1939
870
 
 
 
22.10.1992 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
ratification 
 
 
for the period from 
13.08.1939 to 
10.04.1941 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend or withdraw at any 
time, 6 months period of notifice 
 
INDIA 19.09.1929 
(ratification 
15.02.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
amended 
27.09.193  
 
28.02.1940 
(ratification 
07.03.40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
07.01.1956 
(ratification 
09.01.1956) 
 
 
10 years, thereafter 
until termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
28.02.1940, 
thereafter until 
notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until termination 
 
 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other means of pacific 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to request suspending 
proceedings, in the case of disputes under 
consideration by the Council of LoN 
 
-reservation excluding disputes arising out of 
events occurring during hostilities under way 
 
 - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 05.02.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation on hostilities 
- reserving the right to suspend proceedings in case 
of disputes under consideration by the Council of 
LoN 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 26.01.1950) 
- reservation concerning other methods of peaceful 
settlement 
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 No ratification ha been deposited. 
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14.09.1959 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.09.1974 
 
 
 
 
  
until termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until termination 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning disputes regarding war 
events, military occupation, etc.  
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 26.01.1950) 
- reservation concerning other methods of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes concerning belligerent or 
military occupation or discharge of any functions 
pursuant to any recommendation or decision of  
any UN organ 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- excluding disputes with states not having 
diplomatic relations with India  
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other  method of 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation regarding disputes where the 
jurisdiction of the Court founded on the basis of a 
treaty concluded under the auspices of the LoN, 
unless India agrees to jurisdiction in each case 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- excluding disputes with states not having 
diplomatic relations with India or which has not 
been recognized by India 
- reservations concerning disputes relating to     (i) 
territorial status, boundaries, etc.(ii)  the status of 
its territory or the modification or delimitation of 
its frontiers or any other matter concerning 
boundaries; (iii)  territorial sea, continental shelf 
and margins, exclusive fishery zone, exclusive 
economic zone, and other zones of national 
maritime jurisdiction including for the regulation 
and control of marine pollution and the conduct of 
scientific research by foreign vessels; (iv) 
condition and status of islands, bays and gulfs and 
that of the bays and gulfs that for historical reasons 
belong to India; (v) the airspace superjacent to its 
land and maritime territory; and (vi) the 
determination and delimitation of its maritime 
boundaries 
IRAN 02.10.1930 
(ratification 
19.09.1932)
871
 
 
 
 
6 years, thereafter 
until notification of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- ratification 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning disputes relating to 
territorial status of Persia, including rights of 
sovereignty over island, ports 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
                                                 
871
 On 09 July 1951 Iran terminated its declaration of acceptance. 
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-objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to suspend proceedings in case 
of disputes submitted to the Council of LoN 
 
IRAQ 22.09.1938
872
 
 
 
 
5 years from 
ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- excluding disputes with Arab states 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes affecting territorial status of 
Iraq including rights of sovereignty over its waters 
and communications 
- reserving the right to require suspending  
proceedings in respect of disputes submitted to the 
Council or Assembly of LoN 
 
IRELAND 
/IRISH FREE 
STATE  
 
 
14.09.1929
873
 
 
15.12.2011 
20 years - ratification 
 
- excluding disputes with the United Kingdom in 
regard to Northern Ireland 
- reserving the right to amend or to withdraw the 
declaration at any time with immediate effect 
ISRAEL 
 
04.09.1950 
(ratification 
28.06.1951) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.10.1956 
(valid from 
25.10.1956) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
amended 
5 years from 
ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) in 
particular, which do not involve a legal title 
created or conferred by a Government or authority 
other than the Government of the State of Israel 
or an authority under the jurisdiction of that 
Government 
- reservation concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes between Israel and another 
state which refuses to establish or maintain normal 
relations with it 
 
- reciprocity 
excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 25.10.1951), provided that such 
dispute does not involve a legal title created or 
conferred by a Government or authority other than 
the Government of Israel or an authority under the 
jurisdiction of that Government 
- reservation concerning other means of settlement  
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes between Israel and another 
state which refuses to establish or  maintain 
normal relations with Israel 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between 15.05.1948 and 20.07.1949 
- excluding disputes connected with any war 
events, hostilities, etc. breach of armistice 
agreement or belligerent or military occupation in 
which Israel involved at any time 
 
- reservation preventing surprise applications  
                                                 
872
 No ratification has been deposited. 
873
 No ratification has been deposited. 
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28.02.1984
874
     
 
 
ITALY 19.09.1929 
(ratification 
07.09.1931) 
5 years  - ratification 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement, and  in any case where a solution 
through the diplomatic channel or further by the 
action of the Council LoN could not be reached 
 
JAPAN 09.07.2007 5 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula 
critical date 15.09.1958) 
- reservation concerning arbitration and judicial 
settlement 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
KENYA 19.04.1965  - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 12.12.1963) 
-reservation concerning other method of settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
-objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes concerning belligerent or 
military occupation or the discharge of any 
functions pursuant to any recommendation or 
decision of an UN organ 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
LATVIA 11.09.1923
875
 
 
10.19.1929 
(ratification 
26.02.1930) 
 
 
 
renewed 
31.01.1935 
 
 
 
5 years  
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, 
thereafter until 
notice of 
abrogation 
- ratification 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
 
-ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 26.02.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
LESOTHO 06.09.2000 until notice of 
termination 
- reservation concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
LIBERIA 1921
876
 
 
 
20.03.1952 
 
 
 
5 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning settlement of disputes by 
other tribunals 
LIECHTENSTEI
N 
29.03.1939 
 
5 years  
 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- other method of pacific settlement 
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 By a note of 21 November 1985 Israel terminated its declaration of acceptance. 
875
 No ratification has been deposited. 
876
 No ratfication has been deposited. 
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10.05.1950 
 
until revoked 
subject to one 
year’s of notice 
 
- reciprocity 
 
LITHUANIA 05.10.1921 
(ratification 
16.05.1922) 
 
renewed  
14.01.1930 
 
renewed 
12.03.1935 
 
21.09.2012 
5 years 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
14.01.1930 
 
5 years, as from 
14.01.1935 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity  
 
 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation concerning matters excluded from 
compulsory arbitration  
- excluding disputes connected with military 
operation carried out in accordance with a decision 
taken by international security and defence 
organisation or organisation implementing 
common security and defence policy 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
LUXEMBOURG 1921
877
 
 
15.09.1930 
 
 
 
 
5 years, thereafter 
tacitly renewed for 
5 years, if not 
denounced before 6 
months before the 
expiration   
-ratification 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
MADAGASCAR 02.07.1992 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other means of settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
-reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
MALAWI 12.12.1966 no time limitation - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reseervation concerning beligerent or military 
occupation 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
MALTA 06.12.1966 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes connected with military 
occupation or the discharge of any functions 
pursuant to any UN recommendation or decision  
- multilateral treaty reservation  
                                                 
877
 No ratification has been deposited. 
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- reservation concerning matters excluded from 
compulsory arbitration  
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judiciary proceedings have taken place with any 
state which, at the date of the commencement of 
the proceedings, had not accepted the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 amended 
02.01.1981 
(suppl. to the 
1966 
declaration) 
 - stating the followings “accepting as compulsory 
without the condition of reciprocity and without 
reservation the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice in respect of any disputes 
concerning the delimitation of areas of the 
continental shelf in the Mediterranean Sea” 
 02.09.1983 
(completing 
the 1966 
declaration) 
 - reservation excluding disputes concerning its 
territory, including the territorial sea, and the 
status thereof 
- reservation excluding disputes concerning 
continental shelf or any other zone of maritime 
jurisdiction, and resources thereof 
- reservation excludingdisputes concerning the 
determination or delimitation of any of the 
above  mentioned zones 
- reservation excluding disputes concerning 
prevention or control of pollution or contamination 
of the marine environment in marine areas 
adjacent to the coast of Malta 
MARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
23.04.2013 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation excluding disputes with states 
accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 
relation or for the purpose of the dipsute  
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
MAURITIUS 23.09.1958 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- other method of peaceful settlement  
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes connected with military 
occupation or the discharge of any functions 
pursuant to any UN recommendation or decision  
- reservation concerning matters excluded from 
compulsory arbitration 
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judiciary proceedings have taken place with any 
state which, at the date of the commencement of 
the proceedings, had not accepted the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
MEXICO 28.10.1947 5 years, thereafter 
until termination, 
taking  effect after 
6 months of  notice 
of  denunciation 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
MONACO 26.04.1937 5 years - excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
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(ratification 
22.04.1937 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
NAURU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NETHERLAND
S 
29.01.1988 
 
 
 
renewed 
09.09.1992
878
 
 
 
06.08.1921 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
02.09.1926 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
05.08.1936 
 
 
 
05.08.1946 
 
 
 
 
01.08.1956 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
29.01.1993 
 
 
5 years  
 
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
06.08.1926 
 
 
 
 
10 years,  from 
06.08.1936 
 
 
 
10 years, thereafter 
until notice of 
denunciation 
 
 
5 years, renewable 
tacitly for 5 years, 
unless notice of 
termination given 
not less than 6 
month before the 
expiry of 5 years 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
 
- reciprocity  
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement, agreed after the Statut’s entry into 
force  
 
-reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement, agreed after the Statut’s entry into 
force  
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement, agreed by the parties after entry into 
force of the Statute 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (critical dete 
05.08.1921) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
NEW 
ZEALAND 
19.09.1929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modification
07.09.1939 
 
08.04.1940 
 
 
 
 
10 years, thereafter 
until notice of  
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years,, thereafter 
until notice of 
termination  
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of  pacific 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- reciprocity 
-excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 29.03.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of pacific 
settlement 
                                                 
878
 After 5 years the declaration was expired. 
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22.09.1977 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, thereafter 
until expiration of 
6 months after 
notice of 
termination 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- reciprocity 
-reservation concerning other method of  peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reservation concerning disputes relating  to  
exploitation, conservation, etc. of the living 
resources in marine areas within 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines 
- reserving the right to amend at any time, in the 
light of the results of Third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in respect of the settlement of 
disputes 
NICARAGUA 24.09.1929 
 
amended 
24.10.2011 
 
unconditionally 
 
 
 
- excluding disputes regarding any matter or claim 
based on interpretations of treaties or arbitral 
awards that were signed and ratified or made, prior 
to 31.12.1901 
NIGERIA 14.09.1965 
 
amended 
30.04.1998 
no time limitation - reciprocity 
 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- excluding disputes with parties accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction less than 12 months prior to 
the filing an application, and excluding also 
disputes in respect of which any party has filed an 
application in substitution for the above mentioned 
application 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
- excluding disputes with states not having 
diplomatic relations 
- excluding disputes concerning, allocation, 
delimitation, demarcation of territory (whether 
land, maritime, lacustrine or superjacent air space) 
- excluding retroactive effect regarding disputes 
before independence (double formula) 
- reserving the right to amend at any time, with 
immediate effect 
NORWAY 06.09.1921 
(ratification 
03.10.1921) 
 
renewed 
22.09.1926 
 
renewed 
29.05.1936 
 
16.11.1946 
 
 
5 years  
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
03.10.1926 
 
10 years, as from 
03.10.1936 
 
10 years, as from 
03.10.1966 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
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17.12.1956 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
02.04.1976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.06.1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
03.10. 1956 
thereafter tacitly 
renewed for period 
of 5 years, unless 
notice of 
termination given 
not less than  6 
months before the 
expiration  
 
5 years, from 
03.10. 1956., 
thereafter tacitly 
renewed for 
periods of 5 years, 
unless notice of 
termination given 
not less than 6 
months before the 
expiration 
 
5 years, from 
03.10. 1956., 
thereafter tacitly 
renewed for 
periods of 5 years, 
unless notice of 
termination given 
not less than  6 
months before the 
expiration 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- reserving the right to amend at any time, in the 
light of the results of  Third   UN conference on 
the Law of the Sea in respect of the settlement of 
disputes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity  
- providing that the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and the 1995 Agreement relating to 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks shall apply to all the disputes concerning to 
the law of the sea 
PAKISTAN  22. 06.1948 
(ratification 
09.07.1948) 
 
 
 
23.05.1957 
 
 
 
13.09.1960 
5 years, thereafter 
until expiration. of 
6 months 
after notice of 
termination 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- reservation concerning other tribunals 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
 
 
 
- reservation concerning other tribunals 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
 
- excluding retroactive effect (ritical date 
24.06.1948) 
- reservation concerning other tribunals 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
PANAMA 25.10.1921 
(ratification 
14.06.1929) 
 - reciprocity 
PARAGUAY 11.05.1933
879
 
 
25.09.1996 
unconditionally  
 
- reciprocity 
                                                 
879
 By a note of 26 April 1938 Paraguay withdrew the declaration of acceptance. 
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 - excluding retroactive effect 
PERU 19.09.1929 
(ratification 
29.03.1932) 
 
 
 
 
07.07.2003 
10 years, from 
ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
withdrawing 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement by arbitration, or to submit the dispute 
previously to the Council of LoN 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning arbitration or other 
judicial settlement 
- reserving the right to amend or withdraw at any 
time with immediate effect 
PHILIPPINES 12.07.1947 
 
 
 
 
 
18.01.1972 
10 years, as from 
04.07.1946, 
thereafter 
until notification of 
abrogation 
 
 until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
 
 
- other method of peaceful settlement 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation excluding surprise application 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
- reservation concerning disputes arising out of or 
concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or 
exercised by the Philippines 
- reservation concerning disputes in respect of the 
natural resources, including living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species, of the sea-bed and 
subsoil of the continental shelf, or its analogue in 
anarchipelago 
POLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
24.01.1931 5 years  - ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes with states refusing  to 
establish normal diplomatic relations with Poland 
- excluding disputes connected with World War I 
or with Polono-Sovietic War 
- excluding disputes resulting from the Treaty of 
Peace of  18.03.1921 
- excluding disputes relating to internal law 
connected with the above mentioned war events 
PORTUGAL 28.01.1921 
(ratification 
08.10.1921) 
 
19.12.1955 
 
 
 
 
25.02.2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 year, thereafter 
until notice of 
denunciation 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
- stating that declaration applies to all disputes 
arising before or after 16.12.1920  
- reserving the right to exclude any dispute at any 
time, with immediate effect 
 
- other method of peaceful settlement 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 26.04.1974), unless it refers to 
territorial titles or rights or to sovereign rights or 
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jurisdiction  
- excluding any dispute with a party to a treaty 
regarding which the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been explicitly excluded  
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
ROMANIA 08.10.1930 
(ratification 
09.06.1931) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
renewed on 
04.06.1936 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as  from 
09.06.1936 
- ratification 
- reciprocity in respect of governments recognized 
by Romania 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- excluding matters for which special procedure 
has been provided 
- reserving the right to submit the dispute to the 
Council of LoN before having recourse to the 
Court 
- excluding questions which might cause the 
existing territorial integrity of Romania and of her 
sovereign rights, including rights over ports and 
communications, to be brought in question  
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
 
 
SENEGAL 02.12.1985  - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
-reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
SERBIA/ 
YUGOSLAVIA 
16.05.1930 
(ratification 
24.11.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
26.04.1999
880
 
 
5 years from 
ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- ratification 
- reciprocity in relation to any government 
recognized by Yugoslavia 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other procedure or 
method of pacific settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
SIAM see 
THAILAND 
   
SLOVAKIA 28.05.2004  - reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- excluding disputes with regard to the protection 
of environment 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
SOMALIA 11.04.1963 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
                                                 
880
  On 13 May 2008 Serbia stated that it did not recognize the declaration of 26 April 1999. 
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SOUTH 
AFRICA 
29.091929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modification
18.09.1939 
 
07.04.1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.09.1955
881
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
respect of any dispute under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- reciprocity 
-excluding retroactive effect  (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
- reservation to request suspending proceedings, in 
respect of any dispute under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect  (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
SPAIN 21.09.1928 
 
 
 
 
29.10.1990 
10 years  
 
 
 
 
until withdrawal, 
with 6 months of 
period of notice, 
however, in respect 
of states 
establishing  
a period of less 
than 6 months, the 
withdrawal of the 
Spanish declaration 
shall become 
effective after such 
shorter period  
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect  (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
 
SUDAN 02.01.1958 until notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 01.01.1956) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
                                                 
881
 In a communication 12 April 1967, the Government of South Africa gave notice of withdrawal and 
termination of the declaration of 12 September 1955. 
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SURINAME 31.08.1987 5 years, than  
shall continue in 
force after that 
period until 12 
months after giving 
notice of 
termination 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (critical date 
07.08.1987) 
- reservation concerning other method of 
settlement 
Swaziland 26.05.1969 until notification of 
withdraw 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other means of peaceful 
settlement 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
SWEDEN 16.08.1921 
 
renewed  
18.03.1926 
 
renewed 
18.05.1936 
 
05.04.1947 
 
 
06.04.1957 
 
5 years 
 
10 years, as from 
16.08.1926 
 
10 years, as from 
16.08.1936 
 
10 years 
 
 
5 years, than 
renewing by tacit 
agreement for the 
same duration, 
unless notice of 
abrogation, at least 
6 months before 
the expiration of 
any such period 
- reciprocity 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 06.04.1947) 
 
SWITZERLAND 28.01.1921 
(ratification 
25.07.1921) 
 
renewed 
01.03.1926 
(ratification 
24.07.1926) 
 
renewed  
23.09.1936 
 
28.07.1948 
5 years, from 
ratification 
 
 
10 years, from 
ratification 
 
 
 
10 years, from 
ratification 
 
until abrogation 
subject to one 
year’s notice 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
 
-ratification 
- reciprocity 
 
 
THAILAND / 
SIAM 
20.09.1929 
(ratification 
07.05.1930) 
 
 
renewed 
09.05.1940 
 
 
 
renewed 
20.05.1950 
10 years 
 
 
 
 
10 years, as from 
07.05.1940 
 
 
 
from 03.05.1950 
- ratification 
- reciprocity  
- reservation concerning other means of pacific 
settlement 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity  
- reservation concerning other means of pacific 
settlement 
 
- ratification 
- reciprocity  
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 - reservation concerning other means of pacific 
settlement 
TIMOR–LESTE 21.09.2012 until notice of 
termination 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
TOGO 25.10.1979 unlimited period 
subject to 
denunciation 
- reciprocity 
- reserving the right to amend 
TURKEY 12.03.1936
882
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 May 1947 
 
 
 
 
renewed 
08.06.1954 
 
renewed 
07.08.1958 
 
renewed 
19.03.1964 
 
renewed 
31.08.1967
883
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
 
 
5 years, as from 
22.05.1952   
 
5 years, as  from 
23.05.11957 
 
5 years, as from 
23.05.1962 
 
 
5 years, as from 
23.05.1967 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect 
- excluding disputes relating to the application of 
treaties or conventions providing for some other 
method of peaceful settlement 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning a different 
method of settling disputes 
 
UGANDA 03.10.1963  - reciprocity 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
19.09.1929 
(ratification 
05.02.1930) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modification
11.09.1939 
 
28.02.1940 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.02.1946 
limited 
10 years  until 
notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years,  thereafter 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
 
- ratification 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula) 
- reservation concerning other  method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation to require suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring during hostilities under way 
 
- reciprocity 
- reservation concerning other  method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- reservation concerning hostilities 
- reservation to require suspending proceedings, in 
the case of disputes under consideration by the 
Council of LoN 
 
- reciprocity 
- accepting the jurisdicition of the Court “in all 
                                                 
882
 No ratification has been deposited. 
883
 After 5 years the declaration was expired. 
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acceptance 
 
 
 
 
 
02.06.1955 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.10.1955 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18.04.1957 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
legal disputes concerning the interpretation, 
application, or validity of any treaty relating to the 
boundaries of British Honduras, and over any 
questions arising out of any conclusion which the 
Court may reach with regard to such treaty.”  
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 05.02.1930) 
- other method of peaceful settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between the 03.09.1939, and 02.09.1945 
- reservation concerning hostilities, military 
occupation, etc. 
- disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration  
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 05.02.1930) 
- other method of peaceful settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between 03.09.1939, and 02.09.1945 
- reservation concerning hostilities, military 
occupation, etc. 
- reservation concerning disputes relating to any 
matter excluded from compulsory adjudication or 
arbitration  
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judicial proceedings are taking, or have taken 
place, with any state which, at the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings, had not 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction  
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 05.02.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between 03.09.1939 and 02.09.1945 
- excluding disputes relating to hostilities, military 
occupation, etc. or relating to any question which, 
in the opinion of the Government of the United 
Kingdom, affects the national security of the 
United Kingdom or of any of its dependent 
territories 
- disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration  
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judicial proceedings are taking, or have taken 
place, with any state which, at the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings, had not 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction  
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26.11.1958 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27.11.1963 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01.01.1969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until notice of 
termination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
until termination 
 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity 
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
ritical date 05.02.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between 03.09.1939 and 02.09.1945 
- excluding disputes relating to hostilities, military 
occupation, etc. 
- disputes concerning questions connected with 
events occurring before the date of the Declaration 
which, had been the subject of proceedings 
brought before the Court previous to that date, 
would have been excluded from the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction under the second part of 
the reservation numbered (v) in the 1957 UK 
declaration  
- disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration  
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judicial proceedings are taking, or have taken 
place, with any state which, at the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings, had not 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction  
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity  
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 05.02.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- objective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- excluding disputes arising out of events 
occurring between 03.09.1939 and 02.09.1945 
excluding disputes relating to hostilities, military 
occupation, etc. 
- disputes relating to any matter excluded from 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration  
- excluding disputes in respect of which arbitral or 
judicial proceedings are taking, or have taken 
place, with any state which, at the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings, had not 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction  
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity  
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 24.10.1930) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
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amending  
05.07.2004 
 
 
 
settlement 
- excluding disputes already submitted to 
arbitration by agreement with any state which had 
not at the time of submission accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court  
- Commonwealth reservation 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
 
- reciprocity  
- excluding retroactive effect (double formula, 
critical date 01.01.1974) 
- reservation concerning other method of peaceful 
settlement 
- Commonwealth reservation 
- reservation preventing surprise applications 
- reserving the right to amend at any time with 
immediate effect 
UNITED 
STATES OF 
AMERICA 
26.08.1946
884
 5 years, thereafter  
until the expiration 
of 6 months after 
notice of 
termination 
- reservation concerning other tribunal 
- subjective reservation of domestic jurisdiction 
- multilateral treaty reservation 
URUGUAY prior to 
28.01.1921 
 - reciprocity 
YUGOSLAVIA 
See SERBIA 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
884
 In a notification received by the Secretary-General on 7 October 1985, the Government of the United States 
of America gave notice of the termination of its declaration of 26 August 1946. 
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